Prima Secundae
Lecture 15: Beatitude: Bodily Goods and Pleasure as False Ends

Transcript
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So we're up to Article 5. To the first one proceeds thus. It seems that the baritou de man consists in the goods of the body. For it is said in Ecclesiastics 30, there is not what? Sensus. We have that in the English there. There is no riches above the riches of the health of the body. But in that which is best consists of what? The other two. Therefore it consists in the safety of the salvation of the body, right? I've seen none of the advertising on the TV, you know. You've got your health, you're pretty good. You've got everything, right? Moreover, Dinesh says, in the fifth chapter of the Divine Names, that to be is better than to what? Live? And to live better than the other things which follow. But to be and to live a man requires the, what? Safety of the body, salvation of the body. Since therefore the attitude is the highest good of man, it seems that the, what? Good condition of the body, I guess, sounds. Health in the body, yeah. Salud? Yeah, it sounds, yeah. It's also that we're chances, we take a sense of this from counting, so that's how it might have a sense of wealth. Oh, yeah. You're counting up here. Yeah. Yeah. Okay. Okay. Since therefore the attitude is the highest good of man, it seems that the health of the body most of all pertains to beatitude. Moreover, the more something is common, the more it depends upon a, what? Higher. Higher beginning, yeah. Because the more a cause is above, superior, the more its power extends to many, huh? But as the causality of the efficient cause is considered according to its, what? Influence, so the causality of the end is to be noted according to desire. Therefore, just as the first efficient cause is that which flows into all things, so the last end is that which is desired by all. But to be is what is most desired, what? By all. By men. Therefore, these things, and those things which pertain to the being of man, such as is the health of the body, most of all consists in what? Be added to them. But against this, huh? According to beatitude, man excels all the other animals. But in the goods of the body, he is overcome by many animals, right? Just as by the elephant in the length of life, by the lion in, what, fortitude? Right. By the... By the heart of the deer. The deer, yeah. In running, right? Mm-hmm. And therefore, the beatitude of man does not consist in the goods of the body. So a healthy dog would be better than a man is healthless, primarily, you think. Mm-hmm. Or at least an elephant. Yeah. I answer, it should be said. Impossible. Impossible. Is it for the beatitude of man to consist in the goods of the body? For two reasons, huh? First, because it's impossible that of that thing which is ordered to another as to an end, the last end should be its, what? Conservation and being, huh? Whence the chip captain, I guess, huh? Yeah. Helmsman. Helmsman. Does not intend as a last end the conservation of the boat committed to him, right, huh? In that the boat is ordered to something else, as to an end, huh? To navigating, right? To sailing, huh? But just as the boat is committed to the helmsman, as you say, to be directed, so man is commissioned to his, what? Will and reason, right? Mm-hmm. According to what is said in Ecclesiasticus, chapter 15, God, from the beginning, constituted man and left him in the hand of his own, what? Consul. Mm-hmm. Pretty weak place to leave. Yeah. It's kind of dicey. Now it is manifest, however, that man is ordered to something as to an end, huh? For man is not himself the highest good, huh? Whence it is impossible that the last end of reason and the human will is the conservation of man's, what? Being, right? That's something that has to be attracted to something else, huh? Secondly, because given that the end of reason and of human will were the, what? Conservation of human being, right? It could nevertheless not be said that the end of man is some good of the body. For the being of man consists both in soul and in, what? Body. And although the being of the body depends upon that of the soul nevertheless the being of the human soul does not depend upon the body as has been shown in the Prima Pars, right? So the form is the, what? Beginning of being, right? And so the body has being through the form but the form doesn't have being through the body. But the body is for the sake of the soul as matter for the sake of the, what? Form. And tools for the sake of the mover, right? That through them he might exercise his, what? Actions. Whence all the goods of the body are ordered to the goods of the soul as to a, what? An end. Whence it is impossible that in the goods of the body the attitude consists which is a last end of, what? Man. You could argue that these goods we have in common with the beasts, right? Why better to lose the good of man as part of the man? That's what St. Jane de Chantal used to say. She used to remind herself of that whenever she went to the refactor. Well, it's what we have in common with the beasts. It's been, I developed for myself every time