Prima Secundae
Lecture 8: The Last End and the Infinity Problem in Human Action

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Even though they have the same foods available in the supermarkets of the United States, right? They might choose to eat something differently, because of custom, I guess. I often wondered if I could have been brought up, you know, with fish, I thought that would be... I usually choose not to eat fish, if I could have... You don't like fish? No, no, no, no. He's from the Midwest, they're like four-footed things. I told you one time, you know, we used to come around to the house, you know, and they're selling these, you know, tickets for, I mean, things to get... Rapporty? No, no, discounted meals, right? And so it's not a good deal, you know, because it's kind of a nice restaurant in the town. And after we looked at the tickets more carefully, they're good only for Friday nights. And this is when he had to eat fish, he could eat meat on Friday, so. But that's when I discovered, in Minnesota, the Wallet Pike with almond slivers, you know. And that's really good, that's good. So I was at university, you know. And I remember one day I helped correct his exams or something like that. And so he took me out to lunch, you know, and he got a lot of fish, a lot of lemon juice on there and so on. It tastes pretty good stuff, you know. But, you know, I always paraphrase, you know, the only good Indian is a dead Indian. The only good fish is a disguised fish, you know. So, but anyway, you can say that custom kind of almost seems to determine what our choices will be, right? And, you know, I go into a restaurant and there's, you know, selections there. You can almost tell what I'm going to choose, right? Because I'm accustomed to choosing this, right? By the other hand, choice gives rise to custom. By repeated choices, you get a certain custom, right? So I've often puzzled over that as to why it's called, presumably, moral ethical philosophy. It means originally customary philosophy, right? And that's just like natural philosophy is about things that are by nature. Customary philosophy is about things that are by what? Custom, yeah. It has a lot to do with it, right? I guess we've got to stop there. We've got to look at the reply line, take the replies to the objection. Okay. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the end is not altogether something extrinsic from the, what? Act, huh? Because it is compared to the act as a beginning or as a limit, huh? That's the comparison he made there, right? And this is of the notion of act that it be, what? From something as regards action and that it be to something as regards, what? Passion, right? To the second, it should be said that the end, according as it is before an intention, as has been said, in this way it pertains to the will. And in this way it gives species to the human act or to the moral act, right? They're used to adopting that way of speaking, right, huh? To the third, it should be said that the same act and number, according as it, what? At once, at one time, goes forth in the agent, right? It is not ordered except to one proximate end from which it has its, what? Species. But it can be ordered to many remote ends, right? One of which is the end of the other, right? For it's possible for one act in the species of nature, right, to be ordered to diverse ends of the will. So, just as this act, which is to kill a man, right, which is the same according to its natural species, huh, can be ordered towards the end to the, what, conservation of justice, right? And it could be ordered to satisfy everyone's anger with somebody, right? And from this, there will be diverse acts, not in their natural species, but in their species of, what, morals, right? Right. So you'd say, you know, when the judge condemns you to death, right, and you're put to death, right, by the man out there who chops your head off, that is an act of justice, right? But when I get mad at you and I whack you in your head off or something, that's an act of what? Eidosis. Yeah, yeah, or an act of, yeah. Okay. And from these, that they are diverse acts according to the species of morals, because in one way it is an act of virtue, in the other way an act of what? Vice. Vice, huh? For motion does not receive a species from that which is an accidental term, right? But only from that which is the per se term, right? But the moral ends happen to the natural thing, right? And reversely, the, what? The ratio of the natural end happens to the moral, right? And therefore nothing prevents acts which are the same according to the species of nature to be diverse according to the species of moral, right? It's kind of a subtle thing there, right? At least that example is clear, right? If I'm killing you because you've been, you know, justly guilty of something, and then this is an act of justice, right? In the other case, it's crime, right? I'm committing, right? He's talking here about