Prima Secundae
Lecture 19: Beatitude, Intellect, and the Vision of God

Transcript
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not any natural knowledge of God. And so one of the objections against any angel is any natural knowledge of God is that there's an infinite distance between God and what? Or God and angel, right? Well, you can't go an infinite distance, right, then? I said, how the heck he's going to answer this, right? And Thomas says, well, even when the angel knows God, right, as he does because he's made in the image and likeness of God, between the angel's knowledge of God and God's knowledge of God, there's an infinite distance. So he doesn't, in a sense, do away with the infinite distance, right? But he transposes it now from their substance to their knowledge, right? So just as there's an infinite distance between the angel and his natural substance, huh, and the substance of God, so in the knowledge that these two have of God, there's what? An infinite distance, right? So even the angel sees God most clearly, the Lucifer, right, or wherever he is, even if there's a division, right? There's still an infinite distance, right? God is infinitely more knowable. He's infinitely more, what? Lovable, right? Than he can be loved by any saint, I suppose, even by the Blessed Virgin, huh? Or even Christ, huh? In his human nature, can he love God as much as he's lovable? Only in his divine nature can Christ love God as much as he is, what? Unlovable, huh? It's kind of an amazing thing to see, huh? You know, I would say Francis de Sales, right? He's talking about praising God in the personal love of God, you know, and he says, well, it says in Scripture, you know, praise God as much as you can because he's above all praise, right? Well, finally, you want God to praise himself. Because only God can, what? Yeah. And you want someone to, what? Love God as much as he's lovable because you realize no matter how much you love him, you will never love him as much as he's lovable, right? And it'd be, you know, pity, right, huh? And so, you know, in my foolish days, you know, see a young lady, I mean, he thinks he's lovable, you know, and why doesn't that come? You know, lover, but she's lovable. She's really lovable, this one. But notice, you have a fortiori there in heaven, right, huh? And you see how lovable God is and you're loving him more than you ever loved him in this life, but you realize you don't love him as much as he's lovable. Well, some would not appreciate him, right, huh? You know? Or even, you know, I hear the music of Mozart and they say, geez, we need lovable, you know? I don't, you know, other people love this as much as it's lovable, right? I don't think the music of Mozart is infinitely lovable, right? But I know sometimes, you know, I'll be driving in the car there and I turn the radio on sometimes and get some classical music and hear a piece of Mozart and nothing would do, you know, and I'm just talking on and driving in the car. I said, gee, this is really a good piece and I should go back and, you know? Because sometimes at the house that I'm reading something and I'm a little distracted, you know, give my full attention to the piece, you know, and now I am, you know? It's good to appreciate the music of Mozart as much as it's appreciable, you know? Or sometimes you have a really good meal, you know, but you ate the wrong thing before you hear it. Your taste buds all burned out. You can't do justice. You can't enjoy it as much as it's enjoyable. I was foolish to have had that spicy stuff or whatever it was. You can't eat all those pimples. You know, this is a fake limer of what I'm talking about, right? That you want someone to know God as much as he's knowable and someone to love God as much as he's lovable, but you find out that God is the only one who can know God as much as he's knowable and love God as much as he's, what? Lovable, right? I think in heaven, yeah, I mean, even though there'll be people above you in heaven, right? You go on. But people above you in heaven, but you'll say, you know, you will rejoice, not that you love them God less than they love God, right? But you rejoice in the fact that they love them more than you do, right? I mean, someone would love God for it than a sinner, right? But you've still got that idea that you want someone who can love God. Will we remain in heaven? Oh, yeah. Oh, yeah. No, I think we'll remain in heaven, yeah. Oh, yeah. Come on, Father. Come on. You'll remind me as you look down. As you look down. You'll always forget. You'll always forget. I'll never forget. I don't know about that. Our Lord says there, learn to be for a meek and humble of heart, right? I can learn other virtues from Christ besides those, you know, but does he single out any other virtue? Maybe love he does. But, you know, be as courageous as I am. As if he attaches of great importance to what? Humility, right? Okay, we're at the third reply to the third objection. To the third, it should be said that the end is first grasped by the understanding. you've read that word in the Latin text. You're apprehended, right? That's the Latin word for grasping, right? Nevertheless, the motion to the end begins in the will, right? And therefore, the will, to the will is owed that to which we, what? Which follows at last the achievement of the end, right? Namely, what? Delight over. Yeah. Okay. Now, to the fourth objection