I went to the refactor and I think, off to the trough. Nice to say that you catch and know we're having steak for dinner and see if she would understand me after a while, you know. I've been checking tonight. Now, when I used to argue in class I would take the division of the goods of man that the Greeks have and the goods of the soul, the goods of the body and the outside goods, right? And they say, now, which of these goods are the best, right? And I'd argue, well, the end is always better than what's for the sake of the... So then I'd argue that the outside goods are for the sake of the inside goods, huh? So the chair is for the sake of my body, right? The food is for the sake of my body, right? The book is for the sake of my mind, right? So if the outside is for the sake of the inside and the end, that's for the sake of which something is, is always better, then the inside goods must be better than the what? Outside goods, huh? Now, if they knew a little bit more about the soul and the body, huh? And about matter and form, then I could, you know, repeat the argument and say, but matter is for the sake of form, the body for the sake of the soul, right? Therefore, the goods of the soul must be better than the goods of the body, right? But I didn't think they knew enough about the soul to appreciate it, right? I could show inductively that the outside is for the sake of the inside, right? And you could give an objection, say, well, what about the art of carpentry, which is an inside good of man? It's a virtue of the reason, but carpentry is for the sake of outside things, right? Mm-hmm. or the art of cooking, right? For the sake of the dinner, which is outside of us. But then the chair, though, is ultimately for the sake, again, of the inside, though, right? So even the art, which is for the sake of something outside of us, that outside thing, in turn, is for the sake of something inside, right? So ultimately it always goes back to the outside thing, for the sake of the inside, right? But there's a little qualification there about art, right? Which is better, the art of cooking or dinner? Tasty dinner is better, right? The tasty dinner is, again, for the inside, right? So ultimately the outside thing is inside. So then I would go back and I'd say, well, man is better than the beast, right? Which they were to admit, right? And therefore, the goods which man has that the beast doesn't have are better than the ones that he shares with the beast, right? Because if the goods he shares with the beast were the best goods, then the beast would be just as good as we are. Or I'd argue, you know, that the goods that God is better than man, right? Which they would tend to admit is probable. And the goods of the soul are more like the goods of God, right? Than the goods of the body, right? Okay? Or I'd argue, you know, the soul is more like God than the body, right? Therefore, the goods of the soul must be better than the goods of the body, right? But Thomas here, because he's shown in the first part, he takes up the soul, right? And Aristotle had shown that, right? The matter is for the sake of form. And you can argue again from the end always being better, right? The body is for the sake of it, right? When I, you know, take off from Shakespeare's exhortation, right? I use these other arguments. From things more known to them, right? Than that the body is for the sake of the soul. Well, you probably think it's the other way around, right? Because most people use their reason to see how they can satisfy the body. And it's a, yeah, reason's there for that purpose, right? And it's an appearance of that, right? You know, because most of life is taken up and gained excesses of life, right? And for a lot of people in, you know, poorer countries, right? I mean, you don't even get enough for their body, maybe. I don't have enough to eat or something, right? So you might think that the higher is for the sake of the lower, right? I kind of paradoxically with parents and children, right? The parents are doing all these sort of things for the children, especially when they're little, right? So the parents exist for the sake of the children, right? And therefore, the children must be better than the parents, right? You know, the parents are presumably more developed, you know? And of course, you're taking care of the children so they might become adults, right? It's nice when they're little. Ones are kind of cute when they're little, but if they stayed that way all the time, never grew up, I'm not sure. So you're trying to prepare them for adulthood, right, huh? So rather than become a child yourself, I mean, sometimes they do become children. But so obviously adulthood is something better than what? Childhood, right, huh? A lot of people don't think so, right? Because they think that the good body are better, right? And maybe the kid enjoys his sort of pop more than we do or something, or his candy more than we do or something, you know? I'm not so sure now that, you know, as a little boy, that candy is a pretty great good, you know, but I'm not quite so sure now that it's too high on the scale of goods now that