the proximate end, huh? Why am I killing you? Carry out the, yeah. Or I'm killing you because I'm angry at you, right? At the same act. When the species of nature is the same act, right? It's not the same act in the, what? Kind of, with words there, huh? If I had honey on my toast this morning, and I'd call my wife honey, it's the same word. In one sense it is the same word, right? In one case it's, what? The name of what I had on my, you see? In the other case it's a figurative thing. It's not the name of my wife. She didn't say it's our name honey. So is it the same name? No. You see, what you mean by name? Yeah. Is it the same meaning? It's got the same letters in both cases, right? That's the same word. Yeah, but if you say that in one case it's a metaphor, right? It's a figurative name, you know? Doesn't seem like it's the same name, does it? Because the metaphor is not a... The word, that's important. The metaphor of any figure is based. The word you use does not mean what you mean. When you use that word, is it the same word? I wonder about name, but the name includes in its notion the meaning of the word. See, if it includes the notion of meaning, then it would be a different name. But if you don't include... But in some sense it's the same word because you have the same letters. The same sound. And the same order and so on, you know the letters, right? Same sound, right? But in another way, there seems to be a difference. If you look at it from the point of view of the logic or the sciences that can turn it with the sermons and knowledge, as they call them, it's not the same, right? And that's because I think if you know what a figure of speech is, then you'll know that it's not the same name because a figure of speech is precisely not to have the same meaning. Right? I think that's what I'm trying to figure out. If you understand what a figure of speech is, then you know. If name includes meaning, it's not the same name. If you know what a figure of speech is and you're using it, then you know you don't mean the same thing. You're not really using the same name. Does name mean what you intend to mean? You intend what the name means. Because otherwise there's no communication anymore. But then there's something of a humpy-dunk thing. And then you see what you do. Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, guardian angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas, Deocrexius. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order the luminary images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Pray for us. Help us to understand what you have written. Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, amen. Amen. I was reading about the angels this morning in the Summa Contra Gentiles, and how they differ in that way of understanding from us. You can give us a text there. It's into the second book, but I'd better stay off that. I've got a copy here of the Two Gentlemen of Verona, right? Just to expound a bit on that etymology of the word happiness, right? And you've got to be careful, because the etymology of a word is not necessarily its, what, meaning, right? And because the eda quo, nomen and poienter, the etymology, is from half, right? It doesn't mean that you have to think of happiness as something being the result of half, right? But that's where it gets the origin of its meaning, right? But like in Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, he'll translate the Greek word, eudaimonia, by happiness. So happiness can be used as a name for the end of man, right? The Two Gentlemen of Verona begins with the scene of the Two Gentlemen of Verona, and Valentine is leaving him. And Proteus, of course, is in love with Julia, and he's not ready to leave, right? So Valentine says, the opening words, Cease to persuade, my loving Proteus, home-keeping youth have ever homely wits. Were it not affection chains thy tender days, he's tied down as you can, to the sweet glances of thy honored love, I rather would entreat thy company to see the wonders of the world abroad than living dully sluggardized at home whereout thy youth with shapeless idleness. But since thou lovest, love still, and thrive therein, even as I would when I to love began. And Proteus says, Wilt thou be gone? Sweet Valentine, adieu. Now the words here. Think on thy Proteus, when thou happily seest some rare noteworthy object in thy travel, and you happily seest. What does that mean? How to see. Yeah, something good to see, right? Okay, and now the next line is even more explicit here. Wish me partaker in thy happiness when thou dost meet good act, and in thy danger, if every danger do environ thee, commend thy grievances to my holy prayers, for I will be thy beadsman, Valentine. It's the rosary, huh? It's those lines, huh? When thou, excuse me, wish me partaker in thy happiness, when thou dost meet good act, huh? When you have good luck, right? When you are happy, therefore, right? In the sense related to the