here about the thing. To the fourth, it should be said that love is preeminent, excels knowledge in what? Moving, right? But knowledge is a previa, right? Way before loving in attaining, huh? For something is not loved unless it be known, as Augustine says in the tenth book about the Trinity, huh? And therefore, the understandable end we first attain through the action of the, what? Yeah, when you come to see God as he is, face to face. Just as the sensible end we first attain through the action of the senses, right? So I have to taste the salmon, or taste the steak before I delight in the, what? This tastes good. Mm-mm. See? I have to taste it before I can, what? Yeah. So if you said that love is the end, you say, well, you can love God even when you have not attained him, right? So you haven't attained the end. So how can love be the end if you love before you've attained the end? But after you attain the end, you'll love God more than you did before, yeah? Looking before and after there, right, no? Now the one who has everything that he wishes is from this blessing that he has all those things that he wills, huh? Which is do something other than through the act of the will, huh? But nothing badly does he will is required to beatitude as a suitable what? Disposition for it, huh? This is what it's called the second definition of happiness that Augustine gives, right, huh? Now a good will is placed in the number of the goods which make one blessed insofar as that a certain what? Inclination at just as motion is led back to the genus of its what? Limit or term as alteration to what? Quantity forming up. Let's take a little break right now before we go on to it. Article 5 here, to the fifth one goes forward thus, it seems that beatitude consists in the operation of the practical understanding. For the end of what? The last end of any creature consists in becoming like God, right? But man is more likened, become more like God to the practical intellect, which is the cause of things, understood. Then through the speculative intellect, which takes knowledge from things, right? So God's knowledge is productive of things, right? The speculative intellect gets its knowledge from things, but the practical intellect is productive of things, like the table and the chair and so on. So that's more like... I was reading about Dietrich Tockel and his correspondence with Goebenau, and Goebenau had these kind of racist theories, right, back in the time, and Dietrich Tockel is very down on what he's doing, and he says, you know, a lot of people are going to accept that are probably the Germans, he says. That's what I'm quoting a lot, you know, how prophetic, you know, huh? It's interesting that you could see that, you know, and that some of the people are, you know, inclined to pick up, you know, these racist theories. Moreover, beatitude is the perfect good of man, right? But the practical intellect is more ordered to the good than the speculative, which is ordered to what? The true. Hence, also, according to perfection of the practical intellect, we are called good, huh? But not according to perfection of the speculative intellect. But according to it, we are said to be knowing or understanding. Therefore, the beatitude of man more consists in the act of the practical intellect than of the, what, speculative. So they can't have what? Prudence without moral virtues, right? Moreover, beatitude is a certain good of man himself. But the speculative intellect is occupied with those things which are outside of man. The practical intellect is occupied by those things which are of man himself, namely his operations and his passions. Therefore, the beatitude of man more consists in the operation of the practical intellect than of the speculative intellect. Being human, we should think of human things and be mortal, mortal things. So the poet said that Aristotle would disagree with. But against us is what the great Augustine says in the first book about the Trinity, that contemplation is promised to us as the end of all our actions, huh? In the, what, eternal perfection of our, what, joys? There, Augustine's saying, atopatio, right? It's the end, huh? Not loving, but anyway. Thomas says, huh? This beautiful quote from Augustine. Let's make a favorite work of Augustine, the Trinity. I like it more than I can facians. Facians is the most read work of Augustine, right? You read it even sometimes in Catholic circles too, you know? Famous work. He said the consolation of philosophy is the most read work of what? Wait, yes, yeah. I wouldn't say it's greater than his work of the Trinity, though. I wouldn't say that. I answer, it should be said, that beatitude more consists in the operation of the speculative intellect than the practical, which is clear from three things. How does he see all this, Thomas? I don't know sometimes. First, because, from this, that if beatitude is a, what, operation, an action, an act, it's necessary that it be the, what, the best operation of man, huh? But the best operation of man is that which is of the best power with respect to the best, what, object. But the best power is the intellect, whose best object is the divine good, which is not an object of the practical intellect, but of the, what, speculative. You can't make or do God, huh? Whence in such an operation, to wit, in the contemplation of divine things, most of all, maxima, human beatitude