Prima Secundae
Lecture 6: Editorial vs. Logical Division and Man's Last End

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You know, in the Henry IV plays, you know, where the king, I mean, Falstaff, right, is not leading the life of reason, right? And, you know, Shakespeare introduces him to us, you know, as a character, right? What time of day is it? And then Prince Hel, you know, speaks of House of Perifids. Why was he asking this? What difference does it make to him what time of day it is, right? Unless, you know, the son was a woman in Taffeta and all sorts of stuff, and so on. Well, if you go to what Aristotle says, well, the Shakespeare's definition of reason, right? It's looking before and after, right? And the first sense of before and after is in time, right? What difference does it make? The man is doing this irregular life, what time of day it is, right? I mean, if I feel like having a drink, you know? My brother Mark used to say, you know, you should never drink before noontime. No, that was kind of a secret rule, you know, you don't sit down and have, you know, a bottle of wine for your breakfast or something like that, right? But the man just follows, you know, the urge to have a drink, you know, any time of day, morning, noon or night. What difference is about what time it is, right, huh? You know? But it's kind of incredible that Shakespeare should have introduced him that way, right? Asking a question that is obviously relevant to his life. He doesn't observe any order, right, you know? It's a time for this, it's a time for that, as Scripture says, right, huh? And so, if you're really concerned with the time of day, it's because now it's time to sleep, or now it's time to eat, or now it's time to pray, or now it's time to go to church, or whatever, you know? And that's kind of the start of that. You know, when Aristotle talks about that in the third book on the soul, he says man is the animal who has a sense of time, right? And in a sense, if a man just thinks of what he wants to do here and now, he doesn't look at the larger picture, right, huh? In time, he's never really making a human decision there, right? The doctor says, like, any drink, you know, he doesn't even think about the fact that an hour from now he's going to be operating in somebody, see? He's not using his reason, right, huh? So, that's kind of where you begin to see the use of reason, huh? In time, right, huh? Your mother probably said to you, you know, well, you need that now, I'm going to spoil your dinner, you know? That's looking at the wider picture, right? You started to use your reason a bit, huh? My mother would say, you know, eat your fruit before your candy, because if you eat the candy first, the fruit will taste bitter, right? Well, you started to use your reason a little bit here, right? That's important. It's actually marvelous that Shakespeare wouldn't do something like that, right? In that way. It's just, you know, it's nature there, an actual gift or something, but he seems to know how to say things. I was saying to one of my son-in-law's sisters there, he's doing a doctor in English there, he's doing a Catholic U. I said, what is Shakespeare's two best uses of gold and dust, right? He says, well, one where he says, golden lads and girls, all must as chimney sweepers come to dust. Well, you know what I said, I'll say it better than that, right? And then the other one where, and give to dust that is a little guilt, more loud than guilt or dusting. That's a famous, you know, thing on fashion, right, huh? And give to dust that is a little guilt. And that dust, you got a little, you know, gold paint on the outside, you know, spray paint, like that. And give to dust that is a little guilt, more loud, more praise, right, than guilt or dust it on. A little solid gold that dust is accumulated on, right? You got this dust that will go, oh! You know? And give to dust that is a little guilt. You got the New York Times or something like that, you know, and they're writing about this latest book or this latest, you know, thing. And it's dust, the book, you know. But it's got a little glitter gold and it's new and, you know, and so on. And then, say, Augustine, you know, there's solid gold there and dust at the top of the dust. Dusting what's that thing, you know? But it's marvelous the way he says it, right? And give to dust that is a little guilt or loud than guilt or dust it. He didn't say it better than that. Golden lads and girls, oh, must as chimney sweepers come to dust. I suppose you saw chimney sweepers, you know, come out, oh, come to dust, you know. So he said, you know, golden lads and girls, that would be great, too. It would fall apart, they would be good dust, you know. But that's kind of the frugal song there and symbolizing, you know, beautiful. What was the other one? The other one was the professor of Cressida. They had the famous thing on the greatest denunciation, you might say, the greatest understanding ever written on the danger of fashion, right? It's curious how certain authors are, I think, they've become fashionable, right? And they're, you know, you know, Sammy