Prima Secundae
Lecture 17: Beatitude as Uncreated and Created: Nature and Operation

Transcript
================================================================================

Okay, question three here, a little premium here. Then we're not to consider what is beatitude, right? And the things that are what? Required for it, right? Now about the question, what is beatitude? Eight things are asked, right? First, for the beatitude is something uncreated. Now remember that distinction now between the object, right? The beatitude, which is something uncreated, right? But is the beatitude itself something uncreated? So whether the beatitude is something uncreated, well, we'll see. Second, if it is something created, which probably we saw in the first article, whether it be an operation, an act. Apparently the answer to that is going to be yes. Third, whether it's an operation of the sensitive part or of the intellectual part. Only, yeah. Now the fourth one, this is going to be the more controversial one here. If it is an operation of the intellectual part, the understanding part, would it be an operation of the understanding or of the what? Will. And Perry is going to answer it's an operation of the intellect, right? And then whether, if it's an operation of the understanding, whether it's an operation of the speculative or the looking understanding, right? Incidentally, there, if I speak English, the word would be looking, right? Like Shakespeare has, right? But you have the words theoretical, which comes in the Greek for looking, and then speculative, which comes in the Latin for looking, and then looking, which is the English word, right? So, but usually people, you know, don't call it the looking understanding, but the speculative or the theoretical understanding, right? Or the practical, right? The doing. Okay. Yeah. I'm preparing the answer to the answer to the speculative one, right? Can I guess what's going to do with these articles from the order of them, right? Whether, if it is an operation of the looking understanding, whether it consists in the looking of the, what, speculative sciences, right? Like Euclid and so on, right? And maybe even the physics, right? Third, seven, whether it consists in a looking at the separated substances with the angels, right? I was wondering this morning, whether I was starting to reread the tweet of some of the angels there in the Prima Paras, right, huh? It's like full work there. And that's when the rank of an angel thinks of this, right? You haven't seen, you haven't got the size idea of what an angel is per question. But kind of, you know, watch it by mind, you know. You know, Teacher Catricus used to say, you know, the angel watching you make decisions like you're watching, you know, an eagle worm, you know, decide where to go or something. You know, but he starts saying, you know, I've got no idea, you know, what the angel really is. Why do you see me? That's what they say. The fellow I knew on pilgrimage, he asked Father Wagner about, what do you suppose the angels think about us going to the moon? Oh, and he said, you're probably not impressed. That's just going from there to there. Great deal. I remember one of these TV hosts there, you know, was interviewing William F. Buckley, you know. They were up in New York, there were all these skyscrapers there, you know. This guy was, I forgot exactly the conversation, but, you know, it's impressive, you know. He was saying to Buckley, the interviewer, Buckley says, toys, he says. Okay, apparently the angel's going to be known about being angels, right? Now, my teacher, I told you that story, my teacher said, when you first see your kind angel, this is God, you know. And he said, no, no, he's up higher, but higher than me. Not even the highest of the angels, but he's still higher than us. And eight, I guess we're going to find the final, what, truth about this, whether it be in the Sola Speculazione Dei, in the looking at God, not that you have in philosophy, or even by seeing your own soul, but the one in which you see God, who is what? Very essence, huh? But St. John, you know, speaks of seeing God as he is, right? That's another way of putting it, huh? Or seeing him face to face, as St. Paul says, right? It's a little more metaphorical, maybe, but seeing him as he is. I used to stick both of them, to be sure. What's he got as he is, face to face? That's what God said about motives. I speak to him. Yeah. Now, you've got eight articles, right? You know, what's this business about the rule of two or three? Maybe it's the first one? Yeah. And whether or not it consists, in what part it consists? A group of articles there about it being an operation, right? Whether it's an operation and then, and then, yeah, I mean, you might divide. That's an operation, then which operation in particular is it, right? You only divide the one against the other, right? So you'd probably have to divide these into, what, twos and threes, right? I was looking at the twos and the angels this morning, and Thomas begins by saying, okay, four parts, right? Oh my gosh, what's wrong with the man? He needed a good answer. Yeah. So, he divides into four. Substance of God, right? Then, the understanding, excuse me, substance of the angels, right? The understanding of the angels, right? The understanding faculty, right? And then the, what, the will. And then their, what? Creation. Yeah. Well, you can easily divide that into two or three, right? Because I'd probably divide it into two. The first three are about the angel in itself, and then it's creation, right? And