Prima Secundae
Lecture 9: The Unity of the Last End and Its Perfection

Transcript
================================================================================

Happiness is always one purchase away. So they convince you, as Father Hardin would say, they convince you to buy things you don't need, money you don't have. Yeah. But sometimes you wonder about that, because the Greeks said, the seven wise men said, nothing too much, right? Okay. But can you love God too much? Or can you, what, know God too much? No, he's always more, he can always praise God more, right? He can always love God. The creature can never love God as much as he is, what, lovable, right? The only one that can love God as much as God is lovable is God himself, right? And can the creature ever know God as much as he is knowable, right? Only God can know God as much as God is what? Knowable, right? But sometimes, you know, you think about heaven, you say, well, I'm here down kind of the lower ranks or somewhere. And up there is St. Peter, and he understands and knows God more than I do, right? Wouldn't I have a desire to know God more in heaven, right? Never disturb the tentacility of heaven with my desire to know God more, huh? Or is it that in heaven I will want to know God as much as God wants me to know him? Kind of hard to understand, but that seems to be what the truth must be, right, huh? That if you get to heaven, your will is entirely conformed to God's will, right? And then you don't want to know God more than God wants you to know him. You had to say that, wouldn't you? I don't know how else you'd say it. But it's kind of contrary to our experience, you know, like they say, I go back and read Euclid now, and I say, gee, I really don't understand this stuff right well. I can understand that better, right, huh? And, you know, I'll go through my favorite book, David Summa Cana Gentiles, or go through the metaphysics, and, you know, like DeConnick said, right, you know, he'd been teaching physics since 1935 there at Laval. And I had him in the, what, the 50s, in the late 50s, and he said, I still want to see something new when I, what, go through it, right? So you kind of always want to understand these things better. You want to understand the fostering analytics better, right? And so you say, why wouldn't that be so in heaven, right, huh? It's kind of hard to. I figure, right? I suppose God gives us an equal mind, too, right, huh? And I'll never understand these things as well as Euclid does, or as well as Aristotle does, or as well as Thomas does, you know? Maybe God didn't intend for me to understand these things as well as these guys did, right, huh? My days are numbered. I don't know what the number is, but they are numbered, right? You made everything in number, right? And so my days are numbered, right? So there's even a limit as to how much I'm going to understand these things in this life, right, huh? And so weight is not numbered. Yes, it is. Yeah. How much do you weigh? Weight? How much do you weigh? How much do you weigh? Because you know more, no less. You've got a number on it. No increase. No increase. No, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no No, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no No, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, it's a metaphor, but it helps you to understand, I suppose, you know, in a way proportion to us, right, I'm full, but we all don't eat equally, right, at the feast, right, on the food channels like that, they have, you know, these people are in the hot dog eating contest, but the number is, you know, how many, 52 hot dogs, well, whatever they eat, you know, but I have no desire to into the competition with these, these giants, you know. Now, the second objection, that reason, right, multiply things, it's fitting to them, right, okay, to the second it should be said that in those things which are per se, reason begins from beginnings naturally known, right, and it goes forward to some, what, terms, some in it. But whence the philosopher proves in the first book of the postmodern analytics, that in demonstrations, there is not a going forward in infinitum, right, because in demonstrations, there is to reserve the order of some things that are per se, connected with each other, and not, what, per accidents, huh, but in those things which are connected per accidents, nothing prevents reason from proceeding, right, forever, right, now it happens to quantity, or to a pre-existent number, as such, that there be added, what, quantity, or a unit, right, whence in things of this sort, reason proceeds, nothing prevents reason from, what, going on forever, those kind of, empty after a while, right? There are styles taking up the infinite there in the third book, and physics here, different reasons why people think the infinite exists, right? And one is that the reason never gives out, but reason can make a kind of, what, mental multiplicity there, right, huh, which is no, could be great significance, but