Prima Secundae
Lecture 13: Honor as Sign of Excellence, Not Beatitude

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So, honor is owed to God and to the most excellent as a sign or testimony of a, what, pre-existing excellence, right? Not that the honor itself makes the, but excellent, right? Okay. That's what politicians think. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. That's fine. Some of them like it when you play that Hail to the Chief, you know, when they come in, you know, makes them feel good. It must feel pretty good. Have you had that? Well, it's a march. Oh, there's 10, there's 21 again, salute over there. Of course, the man of honor is making sure that it gets the full quota. Yet, honor makes people, you know, do pursue higher things to some extent. It's not terribly bad, it's effective. To the theory, it should be said that from the natural desire of the attitude, which honor, what, follows, it happens that men most of all desire, what? Honor, right, huh? Whence men seek most of all to be honored by the wise, in whose judgment they believe themselves to be, what? Confirmed, whether they're excellent or what? Happy, right, okay? First, it says that you want to be honored by someone you think is, what? Notice what he's saying, right? You know? To be honored by the, you know, the ignorant multitude, right? You know? There's no confirmation of any excellence in your writing. Like a priest told me, he does a lot of mission work and this and that. He's in the community, it's very popular. And he said, well, you guys, you guys are doing important work at the church. We're like rock stars. All right, you know, hoop down, hoop. You guys are the real people. You're the real people. So, I guess we've got to stop down here, huh? Yeah. Mm-hmm. Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit, amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. God, our Enlightenment. Guardian Angels, speak from the lights of our minds, order the luminary images, and allows us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. May I be with us? And help us to understand what you have written. Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit, amen. Well, last Monday there, at Mass there, the saints were Perpetua and Phlicita, huh? Okay, so I was thinking of Perpetua Phlicitas, huh? But coming back a little bit to that word, you know, that Thomas will use, say, we are finding the Latin translation, say, of Aristotle's Nicomaiacian Ethics, the word that is translated in English as happiness, and which is eudaimonia in the Greek, is translated into the Latin by Phlicitas, huh? And I think I mentioned how the word Phlicitas comes from Felix, which means, what, fruitful, right, huh? Now, if you look at question 70 here in the Prima Secundae, which is the question on the fruits of the Holy Spirit, huh? In the body of the article, the first article there, you have Thomas giving a kind of explanation of this word, fruit, huh, which he's doing there at that point to explain the, what, the, why St. Paul speaks of the fruits of the Holy Spirit and what these things mean, right? Well, we're interested in it for the more, just the basic meaning of how the word fruit is extended. So he says, As I answer, it should be said that the name fructus, huh, which I suppose you could translate as fruit in English, is carried over, translato, that's what the word translato means, from bodily things to spiritual things, huh? And that's a common thing with our names, huh? Now that is called fruit in bodily things, which is produced from a plant when it has arrived at, what, perfection, right? And has in itself, which has in itself, suavitatuma, which means, what, sweetness, huh? So you can see how the word fricitas might be applied to the end of man, right, huh? Because it comes when he arrives at perfection, and it is, what, pleasant or sweet, huh? And then Thomas goes on a little bit, he says, Which fruit can be compared to two things? To the tree producing it, and to the man who obtains fruit from the tree, right? According to this, therefore, the name of fruit in spiritual things we're able to take in two ways. In one way, as it is called, the fruit of man, as it were of a tree, right? That which is, what, produced by you, right? And I say in some way that word fricitas is appropriate in the ethics, right? Because Aristotle is talking about how fricitas, or happiness, is a result of your virtuous behavior, right, huh? And so that kind of fits this sense, huh? Okay. Another way, that is called the fruit of man, that which man himself, what, obtains, huh? And he goes on, he says, Not, however, everything that a man obtains has the notion of a fruit. But, and this is two things then, that which is ultimum, or last, and having pleasure, right? Okay, that's why it's called