that doesn't make sense, right? And you can divide the first into three immediately, or into the substance and the operation of God, right? I mean, the angels. And, but I mean, I think time is edge, you would tend to divide it into two or what? Three, you know? Interesting, when he divides a consideration of creatures there, he divides it into the angels, and then matter, and then the soul, right? Kind of what you have in the, in the Psalms and so on. And then when in Daniel, then when you're praising God, right? You kind of start with the angels, then you go to the lower matter, and then you end up with man, right? It's kind of interesting, that order, right? It's not the philosophical order, but it's, it makes some sense. Because man is kind of, you know, a microcosm, as you said, right? Because he involves the material world and the spiritual world, then combined, in a sense, so he's kind of considered last. That's why it's probably appropriate for Christ to become a man, right? I mean, that's one of the reasons. Because he brings up the whole creation back to God, and the material world as well as the spiritual world. So, to the first end, one proceeds thus. It seems that the attitude is something uncreated. Now, get back to us talking about Boethius. For Boethius says in the third book of the Consolation of Philosophy, it is necessary to confess that God is, what? The attitude itself, right? I was mentioning a bit how he argues that the attitude is the sumum bonum, right? And the sumum bonum is, what? Well, God, right? So, the attitude must be God. And Thomas ends up the first book of the Summa Cana Gentiles by talking about the attitude of God, right? God is the attitude itself. We kind of partake of God's, what? Beatitude, right? Sometimes they call beatitude, what? Eternal life, right? Of course, God has eternal life, essentially, right? But we have a certain partaking of that in the deity vision. And here's the very soldiers in the house giving. Remember that, right? Beatitude is the highest good. But to be the sumum bodum belongs to God. That was the last article on the goodness of God in both summas, right? Therefore, since there are not many summa bona, it seems that beatitude is the same thing as God. Moreover, beatitude is the last end in which naturally the human will tends. But in nothing other does the will as an intend except towards God, who alone should be what enjoys. So I shouldn't enjoy my candy or my steak. This is a hard teaching. Who can follow this? Especially with chocolates and cookies around. Therefore, beatitude is the same as, what, God. Against all this is that nothing made is, what, ungood. But the attitude of man is something made, huh? Because according to Augustine, those things should be enjoyed, which make us blessed, right? Therefore, beatitude is not something uncreated, huh? See, God is going to be both the object of beatitude, right? And our beatitude will be a partaking or a likeness of God's beatitude, right? So God just thinks about himself. That's what we'll be doing, huh? Just thinking about him. Looking at him, huh? I answer, it should be said that as has been said above, the end is said in two ways, huh? In one way, that thing which we wish to, what? Obtain, I guess, huh? Just as to the avaricious man, the end is, what, money, huh? I was thinking about the Magnificat, you know, and how, what does she take there, you know, the proud, the second part of the Magnificat, that God is not going to be too good to the proud and to the, what, rich, powerful, and some of the, some of the, most of the goods there, right, you know, the riches, the power, the honor and glory, another way, the obtaining or the possession, right, or the use or the, what, enjoyment of the thing which is desired, right, huh? Just as it be said that the possession of money is the end of the avaricious man, right, huh? And to enjoy a pleasurable thing, right, is the end of the intemperate man, huh? Now, in the first way, the last end of man is the uncreated good to wit God, who alone, huh, by his infinite goodness, huh? And notice the way those two are put together, right? Su infinita bonitate, right, huh? In that sense, I kind of understand the order a little bit better in the Summa Theologiae, right, where he takes up the perfection and goodness of God, and then the next question is after that, the infinity of God, right, huh? Because infinita here is modifying, what, bonitate, right, huh? That's the way I try to force the five into three, right, huh? That infinitate could be put with the goodness of God, right, huh? As being kind of, what, modification of it, right, huh? Grammatically speaking. But here you see it, huh? Quis solus su infinita bonitate, right, huh? Thomas More have to say that than say his simple goodness, so he could say that too, right? Because they're all, in a sense, the same thing. Who alone, by his infinite goodness, huh, is able to perfectly fulfill the will of man, huh? I think implere would be translated by fulfill, wouldn't it? I mean, if you want to be etymologically like it, huh? I was talking about how the word full is taken from the continuous, right, huh? You know, my glass is not full anymore, right? Okay? But, you know, it's carried over there, huh? When you talk about your desire being fulfilled, right, huh? Okay? Sometimes people speak of their cup as overflowing, right? In the second way, huh, where you speak of the possession now, right? Or the obtaining of the good, right? The last end of man is something created existing, what? In him, right? Which is