I'll make them a little more mature, you know? Now, Thomas, you know, thinking along these lines, huh? The purpose is thinking along, huh? To the first, therefore, it should be said that just as the body is ordered to the soul is to an end, so exterior goods are ordered to the, what, body itself. And therefore, reasonably, the good of the body is referred to, what, exterior goods, huh? Which, through the word, what? I guess through wealth is an insignified, I guess. I signified, yeah. Just as the good of the soul is referred to all the goods of the body, right, huh? But as I say, it's more known to us that the exterior are for the sake of the interior, right? And not just the body, but also for the mind, right? Because the books are, you know? You carry these books around, it's not the good of the body, you carry these big books, and assuming you're developing your muscles this way or something, or getting your balance, it's used to say, if you put a book in there. There's a poem by Emily Dickinson about what good a book is. It starts off with, he ate and drank the precious words. His spirit grew robust, and he knew no more that he was poor, nor that it's faint as dust. And what liberty, a loosened spirit brings us, he says. But you're talking about reading books are for the good of the spirit, the good of the soul. Yeah. Now, what about this good of being, right, huh? To be or not to be, huh? To the second it should be said, to be simply taken, according as it includes in itself, every perfection of being, right, huh? Is preeminent to life and to all things that come subsequent. For thus, ipsum esse, which is God himself, right, has before in itself everything that is, what, subsequent, right? And in this way, Darnitius speaks, right? He's talking about the name of God. I am, who am, right, huh? But if one considers to be insofar as it is partaken of in this thing or in that, right, huh? And those things which are not, what, grasp the whole perfection of being, right, huh? But they have being in an imperfect way, just as is the being of any, what, creature. Thus is manifest that being with perfection added above that, right, is more eminent, huh, than being alone, right? Whence Darnitius there says that those who are living are better than those who exist but aren't alive, and those understanding than those living but not understanding, right? He's handing that quickstone to Darnitius, huh? To the third it should be said, huh, that because the end corresponds to the beginning, from that reason is proven that the, what, last end is the first beginning of being. In which there is all, what, affection of being, whose likeness we, what, is desired, huh? According to one's own proportion. Some according to being only, some according to being alive, some being, what, living and understanding, and even, what, blessed, huh? And this is, what, few. Of course, huh? And this is, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what Now, whether the beatitude of man consists in pleasure, now this is what we all think, right? Now he's on the subject. It's interesting, Aristotle takes up pleasure there, you know, with his final consideration of happiness in the 10th book, right? And he has to see the distinction there. To the sixth one precedes us. It seems that the beatitude of man consists in what? Pleasure, right? I was quoting Guston there earlier. He's saying that the beatitude is gaudium, the very topic. So sometimes you speak as if it were, what? Something like joy or pleasure, right? Now, beatitude, since it is the last end, is not desired for the sake of something else, right? But other things are desired for the sake of it. But this, most of all, belongs to what? Pleasure, huh? Because it's ridiculous to ask or to seek from someone on account of what he wants to be, what? Delighted, huh? Why do you want to be delighted, huh? Seems like it's, what? Wired for its own sake, right, huh? Okay. Therefore, beatitude most of all consists in pleasure and delight, huh? Okay. So there's a lot of, what, probability in saying that the end is pleasure, right? Seems to be desired for its own sake and not for the sake of something else, right? Moreover, the first cause more vehemently impresses itself upon the effect than the second cause, huh? As is said in the book about causes, huh? But the influence of the end is found in the desire for that end, huh? Therefore, that seems to have most of all, the definition of a last end, that most of all moves what? Desire, right? But this is what? Pleasure, right? A sign of which is that pleasure so much absorbs the will and reason of man and that it makes him, what, hold in contempt of the, what, goods, huh? Therefore, it seems that the ultimate end of man, which is beatitude, most of all consists in, what, pleasure, huh? Moreover, since desire is of the good, that which all desire would seem to be, what, what is best? But all desire, what, pleasure, both the wise and the, what, good. The insipid, the foolish, right? And even, even those lack in reason. Yeah, like the animals, right? Therefore, pleasure is what is best, huh? Therefore, the attitude consists in