sweet, metaphorically, right? Now, you have this thing explained in other parts, too, there, where he talks about the fruition, you know, of it after the will. We'll see it there, huh? Okay. Now, a little side here to Shakespeare, right? To my current reading, or rereading, I should say, huh? Which is the, or was the king of the shoe. Just finished it, huh? I think I mentioned before how in the beginning of the taming of the shoe there, after the induction, you have Shakespeare's most explicit statement about philosophy. And Lucentio, the young man there who's traveling around Italy, huh? He says to his servant, Trinio, who's an older man, actually. Kind of his pedagogue, you might say. Trinio, since with a great desire I had to see fair Padua, Nursery of Arts, I am arrived for fruitful Lombardy, the pleasant garden of great Italy, and by my father's love and leave, am armed with his good will and thy good company, my trusty servant well approved in all. Here let us breathe and happily institute a course of learning and ingenious studies. Pisa, renowned for grave citizens, gave me my being and my father first, a merchant of great traffic through the world. Vincencio, come at the vent of Oli, Vincencio's son, brought up in Florence, it shall become to serve all hopes conceived, to deck his fortune with his virtuous deeds. And therefore, Trinio, for the time I study virtue, and that part of philosophy will I apply that treats of happiness by virtue especially to be achieved. That's a good description of what the epige is about, right? That part of philosophy that treats of happiness by virtue especially to be achieved. So he says to Trinio, tell me thy mind, for I have Pisa left, and M to Padua come, is he that leaves a shallow plash to plunge him in the deep, and with satiety seeks to quench his thirst. And Trinio says, and Shakespeare's a little bit Italian, mi perdonate, great master of mine. I am in all effected as yourself, glad that you thus continue your resolve to suck the sweets of sweet philosophy. That's a lot of sweetness in that line, right? To suck the sweets of sweet philosophy. Now, make a little side here. What's the Latin word for wisdom, huh? Yeah. And that comes from what? Taste, huh? Okay. And Thomas sometimes explains the word, or the etymology of the word, as sapida sciencia, right? Which could be translated as savory knowledge, right? Tasty knowledge, right, huh? It's something you have to, what? Savor, right? You see, we have to savor Shakespeare, right? Okay. But notice how wisdom is in a way our end, isn't it, right? And the end is called what? Sweet, right? The sweets of sweet philosophy, huh? Only good master, while we do admire this virtue and this moral discipline, let's be no stoics nor no stocks, huh? I pray, huh? Well, that's kind of the stoics were saying, you know, if your wife and children are being killed in front of your eyes, you can't do anything about it, you just feel like a, what? Yeah, you don't, yeah. So let's be no stoics nor no stocks, right? It's kind of a pun on the word stoics there, I pray. Or so devote to Aristotle's checks as Ovid, huh? The poet of love, huh? The art of love. Be an outcast quite adjured. Bulk logic with the acquaintance that you have, huh? And practice rhetoric in your common talk, huh? Music and poesy used to quicken you, huh? The mathematics and the metaphysics. Now, he used out philosophy of nature, but mathematics and metaphysics, what? Alliterate, right? So the beginning and the end of looking philosophy, huh? The mathematics and the metaphysics fall to them as you find your stomach serves you. No profit grows where there's no pleasure attained. In brief service, study what you most affect, huh? Now, he used out natural philosophy, but in King Lear, he calls natural philosophy the wisdom of nature, right? And I mentioned before how I like that way of speaking, huh? You could say that the wisdom of nature is about the wisdom of nature. And that's not to say it's about itself. But you have those two senses of the wisdom of nature, right? The wisdom which is about nature and the wisdom which nature shows in its works, huh? which is really partaking of God's heart, right? Just like, you know, the term word of God is about the word of God, right? Two different... senses there, right? Or we could say that Shakespeare's education used reason is a knowledge of reason in both senses. It's a knowledge which reason has about reason, right? So a knowledge of reason could say either what the knowledge is about or of whom or of what has the knowledge, right? Now, I won't go into the whole play, but as you know, Petruchio tames the shrew, right? So, at the end, what does he say, huh? When finally, you know, kind of his superiority now of his married life over that of the other two people who get married in the