nothing other than the obtaining or the enjoyment of the last, what? End, huh? Now, the last end is called, what? Beatitude, huh? Okay? It's got other names too, huh? Behold how good it is and how pleasant for brethren to dwell at one. It is when the precious weight up on the head runs down on the beard of the beard of the beard of the beard. Up on his collar, right, huh? His due like that affirming, which comes down upon the mountains of Zion. For there the Lord has pronounced his, what? His blessing. That's where you get the beatitude, right? And then it says, what? Yeah, which is like eternal life, right? So sometimes the last end is called eternal life, huh? Right? Okay? That's Psalm 132, which is in the third part of the Psalms, right? Which is dealing with the resting in the end now. If, therefore, the beatitude of man is considered as regards its cause or object, right? Notice here, cause and object are the same thing, right? Not that the words mean the same thing, right? But they can be the same thing, huh? Just like what Thomas says, is good the what? Yeah. But the middle term is that the object of love is the cause of love. Good is the object of love, therefore. But you can say for all, you know, even for all the emotions, right? You can say that the object of fear is the cause of fear, right? The thing I fear is what causes me to be afraid. You know, you're afraid of that, whatever, Japan there, the same thing going up, melting down, whatever. If, therefore, the beatitude of man is considered as regards the cause or object, thus it is something, what? Uncreated. If, therefore, it be considered as regards the very essence of beatitude, thus it is something, what? Created, huh? So now we're interested in the essentia, what it is of beatitude, right? And that's something created, huh? Thus it is something created, huh? To the first, therefore, it should be said, the great text of the great Boethius there. To the first, therefore, it should be said, and of course, even Aristotle sometimes will hold God up as a model of what happiness is, huh? To the first, therefore, it should be said, that God is beatitude to his very, what? Substance, his very essence. For not through the obtaining or partaking of some other good is he blessed, right? But he's blessed to his very, what? Nature, his very substance. But men, however, are blessed, as Boethius says there, right? By partaking, huh? Just as they are called, what? Gods, huh? By partaking, even scripture. But that partaking of beatitude, by which a man is said to be blessed, is something, what? Created, huh? So my seeing God as he is, my seeing God as he is, is something created, right? It doesn't exist now, but, okay? And even my, what? Loving God, right? Is something, what? Created, right? To the second, it should be said, that beatitude is said to be the highest good of man. not because it is the highest good, but because it is the obtaining or enjoyment of the what? Highest good, huh? To the third it should be said that Beatitude is said to be the last end in the way in which the obtaining of the end is said to be the what? The end. Okay. Now, whether Beatitude is a what? Operation, a doing, huh? Oh. You read the question, reading the QD there on the soul, usually you have about 20 objections, you know? Well, yeah, but we're just beginning. To the second one proceeds thus, huh? I suspect in the original text of Thomas, you don't have the utumbiotis where they sit uprights here, right? You have to wait to get to the, to the, I also recall what I said before. To the second one proceeds thus, it seems that Beatitude is not a operation, an action, an act, or a doing, right? For the Apostle says in Romans chapter 6, You have your fruit in what? Sanctification. Your end, eternal life. That's what I was doing with the psalm there, right? But life is not an operation, but the very being of the one living, huh? Therefore, the last end, which is Beatitude, is not a what? Operation. So, actually, you know, to live, or life is this double sense, right? It can refer to the operation, or it can refer to your very, what? Being, right, huh? So, my death, which is the opposite of life, is opposed to life in the sense of my, what? Being a living animal, right? If I say my life is being, then you're talking about an operation, right, an activity, right? My life is listening to both sides, or eating steaks. What was he doing then, was teaching, teaching of his life, or anything? Semavi, yes, what do you do? Oh, oh, oh, yeah, somebody said, was going to retire, and he said, well, that's Semavi, yeah, something about his life. My life. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. So, it doesn't mean he'd be dead if he stopped teaching. But, to your senses, okay. Moreover, Boethius says, in the third book of Consolation, that the Beatitude is a state made perfect by the bringing together of all goods, right? That means a collection, or it means, you know, in God, right, that you have, in a sense, all goods. Thomas often quotes scripture there, where God says to, I think he says to Moses, I will show you every good. It sounds like a collection, right? And Thomas says, it is, myself. I show you myself, I will show you every good. But we have to speak that way, right? Thomas is talking there, you know, about the angels, and how we have to know a simple thing in a composed way, right? A way of knowing is not the way the thing is, right? So, the angels, we know the things above us, which are more simple than we are, in a more, what, composed way, right? But we know the things below