Prima Secundae
Lecture 16: Beatitude Cannot Consist in Created Goods

Transcript
================================================================================

Article 8, where the beatitude of man consists in some created good. To the 8th one proceeds thus. It seems that the beatitude of man consists in some, what, created good. For Dionysius says in the 7th chapter of the Divine Names that the Divine Wisdom joins the ends or the last of the beginning, right, to the beginnings of the second, from which one can take that the highest thing of the lowest nature is to attain the lowest of the superior nature. But the highest good of man is beatitude. Since, therefore, the angelic and the order of nature is above man, it seems that the beatitude of man consists in this, that in some way he attains to the, what, angel. Interesting argument there. Moreover, the last end of something is in its, what? Yeah, or in the greater state. Yeah. Whence the part is an account of the whole as an account of the end. Remember, I was mentioning before how the two most basic statements about the better are perhaps that the end is better than what is for the sake of the end, and the whole is better than the part, right? But of those two, perhaps the most basic one is the end is better. Because you could say the whole is the end of the part, right? So you can kind of see that as a principle here. But the whole universe of creatures, which is said to be the, what, greater world, right, is compared to man, who in the 8th book of the physics is said to be a liquid world, is the Greek, who is it? Hmm? Michael Cosm. Yeah, Michael Cosm, yeah. And that was, sort of a democratist, I think. As the perfect and imperfect. Therefore, the beatitude of man consists in the whole universe of what? Creatures. Warren Murray is asking an interesting example of the Socratic question there, right? As a scientist, he's sometimes asked, you know, why are these great scientists atheists, right? And like Einstein, you mean he's kind of an atheist, right? And Niels Bohr was an atheist, you know, and so on. And other great scientists. It kind of runs through them, right? And I suppose it's kind of, you know, the start of an attack upon the church or something, right? Why are these scientists atheists, right? And Warren says, well, maybe it's the reverse. Why are they atheists scientists, right? In other words, that they've, for some reason or other, denied God, right? Then they have to find symptoms for God, right? And therefore, they see this in this kind of, this very intense study of the natural world, right? And kind of reminded of it here, right? You know, we'd say, you know, that one is what? Even the way Galileo, or Galileo is a believer, I don't mean to put him in the atheist, but Galileo is saying, why is he studying the universe, right? Well, the whole is a greater thing than the part, right? So we're a part of the whole. Well, topon is the all, as the Greeks would call. Topon, the all. And so it might seem, you know, the universe is the greatest thing there is. And therefore, we've got to find our fulfillment in the understanding of the universe as a whole, right? The way Einstein, especially, gave his life at the end there, after the general relativity theory to the cosmology, right? The study of the cosmos as a whole, right? But that goes back to what you said, the more basic statement is that the end is better than what's been taken, and the universe is for the sake of man, not the end of the earth. Well, no, if you take the universe as a whole, man is a part of it. It's true. Yeah. So you might say that the whole is better than the part, right? In some way. But then you're going to say, but why is the universe just for us? Well, you've got to be careful about that, you know, see, because we might be a very, you know, elevated part, right? In some way, our soul is the end of matter and so on. But nevertheless, the universe as a whole is something better than man, right? Okay. You've got to be careful about that. But when you say the universe as a whole, that would include man, wouldn't it? Yeah, yeah. Man would include the angels, too, right? But scientists might not know that, right? So, anyway. Moreover, through this man is rendered blessed that his natural desire is brought to rest, right? But the natural desire of man does not extend to a greater good than he is able to, what? Grasp, as it were, right? Since, therefore, man is not capable of a good which exceeds the limits of, what? The whole creature. Yeah. It seems that through some created good, man can be made, what? Blessed, right, huh? I ain't satisfied, as Einstein said, to understand the universe, you know. And, therefore, the beatitude of man consists in some, what? Created good, right, huh? But against this is what Augustine says in the 19th book about the city of God. As the life of the flesh is the soul, so the blessed life of man is God, whom it is said in Psalm 143, blessed are the people whose Lord is his, what? God is his, what? God is his, what? Okay. Thomas says, I answer it should be said that it's impossible. Right? That possible word again there. It's not as impossible. Our style of distinguishing is the