consists, right? And because each thing seems to be that which is best in it, huh? As is said by Aristotle in the ninth, in the tenth book of the epics. Therefore, such an operation is most, what, proper to man, meaning most, what, private to him, right? That's characteristic of him. And maxima, huh? Most of all, what, to like for it. Secondly, it appears the same from this, that contemplation is most of all sought an account of itself, huh? For the acts of the practical intellect are not sought for their own sake, but an account of action. But these actions are to some end. Whence it is manifest that the last end cannot consist in the act of life, which pertains to the, what, practical intellect. Third, also, it appears from this, that in the contemplative life, man communicates, as in common with, the higher things, to wit, God and the angels, to which he is, what, likened to the beatitude. But in those things which pertain to the act of life, also the other animals with man in some way, what, communicate, although what, imperfectly. And therefore, the last and perfect beatitude, which is expected in the future life, the whole consists in contemplation. But the imperfect beatitude, such as can be had here, first and chiefly consists in contemplation, secondly, in the operation of the practical, what, understanding, ordering the actions and passions of man, as is said in the Tenth Book of the Ethics, right? Nostal gives this final consideration of happiness, right? He says, perfect happiness in this life, so far as you can have it, right? Consists in wisdom, right? It's a contemplation of God and wisdom. But then secondly, in the, what, perfection of prudence, right? So was Churchill happy, right? When he was head of the government, right? He slept well that night when he became prime minister, right? He's crazy, huh? He knew now it was a man who could direct things, right? Nostal sold that. So those are the three reasons he gives, huh? Nostal calls the happiness of contemplating according to wisdom, kind of a divine happiness, right? And then the practical one's kind of a human one, right? Because he's concerned with human things, right? So we must not follow those who advise us men to think of human things as being mortal or mortal. We must, so far as we can, stream every narrative of what is best in us, and so on. You were memorizing this in the English edition there, you know, and my father comes by and he says, what are you doing? I said, I'm memorizing this. And I said it, I said, oh, sounds good, he said. Fun to find his son memorizing this. He never even had a chance to go to high school, you know, I mean, he had to work his way through high school, and that was it. I remember I'd, you know, talk to students about this sometimes, and we said, well, it's going to be all contemplative. Next life, we got to, you know, get ready. We got to do the practical of this life, and then we'll have a contemplative life of the next. We had a contemplative life of this life, and then it's going to happen next life, so you've also got to do the practical of life here and get that. Enjoy that. Thank you. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the likeness, the foresaid likeness of the practical understanding to God is according to what? Because it has itself, right, to its thing known as God to what? He is, right? But the assimilation of the speculative intellect to God is according to union or informing, right, which is a greater assimilation. And nevertheless, it should be said that with respect to the chief thing known, which is his own essence, God does not have a practical knowledge, right? But he has, what, only a speculative, yeah. That's why Thomas says, you know, it's theology, practical or speculative. Well, unlike philosophy, where you have speculative philosophy here and practical philosophy here, it's both, Thomas says, right? But it's chiefly speculative, theoretical, because it's chiefly about God, and God's not something to be made or done, to be contemplated. That's kind of interesting, the talks about this, huh? So the distinction, because God knows what? Primarily himself, right? Well, then are we like God when we know ourself? You learn the Shakespeare's exhortation to use reason, right? And now reason is knowing itself, right? And now reason is what? Like God, who knows himself, right? So is reason most like God when it knows itself? Well, that's what God does, knows himself. But there is a likeness of proportionality, right? And what proportion means is what? The first is to the second, there's a third is to the fourth, right? Okay? So when our reason knows itself, it's like God who knows himself, right? But is that being as much like God, reason knowing reason, as in reason knows God? Because the reason knows God is not knowing itself, it's knowing God. And so in that sense, it's not like God who knows himself, right? But it's more like what? It's the same thing, you know, right? And that's being more like God, you know, the same thing God knows, which is himself, than when reason knows itself, right? So you're not more like God in knowing Shakespeare's definition of reason. But you like him in some way, proportionally, right? It's a little bit like, you know, you used to say about love, you know. What does God love? Well, primarily, God loves himself, right? So am I more like God when I love myself? Don't I love God? Well, I'm like God