etymology there. Wish me partaker in thy happiness, huh? Okay. And of course, this pertains to friendship, right? That you want to, what? Share the happiness of your, what? Friends, right? And you want them to share in your, what? Happiness, huh? Now, I'm not going to go through the whole play, because it takes too much time here. But, um, Proteus is not only going to be faithful, right? As his name indicates, huh? Yeah. Proteus is the one who, in the Greek mythology there, takes on different shapes all the time, right? But, at the end, he is, what? Repentant, huh? And forgiven, and reunited with Julia, and forgiven by Valentine, and so on, for his pursuing the girl that Valentine fell in love with. And it's very good, the, you know, the, um, repentance there, huh? Because he's about to, to, uh, advance himself on Valentine's girl, and Valentine discovers them, huh? Ruffian, let go that rude and silver touch, thou friend of an ill fashion. And Proteus is, Valentine. Valentine says, thou common friend, that is without faith or love, for such is a friend now. Treacherous man, thou hast beguiled my hopes. Not but mine eye could have persuaded me. Now I dare not say I have one friend alive. Thou wouldst disprove me. Who should be trusted now when one's right hand is perjured to the bosom? Proteus, I am sorry, I must never trust thee more. But count the world a stranger for thy sake. The private wound is deepest. O time most cursed, amongst all foes, that a friend should be the worst. Proteus says, my shame and guilt confounds me. Forgive me, Valentine. If hearty sorrow be a sufficient ransom for offense, I tender it here. I do as truly suffer as air I did commit. And Valentine says, that I am paid, he says. Once again I do receive the honest. Who by repentance is not satisfied. He is nor of heaven nor earth. For these are pleased. By penitence the eternal's wrath's appeased. That's beautifully said. And so he's reunited with Julia. I don't think we're going to all the complications. And he would... Well anyway, the bride of Valentine is the daughter of the Duke, right? And so the Duke is now, you know, in favor of Valentine too. I won't go into all that happens. But just towards the end here now. He says to the Duke, Please you, I'll tell you as you pass along, that you will wonder what a fortune, or fortunate, by the way, it's pronounced in the English. Notice that. You will wonder what a fortune, what has happened by fortune, right? You'll wonder, because it arouses. Come, Proteus, tis your penance, but to hear the story of your loves discovered. That done, our day of marriage shall be yours. So they both get married, right? Now we come to the last line of the play. And I was just talking to Warren Murray on the phone this morning. Because I asked him years ago, I said, What one line in Shakespeare best describes heaven? What one line in Shakespeare? He said, I don't know. So anyway, I was on the phone today, so I was thinking about this. And so I asked him to say, I'm Christian again, you know. What one line? He said, I don't know. I said, well, I asked you this, you know, years ago, Warren. You didn't look at it. And I told him then, you know, and it was, you know. Okay. Now, this is such a beautiful line. I'll have to write on the board, huh? So he says, That done, our day of marriage shall be yours. Another last line. One feast, one house, one mutual happiness. So this is what he says. That's the line. One feast, one house, one mutual happiness. Remember how in those opening lines, you know, wish me particular happiness, right? So if you're a friend, you want to, what? Share your happiness, right? But I'm struck by this line here, because in, for example, Thomas Aquinas, right, in the communion prayer, he speaks of heaven as that, what, ineffable convivial, right, huh? That inexpressible banquet, right? Eye has not seen, ear has not heard, presence from the heart of man, the things that God has prepared for those who love him, right, huh? So that's usually said, one feast, right, huh? And Christ sometimes speaks of, you know, eating at the table, you know, it's in the height. And then he says, one house, if he said, you know how the Lord says, in my father's house there are many, what, mansions, right? And I might remember it of, reminded of John Paul II, when he was dying, and, you know, he didn't want to go. And he said, let me go to the house. My father, the house of the father, he said, let me go to the house of the father, right? So that's beautiful. Great person there, right? And then with mutual happiness, right? Talking about the vast end, right? Isn't that beautifully said, right? And this idea of one here, as you've pitted over these three times, well, that one psalm, that was in 32, right? Behold, how good it is, for brethren dwell upon him, because there was no ancient, and he goes on saying about the oil coming down, right? And then it's like the dew of the turbine, right? And I think this refers to the