sense of impossible, right? The strict sense of the impossible is what there in no way can be, right? But also the other things are called impossible because they're hard to realize. I answer it should be said that it's impossible, I think Thomas has taken that in the absolute sense, for the beatitude of man to be in some created good. Now, why does he say this? For beatitude is a perfect, what? Good, huh? Which wholly brings to rest desire, huh? Otherwise, it would not be the last end if there still remains something to be, what? Desired, huh? But the object of the will, which is the human faculty of desire, right? And I pay two stairs taken for the faculty, right? The object of the will is the universal good, right? Just as the object of the understanding is the universal truth, right? You should tell the students, you know, in some sense you know everything, right? Because everything is something and you know the difference between something and nothing, right? So in some way you know everything, right? I always have some students say, I'll go home and tell my dad that Mr. Bergman said we know everything. Well, it's a kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum kundum You know, Dietrich is kind of satirizing these philosophical conventions where everything is satisfying, you're talking about being, you know? He's going to write an essay entitled The Boredom of Being. But in some sense to say it's being or it's something, right, is about as confused as you could be. Indistinct, right? But at the same time, it does show that in some way our mind is open to what? Everything, right, huh? Some people go from the confused to the more confused. This reminds me a little bit of the way the atheist proceeds, right? In the second part of Book 3 where he takes up perfect happiness because he sees happiness as what? The sumum bonum, right? The sumum bonum is God, right? Every happiness is God, right, huh? So you can kind of see that right away in a quick way compared to what the philosopher might see here normally. For beatitude is a perfect good which wholly brings to rest the appetite. Otherwise it would not be the last end if there still remains something to be desired. But the object of the will, which is the human desiring power, is a universal good, right? Just as the object of the understanding is the universal truth, right? Of course, this is said to be the human, what? Ability to desire, the will, because it follows upon a reason, right? Just as the emotions follow upon the senses, right? So if the reason knows truth universally, right? And therefore it knows the good universally, then the will is open to the whole of good. From which he says, Because it is clear that nothing is able to, what? Bring to rest, huh? The will of man except a universal, what? Good. Which is not found in anything created, but only in God. Because every creature has good that is partaking, right? Of the universal good, right? Having in a partial way, huh? Whence God alone is able to fill, I guess, huh? What? Yeah. But I think, at times, the Latin word, the impleri, is the word for full, right? Okay. It's to fulfill the will of man, right? According, as is said in Psalm 102, who fulfills in good things your desire, right? You know, so then you can fill your will, right? One way is your will is going to be more or less empty. Okay? But so you're not full, right? In God alone, therefore, the beatitude of man consists of. That's beautiful the way he reasons that out, huh? And this notion of universal good, is it going to particularly make that? The fact that God is the only universal good? Well, no, he's goodness itself, right? So he includes, what? The good of some creatures as in a partial way, right? He does this in a complete way, right? So if he's goodness itself, and no creature is goodness itself, goodness is that by which the good is good, right? So anything that could be good would be good by partaking some way of goodness. That's to say in some way partaking of what God has, or what God is, I should say. Okay? You see, you know, one way they show this is to go back to the connection between perfect and good, right? And we speak of perfect, even Aristotle in the fifth book of wisdom. When he takes up the word perfect, he first takes up, three meanings of the word perfect, right? And first meaning of perfect is what has all its parts. The second meaning of perfect is what has the whole debility of its kind, right? Like Homer is the perfect poet. He doesn't have everything, but he's everything that a poet needs, right? Or Mozart is the perfect musician, right? Okay? And then the third meaning of perfect is what has reached its what end, right? And then after that, Aristotle makes another distinction, right? Or points out a distinction between what is perfect in its kind, which is lacking in nothing that that kind of a thing should have, right? And then what is lacking in nothing. Even Averroes says, he's talking about God there. Thomas, right? He agrees with Averroes, huh? That's what Aristotle's talking about there, right? Really profound, Aristotle, right? And sometimes when Thomas, after he shows that God is, that God to be is the same thing as God, I