pleasure, which is the highest, good, huh? All right, let's go enjoy ourselves. I'm convinced. I'm convinced, yeah. Used to be that song, enjoy yourself, it's better than you think. Carpe diem. There's one guy who said, deny yourself, it's better than you think. But again, this is what Boethius says in the third book of the Consolation. I think Thomas has got Boethius on his mind somewhat, right? Sad are the, what, end results? Yeah, outcome. Of pleasure is right, huh? Whoever remembers his, what, lust, you might say, right? Well, understand this, if you recall this, I may, huh? I'm trying to say this, what's I'm saying about that. Pleasure will be paid or something, I forget what that one is. Which, if they were able to make us blessed, right, huh? There would be no reason why the beast's right also would not be called, what, blessed, right, huh? Thomas says, answer. It should be said that because bodily, what, pleasures, are known to, what, many, right, huh? And they take on for themselves the name of, what, pleasures, right, as is said in the seventh book of the Epics, huh? So, that's what most people would think of, that pleasure is something bodily, right? They think that. I could enjoy a Tyrion of Euclid, I mean, I could take pleasure in understanding what the soul is or something, huh? What they think of pleasure is something bodily, that most men, right? So, any body pleasure is more known than any other kind of pleasure. When a hover, there are, what, other pleasures that are more, what, potent, right, huh? It's kind of strange how I should say that, right, huh? They must have tasted other pleasures, right? They're more potent. In which, nevertheless, beatitude does not consist chiefly, even in these, what, more potent pleasures, right, than the bodily pleasures, because in each thing, other is what pertains to its what? Essence, what it is, another to its what? Property, right? Mm-hmm. Propio machidans, right, huh? Just as two is more two than, what, half a four? Even though two is half a four. But it's more two than half a four. And it's more two than three to six. That's a propio machidans of it, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? Just as in men, other is that he is a reasonable mortal animal, right? Another that he is, what, capable of laughter, which is a proper accident of man, right, huh? It should, therefore, be considered, huh, that every pleasure is a certain, what? Proper. Proper accident of what? That follows upon beatitude, huh? Mm-hmm. Or upon some, what? Part of the beatitude, huh? For from this, someone is pleased that he has some good that is suitable to him, right? Either in reality he has this good, right? Mm-hmm. Or because he has it in hope, right? Or at least in memory, right? This is what Aristotle said, right? Uh, but a suitable good, if it is perfect, is the beatitude itself of man. If, however, it is imperfect, it is a certain, what, partaking of beatitude, either near or remote, right? Or at least apparent. Whence it is manifest that neither pleasure itself, which follows upon the perfect good, is the very, what, nature of beatitude, but something fouling upon it as a per se, what, acidenza. So per se acidenza has the same meaning in this text as that term propium acidenza, right, huh? Mm-hmm. But what Porphyry would call Aristotle's son, it's a property, right, huh? Now, uh, the pleasure of the, the bodily pleasure is not able in the, what, foresaid way to follow a perfect good, for it follows upon the good which sense apprehends, huh, which is a power of the soul, an ability of the soul, using the body, right? But the good which belongs to, or pertains to the body, that is... Rats were apprehended, known by the sense, cannot be the perfect good of manna. For sense, the reasonable soul exceeds the proportion of what? And the way we know that is because it has some doings that are not in the body, right? So Aristotle, in the third book about the soul, he shows that understanding is not in the body, right? There are many ways that they show that, right? It means understanding the universal, right, is not in the body, right? Because whatever is received in the body is, from that very fact, individualized, right? So if I understand what a triangle is, am I understanding it in the body? Or another way I sometimes show this is that our reason understands the continuous in an uncontinuous way. So the body is continuous, but when I understand what the continuous is, or understand what a triangle is, is the definition and its parts continuous, do they meet at a common boundary? Right? So if I understand the continuous in an uncontinuous way, is that because of what I understand? No, what I understand in this case is the continuous, right? So if I understand the continuous in an uncontinuous way, then I don't understand it in a body, right? So the fact that the soul has understanding, and the same thing is going to be shown about willing, right? Not in the body, that shows that it's not completely immersed in the body, like the soul of my dog or cat is. So I'll probably stick with somebody here in the back of the car. I love my cat. I haven't