in some way by loving myself, right? Because God loves himself, right? But I'm not as much like God in loving myself as I'm like God in loving God. And that's the greater likeness, huh? You know, and Aristotle gives the tool of likeness there in the first book of the topics, the book about places. And he says, you know, that he gives the two tools there, the third and fourth tool, the tool of difference, right? And then the tool of likeness, right? And he says, one is exercised in seeing differences more when you see the differences between things that are closer together, right? So when the mind sees a difference between a cat, let's say, and a tree, it's not exercised as much as in seeing the difference between a cat and a dog and, say, a tree. And, of course, the likeness of proportion is the more, what, distant likeness, huh? So you see this is to that as that is to that, right? Okay. So I see that two is to three as four is to six, right? The mind is more exercised, right? And so this, when reason knows itself, it's like God, but there's more distant likeness than when reason knows, what, God, right? So reason is more like God and knowing the same thing that God knows. But it's also like it in some way, knowing itself. So you have to see something profound about the definition of reason and something God-like in some way, right? But it's kind of a pride, I would assume, to say that reason is better, what, knowing itself than knowing God. Let him know himself and I'll know myself, you know? Of course, you know, what Karl Marx is doing was, in a sense, to reason for a man to know himself, right? But he thought, you know, that man comes to know himself by making other things, right? And he sees his light, latent powers, you know, and so on. But kind of the end is for man to know himself, you see, for Marx. So he is seeking a certain likeness to God, right? But a likeness that is more remote than the likeness that is had when reason knows and loves God. It seems like it's almost the same, it's the same object, right? Other cases have the same object, right? There's a proportion there, right? It's kind of interesting, I think. So it's interesting to use the word here. Thomas has a little problem, you know, because he didn't follow Euclid's language there, right? Because what happened was that the word proportion in Euclid means a likeness of ratios. So two to three is a ratio, four to six is a ratio, three to four is a ratio, right? But two is not to three as, say, three is to four. But two is to three as four is to what? Six. So you could call that a proportion, right? Well, then they started calling the, what, ratio a proportion. You find that, you know, in modern science, that the proportion is used for a ratio. Now what do you call a proportion in Euclid sense? Well, they started, proportionality is kind of a clumsy word in it. You know, I'm sorry that Thomas got caught up in that misuse of language, but... In the new and improved edition, Euclid, right? I've always explained, yeah, yeah. Proportion. So he's talking about what Euclid calls a proportion, and that's a likeness, but a more distanced one, right? And you can, you know, see things far apart, right? And sometimes Thomas talks about the importance of proportion in knowing God, right? Because proportion enables you to what? You see a likeness between things that are very far apart. So if I say, you know, two is to three, it's four is to six, okay. But two is to three is 400 is to 600. It's 4,000 is to 6,000, you know? It's four trillion, you know? I've been talking about trillions all the time in Washington now. It's four trillion is to six trillion, right? You see? Well, it's a big, you know, it's a trillion, you know? But I've still got the same proportion, right, then? So the Lord is my shepherd, you know? Shepherd is to his flock as God is to us, or God is to us as a shepherd is to his flock, you know? Things that are very far apart, but you can still see a likeness there, right? So given the fact that we're an infinite distance, you know, big God, right? We can go in, we can go with proportions, you know, and find a likeness between things that are extremely far apart, right? And even us and what? And God, right? Yeah, yeah. So in kind of the famous Haribos of our Lord seem to send names based upon a proportion, right? The king of heaven is like a man who found a treasure and sawed him he had. And so on. You know, it's beautiful, you know? And we'll do the new. You know, it's beautiful, you know? We'll do the new Berkowitz edition of St. Thomas, Ad Mentem Euclid. Euclid by my brother Mark, you know, he's joking about writing a liberalism more a geometrical demonstrata. And see, different theorems, you know. One theorem, you know, the first theorem Euclid is to make the triangle on top of a, you know, the line. So one theorem he had was, on a flattened federal republic, to compose a pyramid of total power, right? Yeah. And then, you know, actions, you know, how they speak of the fifth postulate, you know, about parallel lines. He says, a liberal's mind, in reality, if you extend it to infinity, never meet. We should make a collection of these. Yeah, yeah, they're beautiful, you know, huh? I remember, you know, I was reading, what's his name, the English novelist there, Flins Dickens, you know. Zachary, no. Not Zachary, no. This is the earlier guy, the 18th century guy. My name's got him in