humanity and divinity of Christ. But anyway, and then the last line, he's going to give them eternal life. Well, you mean one, of course, most of all by charity, right? And mutual love, but also one in your hopes, you know, and one in your faith, and so on. So, well, what Shakespeare would put all that in one line? So I, until a better line comes up, this is, in my opinion, the one line of Shakespeare that it best describes, but not ever. One feast, one house, one mutual happiness. So I have a lot more respect for the two gentlemen of Rona than most, you know? Incidentally, there's a Friar Lawrence in there, too, you know? He doesn't, he just mentioned Friar Lawrence. But Friar Lawrence is the one who marries Romeo and Juliet, right? So he's mentioned it there, you know, as sitting at something. So, might be the same Friar Lawrence, huh? Were they Rona, too? Yeah, yeah. Two households, both alike. Friar Rona, where we lay our scenes in the dream. For the prologue. That's right. So, beautiful play. And it could be, doesn't he have, was it, it's one of his, one of his poems about the, it's not a sonnet, but it's about the two being one. How is it, you mentioned it before, I know. About murdering numbering. Yeah, yeah. And I think of that as two gentlemen of Rona in the last place, one, one, one. Yeah. Yeah, that's beautiful. That's what it's said, yeah. It's the thing awfully rich about Shakespeare. I mean, you wonder where all this comes from, you know, because it's incredible, though. So, we're still, you know, trying to find out what happiness is, though, here, right? So, we're up to Article 4 here in Question 1. To the fourth, one proceeds thus. It seems that there is not some last end of, what, human life, huh? Now, I'm kind of struck by this ultimus, right? But Shakespeare saves this for the very last line of the play, right? From Ultimus, huh? Isn't that by chance? That his best line in the last end should be the last line? No, it's very strange, Shakespeare. The good, according to its, what, definition, is diffusive of itself, right? This is the famous thing that they take, especially from Dionysius in the fourth chapter of Divine Names. And that's one of the middle terms that Thomas uses for arguing that God must be good, right? Because he's diffusible in sui, right? You know, bestows good things upon creation, right? So, he must be good, right? If he's diffusible in sui. That's a nice middle term. If, therefore, what proceeds from the good, it itself is good, right, huh? Is necessary that that good diffuse another good, okay? And since that will be good, too, right? Then that will diffuse itself, and it will go on forever, right? Like these children, right? And thus, the proceeding or going forward of good is in infinitum. It goes on forever. It has no end. No end to this, huh? Okay. And then their children will have children, and this will go on, you know? But the good has the notion of an end, right? So, if the good goes on forever, then there's no what? There's no end. Yeah. Therefore, in ends, there's a going forward in infinitum. It's a very interesting objection, right? Think about it, sort of way. I mean, where's it going to end? More, he says, those things which are of reason are able to be multiplied without end, huh? Whence mathematical quantities row forever, right? Without end. For the species of numbers and accounts of this are, what? Infinite, huh? Because given any number, right, reason is able to think out a greater one. Just add one, and you've got a new one, huh? But the desire of the end follows the grasping of reason. So if reason doesn't give out, then it doesn't seem there's going to be any end to this desire for the end. Therefore, it seems also in ends that one goes forward forever, without any end, huh? Now, the translator can't retranslate it and say, therefore, also in ends, one goes forward in infinite. It doesn't sound right in English, does it? Without end, huh? You can say in English, huh? Moreover, huh? I know that argument is from reason, right? Because the desire for the end follows the apprehension of reason. Now he argues from the will, right? Moreover, the good and the end is the object of the, what? Will. But the will can reflect upon itself infinitely, right? For I can will something, right? And I can will me to will it. And thus, in infinitum, right? Same thing for reason, right? I can know what a square is, and I can know that I know what a square is. And I know that I know that I know what a square is. And this goes on forever, right? He says the same thing with the will of that, right? Therefore, in ends, in the ends of the human will, one proceeds without end. And there's not any last end of the human will, huh? Used to be the old program that was GE or something on TV. And they're saying that our most important product is progress. Well, it's kind of endless, right? Your most important product is. That's so 20th century. But against this is what the philosopher says in