am who I am, right? He says nothing is, what? Perfect, except through, what? Being something, right? He says, I would not be perfect by my wisdom if I was not wise by this, right? Okay? My justice would not perfect me if I was not to justice, if I could not be said to be just, do my justice, right? Okay? Even health would not be perfection of my body if my body were not healthy to health, right? Or my body was not strong through strength, right? Okay? So, it's always by some kind of being that one is, what? Perfect, huh? Well, God is being itself, right? So he's universally perfect, right? Anything else would be perfect by being in some particular way. And by universally, you mean complete? Yeah, universally perfect, yeah. That's the way we describe God, right? I said the sense in which God is perfect is given by Aristotle in that distinction in the fifth book of wisdom, right? So God, in terms of being itself, right? He has whatever perfection I have by being something, by being a logician, or by being a geometer, or being a mathematician there from the eighth book, right? I don't understand too well. It's beside the point. Okay? It's by being in some way, right? That I have a certain perfection, right? But God's being is in no way, what? Limited to being in this way or that way, right? But he's being itself, right? So he contains, in eminent way, any perfection that any creature would have by being in some way. I have being only in some way. I'm not being itself, right? And so I have a little partaking of what God has. But he has a universal, right, huh? Mozart is lacking nothing that a physician should have, right? He's lacking in other things, right? But God is in no way lacking, right? So only a good that is good in the way God is good, right, could satisfy, right, or bring to complete rest our will, right? So our will could not come to complete rest in us, right? In what we are, what we have, right, huh? It could only come to complete rest in God himself, right? So universal would have a sense of perfect. Yeah, but not just in sense of perfect in his kind, but universally perfect, right? Universally perfect, right? The existence of itself in its perfection? In what? Oh, in its perfection. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. That's one of the ways Thomas argues, you know, to the universal perfection of God, right? His being, being, itself. Usually in both Summas, I mean, the order of the five things that Thomas divides up there, right, consideration of divine substance, right? But he always takes up the simplicity of God, huh? Now, before he takes up the, what, perfection of God, right, huh? Okay? It's kind of beautiful, right? But you can argue more from the simplicity of God when you see it in detail, right, huh? Because part of that thing is that he's being, itself, right? You can see more from that, the universality of his perfection, right, than the reverse, right? So I think there's a reason why he always takes that up before the other, right, huh? And it kind of fits in with the character of our mind, right? Because it's more known to our mind that the beginning of things is simple than that it's perfect, right? So I think there's a reason why he always takes that up, right? Because even the Greeks, I mean, the people who thought that there's only a material world, they tried to take the beginning of things, water or earth or air or something, they thought it was simple, you know, and couldn't be broken down into different types, right? But they took something that was at least perfect, right? The most basic kind of matter, right? They didn't take, you know, a dog or a cat. It's the beginning of all things, right? But the first guy said water, you know? And before him they spoke of earth, right? That was the beginning, right? Common mother thou, as Shakespeare says, right? Human breast, you know, feeds, you know, generates and feeds all, right? But they didn't see that first thing as being perfect, right? I was trying to read through the last two books of wisdom there, which Thomas didn't comment on, on the 13th and 14th books, you know, but a number of places Aristotle's coming back and saying, these guys, you know, who didn't see at the beginning of things was the most perfect thing, right? And he sees that difficulty, right? And that they didn't see that the first thing was the, what, most perfect of things. I think I mentioned how, I mean, places Aristotle talks about this, but the main places in the ninth book of wisdom where he says that ability is before act, right? And the thing that goes from ability to act, right? But the thing that goes from ability to act does so by reason of something already in act. And therefore, what comes simply before in the universe is something, what, perfect and actual. And only in some respect, and it's a very qualified sense, does ability to proceed after act. And, you know, the second kind of mistake that Aristotle talks about outside of speech, right, in the specific refutations is the fallacy of mixing up what is so simply and what is so not simply. And that's a common mistake, right, it's made all the way through. But in a sense, that's a mistake that the moderns and the