Prima Secundae
Lecture 27: Beatitude: Whether It Can Be Lost and Its Permanence

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For the one man can be more blessed than another, right? The second one goes forward thus. It seems that one man is not able to be more blessed than another. For beatitude is the reward of virtue, as the philosopher says in the first book of the Ethics. But for the works of virtue, to all an equal reward is given. For it is said in Matthew chapter 20, verse 10, that all those who worked in the vineyard each took, got their own what? A day's pay. Yeah, denarius. Because as Gregory said, equal right, reward of eternal life, they all what? Achieved, right? Therefore one is not more blessed than another, right? In this age of democracy, you know, this is kind of assumed without proof, right? That it's going to be equal. So, more of a beatitude is the, what? Highest good. But the highest cannot be something greater. Therefore, beatitude of one man cannot be greater, be a greater beatitude, huh? Well, beatitude is subjective. And another one, huh? Subjective, subjective, right? What? The beatitude is subjective, not the object. Yeah, yeah. More of a beatitude, since it is perfect and a sufficient good, huh? I think what Aristotle said even about happiness, right? Perfect and sufficient good. It puts to rest the desire of man, right? But desire would not be at rest if there is some good that, what? It's lacking some good that is possible to be supplied. If some good is lacking, right, it's able to be supplied. If, however, nothing is lacking that is able to be supplied, there could not be something, what? Some greater good. Something else could not be greater good. Therefore, either man is not blessed, or if he is blessed, there could not be a gratitude greater than another. But again, this is what is said in John 14, in the house of my father there are many mansions. These are the same two ones I was saying that Thomas was quoting in the Summa Contagentia, they just happened to be on that part there. Through which, as Augustine says, they diverse, what? Worth of merits are understood in eternal life. So Augustine apparently understands that with Thomas, right? But the dignity or worth of eternal life, which is given for merit, is the beatitude itself. Therefore, there are diverse grades of beatitude, and not of all is there an equal, what? Beatitude, huh? Well, Thomas says, and so it should be said, as has been said above. In the definition of beatitude, two things are included. One is the last end, which is the highest good, and the adeption, or obtaining, or the enjoyment of what? The good itself, huh? As regards the good itself, which is the object of beatitude, huh? Like you were saying, Father, and the cause, huh? There cannot be one beatitude greater than what? Another. Because there is not except one highest good, right? So the object of every man's beatitude, every age's beatitude, is the same highest good in the God, right? To wit, God, huh? By the enjoyment of which men are, what? Blessed. But as regards the obtaining of this good, or the enjoyment of it, one can be, what? More blessed than another. Because the more one enjoys this good, right, huh? The more blessed one is, huh? But it's possible that one more perfectly enjoy God than another, in that he is more, what? Better disposed. And better, what? Ordered to its enjoyment. That's by charity, I suppose. And by this, he's able to be more blessed than another. So if we both hear the same piece of music by Mozart, can one of us enjoy it better? Well, it's the same piece of music that we're enjoying, right, huh? One of us is better disposed, got better ears or something, huh? And he's better disposed, right, huh? Imperative, huh? Now, the denarius, huh? The unity of the denarius in that parable of our Lord, huh? Signifies the unity of beatitude on the side of the, what, object, huh? But the diversity of mansions or dwellings signifies the diversity of beatitude according to the diverse grade of, what, enjoyment, huh? Interestingly, he speaks in terms of enjoyment rather than in terms of seeing more clearly. I think he'd admit that, too, huh? Because it consists of beatitude more in the seeing than in the enjoyment of it, but the two are connected on the seeing. To the second, it should be said that beatitude is said to be the highest good insofar as it is the, what, perfect possession or enjoyment of the highest good, huh? What about lacking something? To the third, it should be said, to no one, what, blessed, is lacking some good that he desires because he has the infinite good itself, which is the good of every good, as Augustine says, huh? There we are. I told you that in the article on the goodness of God, right? He doesn't have an article on, he'd be in the good of every good, right? That's one of the five chapters there on the good in the Summa Congenitiles, huh? I'm glad I got into the Summa here, right? The quote from Augustine, yeah. And the reference down here is on the 134th song, right? In my footnote here. De Trinitati, book 13. Well, really, that's on the song, too. Yeah. Huh. Well, I bet you Augustine is quoted in the song, or referring to the song, that's probably what it is. Your edition is going directly to the source. Well, it's quoting his work, his commentary on the Psalms. Oh, is that what it says? Yeah. Well, this is, I think you said it was from the Psalms. No, it says they turned out in the book 13th, chapter 7. This is in the rata, period, it is in the rata, in the rata, in the rata, in the rata, in the rata, in the rata, in the rata, in the rata, in the rata, in the rata, in the rata, in the rata, in the rata, in the rata, in the rata, in the rata, in the rata. It's possible. Augustine probably said it one to one. It's possible. And the editor is this why you chose. One second. I mean, your line just now. This is Mary Eddie. Yours is Mary Eddie. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. But someone is said to be more blessed than another, from a diverse, what, partaking of the same, what, good, huh? But the addition, however, of other goods does not, what, the attitude, huh? Whence Augustine says in the fifth book of Confessions, who knows you, meaning what, God and other things, not an account of this is he, what, more blessed, but an account of you alone is he blessed, huh? An account of those things. Now let's find out if we can be blessed. in this life, or pursuing something worth figuring that one out. To the third one proceeds thus, it seems that the attitude is able to be had in this life. For it's said in Psalm 118, blessed are those who are immaculate in the way, right? And who walk in the law of the Lord, right? Now go back to the macroconception there, right? Yeah, the immaculate. This over can happen in this life, and therefore someone in this life is able to be, what? Blessed. That's good, and we'll solve that, huh? I bet you didn't think that. Christoph says, you know, we call a boy happy because we, what, foresee that he's going to, you know, develop into something, you know? But he can't be happy, boy. It's a little different about boyhood than we have, you know, if you put it in a democratic society. Moreover, an imperfect partaking of the highest good does not, what, take away, I guess, or destroy the notion of gratitude? Otherwise, one would not be more, what, blessed than another. But in this life, men are able to partake of the highest good by knowing and loving God, although imperfectly. Therefore, man in this life is able to be blessed, right? It's just a question of more and less, huh? Yeah, it's like the beatitude, right? Blessed are the poor and spirit. There he's talking about the end, right? Moreover, what is said by many cannot be wholly false. What is said by many. That seems to be natural, which is found in the many, right? For nature does not entirely, what? Fail. Fail, huh? But many place their beatitude in this life, as is clear, that is Psalm 143. Blessed, they say, this people, to whom these things are, to wit the goods of the present, what? Life. Therefore, someone in this life is able to be blessed, huh? I don't trust that, but. Scripture also says, we're fools and enders. But see, when everybody says that the end is, or most men say the end is pleasure, right? See, there's some truth to that, right? But against this is what is said in Job 14. Man born of woman, living for a brief time, is filled with many miseries. Hamlet there, silico, yeah. But beatitude excludes misery, right? Therefore, man in this life cannot be, what? Blessed, huh? Thomas answers that some partaking of beatitude can be had in this, what? Life. But the perfect and true beatitude cannot be had in this life, huh? And this can be considered in two ways, huh? First, from the common definition of beatitude, huh? For beatitude, since it is a perfect and sufficient, what? Good, huh? That's what Aristotelian said. It excludes every evil, right? And it fills every, what? Desire. Desire. In this life, however, it's not possible that every evil be excluded, right? For the present life is subject to many evils, huh? It's not able to be, what? Avoided, huh? Both of ignorance on the side of the intellect, huh? I mentioned that thing in the Summa Ganga Gentiles, where he says, Er is magna paris, miseria. To be mistaken is a great part of misery. He says ignorance, huh? And disordered affection on the side of what? Desire. And the multiple penal things, huh? On the side of the body, huh? Like Augustine, huh? There's a tooth there. Remember that? Any other terrible toothache? I mean, the... Yeah. Is that in the confessions, huh? Yes. Terrible, yeah. Well, he did find that. I think he had to pull it out. Wait for the door to open up. As Augustine diligently pursues in the 19th book of The City of God. Likewise, the desire for the good in this life cannot be, what? Satisfied. For naturally, man desires permanence of the good which he has. But the goods of the present life are transitory. Since also the life itself passes away, right? Which we naturally desire. And we, what? Wish it to remain, what? For it. Yeah. Because naturally, man, what? Flees death. So you can't have all you want. Avoid these evils he mentions, right? Once it is impossible that in this life, true beatitude could be had, right? Secondly, if one considers that in which the attitude especially consists, to wit, in the vision of the divine, what? Yes. Essence, or substance. Which vision cannot come to man in this life, as has been shown in the first part of the Summa, from which manifestly appears that one is not able, in this life, to obtain true and perfect, what? The attitude, huh? Of course, in the first part of the New York Star, it says, right? And that's why he kind of concludes, you know, and call these men, what? Call them happy as men, right? As if they don't have the full notion of happiness. But, you know, you