Johnson and his circle, they had the 100-year rule that the poet is still being read 100 years after he's dead, and that's prima facie evidence that there might be something to the poet, right? But, I mean, if the guy's, you know, being read today and somebody else is being read tomorrow and somebody else the next day, you don't know what he is. They are kind of the best of it. Yeah, yeah. That's kind of the danger, right, huh? I said, you know, can't really say it anymore, not these new machines, but what's the most read thing in the country today, right? Well, in those days it was the newspaper, right? The very name indicates it's about the new, right? Why is everybody reading the newspaper, you know? Well, probably because it's new, right? You know? They don't look like the Bible today. Oh, that's old stuff, you know? It's an old thing, you know? So the Bible might be, what, guilt, gold, right? And the wisdom is gold, right? But that's just accumulated in the Bible, right? So they want this dusty thing, right? You know, it's great there. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, or in illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more quickly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Praise to you, Lord. And help us to understand knowledge you have retained. Father, Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. Now, at the beginning here, there's a, what? Prologus, huh? Bola, huh? Just like there is for, yeah, a prologue, right? Okay. Now, is this a prologue to the Prima Secundae? Yeah, it's a prologue to the whole second part, right? Okay. Now, you might recall the distinction that I gave a long time ago about the two kinds of division of a book. Recall this for a year. One I would call the editorial and reference division, and the other I would call the logical and understanding. So, take my favorite example, right? It's customary, since it was made in the Middle Ages, to divide the Gospel of, what? Matthew into, what? 28 chapters, right? Now, this is an editorial division, huh? And it's a reference division. And then each chapter is divided into verses. And this is handy to refer, if I want to say, well, it's in chapter 10, the third verse, and then you and I can look it up together and begin with what I'm talking about, right? Okay. Okay. But what's the logical and understandable division of the Gospel of Matthew, huh? Well, in Thomas' commentary, it says Matthew emphasizes the humanity of Christ, huh? And that's why Matthew is usually represented as the man, right? And as man says, Christ came into the world, he went through the world preaching, right? And then he left the world, right? His passion and death and so on. So, the Gospel is divided into three parts, right? Okay. So, that's the logical and understandable division, right? You can't understand the division. 28, that's not understandable, right? But it's useful to refer to any particular passage that you want to, right? Okay. So, that's a very important, what? Distinction, right? And as I say, you know, with the rule of two or three, in the logical and understandable division, usually it's into two or three, right? Why, you know, the editorial reference division could be into any, right? Matthew happens to be 28, no particular reason for 28, right? Okay. But there's nothing to be understood there. No one might possibly understand the division is 28 parts, right? It's not the question, right? So, for example, Aristotle's Metaphysics, right? The editorial and reference division is into 14 books, right? And those 14 books can be divided into chapters and even down to numbers for the actual lines, right? Or intellections, like Thomas has, right? But is the logical and understandable division of the 14 books of wisdom into 14? No. And when Thomas divides it, he divides it into two. The premium, right? Which occupies the beginning of book one. And that's divided against all the rest of it. The rest of book one and all the way to 14, right? And he keeps on dividing and subdividing, right? So you have to realize that you can't base your understanding upon the, what, editorial and reference division, although it's good to know that, so you can refer someone to a text if you want to. You can find that, you know. And if you can remember, you know, it depends on what your memory is, right? But that's not going to be the basis of your understanding of the text, huh? So this prologue here is divided against the whole of the, what, second part, right? So he begins with St. John Damascene, right? A quote from Damascene. Because, as Damascene says, in the Orthodox faith, man is said to be made to the image of God. As it said in Genesis, isn't it? To the image and likeness of God. According as by image is signified, right? Something that is intellectual, right? And a free judgment, right? And, what? Yeah, moving itself, huh? Powerful, huh? Quotestativum, right? To himself, huh? So he says, then, after one has spoken about the exemplar, to wit, about God, in the first parts, and those things which, what? Go forth from the divine power according to his will, right? It remains that we consider