us, in a way, more simple than they are. It's kind of interesting, right? So, in a sense, we say, God is every good, one. You know, it's because we have to, what, we can't express very well the universality of his goodness, right? And that scripture's the only way of speaking there, when God says, you know, I will show you myself, right? You know, when we try to imagine the excellence of an angel, even now, we say, you know, if you imagine a man who was, you know, had the musical gifts of Mozart, and the poetic gifts of Shakespeare and Homer, and the philosophical gifts of Aristotle, the theological gifts of Thomas, and the scientific gifts of Einstein, oh, Mr. One, you know, you know, you know, then you say, really, you know, he has the fullness, right? You know, and the prudential work of George Washington, or military thing, or MacArthur, or somebody, all rolled into one, one hell of a guy. When Thomas is talking about the perfection of an angel, each angel has the whole perfection of his kind, right, which we don't have, right? No man has the whole perfection of man, and no man reveals everything which man is capable of, right? Right, huh? Well, yeah, I bet I could maybe reconsider that, but... Except for the prudential rules, they say. That's what Chesterton said about God, God as being, all the being, and possibly. Yeah, yeah. But, you know, the thing that is interesting that Christ doesn't show, you know, his understanding of numbers and so on, right? The understanding of the natural world, right? Doesn't mean he didn't have it. He didn't show it. No, no, he didn't show it. He didn't show it at all. He showed some, but not all. He pulled out. Yeah. I suppose it's like a teacher, you know, doesn't... He's teaching the young, he doesn't, you know, say everything he knows, right? But he says something that's, you know, capable of, right? I remember St. Francis de Sales, you know, he gives kind of a parable, you know, and he says, this is our Lord's favorite way of teaching, you know? He's kind of imitating our Lord, but it's kind of proportion to the audiences he's dealing with, too, you know? The Lord has, you know, profound things that you can think about, too. You have to admire his moderation, right? In teaching, you know? It's showing off, you know, a little bit of his knowledge of the moon and the sun, the moon and the stars. And St. Bonaventure says that about preaching, he says, you have to consider your audience. He says, are they sensuales, not meaning sinful, but meaning are they more rooted in the senses, or are they spiritual? In the military, yeah. But status, huh? In the Latin there, boethius, huh? It says status, right? This is not named an operation, right? Therefore, beatitude is not an operation. That's kind of an interesting thing. I don't have to see what, by now, but the boethius is a word there. Beautiful, though. Beautiful. It's like when Thomas, you know, sometimes he has an article on the definition that could be turned into, or something like that, and each objection singles out one part of the definition and affects to it, you know, but it kind of concentrates your mind upon the whole definition in a distinct way, right? There's something beautiful about the way he does these things. Moreover, beatitude signifies something existing in the blessed one, since it is the last perfection of man. But operation does not signify as something existing in the one operating, but more something, what? Proceeding from it, huh? Therefore, beatitude is not a, what? Operation, huh? Moreover, beatitude is, what? Left, something remaining in the one who is blessed, huh? But operation or doing doesn't persist, but passes away, huh? I always forgot about that geometry now, since I've come here. I'll come back a little bit, but. Therefore, beatitude is not an operation, right? That's interesting. Aristotle's talking about the blessedness of God there, you know. He's saying, if he's always in the state which we can only sometimes be, you know? Well, that's powerful, as he says, right, yeah? And if, when he is in it, always. In a better way than we, even more so, you know. But he's got to fill the wonder, you know, about God, huh? But these operations, they come and go, right? Moreover, of one man, there is one beatitude. The operations they're doing are many, right? There's many theorems in Euclid and so on. Therefore, beatitude is not an operation, huh? Then I have 48 beatitudes in the first book of Euclid, right? Only the 47 theorem would be the Pithagorean theorem, right? The beatitude of knowing that. Moreover, beatitude is in the one blessed without interruption. But the operation of man is frequently interrupted by sleep, as Aristotle's talking about, right? Because he's marveling about God, right? Because there's no interruption there, right? In God's blessedness. Or by some other occupation, or by rest, sleep, right? Therefore, beatitude is not an operation, huh? So when Aristotle talks about listening to music there in the hate book of politics, he says, well, sometimes we rest, and for music as a role to play, you know, taking our rest and so on. I remember coming back from a session with Monsignor Dianne, exhausted, you know. Go back to Warren's house, and Diane De Sotel is there, you know. She was a student there. She's playing the piano, so he's like, oh, it's all restful. But I'm no longer at this intense intellectual activity with Monsignor Dianne, right? So, yeah, it's not an operation. What was that? Was he a musician in all himself, Monsignor Dianne, or Belay? I don't know if they played