know, they're quoting Solon there, you know, call no man happy till you be dead, because you don't know what's going to happen to them, right? Look what happened to Oedipus, you know, and these great tragedies, right? And how these men are, you know, or how Othello was so happy there, when Desdemona arrives on the island, right? And look what happens to him. Who can control his fate, as he says, right? So, I mean, this is the idea that, given that a man can fall from great happiness to terrible misery, right? You can't be sure of anything in this life, right? I think the wisdom of this old woman, who I never knew, she's long dead before, Grandma Quigley, I was told, she was at some social thing with all the other grandmothers, and she was Grandma Quigley, and I think she had no grandkids, but my mother called her Grandma Quigley. Anyway, Grandma Quigley was at some function of all the other old ladies, they're all bragging about their kids, how successful they are, this and that, blah, blah, blah. Grandma Quigley didn't say a word, she had a bunch of kids, who never married, which was kind of strange, but that's not true. So finally, they got tired of talking about all their wonderful kids, so they said, well, Mrs. Quigley, why don't you tell us all about your kids, and how wonderful they are? She said, not only dead yet. She was going to brag about everything, but like, finish the race. Wow, what a reason she is. Yeah, I think so. That's a paraphrase I told you, you know, call no matter if that's your WB dead. Where did that paraphrase come from? That's mine. That paraphrase in Solon, though, I mean. So long by Berkowitz, yeah. Yeah. Now, the first, therefore, it should be said, that some are called blessed in this life, either on account of the hope of what? Attaining the attitude of the future life, according to that of Romans 8, by hope, right? Yeah, right. They'd say, or an account of some partaking of the attitude, according to some. So long by the way. So long by the way. So long by the way. So long by the way. Enjoyment of the highest good, right? It's the name of the encyclical body. Space? Space all. I hope they say that it's one and a whole. Now what about the second one, which is kind of speaking of what? More or less, right? To the second it should be said, the partaking of beatitude can be imperfect in two ways. In one way, from the side of the object of beatitude, which is not seen in its essence or substance. And such an imperfection takes away the notion of true beatitude. In another way, it can be imperfect on the side of the one partaking, who attains to the object of the beatitude. Yeah, to wit God, but imperfectly, with respect to the way in which God himself enjoys himself. And also incomprehensible it is, if you think of God in human terms, right? Because he's enjoying himself infinitely. And you say, I enjoy myself infinitely, so what's wrong with you, you know? I'm not enjoyable infinitely. And such imperfection does not take away the true notion of beatitude, huh? Because since beatitude is a certain operation, as has been said above, the true definition of beatitude is considered from the object, which gives what? The species to the act, the kind of act it is. It's not, however, from the, what, subject, huh? You wouldn't say that the imperfect beatitude of this life is seeing God as he is. Imperfectly. No, it's not really seeing God as he is, right, huh? And knowing what he's not. He's above what we know. He's the cause of the things we know, but he is in himself. You know, I was talking about, you know, what's wrong with Heidegger's question, you know, that people think it's so profound, you know, why is there something rather than nothing, right? And in a sense you're thinking of what is as being able to be and not be, then why is it? But that's only true about contingent things, huh? So the things we know most are the things that can be and not be, like you and me and the dog and the tree, they can be and not be, right, huh? And then you might ask, well, then why are they, right? And so you have to go outside of them as to why they are, right? And you come to something that is necessary, right? And then you might think that you've arrived because, as Democritus says, you know, don't ask for the reason for what is necessary. It must be. But we know from our study of logic there that something can be necessary because it's something else. Then you have to come eventually to something necessary through itself, and that's God, right? God is the being that to Himself necessarily is. So when we see God as He is, we'll see He must have been because of what He is, right? And you can't even maybe use the word because, right? But through Himself, He necessarily is, right? And it's Aristotle's sense in metaphysics, you know, it's absurd to ask why a dog is a dog, or why two is two. Why is two two? Yeah, yeah. Through itself. Yeah. But you can't really get a reason why. There's got to be some distinction between this and that, that there's going to be a reason why this is that, right? So, you know, why is the light of the sun eclipsed, right? You know, there's got to be some distinction between this and that. So when you see God as He is, I am who I am, and you say I am who I am, you know, you can't care about the reason why He is. He is through Himself. He is Himself. I am who I am, and you are. He who is not, and she who is not. And so in a sense, Heidegger, in a sense, would be asking about