about his, what? Image. That is about man. According as he himself is the beginning of his own, what? Deeds, huh? As having free judgment and the power over his, what? Works, huh? And notice, that's quite different from what Aristotle is doing in Nicomachean Ethics, right? In Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle is considering man, not as, what? Made to the image of the likeness of God. Although you see something of that, right? But that's why, when he takes up the virtues, Thomas would take up the virtues in a different order than Aristotle does, huh? So, Thomas takes up the intellectual virtues, like in secunde secunde, and then the virtues, what? Of justice, and then the will, and then, what? Fortitude, and last of all, temperance, right? Well, Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics takes up fortitude and temperance first, then he goes to justice, and last of all, to the virtues of, what? Reason, huh? Well, why do you take up, just take, not take everything in there, but just take, why does Aristotle take up courage and temperance before justice and wisdom, let's say, right? Or foresight. Why does he do that, right? Well, Thomas says it's because, for two reasons, huh? They're more known to us, and because by them we're disposed for the higher things, huh? But why does Thomas take up the virtues of reason and those that are in the will, like justice and so on? Why does he take those up before the ones considered the emotions? As the image of God, yeah. Because God doesn't have any emotions. He's emotionless, right? But he does have the virtues of, what? The will, like justice, right? And the virtues of reason, like art and foresight and wisdom and so on, right? So the order is, what? Almost the reverse, right? So it's clear what Thomas is saying here. He's going to treat this up. And this is because in ethic, I mean in theology, as the name indicates, it's about God and other things only in so far as they're related to God in some way. And so man is being made to the image and likeness of God as taken up in theology, more than the dog or the cat, huh? Although they might have a footprint of God in them too, right? But man is more, you know, worthy of being considered because he's made, what? The dog master over there. I can vouch for it. This is the paper today about reading children, reading stories to a dog, the dog trained to listen to the story. And some kind of training, I don't know, I didn't read the article. My wife's looking at my paper and she's like, you know, showing me this, referring to this article. So I don't know, maybe there's something to be said for that, huh? Now, how is the second part of Summa divided? Well, the art person would probably say it's divided into two parts. The prima secunde, right? And the secunde secunde, right? Now that... That would be the way it's divided by the editorial and what? Reference division, right? So if I wanted to refer you to any passage in the second part, I'd tell you whether it's in the, what, I'd say, Prima Secundi or Secundi Secundi, I'd tell you that first, right? And then the question, and then the article, and maybe odd three, you'd reply to the third objection. But I would follow Prima Secundi, Secundi Secundi, right? And I'm like in my summa, this is the Prima Secundi, and I have another one, the sticker, the Secundi Secundi, right? So that's the editorial division, right? That's the way they print it, right? But is that the logical and understandable division, right? Well, you wouldn't know at first, you know, but if you look a little bit into what Thomas does, if you look at the beginning of the question one, where he has a premium, right? Okay, where first one ought to consider about the, what, last end of human life, right? And then about those things through which man is able to arrive at this end, or to deviate from it, right? And basically he's dividing there the whole second part, right? The Prima Secundi and the Secundi Secundi by, into two here, right? And he gives a reason why he's divided into those two parts, right? And why one of them comes before the other, right? Why the consideration of the last end of human life, the last end of man, right? Is before those things at which he arrives at the end, or he, what, deviates in the end. For he says, for from the end, it's necessary to take the reasons of those things which are, what, ordered to the end, huh? That's fair to see, right? But that's altogether basic, huh? Now, if you look a little bit later on here, at the premium to the, what, the sixth question, right? Well, questions one through, what, five, are concerned with the last end of man, huh? And then question six of the Prima Secundi begins the second part, which is about those things by which man is, what, able to arrive at this end, or he deviates in this end, right? Okay. So, just look at the beginning of the premium, the beginning of question six. Because, therefore, for beatitude, which is the name of the end of man, to some acts is necessary to arrive, right? Because, therefore, is necessary, right? To arrive at beatitude through some acts, right? Is