the second book of Wisdom, huh? Second book after the books of natural philosophy. And that's where Aristotle is showing that in the four kinds of causes, right? For each kind of cause, that there is, what? The first cause, right? He says that those who make the infinite without an end, they take away the nature of the, what? Good, huh? But the good is what has the notion of an end. Therefore, it's against the notion of the end that one proceeds without end. It's necessary, therefore, to, what? Lay down one last, what? End, huh? Now, in the body of the article, Tom's going to show this in a very complete way, huh? He says, I answer, it should be said. Per se loquendo. Now, that's very important what he says, huh? Per se means what? What? Well, it means literally through itself, right, huh? Okay? It's also sometimes spoken of as such, right, huh? But through itself, huh? As opposed to through another or opposed to through happening, right? So he's saying, per se, he's speaking, huh? It is impossible in ends to proceed forever from any part, right, huh? Okay, or any side, he might say in this, right? For in all things which have, per se, order to each other. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. It is necessary that the first removed, they removed all those things which are, what? To the first. To the first, yeah. Now, why is that, huh? Because being in turn, they can see, but if you take away the last one, there's no purpose in it. Because you have to wield the last one. Okay, okay. What about these ten grandchildren, right, huh? You know, first comes Kate and so on. Um, are they per se ordered? They're not per se ordered, right? So, if Kate was not, Sarah could still have been, right, huh? If Sarah was not, Cecilia could still have been, right, huh? Okay. So, what is the order there? Per se or progences? It belongs to wisdom to order things, right, huh? But with Sophia, huh? Does it belong to Cecilia, I mean to Sophia as such? To come after, um, Isabella. She does come after, Isabella at the time. But does it belong to Sophia as such? Or this morning I, I, I read a, uh, chapter or two of the Summa Contra Chantiles, huh? And then I read a, a little bit of the metaphysics, right? And so on. Um, might do a theorem of Euclid or something, right, huh? You know? Are these things per se ordered? You might have a cup of tea. Listen to, uh, Baron Boehm performing the 26th Concerto of Mozart and the 27th Concerto of Mozart, huh? Could I listen to the 27th without the 26th? So those are not, uh, they're ordered in some way, you might say, but Parachidens, right, huh? Okay. Went to Mass, then I went and dropped some things off at the library. Then I had breakfast. Could I have breakfast before going to the library? Could I have breakfast before going to Mass? You see? So these things are, what, accidentally ordered, right, huh? Okay. But what things would be parasy ordered, huh? Well, that was a beautiful thing there in Euclid, huh? I'll tell you this the other day there. I'm just, uh, getting kind of old now, you know, man. It's a little longer to absorb these chirurgical things. But he had this beautiful theorem, huh? Suppose you have three numbers here. A, B, and C, right? And three other numbers we'll call X, Y, and Z, right? And he says, suppose A is to B as X is to Y. Okay? So the ratio of A to B is the same as the ratio of X to Y. And suppose B is to C as Y is to Z. So the ratio of B to C is the same as the ratio of Y to Z. And that doesn't mean that the ratio of A to B is the same as B to C. It might be a different ratio. And the ratio of X to Y doesn't mean it's the same as the ratio of Y to Z. But the ratio of A to B is the same as the ratio of X to Y. And if B to C is the same as Y to Z. Now, given that, Euclid wants to show that A is to C as X is to what? Z. Now, how the hell would you do that? That's another question I asked Warren at the phone this morning. This is the question, what line does this? It's seven, right? I don't know. He said, ah! It gets a little bit... He looks like it. It's too early to answer. But I was so enthusiastic about the simplicity of what he does. Well, he uses an earlier theorem, right? Which is a very famous theorem about proportions. And that is if the first is to the second as the third is to the fourth. Then the first will be to the third as the second is to the fourth. He proves that earlier, right? Well, how do you do that? He says, well, if A is to B as X is to Y, then you can say that A is to X as B is to Y. First is to the second as the third is to the fourth. Then the first will be to the third as the second is to the fourth, right? And if B is to Y is Z, then B is to Y as C is to Z. Okay? Well, then A is to X as B is to Y, and C is to Z as B is to Y. Therefore, A is to X as C is to Z. And then using the same thing again. First is to the third. Yeah. Then A is to C as... X is to Z. X is to Z, yeah. Just to light it. I had a done geometry for our arithmetic as it