seen that for a while. But I'll say, bring the soldiers home, so that's okay. They won't put the camp on the soldiers, right? No, not. So since the reasonable soul excels the proportion, right, of bodily matter, right? The part of the soul, which is what? Free from the body, right? A body organ. Has a certain infinity, yeah? With respect to the body and the parts of the, what? Soul that are concrete in the body, yeah? The power of sensing and the power of digesting and the power of growing and so on. And of course, a sign of this is the fact that the universal, which we understand, is something that's said of an infinity of things, right? So if I understand what a number is, I understand in a way an infinity of things, right? It's something that, the infinity of it in comparison to the body. In that the form through matter is in a way contracted and, what, limited, huh? Once a form free of matter is in some way, what, infinite, huh? So Aristotle says at the end, I think, he's talking about sensing and understanding the souls in some way all things, right, huh? And therefore the sense, which is a bodily power, knows the singular, which is determined by matter. But the understanding, which is a power free from matter, knows universal, which is abstracted from matter, and contains under itself an infinity of singulars, huh? Whence it is clear that the good suitable to the body, that through the apprehension of the senses, causes, what, bodily delight, huh? Is not the perfect good of man, but is something minimal. Something, yeah, very little. Yeah. But, in comparison to the good of the, what, soul. Whence it is said in the Book of Wisdom, Chapter 7, that all, what, gold, in comparison to wisdom, right, is... Great sand. Yeah, yeah. Thomas was going to exchange paris, right, for St. John's wisdom. On the Book of John, yeah. It's the Book of John, huh? That signifies. Thus, therefore, neither is bodily pleasure, beatitude, nor is it even a, what, property of what, beatitude, right, huh? Well, he's really kind of polarizing everything, isn't he? It seems to be just... Now, what about the fact that pleasure is desired for its own sake? To the first, therefore, it should be said that it pertains to the same reason, to desire good, and that, what, pleasure is desired, right? Because pleasure is nothing other than a certain, what, resting of the desire in the good, right? Just as from, in the old physics, from the same power of nature it is, that the heavy is born downward, and that it rests when it gets to the ground. So, by your desire, you're, what, at the weight of your soul, as Guston says, right? And so you're born towards the good, and then that's the reason why you rest or stay in the good once you arrive at it, huh? Whence, just as the good is desired for its own sake, so, pleasure, right, for its own sake, huh? And not, it's not desired for the sake of something else. If Popter speaks of a, what? My own quality. Yeah. Aristotle, in the ethics here, says that pleasure perfects the perfect doing of man, as beauty perfects youth, right? It's not what youth is, but it's kind of something that follows upon the good looks, you know? So, pleasure is something that follows upon the good operation of the soul, huh? So, um, quence, just as the good is desired for its own sake, so, pleasure for its own sake, and not an account of something else, if Popter says the final, what, cause, huh? If, however, it says a formal cause, or rather the motive, thus pleasure is desirable for something else, that is an account of the, what? Good. Good, which is the object of pleasure, and consequently is its beginning and gives it form. For from this, pleasure has its desired, because it is, what? A rest in the good desire, right? What you desire is the good of which you rest. That's kind of a consequence of that, that you want to rest in it. Now, to the second should be said that the vehement desire of sensible pleasure happens from this, that the doings of the senses, or the operation senses, which are the beginnings of our knowledge, right? Like we were saying before, when you talk about the word fruit there, right? How it's carried over from the things everyone owns. Which are the beginnings of our knowledge, are more, what, perceptible, huh? Whence also, by the many, sensible pleasures are, what, desired, right? And Shonan says there, sugar. That's what he's interested in, sugar. At least he knows. I mean, different things, but it's got to have sugar in it, to really be wanted. That's the best, yeah. To the third should be said, in the same way, all desire pleasure, just as they desire good, right, huh? But nevertheless, they desire pleasure by reason of the good, and not reverse. Once it does not follow that pleasure is the greatest and the per se good, but each pleasure follows some good, and some pleasure follows that which is per se and the greatest good, great, right? Mm-hmm. So it speaks about that in the songs, huh? So if you have a stop here now. So if you have a stop here now, huh? So if you have a stop here now, huh? In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Deo Grazius. God, our