necessary, consequently, to our consideration of what the end of man is, to consider about human acts, right? That's the second part, right? That we might know by what acts one arrives at beatitude, or is impeded the road to beatitude, huh? And now he's going to divide the rest of, what, Prima Secundi, starting with question six, and the whole Secundi Secundi, right? Into two. And because operations and acts are about, what? Singulars, right? Therefore, every science, doing science, every operative science, is perfected in its consideration of the particular, right? So, let's tell us this in the politics, it would be better if Socrates had told us, what is the virtue of a man, and what is the virtue of a woman, than to just tell us what virtue is in general, right? That's kind of interesting, right? So, since action is in the singular, right? The closer you come to the singular, the more perfect is your, what, practical knowledge, right? And that's also the reason why, as your style says, this science is not so certain, right? Because as you descend to the singular, you get more and more particular, there's more and more things to take into, what, account, right? And becomes less and less certain, right? Or more and more uncertain, right? I remember that time I was driving the car with my teacher there at research there when I was in college, and I said, I wish I knew what was going on in Washington, I said something about what was going on, you know? And he said, oh, that's a laugh, he said, if they don't know themselves. So, because of this, moral consideration, which is of what? Of human acts. First ought to be treated in universale, in general, right? Secondly, in what? In particular, right? Okay. And that's kind of the, what, distinction between the rest of the prima secunde and the second part, right? Okay. So, you want to say, what is the logical and understandable division of the second part? It's not the prima secunde and the secundi secunde. That's the editorial division, right? It's useful for referring to particular passages. But it's into the consideration of what is the end or purpose of man, the last end or purpose of man, which is in the editorial division, the first five questions of the prima secunde, and then that whereby you arrive at that end or deviate from it, the virtues and vices and so on, in general in particular, which is the rest of what? The prima secunde and the second part of the second part, right? Now, in a way, Aristotle does that in the Nicomachean Ethics because he considers in the first book the end of man, right? Before he takes up the, what, virtues and vices, huh? And it's at the end of the first book that he kind of touches upon the division of the human virtue, right? Into the moral virtues and the virtues of reason itself, right? But he has the same order that Thomas says here that you have to consider the end before you consider that which is what? The sake of the end, huh? Okay. And that makes sense, huh? Now, if you know a little bit of the history of Greek philosophy, the two great minds are Plato and Aristotle. You could stick in Socrates there, but we don't know where Socrates leads off and Plato begins sometimes, right? But kind of a common thing said about Socrates was that he kind of turned philosophy from looking philosophy, which dominated up to that point, to emphasis upon practical philosophy. Now, if you look at Plato's dialogues, perhaps the most common topic is some virtue other, right? So you could go through the things and find this is not the only thing considered, but what's usually being considered. So in, say, the Lachas, huh, Socrates talks to an old general. They talk about what is courage, right? And in the Theotetus, he talks to a young geometer, right? What science is, right? Figuorous knowledge, huh? And he talks about piety with the euthyphro, right? And so on. But you're kind of thrown into a discussion about some virtue without any consideration of what the end of man is, right? Although Socrates, you know, would touch upon that too, you know, in some places, right? But you don't see the order there, right? But Aristotle puts it together and says, yeah, we should talk about the end of man and about the virtues and the vices, right? Or by your help towards that end or impeded from that end. Virtue is the road to happiness and vice is the road to misery, right? And you can see all that day in the newspaper all the time, right? You are in misery because of following the road. Vice, right? It's the road to misery. Virtue is, huh? So Aristotle says, but you've got to consider what? The end of man before you consider what? The virtues, right? And the reason is given by Thomas here, but he's following that order, right? Now, another thing that's kind of interesting here, if you look at these words of Thomas, and then about those things, going back to Premier here at the beginning of question one now, where first we ought to consider about the last end of human life, and then about those things through which man is able to arrive at this end, or to deviate from it, huh? Those three things that he mentions there, the