there. Goldsmith? Well, he's a goldsmith, but it's a different author from him. But anyway, the young man has gone to Europe, right, to be a grand tour, so to speak. And he's being accompanied by his tutor, right, who, you know, wouldn't know Euclid, right? And he was saying to him, you know, a young man's mind and discretion, you know, if it's infinity, never meet. He's trying to, with these kind of, you know, statements, control young men from getting carried away in the earth there and going bad. But it's kind of interesting the way that these things will carry your mind, huh? You know these things. So he says the likeness, the force of likeness of the practical intellect of God is according to a, what? Proportionality, right, huh? Okay. So you might say, you know, God is to the universe a little bit like the carpenter is to the chair or something, right, huh? In the house and so on, right? Okay. But the simulation of the under-suspective intellect of God is according to a union with God himself, right? But maybe you could, you know, add the idea that you're knowing the same object as what he's saying there, right? Which is a molto meglio assimilatio, a much greater assimilation. If I had to think about myself through all eternity, I think I'd get kind of bored. Exhaust the subject. Yeah, I mean, I think, yeah. But you never get bored with seeing God, huh? You never comprehend this infinite one perfectly. But he goes on to point out a second thing, that in regard to what God chiefly knows, it's not practical knowledge, you know? He can't prove himself or spooze himself up or get a haircut or anything. You know, that's right. He can't will himself to be a body or something, you know? Second objection, huh? To second, it should be said that the practical intellect is ordered to the good which is outside of itself, right? But the speculative intellect, the theoretical intellect, which Berkowitz calls it, the looking intellect, or the looking understanding, has its good in itself, right, huh? To it, the contemplation of what? Truly, right? And if that good is perfect, right, from it, the whole man is perfected and becomes good, right? Which the practical understanding doesn't have, but is ordered to that, right? And Thomas talks about where Aristotle takes up the moral virtues before the virtues of reason, right? He does, and in that order he says, what Aristotle does, because they're more known to us, right? But also, because them, or by them, we are disposed for the other one's son. So the carpenter makes a chair, and then I sit in the chair, and I read Thomas. Now, to the third, it should be said that that argument would proceed if man were his own last, what? End, right, huh? For then, the consideration and ordering of his acts and passions would be his, what? Beatitude, right? But because the last end of man is an extrinsic good, right? To it, God, huh? To which, by the operation of the speculative intellect, we attain. Therefore, more does beatitude consist in the operation of the speculative intellect than in the operation of the practical intellect, huh? Aristotle says that same thing in the tenth book, right? He's saying, you know, if man was the best thing, right, then this activity that's about man would be the best activity, right? But man is not the best thing, right? So it's the activity about the best thing, which is God, right? That is the end of man, huh? It's just in the biography, either, right? But now, does it consist in the consideration of, oh, I guess we've got to stop now. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit, amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Dios, gracias. God, our Enlightenment, Guardian Angels, strengthen the lights of our minds. Order and illumine our images and arouse us to consider them more frankly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Thank you, Jesus. Help us to understand the Lord's Word. Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit, amen. I've been reading, re-reading the treatise on the angels there in the Pium of Paris. And happened this morning to arrive at the article on whether the angels who see God face to face, right, can they sin? And you might expect the answer is no. It's impossible for an angel or for any rational creature that sees God as he is face to face to sin anymore. Impossible. Now, how is Thomas going to show that, huh? Or help us to kind of understand why that's so, right? Well, what you often do with a proportion, once you see the proportion, you often reason from the ratio that is more known to us to the ratio that is less known, right? Now, as I gave an example before you came in, where our Lord is talking and he says, Now, which of you fathers, you know, if your son asked for a loaf of bread, would you give him a stone, huh? Or if he asked for a fish, would you give him a snake or something? Another tree, yeah. Yeah. And he says, Well, then, if you, bad as you are, huh, know how to give your children good things, huh? How much more will your heavenly Father give you good things, right? So notice, our Lord has in mind there a proportion, right? As I am to my children, right, huh? So God is to us, right? Now, which is more known to us? How I am to my children, or how God is to us, huh? What's more known? How I am to my children, right? So if I, bad as I am, give good things to my children, right, how much more so will God, right, give