materialists are making, right? Because in some particular way, limited sense, right, in some qualified sense, right, ability to before act, therefore they think that's the whole truth, right? That's the truth about the universe as a whole. I mean, it's just the reverse, huh? I mean, that kind of mistake is made all the way through philosophy, right? You know, in the Mino there, which is kind of a reduction to logic there, you have Mino saying, you know, well, you can't know the unknown, right? And you've got to be careful there, right? Because Socrates' whole, you know, he's famous for knowing that he doesn't know, right? So he knows what he doesn't know, right? He says, well, how would Socrates be possible if he couldn't, in some way, know what you don't know, right? I mean, I walk down the street there and I see somebody coming up the street and say, I don't know what his name is, you know? Do I know what I don't know? Yeah, I don't know his name, right? Now, is that to know simply what I don't know? Come on, let's say his name is George, and I don't know that his name is George. Then I even know what I don't know. But then I know what I don't know, right? See? Then I know simply what his name was, George, right? You see what I mean? But in some way, I know George, right? Because I know I don't know his name, and his name is George. So in some way, I know what I don't know, right? But that's in perfect sense, right? So, I mean, you know, what's his name? Pino is saying you can't go looking for what you don't know. Why are you paying all these guys to do research, you know? The guy who's trying to find the cause of cancer or Parkinson's, they're talking about discovering some gene for Parkinson's or something. I don't know, or discovering something. But are these guys being paid? They don't know what they're looking for? Well, simply, they don't know what they're looking for because then they wouldn't have to be looking for it, right? If they didn't know in some way what they're looking for, how could they direct their activity towards that, right? How could you look up on the internet to find something else you don't know if you didn't know what you're looking for? Google this. Why? I don't know. They asked you, yeah, yeah. Google this. Why? I don't know. The unknown. Google. Google. I don't know who it does. Unknown.org. You should probably break down. The unknown.org. There'll be an whole website out there, an organization, a job paid dues, a proper sticker. None of the Summa Cargantinus, as I mentioned before, when Thomas takes up the goodness of God, right? The first article is whether God is good, right? The second one, whether he's goodness itself. The third, whether it could be anything bad from God, right? Anything bad can happen to him. Then the fourth one is whether he's, as Augustine says, the good of every good, right? And then the fifth article is whether he's the, what, summa modem, right? I think in the Summa Theologiae, God is the good of every good. That's not one of the articles there, right? So that's, you know, a little superiority in the Summa Cargantinus, man. But then you really kind of, you know, get a big view, right, of God's goodness so far as we can know it there, philosophically, theologically, right? But I mean, part of that depends upon understanding the way which God is, what, perfect, right? Because Thomas takes up the perfection of God before his, what, goodness, right? Even though they might do the same thing, right? But he shows that God is perfect and universally perfect before he takes up God's being good, right? And what was his first objection? He managed to only reach the lowest ranks of the angels, right, huh? To the first, therefore, it should be said that the, what, highest thing in man attains the lowest of the angelic nature to a certain, what, likeness, huh? Not, however, that it there rests as in a last, what, end, huh? But it precedes usque, as far as the universal fountain of the good, huh? That's a beautiful way of speaking, huh? Which is the universal object of beatitude of all who are blessed, right, huh? As it were, existing as an infinite and, what, perfect good, huh? You notice in the Summa, in the Summa Theologiae, he takes up the infinity of God right after the, what, perfection of God, right? Because he's really seeing, I think, the connection between the infinity of God and his perfection, right? They kind of go together, right, huh? It's almost like infinity is modifying, you know, grammatically speaking, the perfection of God, right? He's infinitely perfect, right, huh? There's no limit to his perfection, right, huh? That's why we never get bored in heaven. Well, I mean, the thing is that when you start to talk about love or desire, in general, you first speak of the good, right, huh? But God's love and his knowledge and all these things are the same as his goodness, right, huh? But you first see it in terms of good because good is the object of the will, right? And, you know, when you're talking about the last end of man, end and good, we saw even from the Nicomache Ethics, right? Good and end seem to be almost the same thing, right? In a secondary way, the means could be said to be