instrument or not. I've heard stories, you know, that I don't know what they threw in at that Monsignor Dianne who was protecting the choir for a while, you know. So I don't know. I don't know about these stories, how they get going, you know. But again, this is what the philosopher says in the first book of the Epics, that happiness is an operation activity according to perfect virtue, right? I answer it should be said, that according as beatitude of man is something created, existing in him, right? It is necessary now to say that the beatitude of man is a, what, operation, activity, right? For beatitude is the last perfection of man. But each thing is perfect to the extent that it is in, what, act, right? So there's how it shows in the ninth book an act and ability. For ability without act is something, what, imperfect, right? Therefore, beatitude is in the last act, it consists, therefore, in the last act of man. But it manifests that doing or operation or activity is the last act of the one operating, right? Or acting. Whence it is called by the philosopher a second act in the second book about the soul. For the one having a form is able to be acting in ability, right? Right? Just as the one knowing in ability is, what, impotency considering, right? And thus it is that in other things each thing is said to be an account of its, what, operation, as is said in the second book on the universe of our star, the chain of window. It's necessary, therefore, that the beatitude of man be a, what, operation of the act. It goes back to the understanding of ability in act, right? This is the ultimate act of man. I'm going to make a sound. I've got a book called The Ultimate Act of Man. Wow. It sounds interesting, right? The last act of man. What would that do? What is he talking about? You could make it a little more dramatic called The Final Act. Yeah. Now, the first is solved. The first, therefore, it should be said that life is said in two ways, right? In one way, the to be, the existence of the one living, right? And in this sense, beatitude is not what? Life, huh? For it has been shown that the being of one man, whatever it might be, is not the beatitude of man, right? And God only is the beatitude, is what? Being, huh? That's how Thomas would show that no one can be as blessed as God, right? Because he is his own beatitude, right? None of the rest of us are our own beatitude, huh? In another way, life is said to be the doing of the one living, right? According as the beginning of life is reduced to act. And thus, we speak of an active life or contemplative life or voluptuous life. And this way, eternal life is said to be the last end. Now, there, that comes in. Another way of naming the last end, huh? Beautiful there. That's, I think, the way St. John's talking about it in that epistle, right? Where he says, we're going to see God as he is. Which is clear through this, that is said, John 17, 3. This is eternal life, huh? That they know you, God, the, what? True one God, huh? But there, God himself seems to be saying that eternal life is knowing rather than loving. To the second, it should be said that Boethius, in defining beatitude, considers the common notion of beatitude, right, huh? Now, there's a common thought of beatitude that it'd be a, what? Perfect, common good. And he signifies it, and this is signified when he says it is a state perfect by the bringing together of, what? All goods. Through which nothing other is signified except that the one who is blessed is in the state of a perfect, what? Good, huh? But Aristotle expresses the very essence of beatitude, showing through what man is in the state. And that is through a certain, what? Operation. And therefore, in the first book of the Ethics, he himself shows that beatitude is a, what? Perfect good, huh? I think you'd say other things about, wait, there's this thing there, right? God was saying earlier there, right? That God himself says, I will show you every good, right? As if God is the collection of all goods. And that's kind of our way of, what? Knowing the simple through, what? Compose, yeah. It's like God is, what? All these rolled into one, right? Universe. Universe. God is the universe. It's all turned into one in God, right? Okay? And that's just turned out into many, right? But God is, that's kind of, our mind has to speak that way, right? To the third should be said, that just as is said in the, what? Ninth book of Wisdom. Ninth book after the book is a natural philosophy. Twofold is action, right? This is the distinction that Aristotle makes. One which proceeds from the one doing it in exterior matter, as to what? Yeah, unto. To dry. Yeah. Or sikhar as a cut. Cut, yeah. I'm sorry. Sikhar. And such a doing cannot be beatitude, right? For such an operation is not the action and perfection of the agent, right? So making a chair can't be my beatitude. Making a chair is perfection of the chair. As such, not of me, right? And it can't be teaching either. Because teaching is a perfection of the student as such, right? And that's kind of, you know, where Marx makes his mistake, right? Because most teachers will say, I mean, college teachers, that they come to learn the subject better in teaching, right? So the teaching perfects the teacher, but that's accidental to teaching, right? You don't teach insofar as you don't know, insofar as you're learning the very thing you're trying to teach. That may be the human condition, you know, for the most part, right? But even so, it's accidental that the professor learned what he's teaching. He should know what