course of the play, huh? People are amazed at how he's tamed her. Here is a wonder, as Tensio says, if you talk of a wonder. And Tensio says, and so it is. I wonder what it bodes. Petruchio says, marry, he says, peace it bodes, right? And love, and quiet life, and awful rule. That's awful in the good sense now, right? And right supremacy, and to be short, but not that's sweet and happy. Sounds sweet, doesn't it? What's not that's sweet and happy, huh? Puts the two together, right? You think about that in terms of the explanation of flichitas, huh? It's very good, huh? Now, second point that we made last time, we're talking here a little bit about the question two here, which we're now into the what? Was it article three we left out? Yeah, I think. What? Article two we start with today? Okay. If you look at the premium here at the question two, where he's going to consider in what things beatitude consists, right? And about this, he says, four things are asked. First, where the beatitude consists in wealth or riches. Second, he wither in honors. Third, wither in fame or glory. Fourth, wither in power. Fifth, wither in some bodily good. Or sixth, wither in pleasure, right, huh? And then in some good of the soul or in some creative good. But the first six articles quite of course bond to the parts of false happiness, right? In Boethius, huh? So in a way, Thomas is following the order of Boethius in the consolation of what? Philosophy, huh? And I brought the consolation of philosophy with me today. And you find in the third book of the consolation of philosophy, Lady Wisdom has come down to console him, right? Like you met current wisdom or any other time, huh? But the commentator says, you know, Lady Wisdom comes down to the form of a woman because a woman is more consoling than a man, right? And so wisdom is, of course, sapiensia is feminine in Latin too, of course, huh? But anyway, in the third book, Lady Wisdom first talks about false happiness and goes through what false happiness is. And then she turns to what? True happiness. And the ninth reading of the ninth part there of the third book, huh? It's a turning point there. I'll just read you in the English here. Now let what I have so far shown you of the shape of false happiness suffice. If you look at that properly and thoroughly, the right order now is to show you what true happiness is. So Thomas seems to be following that what? Order, right, huh? Okay. Okay. Okay. Now, in the beginning of the third book here, huh? When Lady Wisdom is talking about false happiness, huh? There she touches upon the, just to read you a little bit what she says here. But you say you are desirous to hear more. What desire you would burn if you knew where I was going to lead you? Where, I asked. To that true happiness, said she, which your spirit too dreams of, but cannot see as it is really because your sight is too occupied with images. Then I said, tell me, show me without delay, I beg you, what the true happiness is. I shall willingly, she answered, for your sake. But first I shall try to describe in words and delineate a subject better known to you. So that when you have seen that clearly, you may, since you will then have turned your eyes on its opposite, recognize the appearance of true blessedness, huh? Said quae tibi causa notziores, right? And that's the false happiness, huh? And then she goes on there in the next little reading. She says, the whole concern of men, which the effort of a multitude of pursuits keeps busy, moves by different roads, yet strives to arrive at one in the same end that happiness. Now that is the good which once a man attains, it leaves no room for further desires, and is the highest of all goods, containing in itself all that is good. For if there were anything lacking to it, it could not be the highest good, since there would remain something outside it which could be desired. So it is clear that happiness is that state which is perfect, since all goods are gathered together in it. This it is, as I have said, that all men strive to obtain by various paths. For the desire for the true good is naturally inborn in the minds of men, but they are led astray after false goods. Now some men believe that the highest good is to want nothing, so that they are able to abound in riches. But others hold whatever is most worthy of honor to be the good, huh? And strive to be honored and respected by their fellow citizens for the distinctions they receive. There are some who think that the highest good lies in the greatest power, but those who think fame is something very good hasten to spend their names abroad, made glorious through skill and war or peace. War, however, measure their enjoyment of the good in terms of joy and gladness, and think it most happy to abandon themselves to pleasure, right? And then he