can get as much as it wants, right, huh? Socrates is Socrates. Now, Socrates is found, what, twice, so this one man is found twice in that sentence, right, and then I can come back and say, Socrates is Socrates, is the statement, Socrates is Socrates. Now I've got four Socrates, right, and I can say the whole thing is itself, right, and it gives me Socrates. He says, I want it. More than one. And he kind of was refuting Bertrand Russell, you know. Bertrand Russell was trying to prove that the part is equal to the whole. And this is the way he did it, just so you can mention this before. If you sit up, get over here, with all the numbers, for the moderns, one's a number. So you get 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, etc. And if I take the double of each one, right? 2, 4, 6, 8, 10. In this left series here, you have all the numbers, right? In the second series, you've got only, what, even numbers, right? Now, would there be an even number for every number over here? Yeah, just take the double of it, right? So, no matter how far you go, there's going to be one number in the second list here. The list of even numbers for every number in the list of all numbers, right? Okay? So, therefore, the even numbers are equal to all numbers, right? But the even number is only a part of all numbers. So, therefore, the part is equal to all, right? That's not just mirrors. That's smoke and mirrors. Yeah. But you can't, you can't, you can't say because of this, huh? They were just talking about that, right? Socrates is Socrates, and Socrates is Socrates, and Socrates is Socrates, and Socrates is Socrates, right? Socrates, and Socrates, and Socrates, and Socrates, and Socrates, and Socrates, and Socrates, and Socrates, and Socrates, and Socrates, and Socrates, and Socrates, and Socrates, and Socrates, and Socrates, and Socrates, and Socrates, and Socrates, and Socrates, and Socrates, and Socrates, and Socrates, and Socrates, and Socrates, and Socrates, and Socrates, and Socrates, and Socrates, and Socrates, and Socrates, and Socrates, and Socrates, and Socrates, and Socrates, and Socrates, and Socrates, and Socrates, and Socrates, and Socrates, and Socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates. Socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates. And socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates. And socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates. One in what? Reality, right? And socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates. And socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates. And socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates. And socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and socrates, and so which is clear from this, which is clear from this, that about one in the same end, indifferently, once or many times, the will reflects upon itself, right? I mean, Thomas will talk about that when he talks about charity, right? What are you supposed to love by charity, right? Well, obviously, God and your neighbor, right? And, but also yourself, right? But are you supposed to love charity by charity, right? You know? Because in some sense, you can love that you, what? Love, yeah, yeah. And then can you love that you love that you love, right? But that could be any number of times, right? It's indifferent, right? There's nothing per se about that, huh? I often think about the fact that I think I know this, and I say, I don't think I know that. But I don't think I go often much further than that, right? And say that I know that I know that I know, right, huh? So it's kind of accidental, right, huh? I suppose I want to know God, and I want to know other things, too. But I want to know that I know God, right, huh? Yeah. So you take a little break now, or is there a few 20? Fifth article here, where there can be many last ends, right? To the fifth one proceeds thus, it seems possible that the will of one man can be carried over to what? The same time, to many, right? As in ultimate ends, right? I think you've got to look at the words there, in plural theory, born to many things, right? Simul, together, right? Thomas doesn't seem to be, he's going to deny that, but he might admit that a man could have, what, many last ends, but not at the same, what, time, right? You know, I forget the work of C.S. Lewis there, but he's just talking about human experience and on how something might seem to you the end of life at one point in your life, and so on, you know? So, to me it might be candy, you know, huh? You know? The first thing, you know? And, you know, we used to have a little story, and I was a little bit, about the little boy who wanted candy, and that was his thing in life, you know? And finally his birthday was coming up, and his mother said, you can eat as much candy as you want to, you know? Well, of course, he ate so much that he got sick, you know? So, he learned his lesson, you know, and so on, huh? So, it might be candy first, and then there it might be, you