Enlightenment. Guardian Angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, or the illumine our images, and rouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Praise God. Help us to understand all that you have written. Father, Santo, and Holy Spirit. Amen. So, Article 7 here. The seventh one goes forward thus. It seems that beatitude consists in some good of the soul. Well, Thomas is going to see a distinction, I admit, to saying that. For beatitude is a certain good of man, but the good of man is divided into three. This goes back to the Greeks, huh? Which are the outside goods, the goods of the body, and the goods of the what? Soul. But the attitude does not consist in the exterior goods, as we've seen, nor in the goods of body, as has been shown above. Therefore, it must consist in the goods of the soul, right? But that's a complete division, and you eliminate two possibilities. The remaining one must be the one, huh? Moreover, that to which we wish some good, we love more than the good that we wish for it. Just as we love more the friend to whom we wish money than the money, huh? But each one desires good for himself, huh? Therefore, he loves himself more than all other goods, huh? But beatitude is what is most loved, which is clear from this, that on account of it, all other things are loved and desired. Therefore, beatitude consists in some good of the man himself, but not in the goods of the body. Therefore, it must be in the goods of the soul. Moreover, perfection is something of the thing that is perfected. But beatitude is a certain perfection of man. Therefore, beatitude is something of man, but it's not something of the body, as has been shown. Therefore, it must be, beatitude is something of the soul. And therefore, it consists in the goods of the soul. So this is kind of surprising, right? You think Thomas is going to take the side that's the good of the soul, right? Against this, as Augustine says in the book on Christian doctrine, that that in which the blessed life is constituted is loved on account of itself. But man is not to be loved on account of himself, but whatever is in man should be loved on account of God. Therefore, in no good of the soul does beatitude consist. So Thomas, now, in the body is going to see a distinction. I answer, it should be said that it has been said above, the end is said in two ways. To it, in one way, the thing itself, which we desire to obtain, right? And then the use or the attaining or possession of that thing. If, therefore, we speak of the last end of man, as regards that very thing, which we desire as a last end, it is impossible that the last end of man be the soul itself or something of it. Because the soul itself, considered in itself, is as in, what, existing in potency, in ability, yeah? For it become, for the one who knows in ability comes to be knowing in act, right? And from the power to be virtuous to being virtuous in act. Since, therefore, potency or ability is an act for sake of act as an account of its what? Completion is impossible that that which is in itself existing in potency have the notion of the last end. Whence it is impossible that the soul itself be the last end of itself, huh? Because it's in potency something else, right? In potency is for the sake of act. Okay? Likewise, also, neither something of it, whether it be its ability or the habit or even the act, huh? For the good, which is the ultimate end, is a perfect good filling of completing desire, satisfying desire. But human desire, which is the will, as opposed to emotions, right, is of the universal good. But every good existing in the soul itself is only a good partaking, a participating good, you might say. And consequently, it's a particular good, huh? Whence it is impossible that something of it be the last end of what? Man. It's not a universal good, right? Particular good, huh? But if we speak, huh, of the last end of man as regards the attaining of it or the possession of it, right, or some use of that thing which is desired as an end, thus it pertains to the ultimate, thus something of man on the side of the soul pertains to the last, what, end, huh? So if you're talking about the end in the sense of what? The possession of the thing you desire most of all, right? Then it's something of the, what, soul, right, huh? You possess this thing by something of the soul, huh? because man through his soul reaches, huh, beatitude, huh? So the thing, therefore, which is desired as an end is that in which beatitude consists and makes blessed, huh? But the attaining of this thing is called, what? Beatitude, huh? Whence it should be said that beatitude is something of the soul, right? But that in which beatitude consists is something outside the soul. And that will be God, of course, huh? So beatitude is something of the soul, but that in which beatitude consists is that which we attain by something in the soul, by knowing and loving it, right? Now going back to the first argument there, right? Is that an either-or syllogism, right? Well, when you have an either-or syllogism, you've got to what? Exhaust all the possibilities, right? So when Thomas asks, you