goes in and shows, well none of these are really, what, true happiness, right? So I think that's kind of an interesting thing to see, the order there that Moethius has, huh? And in a way, Tom's, I think, kind of follows that too in the third book of the Summa Kahn Gentiles, when he's taking up, at length, the human happiness, huh? But he often returns to this false happiness, huh? Even he talks about the happiness of God, right? And he shows that whatever men might seek in false happiness is found in a much better, true, and more abundant way, in true happiness, right? Because there's some element of truth in false happiness, and men would not pursue it as if it were in true happiness, huh? That's really a great book there, The Consolation of Philosophy, huh? It's interesting, huh? Our best writer here, Washington Irving, right? Even the sketchbook, right? He touches upon that, one of the things here. It's kind of amazing, the learning of Irving, because he never went to college, right? He never went to high school. I don't know where he got his knowledge, right, huh? He's describing, you know, the future James I of Scotland, right, who was a prisoner for years in England, right? And I'll just read you a little passage here, huh? Where he's talking about this poem that's attributed to him, huh? He lay in bed, wakeful and restless, and took a book to beguile the tedious hours. The book he chose was Buickius' Consolations of Philosophy, a work popular among the writers of that day, and which had been translated by his great prototype, Chaucer. And Chaucer, you know, Chaucer, what's Spencer, Milton, Shakespeare? Those are kind of the big names in his fiction. From the high eulogium in which he indulges, it is evident that this was one of his favorite volumes while in prison. That's when he wrote it, in prison. And indeed, it is an admirable textbook for meditation under adversity. It is the legacy of a noble and enduring spirit, purified by sorrow and suffering, bequeathing to its successors in calamity the maxims of sweet morality and the trains of eloquent but simple reasoning by which it was enabled to bear up against the various ills of life. It is a talisman, which the unfortunate may treasure up in his bosom, for like the good King James lay upon his nightly pillow. Did you see that you talked about sweet morality? So let's go back now to the text of Thomas, actually. We've been refreshed by these. Article 2, huh? In question 2, huh? Whether the beatitude of man consists in honors, huh? Notice that the word here being used is beatitude rather than felicitas, right, huh? I suppose because in theology everything is defined in reference to God, right, huh? And so that our beatitude, or our true happiness is in a way a blessing from God, right, huh? Behold how good it is and how pleasant our brethren dwell at one, huh? And then it's because of him as blessing us, right, huh? And so that's the word being used. Why, in the commentaries they say on the ethics, the word in Latin there is felicitas, huh? But Thomas says here in the first objection, beatitude inem sivi felicitas, right? Okay? But in English, you've got the poor word, happiness, right? Yeah. Is the reward of virtue, as the philosopher says in the first book, in the ethics, right? We did this, didn't we? But the honor, most of all, seems to be that which is the, what, reward of virtue, as the philosopher says in the fourth book of the ethics. Therefore, an honor, most of all, consists, what, beatitude, right? I mentioned before how in Aristotle, at the end of the first book, when he's kind of reducing the subject of ethics, huh, and the distinction between moral virtue and the virtues of reason itself, So, then he kind of takes as a line around virtue that's a praiseworthy, huh? An honorable quality, right, huh? And vice is a dishonorable quality, right, huh? So, you might say, well, okay, maybe honor then is the reward of virtue, and that's what it's all about, right? It's an honorable quality, right? So why should I pursue it for happiness? Well, because happiness is honor, I guess. But, moreover, that which belongs to God and to the most excellent ones most of all seems to be the attitude, huh? Which is the perfect good, huh? But of this sort is honor, as the philosopher says in the fourth book of the ethics. There he takes up the virtues that are concerned with honor, right? One of which is magnanimity, which is concerned with great honors, and the other is philotenia, concerned with little honors, huh? And also in 1 Timothy 1, the apostle says, honor and glory to God alone, soli deo. Therefore, in honor consists beatitude, right? Moreover, that is most desired by men, that which is most desired by men is beatitude. But nothing seems to be more desirable for men than honor, right, huh? Because men