second and the third are kind of put together, but they correspond to the three parts of the what? Our Father, right? Because when you say, hallowed be thy name, thy kingdom come, the first two of the seven petitions is about the end itself, right? You're asking for God to bring you to the what? The end, right? But then we say that will be done, and give us this day our daily bread. We're talking about those things through which one is able to arrive at this end, huh? And then in the last part, free us our trespasses, and need us not into temptation, but to the rest of you, those things by which we deviate from that end, huh? I know one of the, one of the, one of the, one of the, uh, the, uh, masses there, they'll say, you know, in the, in the, uh, I mean, part there about being united with the saints and so on, and those who've done his will throughout the ages, right? I'm always struck by that, you know, huh? I don't know if you have that in your particular liturgy, but, but it's, it kind of strikes me, you know, huh? Uh, it's kind of, uh, the saints are those who've done the will of God, huh? That's all they've got to be saints, huh? Okay? But that's, that will be done, right? That's the fifth thing, right? So those three things correspond, huh? It's kind of interesting, huh? Because with the virtue of hope, which is tied up with prayer, right? Hope primarily is aiming at the end, right? And then at the means for a way you can arrive at that end. So it's kind of interesting that the petitions of the Our Father can be divided into those three things that Thomas, what, mentions here. Okay, so now we've seen the division into two of the whole second part, right? The logical division, right? Consideration of what the last end of man is in these first five questions, and then consideration of that whereby we are able to arrive at that end, or that we deviate from that end, and that's the rest of the prima pars, and the whole secunde secunde, right? Okay? Now, how do you divide that first part? Well, again, into what? Two, huh? And because the last end of human life is laid down to be beatitude, that's the word used in theology, right? And beatitude comes in the word for blessed, right? So kind of the, that from which the name is taken refers to what? The divine help, right? We're blessed by God, right? I mentioned how the word happiness comes in the word hap, right? If you want to get kind of a sense of the connection between the word happiness and hap, go to Shakespeare's The Two Gentlemen of Rona, right? We're in the first scene of the first act there to give you the editorial division of the work. Valentine's going off to the court, right? To get his finishing up as a man, right? And Proteus is saying goodbye to him, but he says, you know, when you meet good hap, we should be, you know, partaker of your happiness, huh? There's a reference to this again at the end of the play, right? So it's the idea that hap or luck, right, huh? Is what leads to happiness, right? And we sometimes say, you know, about someone, he's been lucky in life, or he's been, what? Use the Latin word, he's been fortunate, right? Or someone else has been unfortunate because this and that has happened, right, huh? As if it's sort of out of your, what? Control, yeah? See? Now it's interesting when Aristotle talks about luck or fortune, luck is the English word, fortune Latin word, duke there in Greek, on the second book of the physics, right, huh? This is the consideration of the obscure causes, luck or fortune. And when he takes it up, he gives three opinions about luck or fortune. And one opinion is that it's what? Doesn't exist. There's no such thing. Just a name for ignorance, right, huh? Okay. And another opinion is, no, no, it's the cause of the universe, right? I mean, you know, you know, the, the, just like the modern biologists, you know, think that it happened that you and I, you know, were here. Nature could have gone a different way, you know, sort of stuff. But then he gives a third opinion, which is that it's something divine about it. And this, of course, comes up a lot in works of, what, fiction, right? Where something seems to be by luck or by chance. And yet, there's some reason behind this, right? I think Aristotle gives it in the poetics there the example of the man who was murdered and they couldn't find the murderer. But the man was famous and they put up a statue in the plaza and so on. And there's a big festival in the plaza and the crowd, you know, was there and the statue got knocked over and fell upon a man and killed him. And who was that man? Yeah, yeah. Or I can Julius Caesar, you know, where Caesar is assassinated and that's the statue of what? Pompeii, right? Is it Pompeii is getting his revenge now, right? Okay. So there seems, or like at the end of Roman Juliet, you know, where at the end there, you know, the head of the city there, you know, is taking the two fathers, you know, and say God has found a way to punish you for your hatred and your fighting and so on by the death of your only children, right? You know? So it can, you see or suspect that there's something divine behind