God, well, why is God? Because God can be or not be, right? Why is it, you know? And then he's getting into a false thought about God, huh? And the real question is, why are there things that can be or not be? Because you don't explain your own existence. But nothing other than God explains why God is. But it would be very interesting to see God, you know, just for many reasons, honestly. I remember as a little boy, you know, thinking, you know, what if there was nothing, you know? And he's like, you know, well, we don't want to say if there's nothing, you know, but it's absolutely nothing, you know? But what if there was, it's got your imagination, right? What if there was nothing at all? I was thinking about that as a child, and I imagined that, right? Well, who wouldn't know that there's nothing? No, no, there's nothing there, you know? I think he's kind of, you know. That's what, somebody gave us that book. I think Pierre Crane gave us that book. I can't remember the guy's name. He's some kind of, I don't know, he's a psychologist, psychiatrist. He had stories about curious individuals. He had one of this woman, she'd been in a catatonic state for many years. Yeah. She finally, she woke up. Yeah. And so the doctor talked about, like, what's the last thing you remember? Yeah. Before he fell into the state. She said, I was thinking about nothing. And he said, well, how did you do that? And she said, I just sat there going, nothing, nothing. Don't do that anymore. Oh, yeah, Vanna, yeah. Really, that was a good guy. Yeah. Okay. Now, what about most men thinking of some men as being happy, right? To third, therefore, it should be said that man regard in his life there to be some beatitude, right? On account of some likeness of two beatitudes, right? And that's not holy, are they, what, failing in their estimation, right? We have time for one more article here. Whether Beatitude had is able to be what? Lost. To the fourth one proceeds thus. It seems that Beatitude is able to be lost. Adipose. Beatitude is a certain perfection. But every perfection is inside the perfectible in its what? Mode. The mode of that perfectible. Since therefore man in his very nature is what? Changeable, right? It seems that Beatitude is partaken of by man in a changeable what? Way. Mutabilitaire. Let's say what? Adverb? Man is changefully Beatitude. How do you express that in English, huh? Yeah. You know? In one word saying that. Changeable. More of Beatitude consists in the action of understanding, which is subject to the will. But the will has itself to opposites. Therefore it seems that it can desist from the operation by which man is beatified, huh? And thus man would cease to be blessed, huh? So after the beatification on Sunday, he might change his life. I don't want to be... I don't want to think about God anymore. Moreover, to the beginning corresponds to the end. But the Beatitude of man has a beginning. Because man is not always, what? Blessed, right? Therefore it seems it has an end, huh? This is like back to the argument of Melissa, right? He says, you know, being has no beginning, therefore it has no end, right? And if they go together, right? Anyway. But against this is what is said in Matthew chapter 25 about the just. That they go into what? Eternal life, huh? Which has been said is the Beatitude of the saints, huh? But what is eternal does not what fail. Therefore, Beatitude cannot be lost, huh? Tom's got a long, long body here, huh? I answer it should be said that if we speak about the imperfect Beatitude, such as is able to be had in this life, thus it is able to be, what? Lost, huh? And this is clear in contemplative happiness, huh? Which can be lost either through, what? Yeah. As when science is corrupted from some, what? Sickness, huh? Or either, or also through some occupations by which one is totally withdrawn from contemplation. It's clear also in the act of happiness, for the will of man is able to, what? Be changed. That he degenerate in vice from, what? Virtue, right? What's his name there in Shakespeare's play? Measure for measure. Angelo. It's quite a fall, huh? In whose act, chiefly, happiness consists. If, however, the virtue remains whole, the exterior changes are able to, what? Disturb such a Beatitude, insofar as they impede many operations of the virtues. But they're not able, however, entirely to take it away, because there still remains the operation of virtue, while a man, in a praiseworthy way, sustains the very adversities, right? The good man uses the bad will. Well, the bad man uses the good, even badly, right? And because the Beatitude of this life can be lost, which seems to be against the notion of, what? The Beatitude. Therefore, the philosopher says in the first book of the Ethics, that some men are said to be in this life, blessed, huh? Not simpichitare, but as men, right, huh? Whose nature it is to be subject to, what? Change, huh? So you say they're blessed, as men are blessed, right? That's a, what? Diminution, you know, true notion of blessedness. Just as I, what? Know the unknown, right? I know what I don't know. Yeah, in a very imperfect way. So the teacher knows more what you don't know than you know what you don't know. If, however, we speak of the perfect Beatitude, which is expected after this life, it should be known that Origen lays down, following the heir of the Platonists, that after the last Beatitude, man is able to become, what? Miserable, right? Not interesting