good things to what? Us, right? You see how it's based in a proportion there, okay? And in some cases, you know, these proportions to our Lord Jesus, they're continuous, right? And I'll give you the example of the parable there where the master forgave the servant who couldn't pay his debt, right? And then the servant went out and met the lesser servant who owed him some, and he, and then the master found out, right? You know what happened, right, huh? But notice, in a sense, you're saying that the, as the master is to the, what, higher servant, so the higher servant is to the, what, lower servant, huh? Okay? And this is, again, in the Our Father, right? Forgive us our trespasses as we forgive those trespass against us, right? So you've got three things there, but a proportion, right? Just like with four and six and nine, right? So you have proportion. Proportion is four terms, but sometimes you have one used at the end of one, in the beginning of the next. They call that a continuous proportion, right? Okay. Now, what's the proportion that Tom's uses here of God is to the one who sees God as he is, right? One of the times that they did vision, right? Just as something else is the one who does not see God as he is, which is united, right now, huh? The one who does not see God as he is. Maybe never, maybe not yet. Okay. Now, what is that, huh? What's the fourth term, huh? Good and happiness? They're close, yeah. But something we met before we even got into the definition of happiness, huh? What is the fundamental definition in ethics? Yeah. And what is the definition of the good? Yeah, what all want. Yeah, the good is what all want. Somebody might object and say, how can you say the good is what all want, right? Because some people want bad things, you know? Okay? But the point is, as Aristotle points out when he talks about the good there, it might be a real good or a, what? Apparent good, yeah. So we don't want the bad except under the appearance of, what? Being good in some way, right? Okay? So we can't will the bad as bad. We've got to see, or think we see, the bad is in some way good and then it's possible for us to but will it, right? If we don't see it as good in any way, we can't what? Will it. I used to use the example of the, you know, I'd say to students, if somebody annoys you, should you kill them? No. And hopefully the answer, no. It's not good. I say, in some way it is good, huh? It gets rid of an annoyance in your life, right? Okay? And if David there is pursuing Bathsheba, another man's wife, right, huh? Is it good to get rid of that guy's husband if you want to enjoy his wife? In some way it is, right, huh? Okay? And I hear there's a deception going on, right? Because something can be good simply and without qualification and not good simply but in some very imperfect way, right? So even my killing Bathsheba's husband, right, can be seen as good in some way because it enables me to enjoy Bathsheba without the annoyance of this being around. Okay? In the same way if you have some money in a box in your bedroom there and I find out about it and I wait until you're not there and then I go in and get the money, right? Was that good? In some way, yeah! I now have more money in my pocket, right, huh? And it's good and I have more money, isn't it? But this is the second kind of mistake that Aristotle says is the mistake of what? Simply and not simply, right? Mixing up the two, huh? Okay? Mistake that Mino makes, right? And the dad would call it Mino. So as they tell the students, they say, you're making this kind of mistake all day long, right? Or all every week, you know? Because something that is bad simply, you're doing because it's good in some way. And something that is good simply, you're not doing because in some ways it's bad. Is it good to get up on a sudden going to mass? Oh, no, you don't get to rest, right? So in some ways it's bad, right? Okay? But notice, huh? What Thomas sees about the definition of the good there, right? Why it's, we say that good is what everybody wants. Because even those who want something bad do so under some way in which it is seen to be good, right? So it's impossible for me to want to do something unless it's good or at least appears good to me in some way, right? Do you see that? Well, now the one who sees God, he sees what? Yeah, and he sees the good, that God is goodness itself, right? And therefore he sees that nothing else is good except insofar as it, what, partakes of God in some way and is ordered to, what, God in some way, right? So just as the man who does not see God cannot do something unless it, what, seems good to him, right, then? So the one who sees God as he is cannot choose anything except, what, in reference to God and that when he can't sin. Isn't that beautiful proportion, right? And he's reasoning from the ratio that's more known to us, right? It's more known to us that even the thief, you know, or the murderer or whatever it is, right, can't do something Unless it's good or appears at least good to him in some way, right? That's more known to us than that the man who, or the rational creature, that sees guy as he is, cannot, what, anymore sin, right? But one illuminates the other, right? But Thomas was brought up in New England, like everybody who had the liberal arts, right? And therefore, they understand from an early age, when they were boys even, right, ratios and proportions, right?