it, right? Okay. But the word hap doesn't, you know, signify really the divine, but it signifies luck or fortune, right? And some people think that would be responsible for it, right? I noticed myself when I first started to read these things, in, say, Aristotle's work, you had the word happiness, huh? And then I saw in Latin, they would use the word, what? Felicitas, right? And Felicitas has got a different etymology than, what? Happiness, huh? You could have in Latin something like happiness, as bona fortuna, and that would be, you know, the same thing, more or less, as happiness, right? In terms of its etymology. But Felicitas comes from the word for fruitful, right? And that's interesting, huh? Yeah, Felix means fruitful. So it's like saying that Felicitas is the fruit of your, what? Libras, yeah, yeah. And that's closer to what Aristotle's getting at, in a way, right? In the word happiness, huh? But then you have, in the Greek, in Aristotle, there in Poetics, I mean, in Poetics, in Nicomachean Ethics, you have the word, what? Eudaimonia, right? Which means that you're well-demoned, right? The demon doesn't have the negative sense that it has now, huh? And there, it's closer to Beatitude, right? Because there, you're talking about it as having, what? A divine influence there, right? But in a way, you could say, you know, as a starting point for dialectic, you'd say, well, one opinion is that our happiness is a result of good luck or chance. Another is that it's the fruit of what we do, right? And I suppose I'm misery, right? And the one opinion would be due to bad luck. I went into the, crossed the street at the wrong time, and I got hit, and who knows, you know, crippled for the rest of my life, and that was bad luck, right? Or I invested in this company, and went broke, and you invested in that company, and it went up, and so you're happy and I'm miserable, you know? It's outside of our control. But in the second opinion, you could say, hey, no, you're miserable because of the choices you made in life, right? You see? You didn't have to choose this and this and this and this, right? You chose to get drunk. You chose, you choose this, you chose that. But then the word, as I say, damonia, right? Perhaps the word beatitude of it has a sense of being blessed by some superior thing, right? And Aristotle talks about that in the first book of Nicomachean Ethics, right? If anything comes to us from God, what more so than is what happiness is in, right? But in Nicomachean Ethics, the emphasis is upon you following the road to happiness, which is virtue, and avoiding the road to misery, which is vice, right? Aristotle is emphasizing what you can do or avoid to become happy, right? Because what is by luck, you have no control over, really, right? And Aristotle is not denying the role that luck might have in making us happy or miserable, right? But he can't really, what, teach you how to have good luck. And again, if our happiness does depend upon some higher being, some daemon or some god, we can't really control what that daemon or god does, right? Okay. And of course, in the Greek great plays and so on, I mean, you'd be on the right side of the gods for some reason or other, you know? And then they have kind of unaccountable antagonism to some people, you know, and so they lead them to misery or happiness, right? So Odysseus has, you know, Athena guiding him and so on. Someone else, you know, is acting on the wrong side of the gods and they're angry with him and they're going to destroy him now, you know, or he's gotten too elevated or something like that. So, the attitude has a little bit of that sense of eudaimonia, right, huh? But it's used especially for the happiness of a rational creature, the emphasis upon a rational creature. So it's a little more precise than just saying it's the end. So he divides into two parts. He's going to consider about the last end in general and then about the attitude. And that will be starting in the second, what, question. Okay. We'll see how he subdivides that, right? Okay. I think I mentioned before how in the poetics, though, when Aristotle is talking about tragedy and comedy and how you represent men going from happiness to misery or from misery to happiness, right? Then for happiness, he doesn't use the word eudaimonia that he has in the ethics. He uses the word eutuchia, good fortune, right? Because that's kind of the way you would see it presented in the plays, right? So it's interesting, the word with a different etymology, right, is used there, right? But at the same time, it shows that the greatest fiction, right, is really about happiness and misery, right? So it's something very, what, appropriate to ethics, right? Because that's the fundamental thing to talk about in ethics. My student there in Rome asked me questions sometimes at a time, but just the last email he sent me, he sent me a little thing, Aristotle and Shakespeare. I don't know where he picked it up, you know, but somebody, you know, going through Shakespeare and finding things that Shakespeare says about human beings and how they act and how it fits what Aristotle said