know, with Romeo, it's Julia's happiness, right? And then it might be, for someone else, it might be power or wealth or something, right? And so on, but not Simo, right, huh? You know? So, the candy and the girl, or the girl and the wealth would not be, what, the last goal, right? You love me or my money, you know, the girl might say to the guy, you know, the story, the heiress there, you know? And so, one of them is the last in, not the girl. Either girl or the wealth, right? Yeah, what Thomas is saying, not Simo, not together, right? But he might, you know, go from one to the other, right? See, I would argue in his principles that, it seems to me, our notion of happiness is, what is it that perfects me? What is it that gives me, what do I see as my perfection? But it could be that a man sees as, you know, describe your perfection, he says, well, perfection is having, you know, a beautiful wife, lots of money, and power. Yeah. But he sees all of those as perfected. Well, let me take away your beautiful wife, well, I'm not happy anymore. You can take away just one of them, and he sees, so he's got... Okay, that might be composed of all of these, right? It'd be one in, right? Composed of all of these. Yeah. So in that sense, yeah. So no one of them by itself would be his last in, but the combination of them, right? I mean, Thomas is often quoting Boethius, right? He says in the Consolation of Philosophy that happiness is a state made possible by the aggregation of all goods, right? Okay. So it would be a combination of them that it would be his last in, right? I kind of come out of the first argument, you know, but maybe so. Augustine says in the 19th book of the City of God that some place the last end of man in four things. In pleasure, right? In quiet, in quiet, or rest, I guess, in the first things of nature, and in what? Virtue. But these are manifestly many things, right? Therefore, one man can constitute the ultimate end of his will in many things, huh? Well, just, you know, look at the reply to Ad Primum there, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that all those many are taken in the notion of one perfect good constituted from them, right, huh? By those who, what, place in them the ultimate, what, end, huh? Okay. Yeah, we used to say in the society there, for us to turn and study some, friendship and the pursuit of wisdom, or wisdom shared with friends, right, huh? Okay. Well, then, wisdom and friends are both, what, involved in, what, like, or as parts, right, huh? Okay. So, not having two ultimate ends, wisdom and friendship, right, but wisdom shared with friends, huh? One happiness. Yeah. One mutual happiness. You know, that's beautiful, that last line, right, huh? It's also, the context also is marriage, so that adds a fourth one in the way. Yeah, yeah. But, I mean, there's kind of a, metaphorically, heaven is spoken of as marriage, too, right? Exactly, that's what I'm saying. Thomas often quotes that passage from the prophet O.C., you know, that I have, you know, got espoused to you, right, in faith, right, huh? But then the consummation of the marriage is, what, seeing God face to face, right? It comes out in the Psalms, Psalms, too, huh? In the Psalms, what is it, Psalm 44? The one that Thomas says is an epithelamian, right? Which is, you know, on the day of marriage, right? Like, Spencer's epithelamian, right? Moreover, those things which are not opposed to each other do not, what, exclude each other. But many things are found in things which are not opposed, what, to each other. Therefore, if one of them is laid down to be the last end of the will, not on account of this, are others, what, excluded, huh? Thomas will show the kind of opposition there would be in this case, huh? He applied with a second objection, huh? Moreover, the will, through this, the will, through the fact, or through this, that it constitutes the ultimate end in something, or puts in something, does not lose its, what, free power, right, huh? But before it constitutes its last end in this, for example, in pleasure, right, it is able to constitute its last end in something else, as in, what, yeah? Therefore, even after it constitutes its last end of its will and pleasure, it, at the same time, can constitute its last end in, what, riches, wealth, yeah? Therefore, it is possible for the will of one man to be, at the same time, born in diverse things, as in, last ends. The thing Thomas is going to object to is the idea of Seymour, right? Look at the third one. To the third, it should be said that the power of the will does not have itself, but it makes opposites to be together, right? That's the key thing. What should happen if it tended in many things disparate, as in, what, last ends, as is clear from what we've heard before. But against this is that in which one rests, as in his last end, dominates the affection of man, right? Because from that he takes the rules of his whole life. Whence about the, he got this, huh? It is said in Philippians 3, whose God is