does. But notice how one of these theorems comes before the other, right? The theorem that if a first is to a second as a third is to a fourth, then the first is to the third and the second is to the fourth, right? So is the order of this before this accidental? No. And it falls so simply by that. I said, how do you figure that out? You better figure it out first, right? That's absolutely beautiful. Incredible. Incredible. One thing happens like that, huh? When the American poetist said, you know, you could alone look upon beauty itself, right? Pretty good for a poet to say that, right? In American poet, you said? Yeah. Do you have any Dickinson, I think? Okay. Now, if you go back, this theorem that if the first is to the second as the third is to the fourth, then the first will be to the third, the second is to the fourth, that depends upon other premises. How does that go on forever? I have to get back to something that is, what, obvious, right? And then proceed step by step, right? Until I get to that theorem, and then from that theorem to this theorem, right? Okay. And then I'm all set, right? And this can't be unless, can it? It's got to be limited from the starting point to the last theorem I do, right? Okay. Quence the philosopher proves in the eighth book of the physics, huh? That it is not possible in moving causes to proceed in infinitum. Because... Already there would not be a first mover, who being taken away, others are not able to, what? Move, huh? Since they do not move except by this, that they are moved by the, what? First mover, huh? Okay. Was that true about me listing a, I, what? I must have read the Summa Congentilis before I listened to the 26th concerto, because I can't listen to the 26th concerto without having read this. Huh? Huh? Is that an order that I impose upon myself in a kind of arbitrary way? That would have read some Summa Congentilis before I listened to the Mozart, huh? It was a famous inventor, Telsa, I think the name was, who, Tesla, he was Hungarian and a real competitor of Thomas Edison. Yeah. And speaking of, for accidents or per se, in order to enjoy his dinners at the Waldorf Astoria, he had to first calculate the Cuban volumes of every vessel and plate and bowl. Yeah. And then he had to wipe them all out with a napkin, a separate napkin, each, I think, if I remember correctly. Yeah. Is that for accidents or something? He used to see a shrink. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But that's interesting from the point of view of psychology, right? Because people do get these sort of things in their head, right? You know? And they can't depart from them, right? Kind of a form of scruples. Yeah. But it's not a necessary thing, right? Absolutely. Okay. So, let's go a little back to Aristotle's proof there a little bit, just to touch upon it a bit. Because what Aristotle does in the lower sciences, the more particular sciences, you'll see one of these things shown. Like in the physics, right? The first book in natural philosophy, you learn that there's a first mover, right? And in the nickel machinetics, you saw that even in the perineum, right? That there is a first in, right? Which is the last in, right? First in one way, last in another way. And in logic, you learn, you know, that there's not always what? Not every statement is what? A conclusion. Once you see that a particular statement can be both a conclusion and a premise, right? So, there's this theorem say that, you know, if the first is to the second as the third is to the fourth, the first will be to the third as the second is to the fourth. That's both a conclusion and geometry, right? And it's a premise, right? Okay. Then the question is, is every premise a conclusion? Well, Chris, that's going to be shown to be impossible, right? Because in that case, there'd always be a proof presupposed to proving anything. And you couldn't even begin, because any statement you'd begin to use to prove something, someone would say, now before you use that to prove something, prove it. And then whoever used to prove it, they'd say, now before you, you know. So, but it's kind of a similar argument in all these cases. You could say that a statement that is in need of proof cannot be used to prove something before it itself is proven, right? So, if you take away the statement before it, it won't be accepted, right? But if all statements are of that sort, then the whole chain of them are what? They're one chain in need of proof, right? But there's nothing before them, right? Because everything is of that sort, huh? It's a little bit like with a train, in the case of the mover, right? You say, well, suppose there is a railroad car, and it can't initiate motion, right? It can't move itself. But if it's moved by something else, it can move something. Now, if the thing that's moving it is of the same sort, are you going to get any motion? No. So, and does it make any difference whether you have one or two or ten or fifteen ones of