good, but the primary meaning of good is the end. That's where Aristotle, in the second book of wisdom, says that to deny end is to deny the good, right? So it's not surprising that the moderns can deny the end. They don't really have any idea of the good, right? Because the good is chiefly the end, right? Most of all, the end of the whole universe, which is God himself. You know how Augustine begins the Confessions there, you know? Does he have kind of prayer, you know, or a sigh, shall we say? Too late have I come to know thee, thou ancient, what, beauty? Doesn't he call God ancient beauty? But God is, what, beauty itself, right? And if you read the, what is it, the Symposium of Plato, right? That's very beautiful there, Plato. Because Plato has Socrates, you know, talking about beauty, right? And then he talks about the lesser, you know, matters of beauty. He goes on to the higher matters, right? And then he talks about it in a sense, you know, and the contemplation of beauty. But all the way up to the beautiful itself, which is God, right? And it's not in one way beautiful, another way not beautiful. But it's, what? Anyway, look at it. It's beauty itself, huh? If you go back to Thomas' explanation there, you know, the metaphor of sweet and so on, we speak of the beautiful as, what? As being restful, right? You know? I'm convinced this rock and roll stuff is not beautiful, because it's not restful to listen to, right? I was reading about some, I think it was a bishop, a bishop, I guess. But a very busy bishop, as they are, a very bishop. You know, he couldn't, you know, losing his ability to go to sleep at night, right? And so, finally someone found the solution for his problem was, that was like for half hour or so, before he goes to bed, he stops doing his work and listens to some nice classical music, and then he could go to bed and sleep, right? So the beauty makes you kind of what? Restful. Restful, you know? He was one of the stars there. Yeah, yeah. They're beautiful, right? But it helps you to sleep, you know? Rest, yeah. So if God is what? Beauty itself, then he's the only one that completely brings our heart to a what? Rest, huh? Metaphorically put you to sleep, but... So that's the first objection, okay. The second should be said, If some whole is not the last end, but is ordered to a further end, the ultimate end of the part is not the whole itself, but something else, right? But the universe of creatures to which man is compared as a part is to the whole is not the last end, but is ordered to God as to a last end, huh? Whence the good of the universe, which is its order, huh? Is not the last end of man, but what? God himself, huh? Thomas is always quoting what Aristotle says in the Twelfth Book of Wisdom, you know, where he talks about the good of the universe, right? And Aristotle speaks of this distinction here between that when a whole is ordered to some good, right, huh? You can speak of two goods, and one is the order within that whole, right? And the other is the end for which the whole is. So, you can say in the chair here, right, huh? Aristotle speaks of two orders, right? One is the order of the parts of the chair to each other, like this part here comes in at a what? What kind of an angle? Acute? Obtuse? Or a right angle? Obtuse, yes. Yeah. A cute angle would be the worst, right? The worst is that. But even a right angle would not be so good, right? Okay. So, it comes in at a slightly obtuse angle, right? And not one of those chairs, you can go all the way down to a very obtuse angle, put you to sleep. But, so he said there's a certain order of the parts to each other, right? And this comes in, and this comes in at this angle and so on. But then the whole chair is ordered to what? Sitting. Sitting, okay? So, sitting is better than what? The whole chair, right? The whole chair is for the sake of sitting, huh? So Aristotle speaks of the order of the universe, the order of its parts one to another, right? And then the order of the whole universe to the separated good, which is God, huh? And Thomas is saying that, right? You know, so when the part is for the sake of the whole, yeah, is that the last end of the part? Well, if the whole itself is ordered to a further end, then that is the last end even of that, what? Part, huh? Okay? You know, Paul VI there, I remember, he used to complain, where is the love of the church now, he'd say, you know? But isn't the church a greater good than any one of us, huh? So, in some sense, I should love the church more than myself, huh? Greater good than me, right? But the whole church is ordered to a, what? Yeah. When the psalm says, or glorify the Lord, he talks about, you know, he's put peace and order in the thing, you know, and then given them the best week. Well, I think that's referring to the Eucharist, right, huh? So that's, so Christ is better than the whole church, right, huh? But the whole church is better than, what? Me, right, huh? Okay. So I'm for the sake, in a sense, of the good of the church, right? I should love the church more than myself. I should love Christ even more than the church, right? The church is ordered to Christ, huh? Or God, right? Remember how Thomas was