there, what? Belly, yeah. Well, it's interesting what scripture has to speak, right, huh? Because God is our last end, so what you make your last end is said to be your God, right? Even though it's not God, huh? That's beautiful. It's said, huh? Whose God is there, what? Belly, huh? Because they constitute their last end in the delights of the stomach, huh? But, as is said in Matthew 6, no one is able to serve, what? Two masters, huh? Not ordered to each other, right, huh? Therefore, it's impossible for there to be many last ends of one man. and not, what, ordered to each other, right? That's kind of interesting, huh? You might serve two masters, huh? I don't experience the academic world sometimes, was that people try to get two of the teachers, you know, disagreeing, right, huh? They even on the exams, you know, they get the pressure off them, you know, and get the two guys going at each other. But sometimes, too, you have students who are attached to this teacher, right, huh? And others who are attached to this teacher, right? But they swear by this teacher, so to speak, and others who swear by another teacher. But can you have two teachers like that, huh? Two masters in that sense, huh? I don't think so, huh? Deccanic was more known than Dion, right? So can you get attached to Deccanic? It's kind of outgoing personality and so on, but I know, you know, when Warren Murray went up to Laval, you know, to look at Deccanic, Deccanic made perfectly clear to him that Dion was a master. And Mary Shane, you know, when she went to Laval there, and she stayed with Mrs. Deccanic, Mrs. Deccanic made perfectly clear, but Deccanic made clear to her that Dion is a master. And when I was doing my doctorate thesis, and I was working on a question that was in the thesis there and so on, I wanted to see what Deccanic thought about, right? So I went to him and asked him, he says, you know, why do you bother asking me when you've got Dion? He was my advisor, right? He wasn't going to even answer me. So I wonder what you think anyway. So he, you know, tell me what he thought, you know. So I was just, so can you serve two masters, right? You know, one time in class there was some discussion of equivocal names or analogous names. A little complicated what Deccanic was saying. So I said, well, I'll put it up, you know, so you can have it. But you go ahead and see Dion, of course. Dion. So he never got it, of course. Dion. Dion used to joke about Dion, his principal passion was fear, right? And, of course, the fear of being mistaken, you know. And you come up with some new idea, you know. His first reaction is to reject it, you know. And you'd have to, you know, justify it to be good, you know. That's a beautiful one, huh? No one can serve two masters, huh? That or himself, huh? So who's your master, Berquist or Thomas? Yeah. So if you see me departing from Thomas, you say, well, you say, you're not going to follow me, right, huh? You're on your own. If you follow me departing from Thomas, then I'm your master, right? I'd call you to Shrewsbury, but that may be not much further. Okay, I answer, Thomas says, that it's impossible that the will of one man, now, right? He's not saying or denying that two men might have a different ultimate end, right? Warren Murray tells me the story of he joined this club, you know, which is kind of a cuisine club, or what it was, you know. So he goes to their annual dinner, right, and he just sits down, he doesn't know anybody, of course, and the guy who's there started talking about some of the problems they had in getting some of the ingredients for the banquet, right? And almost didn't get this, almost didn't get that, you know, and he was so agitated, you know, Warren's quit the whole society. You know, I get some, you know, kind of good teas, you know, and some of these, you know, tea experts, you know, they, you boil that two and a half minutes, or you boil this four in, in, in, in minutes and ten seconds, you know. And so I, you know, don't do just that about, you know, it's going to be ruined, the tea, you know. And then, I do, I give them all four minutes, and it's standard, you know, I don't know. But, I mean, they have, you know, and how hot the water's supposed to be, and this, and this, and this, and this, and this. Well, maybe they can tell the difference, but I can't be bothered. A friend of mine used to say about these high-powered, super high-priced stereos, headphones, and he said, you know, you get up the upper end of these things, and they're really super expensive, and he said, you know, the only one that can tell the difference is a dog. Yeah. I'm not spending that kind of money. Well, it depends how much you like the dog. So, listen to Thomas' words here. It is impossible that the will of one man, right, huh? So, he's not denying of, what, two men, right? One might have his stomach. Simo, right? Right, okay. And that refers, you know, to time, right, huh? That's a word in the, well, Hama would be the word in the categories, right? But, we're