know, later on, are faith, open, charity virtues, huh? One of the objections is every virtue is either a moral virtue or a virtue of reason, but these are neither of them and it goes to the virtues of Aristotle. Thomas says, well, it's a virtue in a different sense, right? Supernatural virtue, but is that division of virtue therefore complete, right? Okay. So the first effort should be said that according as under that division are comprehended all goods, right? Which are what? Desirable for man. Then the good of the soul is said not only the what? Power or the habit of the act, but also what? the object, right? Which is extrinsic. And in this way nothing prevents us to say that that in which beatitude consists is a good of the what? Soul. That is to say it's an object of the soul, right? But it's not something of the soul. that in which the Beatitude consists, right? Though the Beatitude is something of the soul. It's kind of subtle, huh? This is a very subtle argument, right? It's easy to argue against riches being in the Beatitude, but to see this distinction, right? But you can't find in yourself something that would exhaust your ability to love, right? This isn't that fullness of goodness in oneself, right? I was playing around with the numbers last day, and it would be in the 8th book of Euclid, right, huh? And how many theorems are there in the 8th book of Euclid, huh? Well, obviously there is 27, right? Now, I was saying, what's the significance of 8, the 8th book having 27 theorems? Pardon me. Oh, no. Oh, my goodness. I wasn't there with the prize. Yeah, you do, but it isn't what you think. Well, 8 and 27 are two, what? Cube numbers, right? All right. Okay. 3, 3, 3. Yeah. 8 is 2 cubed, and, you know, 27 is 3, right? Well, in the middle of the book, right, you have the famous theorems, right? That between any two square numbers, there's one mean proportional, and between any two, what, cube numbers, there are, what, two mean proportionals, right? And therefore, these theorems are attributed by the Greeks to Plato himself, right? So, that's why there's 27 theorems in the 8th book, right? Because you have this famous theorem of Plato, right, that between any two cube numbers, there's, what, two mean proportionals, right? Now, let's show them. 8 is to 12, as 12 is to what? 18, 18 is to what? 27, right? So, 8 is 2 thirds of 12, 12 is 2 thirds of 18, and 18 is 2 thirds of what? 27. So, maybe you do these out, just say 8 to 12, 18 and 27. Plato showed this apparently, and you put that in the way, that between any two cube numbers, there will be two mean, what, proportions, right? And, that's kind of a duplicate ratio, right? Okay, now, suppose you take something like, let's say, 27 and 125, right? What are the two mean proportionals for that? How do you find them? How do you find them? I mean, how would you do that quickly, you know? That 5 cube would be 125, right? Yeah, that's 5, and this is 3 cube, right? What do you do? What's the difference between any two, what would be? There's two mean proportions, yeah. Yeah, but it wouldn't be 27 and 64. Yeah, 27 and 64. In 64, that's one. Where are the others? No, that's... When do you find... That's a cube now, right? In between, yeah. But that's the point. The theorem is not that there's cube numbers in between, but there's two mean proportions between any two cube numbers. Between any two. Yeah, between any two at all. Well, there should be between 27 and 64, there should be two. So that's... Yeah, that's possible. Oh, yeah. Actually, I do that too. Between 27 and 64, or you can get two mean proportions too. All right, I guess. So in between any... Any two. So you can take between 8 and 125. Yeah. Yeah. I see. All right. And then notice, this is... I won't go to what I was thinking about. Now, if you take the least, that same ratio, like 2 and 3, right? And you take what? 2 times 3, which is what? 6. And then you multiply 2 times 6, you get 12. 3 times 6, you get, like, 18. Oh. See? So here, what do you take? You take 3 and 5, and they're what? 15. 3 times 15 is what? 45. Right? 45. And 5 times 15 is? 75. 75. I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. Well, 75 is 3 fifths of what? And 45 is what? 3 fifths of that. That's 45. Is that right? You have 3 nines in here? Yeah. 2 more nines makes 45, right? Yeah. 45, and then what? Let's see. Well, there's 9 fives and 45. Yeah, that's right. That's right. Because 9 and 15 would be 3 fifths. Mm-hmm. Yeah? So you have 3 fifths, 3 fifths, 3 fifths, right? Mm-hmm. It's a triplet ratio. Mm-hmm. You know, right? So now you know why. That's just my device. They'll say no. I won't forget. I don't think I've got the reason for this. I won't forget that Volcanoes got 27 things, right? You know? Those are the first two, what? Q numbers, 8 and 27, right? But he had the famous theorem there that Plato showed that between the two numbers, you'd have two portions, right? Mm-hmm. Beautiful. Beautiful. This is the fourth taste of the attitude? Is that what you're telling me? That's right. That's right. But to the truth, I've talked a while, and it's kind of more often enthusiasm after I woke up after