about them, right? So he had little passages, one or two passages in Greek there from Aristotle and then these passages of Shakespeare, so. So about the last end now in general, which is question one, right? And about this, eight things are asked, Aristotle says. And the first is whether it belongs to man to act for the sake of some, what, end, huh? Secondly, whether this is private to the rational nature, right? There's only something in his mind and reason will act for an end, or does the dog and the cat and even the, what, plant, huh? Do they act for an end? Or is it only less rational, which is it act for an end, huh? Third, whether the acts of men receive their specific nature, right? Their species from the, what, end, huh? Your intention, right? Then whether there is some last end of, what, human life, huh? We saw Aristotle arguing that there was, right? In the premium to Nicomachean Ethics, right? But then whether of one man there can be many last ends. And see, the reason why that, there can't be many last ends. The only one. Six, whether a man orders everything to the last end. That's interesting, huh? Remember how Aristotle said there about the last end? That there must be something that is desired for its own sake and not for the sake of anything else, but everything else for the sake of it. The average person would say, oh, I'm not aware of ordering everything I do to my end. If he asked them, you know, why are you doing this, and what for the sake of that, and why that, maybe it's going to come back to the last end, right? I think I'll be happy if I do this. Ultimately, right? If I don't do that, I'm going to be miserable for the rest of my life. I'm going to slip out of my hands. Whatever it is, right? Seven, there is the same last end for all men. You know the famous Declaration of Independence, right? Pursuit of happiness, right? But most people, you know, when you talk about that, they think that everybody pursues his or her own happiness, and it's not the same for everybody, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah. So is there the same last end for all men? I saw a bumper sticker that said, music is my life. It must be musician, right? Well, Mozart is good, you know, and as Aristotle says there in the Eighth Book of the Politics, you know, we ought to listen to music sometime, you know, relax, and it has a certain moral effect, too, if it's good music, and so on. But does Mozart have the same end as Aristotle, or Shakespeare have the same end as Mozart, you know? Or the famous chef, you know, who lives for food? Alcoholic, like, who lives to drink or something? It's all got their own end, huh? And Eighth, whether in that last end all other creatures, what, come together, right, huh? Now, you can sit down and see if these eight, you know, divided into two or three, right, huh? You can see a little bit, huh, but certain things will go together, right? Whether there is some last end of human life, and whether of one man there can be many ends, they kind of go together, those two questions, right? Right? And whether man orders all things to the last end, whether the same end is last for all men, right? Right? Like I say, the first two articles kind of go together, right? Whether it belongs to man to act for an end, and whether this is something that is, what, peculiar to man, or to the rational creature, anyway, right? Those first two would probably go together. The third one kind of stands by itself, right? And then the last group could close a group together, right? Subdivide it, huh? Okay, to the first end, one proceeds thus, it seems that it does not belong to man to act on account of an end. For the cause, it's naturally, what, before, huh? We saw before in the categories, right, that one sense of before is the cause of before the effect, right? Okay, but the end has the ratio, the thought of the definition of last, huh? As the name itself, what, sounds, right? Therefore, the end does not have the ratio of a cause. But on account of that, man acts that is the cause of his action. Since this point is the cause of his action, it's the cause of his action. Preposition procter signifies the relation of what? Cause. Therefore it does not belong to man to act on account of an end. So we see the carpenter, right? The carpenter making a chair, right? So the chair is the end here, right? It's the activity of making a chair. But the chair doesn't exist until he gets through making. So how can what doesn't exist be a cause of what's going on now? How can the chair be a cause of the making of the chair when the chair comes after the making of the chair? It's not before it, right? It's interesting, you know, in the fifth book of wisdom when Aristotle is considering these words that are used in wisdom and in the axioms and everywhere to some extent because they're so common, he begins with the words that refer to causes, huh? He has beginning, cause, element, and nature, and then necessary, huh? Those words in that order. But when Thomas explains that order as he does many times, he says the word beginning is taken up before the word cause because it's more