for Simo, right? Matu. Right after the chapter on, what? Before and after, right? Because the first meaning of before and after is in time, huh? And, of course, the first meaning of Simo is, what? In time, right? So, we kind of say about boys, you know, they get attached to some game, right, huh? And they want to play that game, right? And they're looking for other boys who want to play that same game, right? And then, after a while, they lose interest in that game or something, and then they get a new friend, right? And someone else can play into whatever it is that they are attached to, right, huh? So, their life revolves around, you know, that game, you know, for a certain period of time. But then, something else evolves around, you know, girl, I don't know. Yeah, yeah. Okay. So, he says, it's impossible that the will of one man, Simo, at the same time, right, huh? Has itself to diverse things as to last ends, right? And he says, of this, the reason to be signed is what? Befold, huh? And the first one is perhaps the most fundamental one, yeah. The first is because since each thing wants or desires its own, what, perfection, that someone desires as his last end, that he desires as a, what, perfect good, and one that is, what, completing of himself, right? Once Augustine says, in the 19th book of the city of God, the end of the good, we now say, not what is constituted, that it not be. I think he's using what? The sense of end as being what? It's not that sense of end, I mean. It leads to the destruction of the thing. But what is perfected, that it be, what, full, right? Okay. I used to give the students this statistical argument, I'd say, happiness is the end of life, the end of life is death, therefore happiness is death. What's wrong with that? When you say happiness is the end of life, you mean, by end, that's for the sake of which, huh? But when you say, the end of life is death, end means what? Yeah, is that what Augustine is talking about here? I think he's making that distinction. I don't know what the English text says. How is it the English text? In speaking of the end of good, we know not that it passes away so as to be no more, but that it is perfected so as to be complete. Yeah, yeah. Those are the two different senses of end, right? Nearest Dahl talks about that in the second book of the physics, right? Two different senses of end, right? But the one sense of end, that's for the sake of which, is the fourth kind of cause, huh? Notice the word plenum in Latin is plenum, right? Let's say about the scripture there, I was thinking about the text there, where it's in Christ, it says the plenitudo divinitatis, the fullness of divinity, right? Yeah. But it's interesting to examine that word, fullness, right? Because you can see that the word full comes from what? The class being full or something of that sort, right? And then it's carried over, you know, and you see, he fully understands something, right? You know? The perfection. in the completion of the thing, but it's taken from something very concrete and sensible about it. The fullness of it. You've got a full plate, as they say. So it is necessary, he says, that the last in, thus what? Fulfills the whole desire of man, that it leaves nothing outside itself to be what? Desired, right? Otherwise it wouldn't be the last in. Which is not able to be if something extraneous, right, is required for its what? Perfection, huh? Okay. Who was I reading? But some bishops are talking, you know, about young people nowadays, you know, kind of finding out that things that are offered up by society as happiness, there's something missing, you know? I mean, there's some good things in here, you know, but there's something missing. And they come to the priest or come to the church, you know, with this in mind, that there's something missing, right? So a friend of my dad. So it can't be the end of it. A friend of my dad, we used to, I played golf with him once in the blue moon. My dad just played more regularly. And this guy, I think it was a fall in the way Catholic, he and his wife. And when I came to the monastery, he knew about that, my dad told him I was going to the monastery. And shortly after I left, he said to my dad, out of the blue, because he never talked about religion, my dad. He said, my wife and I started going back to church because we thought something was missing. That's exactly what he said. So when Thomas gets through, you know, in Subaconic Gentile, he's showing what the end of man is, then he shows that it, what? Satisfies all his desires, right? Which is not able to be, he said, if something is extraneous to its perfection is, what? Required. Whence it could not be that in two things, thus, the appetite tends. Because then one would not be, what? Satisfying it, huh? As if each should be the, what? Perfect good of it, right? Now Thomas, in replying to the second objection, just because he related to that first argument, look at the reply to the second objection there, right? He