suffer, what? Injury, you might say? In all other things, lest they suffer some detriment of their, what? Honor, huh? Therefore, in honor beatitude consists, right? So, Heraclitus is kind of summing up, you know, most of men, he says, are like beasts, you know, pursuing the pleasures of food. So, yeah, but the noblest ones seek honor, right? Okay. That's like Achilles, right? Okay. But against this is that beatitude is something in the one who is blessed, right? But honor is not something in the one who is honored, but more in the, what? One honoring him, who shows reverence to the one honored, huh? As the philosopher says in the first book of the ethics. Therefore, in honor, beatitude does not, what? Consist. I think I was comparing that last time to what Aristotle was saying about friendship, you know, and friendship consists in loving and being loved, right? You've got to not only love but be loved before you are friends, right? But then he asks the question later on, does friendship consist more in loving or being loved, right? And, of course, consists more in loving than being loved, right? Because being loved is nothing in the man being loved, huh? It might be a sign of something good in him, right? But the being loved is really something said of him because someone else is loving him, right? And so friendship is, consists more in loving than in being loved, huh? So Thomas etches, I answer it should be said that it's impossible. Cannot be, huh? Not able to be. That beatitude consists in honor, right, huh? For honor is shown to someone on account of some excellence of him, right? And thus it is a sign and testimony of a certain excellence which is in the one honored, right, huh? So I told you about that famous time when the Heiden first heard the quartets of Mozart, huh? That he was there to dedicate to Heiden, right? It's called the Heiden Quartets, right? But they're written by Mozart, right? And so he came to Mozart's father and he says, before God is honest man, right? Your son is the greatest composer known to be, right? But he goes on to describe the excellence of Mozart and so on. But above all, Mozart's taste, right? He talked about it. Interesting word, taste, right? So honor is shown to someone on account of some excellence he has, right? And thus it is a sign and a certain testimony to that excellence which is in the one who is being honored, right? But the excellence of a man is most of all to be noted according to his, what? In the attitude, huh? Man, which is the perfect good of what? Man, huh? I mentioned before how in Aristotle takes up the word perfect. The first meaning he gives a perfect or complete is what has all its parts. And the second meaning he gives a perfect is what has all the ability of its kind, huh? The perfect carpenter, right? He can do all these different things, huh? And then the third meaning he gives a perfect is what has reached its end, right? That's kind of the culminating meaning of perfect, right? So the end and the bodum perfectum, the perfect good, go together, right? Which is the perfect good of man and according to its parts, that is according to those goods by which something of beatitude is partaken of. And therefore honor is able to be something that follows upon beatitude. Which is a sign and witness to, right? But chiefly, it cannot be that in which beatitude, what? Consists, right? Okay? Anymore. Aristotle says that, something like that in the book on friendship, that to be loved in a way he says is to be honored, right? It's not exactly the same thing he says, huh? But, you know, even that popular song, nobody until somebody loves you, right? Those words are the popular song. But you feel like nobody until somebody loves you. But it's the truth of that, right? You see? But again, honor cannot be the chief good any more than to be loved can be one's chief good, right? But it's a kind of witness, huh? That you're honored or you're loved, that there's some good in you, right? Yeah, well, that's a good point. But in the case of God's loving, God's love is the cause of the good in us, right? Well, our love is aroused by the good we find in them, huh? So, So, God's love is the cause of the good in us, right? So, So, He's speaking about honor in the sense of honor from men. Yeah. Yeah, honor from God. Yeah, yeah. And we talked about that. We talked about how in heaven you have true honor, right? Because you're honored for what you really are. Not for what people might think you are, but you are not. Now, to the first, therefore, it should be said that as the philosopher says there, that honor is not the reward of virtue on account of which the virtuous, what? Act, huh? But they take honor from men in place of a reward, as it were, from those not having anything better to give them. So that's the big name of this man, right? He