quoting it there in that text there in the premium, his premium, to the Nicomachean Ethics, right? The distinguishing between those two orders, right? But taking that text from the 12th book. The order of things to each other, the parts to each other, and the order of the whole to something further, right? First, I'll use an example there, the armor. There's an army, there's an order within the army, right? But then the whole army is ordered to, what, victory over the enemy, right? So MacArthur says, in war there's no substitute for victory, right? He stands to say that, right? And, but that's because the whole army is ordered to, what, victory, yeah. So we'd say that there's no substitute for God. Because the whole universe is ordered to God, it's to its end or purpose, right? To glorify God, huh? Notice how, in a sense, in the Our Father there, the first thing we ask for is, hallowed be thy name, right? And then the second thing is, thy kingdom come, right? So why is, hallowed be thy name before thy kingdom come, huh? Yeah. To glorify God, right? Thomas defines the kingdom of God as the ordered society of those who see God. See? That's the order within the kingdom, right, huh? But that's for the sake of the order of the whole kingdom to God himself, right? So we've got to admire Aristotle for seeing this distinction, right, huh? Compared to the universe as a whole, right? The order of the universe, intrinsic to the universe, right? The order of one part to the other is not the ultimate thing. But the whole universe as a whole is ordered to the separated good, which is God. Now the third objection, huh? but men reaching are not going to be some good to the third should be said that the created good is not less than the good of which man is capable as of a what inward thing right and indwelling right inherent intrinsic is nevertheless less than the good of which he is capable as a what object which is something what infinite it comes to often take the fact you know that we can go on forever with numbers right the fact that our mind is ordered to something what infinite right we don't know what the infinite thing is right I think I was mentioning how Heisenberg's student there Weitzacher you know talked about how the renaissance and a little after that they went from the final universe that Aristotle had posited to the infinite universe the famous book there from the closed universe to the infinite universe you know He says this took place at the same time that there came about a decline in the study of theology and God right and so they're if they don't have the infinite God then they've got to have a universe that's what infinite and then he describes how you know in the physics of the 20th century he started to discover all these limits right and after Einstein's general theory of relativity it seemed that even the universe might be limited in size and maybe you're limited in time and he describes you know giving a lecture on the developments in modern physics and this older physicist getting very angry you know this whole thing so an older man gets angry so he kind of you know teach him with some respect and he decided to go see the physicist afterward and see what his objections were and he didn't have any scientific objections to what he was saying I mean it's any difficulty but he just didn't like the idea of these limits appearing all over the place well he began to you know reflect upon that right exactly you know well why was what turns does it make you know well the point is that our mind does want something infinite or it is ordered something infinite right and if the universe is not infinite then it's got to find it somewhere else right and Thomas himself says you know that even the early Greeks you know they thought there was an infant body out there somewhere you know or the air went on forever or something you know and when they realize that maybe there couldn't be an infinite body maybe you know then they realize the infinity had to be found somewhere else right but the mind is is naturally ordered to the what infinite huh but you can see that most easily in the fact that numbers go on forever right the mind keeps on thinking of these higher things like I put the theorem there about the cute numbers I said what about you know four I'm not going to get to that to be fired but so is your mind is not you know it's ordered to the infinite right but what is that infinite it's ordered to so he says it should be said that the greater good is not less than the good of which man is capable as an intrinsic inherent thing he's nevertheless less than the good of which he's capable as an object which is infinite but the good which is partaken of by the angel and even by the whole universe right is a finite and contracted good and this is you know sometimes Thomas will take that up you know because God had made a different universe well yes made the kind of universe he wanted to right so the something finite and contracted in this universe that we live in right which can't therefore be the end for us let's take a little break now let's take a little break now let's take a little break now let's take a little break now let's take a little break now