says, things that are not opposed to each other can both, what? Be desired, right? To the second, it should be said that although many things can be taken which do not have any opposition to each other, right, huh? Nevertheless, it is opposed to a perfect good, right? That to be something of the perfection of the thing outside itself. Now when Aristotle takes up the word perfect in the fifth book of wisdom, the first meaning he gives of perfect is what has all its parts, huh? So if you're missing one of the parts, right, you don't have something, what? Perfect, right, huh? And the second meaning he gives of perfect is what? What has all the ability, what? The ability of its kind, right? And that's really the second meaning, huh? And I always point to the example of Dryden, you know, Dryden says when he began to go to the theater, there was this more plays of, you know, Beaumont Fletcher being performed than Shakespeare, right? And especially Dryden, and then as he saw those plays again and again and started to see Shakespeare's plays, he realized Shakespeare's superiority, right? He said he realized that Dryden was just a, what? A limb of Shakespeare, right, huh? I think it's a beautiful way of saying it, right? But he's talking about the second sense of perfect, right? But he's going back and using a word that belongs to the first sense of perfect, huh? Has all its parts, right, huh? Okay. You know, Einstein speaks of a pre-established harmony between Mozart and Johann Christian Bach, that's the youngest son of the great Sebastian Bach, but he went south, you know, to Italy and married a Catholic and came back. So, but, you know, they describe J.C. Bach as Mozart was something missing. That's the second sense, you know, of course the second sense of perfect, right, huh? You know? I often say, you know, people would say to me, you know, he's Aristotle, there's something missing. I would consider that a great compliment, you know? Or he's talking about something missing, you know? A lot missing, yeah. Then he was, he's Aristotle, there's a lot missing. Oh, yeah. So, to a perfect good, which is the idea of the last end is going to be a perfect good, right? It's something of the perfection of that thing is, what, outside of itself. There the opposition comes in, huh? So, if you have a perfect good that you desire, there's nothing outside of that that you desire as your last, what, end, huh? Now, what about the power of the will to, to will different things? Well, that's their objection. Let's look at the reply to that. That the power of the will does not have itself, that it can do opposite things together, right, huh? Which would happen if in many things that are disparate, as in ultimate ends, it proceeded, right? Because then one would be not, what? Either would be, what, perfect, right? Or if one of them was perfect, it would be seeking nothing beyond that, right? What you would be doing is pursuing two ultimate ends. Let's go back now to the body of the article because most of those arguments are tied up with the first argument here. The second argument is a little more subtle, right? The second reason is because, and I think it's a beautiful comparison there. Just as in the process of reason, the beginning is that which is naturally, what, known. So also in the going forward of the rational appetite or desire, which is the will, is necessary that the beginning is that which is naturally, what, desired, huh? Now, stop on that before we go on to the next principle he's back there, huh? But Thomas has a beautiful passage here in the summa-conscientific field, huh? Where he says that we acquire what is not natural, what, and he gives as a very clear example of this, the fact that we acquire, what, knives and forks and hammers and hammers and so on, uh, through our hands, right, huh? So the hand is a natural tool, tool that we're, what, born with, right, huh? You know, even the baby, you know, they grasp your, your finger or something like that, huh? Okay? So, um, all these artificial tools, huh, are acquired in some way through the hand, right? And therefore the hand is sometimes said to be the tool of tools, right, huh? Okay? Now, um, another, a little less obvious case, but it's, covers a lot, when Aristotle in the book on the poetic art is talking about the imitative arts, right, huh? And he makes the famous statement that man is the most imitative of all the animals. So monkey see, monkey do, other animals imitate, but there's no animal that's as imitative as what? Man. And this is in some way behind the fact that there are plays and things of this sort, huh, these imitations, huh? And he says, uh, at first we learn by imitation, right? And, um, we all naturally delight in imitations, right, huh? So what is that delight that we take in imitations, which is natural to us, or by nature, the most imitative animals? What is that behind, right? If I speak English, more or less, uh, what is that behind, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right, right