accepts the honor, but it just doesn't make, you know, does he care about that, right? Mother Teresa is talking about all the awards you would get from people. She's got this whole room full of all these trophies and plaques and bowls and basics. There's another one. For the true reward of virtue is beatitude itself, huh? I used to say virtue is its own reward, but kind of way of saying that, but not as excesis, right? Because virtue is not really its reward, but its result of the virtue, right? If however one acted on account of honor, it would not be virtue, but more, what? Ambition, right? So you have that disordered man, right? And yet when the man is acting for the sake of honor, he seems to have kind of excelled him in in some way, though, right? Okay? Because he's ambitious, right? He wants to be president. He wants to be something else. Now, he says, honor is owed to God and to those who are most excellent as a sign or testimony of an excellence already existing in them, huh? Not that the honor itself makes them excellent, huh? Well, we kind of confuse that, right? You've read the Iliad there, you know, and when Achilles at the end there is slurping around him, you know, the blood's all in place, you know? He's quitting his way through to immortal glory, right? Honor. Now, what about this intense desire? To the third, it should be said that from the natural desire of beatitude, which honor what? Follows, right, huh? And in a way, when the kene is a saint, that's kind of an honor. Is it being paid to the saint, huh? What's a sign of their beatitude? What they call the first thing is beatification, right? They talk of being raised to the honor of the altars. Yeah. Don't they call it beatification or what do they call it? Yeah. Canonization. For canonization. Yeah, but beatification means being made blessed. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Being made blessed. But not being made blessed, it's kind of a sign of it, you know? It's being, we're being notified of their... They're recognizing, recognizing the beatitude, right? But the word is kind of stating it in a sense, huh? Well, maybe it's in the sense that they've been made blessed, rather than we're making them. Yeah, I mean, somebody else said that I was thinking, yeah, we're not... Yeah, we're not doing it. But we're pretty on the ceremony. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So watch what you're doing there, huh? You're making it. He says, from the natural desire of the attitude, which honor follows upon, it happens in men maximate, right? Most of all, desire of honor, right? So Shakespeare represents, as I say, Hotspur there, right? And Henry V, you know, very much desirous of honor, right? You know, Henry IV, Part I, Hotspur gets killed by Prince Hal at the end of the play, towards the end of the play. One time, the students there, Assumption put on Henry IV, Part I. And the guy who did Hotspur, he did a marvelous job, you know? Yeah, he kind of stole the whole thing, you know? But, you know, you can see this man, huh? You know, and he's killed at the end, as he's dying, you know? It's not his death that annoys him, but the fact that his honor is now all passing over to Prince Hal, right? You know? Because everybody thinks that Hotspur is doing all the great things, right? And getting all the honors, you know? But once Prince Hal overcomes him, right? All these things he's piled up will now go over to Prince Hal, you know? It's kind of like, you know, in the history of philosophy, right? You know, where these philosophers want to be honored, right? Above other philosophers, right? And so, what they try to do is to refute the most famous of those who have come before. So that if you've overcome, you know, the most honored man before then, then you are the most honorable, right? No, it doesn't. Yeah, yeah. But it's funny, though, huh? It's just like, in a way, what Prince Hal is doing, right, huh? You know, everybody's concerned about the fact that he's not piling up his honors the way Hotspur is. But really, really beautiful way Shakespeare describes that desire of honor, huh? Did Lincoln have that desire for honor, right? When he wanted to be president? We'll talk about that sometimes, you know? Some things in Lincoln's character, right? To the third, then, one proceeds thus, huh? Oh, excuse me, I haven't finished the interception. Whence men seek most of all to be honored by the wise, right, huh? Whose judgment they believe, right, huh? By whose judgment they believe, they themselves to be excellent, or what? Felicia's, right? Yep, right? I didn't get the word Felicia's. So I always wanted to be approved by Montague Dion, right? I can't believe there was something good in my mind, huh? I'd rather have the crowd out there, you know? Praising my name, I spoke. Best seller.