I'm going to do. So, that's the first kind of mistake outside of language, right? The fallacy of the accident, right? And that's the one that Marx makes, right? Because he sees man as perfecting himself by making. Because when man makes, he kind of learns, you know? And I've seen practical men say that to me, you know? I'm learning a lot, you know, it's interesting work that he's doing, you know? So, he's perfecting himself as he perfects other things, right? But that's accidental to making. It's accidental that in making something, you perfect yourself in some way, right? But you perfect the thing you're making, it's not accidental to it, right? So, if you make McDonald's hamburgers day after day, you're probably not learning anything about making McDonald's hamburger, but you're perfecting those hamburgers every day, right? It's as far as a hip, right? But people making wine, you know, they learn things and then they make it better, you know, or something like that, and so on. But that's still accidental, right? You can see how people are easily deceived, though, because it happens most of the time, right? And therefore, it seems essential to making that you learn by making, right? Or you learn by teaching or something, right, huh? It's still accidental. Other is the action remaining in the doer, right? As to sense, right? To understand and to will. And this kind of an action is the perfection and act of the, what? Aging, huh? And such an operation can be, what? Yeah, and two, but not the first one, right? And incidentally, in the Ninth Book of Wisdom, Aristotle says that this, the happiness is this kind of activity, right? You know, he saw that, right? It couldn't be the activity of making that activity that's going out to something outside of oneself, right? Because that's really affecting something outside of you, right? Or someone is directing somebody else, right? You know, can that be the ultimate end there, to direct others? Because directing others is helping them to their end, and therefore perfecting others. It must not be perfecting you, right? You can see that in God. Is God perfected by creating the universe? Learn some things about it. I didn't know that. Or is God perfected in himself by directing us to get it to? Now the fourth objection, huh? Operations we're aware of are all transitory, right? It's a little hard for us to understand something, you know. To the fourth, it should be said, that since beatitude says a certain last perfection, according as diverse things are capable of beatitude, they're able to arrive at diverse grades of perfection. According to this, it's necessary that beatitude, or happiness, be said in diverse ways. For in God, there is beatitude to his very, what? Essence, his very substance. Because his being is his operation, right? By which he does not enjoy another, but himself. In angels, however, in the blessed angels, their ultimate affection is according to some operation, by which they are joined to the uncreated good. And this operation in them is one and, what? Eternal. In men, according to the status of the present life, the last perfection is by an operation by which man is joined to God. But this operation, neither can be, what? Continuous. And consequently, neither, what? Unique, huh? Because the operation is multiplied by something cutting up in between, right? An account of this, in the status of the present life, perfect beatitude cannot be added by, what? Man. Whence the philosopher, in the first book of the epics, laying down the beatitude of man in this life, says that it is imperfect, right? After many things concluding, let us call them blessed as men. That's blessed secundum quid, not simpliciter, right? But there is promise to us from God, perfect beatitude, huh? When we will be as the angels in heaven. As he says in Matthew there, he's talking about marriage, I guess. Okay? To the Sadducees, right? Now, as it regards that perfect beatitude, the objection, what? Ceases. Because one and continual, continuous and eternal, is the operation in that state of beatitude, huh? In which the mind of man is, what? Joined to God, huh? But in the present life, as we go to the extent that we, what? Yeah. Or fail from the unity and continuity of that operation. To that extent, we, what? Fail from perfection of beatitude. But there is some partaking of beatitude, right? And the more so, the more that operation can be, what? Continuous and one, huh? And therefore, in the act of life, which is occupied with many things, huh? There is less of the notion of beatitude than in the, what? Contempt of life, which turns around one thing, namely the contemplation of truth. And therefore, if some time man, in his act, does not, what? Do such an operation. This kind of operation. Nevertheless, he's ready, right, you might say, to have it, what? To do it always, right? And because also the cessation of the act as a sleep, or the occupation as something natural. Very discreet here. Is ordered to be foresaid, what? Operation, right, huh? So there seems to be a continued operation. See, I woke up thinking about this thing here again. And through this is the, clearly, the reply to the fifth and the sixth, what? Objection. Objection, right, huh? So it's an operation that will not, what? Come and go, right? Well, come, but it won't go. And once it comes, it won't come and go. Yeah, yeah. And Augustine said that before Thomas, of course, huh? So you're kind of partaking of, what, eternal life, right? There's no before and after in that operation, right, huh? I've got to stop at this time.