that sort? They're like one great, what? Moved mover. Not an unmover, right? And so, one grand mover presupposes a mover. But if every mover is of that sort, it's included in that, what, group of moved movers, right? The one grand moved mover, right? I mean, all the cars between the engine and the caboose, right, are like one grand moved, what? Mover. Mover, right? That whole series of cars in between the two moves the caboose insofar as it's being moved by the engine, right? But if all you had was railroad cars, then you'd have no, what, motion, right? So, they're per se ordered, right, huh? In that sense, one moves only insofar as it's being moved by another, right? That's what it means to be per se ordered, right? So, in the case of these theorems here, I learned that theorem that A will be to C as X is to Z. I learned that through the theorem about the first is to the second as the third is to the fourth. The first will be to the third as the second is to the fourth, right? I learned through that. But did I learn how to hear Mozart's 26th piano concerto through doing that chapter in Summa Concientiles? Did I? I don't think so. Because they're accidentally ordered, right? Now, he says, in inns, there is found a two-fold, what? Order, right? To wit, the order of intention and the order of execution, of carrying out. And in both orders is necessary for there to be something first. For that which is first in the order of intention is as the beginning moving the what? Desire, right? Whence the beginning taken away, the desire would be moved by nothing, right? So, the question is, can the first thing you want be a means? And so, the first thing you want must be an end, right? And nadi means to what? Something else, right? And the means, as means cannot be willed without willing be what? The end, yeah. So, he says, that which is first in the order of intention, the end, is as a beginning moving desire or wanting. Whence the beginning subtracted or taken away, the desire would be moved by what? Nothing. And then the other order he talks about. So, it's infinibus invading to a duplex order, right? That's one order of intention. The other is the order of carrying out. That which is the beginning in execution is whence the what? Operation begins. Whence that beginning taken away, no one would what? Do it. Yeah, yeah. Now, see, two orders are kind of contrary, right? So, you might say, I want to be happy, okay? Therefore, I want to get rid of my headache, right? Now, I wouldn't want to get rid of my headache if I didn't want to be happy. Okay? Now, how can I get rid of my headache? Well, by taking an aspirin, right? So, now I want to take an aspirin, right? Okay. Now what? Now I want an aspirin. I don't have any aspirins. I've heard they have them in the drugstore. Now I want to go to the drugstore, right? Now, I finally come to something I can do. I can walk or drive to the, what? Drugstore, right? And then I'll get the aspirin. Then I'll take the aspirin. Then I'll get rid of the headache. And then I'll be on the way to happiness. Or at least happier than you were before. So, he says there's got to be a beginning in both, right? And in the order of intention, the beginning is wanting to be happy, right? If I didn't care, we all was happy. I'm miserable, I wouldn't be wanting to get rid of my headache, right? The difference is that I'm happy and miserable, right? Okay? And if there wasn't something I could begin to do, the first step I could take, right? Now sometimes you hear people and they're all confused about something, some situation in life, you know, and they'll say, I don't know where to begin, right? But until they find a place where they can begin to face their problem, whatever it is, then they can't do anything, right? Okay? So he says, the beginning of intention is the last end. The beginning of execution, of carrying it out, is the first of those things which are towards the end. Thus, therefore, on the side, and you decide, right, is it possible to proceed, what? Forever, right, huh? Okay? So someone comes to me and he says, Berkwist, I've heard about this famous Pythagorean theorem, and could you show that to me, huh? And I said, well, the only proof I know of the Pythagorean theorem is Proposition 47 in Book 1 of Euclid, right, huh? Now before you can understand 47, you've got to understand 46. Before you can understand 46. But if there's always something you've got to understand before you can do, could you begin to understand that famous theorem? Take it back to something that's already now in your power because it's obvious, right, huh? Because if there was not a last end, nothing would be, what, desired, right? Nor would any action be ended, right? Nor would the intention of the agent, what, come to a rest. If however there was not something first in those things which are towards the end, no one would begin to, what, do anything, huh? Nor would consul terminate, right? Like I was going through a certain