a while. But, you know, it's just completely satisfying my desire to know, you know, to know this. It fascinates me a while, you know. Do you wake up your wife in the room and then? No, no, no. She couldn't care less about Euclid. He probably learned that after the first time. I can tell you what, one summer there, I decided to teach, you know, my kids in the kids in the neighborhood there Euclid, right? So little boys didn't go around and started doing the Euclid, right? About halfway through, the boys were still with me, but the girls were all gone into it. She used to be baking it up. I'll go back to thanking them and the sisters. So we get through the first objection. First objection. Okay. And the second objection, huh? To the second, it should be said that as far as pertains to the, what? Thing proposed? that the beatitude is most loved, right, huh? As the good, what? Desired, right, huh? But the friend is loved as the one to whom one, what? Yeah. Or for whom one desires good, right? And thus also, man loves himself, huh? I think we talked about that in the love and friendship course, didn't we? Two kinds of love. The kind of terms are amor concubicentia, right? And amor amicitia, right? But one is the love of the good that you want for you and yourself or someone else, right? And then a love of friendship is the love of wishing well, the one to whom you wish well, the one to whom you wish this good, right? Winston says there's not the same, what? Ratio of love in both, right? Two senses of the word love, huh? So I can be said to love candy and love myself, right? Candy is the good I love for myself, right? But my love of the candy, my love of the, what? Myself. Thank you. It's not the same kind of love, right? It's not the candy to which I wish well, right? Thomas' example is that he doesn't want the wine to spoil, right? Not because you wish well to the wine, but to yourself, right? Now, whether by the love of friendship, man loves something above himself, right? There will be a place for considering this when you tweet about charity. You might, you know, guess what the answer will be. But we'll leave that, yeah? Okay. Notice that question there, if you apply it there to God, huh? Is God the good that you want for yourself? Yeah, yeah. Or is God also the one to whom you wish well? And wish well more than yourself, right? Think about that, right? That's what Francis de Sales is, the love of complacence and the love of benevolence. Yeah, yeah. Now, the third argument is from the perfection, right? Of the soul being beatitude. To the third should be said that beatitude itself, since it is a perfection of the soul, is a certain good of the soul inhering in it, right? But that in which beatitude consists, as you say, the object, right, which makes one blessed, is something outside the soul, right? So you say you never be satisfied with yourself. Do some people think that they're satisfied with themselves? They try to think that. There's so much good in me that satisfies my desire for the good. But notice, in a sense, this desire that the will has for universal good, right? Now, I see it like in the works of Thomas, right? Something good for many, right? And not just for me, right? That my understanding of Thomas doesn't equal Thomas' understanding, right? Or I haven't got everything out of these books that I can get out of them, right, huh? You know? I'm looking at the first Lectio and the beginning of the Physics there today. And I say, gee, who is now? I kind of missed that a little bit there, you know? And I was reading the three questions about the soul, and I just kind of finished reading that one. I said, gee, who is now? I was talking to Warren Murray on the phone. I said, Warren, you know, I kind of understood a little bit that thing. You know, in the diana there, you know? It's raising it in proportion, you know? These are back proportions, right? Did Warren Warren Murray know why there was a 2070? No, but I'll throw up at him and just annoy him, you know? I have no idea. What difference is that? Isn't he more of the scientists? Yeah, yeah, yeah. I mean, I just do it kind of playfully, you know, because it helps my memory, right? Ah, okay. You know? I probably won't forget now there's 27 theorems and kind of, you know, the way they're ordered, right? You know, a little bit. It's like the Shakespeare's Exhortation, you know, there's what? How many words in there? Yeah. Which is seven times seven, huh? Symbol of wisdom. Is that intentional? Very intentional. And it begins on the seventh syllable, right? Which is symbol of wisdom, right? It ends on the sixth syllable, which is symbol of, what, completeness, huh? Because it's the first perfect number. Is that all by chance? So I kind of said, I was giving up my talk there at the convention, and I said, but this way madness lies. Well, I'll never forget those 49 words, though, right? And so when I lay down my challenge, for anybody in 50 words or less, right, to write an equally good exhortation, right, I challenge them, right? Or even 100 words. I give them 100 words, and nobody ever takes a job. Okay. Okay. Okay. Okay. Okay. Okay.