general, right? Just like here, the end is taken up before beatitude because it's more general, right, huh? So, and then when he talks about the word beginning, he says every cause is a beginning, but not every beginning is a cause. So the point is the beginning of the line without a cause, right? And then he says later on that the common notion of beginning is what is first, right? So it's before other things, huh? In being or knowing or motion and so on. So how can the end be a cause, right? When it's not the beginning, it's the end. It's the absolute beginning, right? It's not before as a cause is before the effect, right? And, you know, when Aristotle distinguishes the four kinds of causes like he does in the second book of the physics and in the fifth book of wisdom, and he says, what? It's just matter, form, mover, and end. When he gets to the end, he kind of stops because it's not so clear that this is a cause, huh? And he has to kind of stop and manifest it, right? So it's the least known cause, huh? This is the objection, right, right? Moreover, that which is the last end is not for the sake of some, what, end. But in some things, the actions are the last end, as is clear through the philosopher in the first of ethics. He saw that in the premium, right, huh? So why do you want to understand God? Yeah, but the understanding is not for the sake of anything further, is it, right? As Latimer said there in his translation of the Iliad, he asked me if I want to translate the Iliad. Well, why talk? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, it's just, you know. If he asked that, he's definitely experienced Homer, right, huh? He may have really experienced Homer, and no Greek would want to, you know, translate him into his own language for the Holy Pauline, huh? Therefore, not all things that man does does he do for anything, right? Sometimes what he does is the end, huh? Okay? What do you want to see God for? Well, if I mark us like that, not for the sake of anything, right? It's the end itself, yeah. So that's interesting. Moreover, then man seems to act on account of an end when he deliberates, right? How can I achieve this end and so on? But many things man does without deliberation, about which, right, sometimes he doesn't think at all, right? Just when someone moves his foot or his hand, right, and tend upon other things, or his beard does. See, that's you guys in mind. Therefore, man does not, what, do all things for the sake of an end, huh? But against this, huh? All those things which are in some genus are derived from the beginning of that genus. But the end is a beginning in the things doable by man, as is clear through the philosopher and the second book of the physics. Therefore, it belongs to man to do all things on account of a, what, end of that. Now you see, you should, I have the rest of the text there, you should have to think about this, right? How can the end be first when the end is last? If it's not first, it's not a beginning, let alone a cause, right? Well, let's see what Thomas says. He can illuminate us, lighten us, I should say. I answer it should be said that of the actions which are done by man, those alone are properly called, what, human, right? Which are proper to man insofar as he is man. Now, man differs from the other creatures that are without reason, right? In this, that he is the Lord of his own, what? Acts. Whence those actions alone are called properly human, of which man himself is the, what, Lord. But man is the Lord of his own acts by reason and, what, will. Whence also free judgment is said to be a faculty of will and, what, reason. My text is a reference there to what the Master says in the second book of the Sentences, huh? Those actions, therefore, are properly called human, which proceed from the, what, deliberate will. And Thomas made this distinction in his premium, if you remember, to the Nicomachean. Ethics, huh? He's explaining that ethics is about human action, right? Well, what do you mean by human action, right? You mean digesting your food? Your food? No, no. But those actions that are, what? Which you are the Lord by your reason and by your will, right? If, however, there are other actions which belong to man, they can be called actions of man, right? But not properly, what? Human acts, huh? Since they are not of man insofar as he is, what? Man, huh? Now, it is manifest that all actions which proceed from some power are caused from it according to the definition of its, what? Object, right? So is your seeing without color? Or light? Okay. Or is your hearing without sound, huh? Without the object, huh? No. But the object of the will is the end and the good. Ergo. So if those are human acts that proceed from the will, and the will's object is what? The good and the end, which are basically the same as we've seen before, right? Well, then everything has to be for some end, right? For some good. Whence is necessary that all human acts are for the sake of some, what? End, huh? Now, how does Thomas apply to the first, huh? Well, he sees a distinction of two orders, right? 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