consul there. I won't give him a headache. How can I do that? Take an aspirin? Or can I get an aspirin and so on, right? So it's kind of a thing. But it would proceed forever, right, huh? But those things which do not have an order per se, but are joined to each other, procedents, huh? Nothing prevents them from having a, what, infinity, huh? For accidental causes are un, what, determined, huh? And in this way, huh, it happens that there's an infinity, procedents, and ends. And in those things which are, what, to the end, huh? So after I do Thomas and the Summa Gargentes and a chapter in the metaphysics, I might do, what, a theory of Euclid. I might do one of the Psalms. I might, you know, go on forever, right? A very unproductive life, huh? No problem. So what about the first objection here about the good is diffusive of itself, right? To the first there, if he says, it should be said that it's of the notion of the good that something, what, flow from it, right? Because of its perfection. Not, however, that it itself proceed, what, from another, huh? And therefore, since the good has the notion of an end, and the first good is the, what, last end, that argument does not prove that there's not a last end, but rather that from the first end being supposed, right, one proceeds forever, right, downward, right, towards those things which are, what, for the end, huh? And this would be fitting, or belong, if one considers only the, what, power, right, of the, what, first good, huh? Which is, what, infinite God's power, right? But because the first good, meaning God, has diffusion by his understanding, of which it, what, is to, what, go forward, or flow over into the cause, according to some, what, certain form, huh? Some certain mode is, what, applied of goods to, what, flow from the first good, by which all other goods partake of a, what, diffusive power, huh? And therefore, the diffusion of goods does not proceed forever, but as is said in Wisdom, in chapter 11, God disposes all things in number, weight, and, what, measure, huh? So if you just consider the infinity of God's power, it could go on forever, right, huh? But if you consider the fact that he exercises power through, what, his understanding and reason, always acts with a view to some, what, definite end, huh? That's one of the arguments, incidentally, that Aristotle uses in the second book of Wisdom, huh? You know, that there'd be no acting for, what, by mind, right, if there was no end. So, you know, sometimes, you know, you say, you know, the kids, when they're little, they say, Daddy, can you count to a hundred? And I said, yeah, wow, you know. Then a few months or I don't know how much later, you know, Daddy, can you count to a thousand? And I said, yes. But, you know, someone is counting to come to the end of numbers, right? And I count to a hundred, so I can count to a thousand. And I count to a thousand, so I can count to, what, a million. And I count to a million, so I can count to, you know, what comes next? And always, I count to this, so I can count to something further. Is there anything reasonable about this, huh? I'm not acting out of mind, right, huh? I'm aiming always at something more than I can ever, what, achieve, right, huh? So can that really be my goal? Another goal for me to aim at me, in this case, right? Progress is our most important product. It used to be, you know, you'd say every night, once a week, that's what this TV program was, and there was the, in their advertisement for the company, right? And gee, you're our most important product. But I think the average academic nowadays, you know, they think of, you know, well, knowledge just keeps on, what, growing, right, huh? And you're trying to advance your art or your science, whatever it is, right? And if people come after you, advance it further, and you come after them, advance it even further, and there's no, what? No reason. Yeah. You don't realize there's something, something unreasonable about that, huh? There's one thing we want to know, really, in the end, which is the first cause, right? Which is God himself, huh? And then why do you want to know that for? Well, there's no other reason, right? It's self, what? Explained, right? Why do you want to see wisdom for, right? It's so in the end. Okay. It's beautiful, right? When St. Bernard Clairvaux says, you know, the reason for loving God is God himself, right? No reason. That's it. But it's funny, I think, you know, they don't think about what they're really doing, right? They're all working into the progress of their art or science. I think it's going to go on forever, right? By a new invention, yeah. They'd be very happy. Yeah. That's what they say, you know, kind of, you know, all the satire of Americans, you know. But I think it's going to go on forever. But I think it's going to go on forever. But I think it's going to go on forever. But I think it's going to go on forever. But I think it's going to go on forever. Thank you.