mistakes here, Origen, huh? But this manifestly appears to be false in two ways, huh? First, since, from the common definition of Beatitude, since Beatitude is a perfect good, a sufficient good, huh? It is necessary that it quiets, or puts to rest the desire of man, and excludes every evil. But naturally, man desires to retain the good that he has, and that he obtain, what? Security of retaining it, huh? Otherwise, he would be afflicted, huh? By the fear of losing it, or the sorrow of the certitude of losing it. It is required, therefore, for true Beatitude, that man have a certain, what? Thought that the good what he has, he will never, what? Lose, huh? Which opinion, if it is true, it follows that he will never, what? Lose Beatitude. If, however, it is false, this itself is a certain evil, right? To have a false opinion, huh? For the false is the evil of the what? Yeah. Just as true is the good of the understanding, huh? As is said in the Sixth Book of the Ethics, huh? Therefore, he would not truly be blessed if some evil were, what? In him, right? So, if he thinks that he'll never lose his Beatitude, that's either what? True thinking or false thinking. If it's true, he'll never lose it. If it's false, then he's not blessed yet because he has the evil of what falsehood in his mind. That's interesting. Thomas Rousseau sees. Secondly, the same appears if one considers the notion or definition of Beatitude special. For it has been shown above that the perfect Beatitude of man consists in the vision of the divine substance, huh? It is so ever impossible that someone seeing the divine essence, the divine substance, wishes, what? Not to see it. Not to see it. Because every good head by which someone, what? Since every good head that someone wants to, what? Lose, huh? Is either insufficient and one seeks something, what? More sufficient in place of it or it has something not fitting the next, right? An account of which it comes into, what? Miriness or boredom, huh? But the vision of the divine substance or essence fills the soul with all goods since it joins it to the fountain of all goodness, huh? Whence it is said in Psalm 16, I will be satiated, satisfied when your glory appears, huh? Your glory. Not our glory. And Wisdom 7 is said, there comes to me all goods together with it, right? To it with the contemplation of wisdom. Likewise, it has nothing unsuitable joint, huh? Because about the contemplation of wisdom is said, the acquaintance with it, right? Has no bitterness, right? Nor its conviction in the, what? Wearing. Wearing. Thus, therefore, it is clear that by his own will, the Blessed One could not, what? Desert what? Beatitude. Beatitude, right? Likewise, you cannot lose it by God being subtracted, huh? Because the taking away of Beatitude is a certain what? Punishment. Punishment, huh? But such a subtraction by God, the just judge, huh? Cannot arrive except for some, what? Guilt. In which cannot fall the one who sees God's, what? Essence. Essence, huh? Because to this vision, a necessity follows the rightness of the will, as has been shown above. Likewise, neither can any other agent be able to subtract it. Because the mind joined to God is raised above all the things. And thus, from this union, no other agent is able to, what? Exclude it, huh? Whence it is inconvenience, huh? Therefore, it seems inconvenient, huh? That to some alternations of times, man, what? Passes from Beatitude to misery and converts, all right, huh? Because these temporal alternations cannot be except in regard to those things which are subject to time and motion. So, in eternal life, we are partaking of God's eternity, huh? Which has no before and after. So, don't look before and after and you get to that vision there. Discourses. No. We don't discourse. One word. One word. To the first, therefore, it should be said that Beatitude is perfection consummated, which excludes every defect from the blessed. And therefore, without changeableness, it comes to the one having it. The divine power making this so, right? Mm-hmm. Which raises up man, right? Into a partaking of the, what? Eternity that transcends every, what? Change, yeah. And you've got to go back to the definition of eternity which you had from Boethius, right? Which was the, what? Tota? Tota sem morn. Perfecta, possessi vitae, eterni nabilis. So, it has neither a beginning nor an end, huh? God's eternity. But it's totally, see? And there's nothing to know before and after. Hard to understand, right? We understand it by negation of what you find in what? Time, right? So, Boethius says that the now that flows along makes time. Now that stands still makes eternity, huh? But the life we would, if we could stop the now of time, the life we had would not be a perfect possession of life. But then, in the now that stands still, there's a perfect possession of life, huh? So, we're being, what? We're partaking of the divine eternity. And that's why we call it eternal life, huh? Like everlasting, but it's not, it's not, it's not what that means. So, now, to the second it should be said, but the will has itself to opposites in those things which are ordered to the, what? End, huh? But to the last end, it is ordered by a, what? Natural necessity, huh? That's another meaning, yeah. Necessary, right? So, it's necessary to understand the word necessary, huh? Yeah. Which is clear from this, that man is not able not to will to be, what? Right. Yeah. So, even the damned want to be happy, right? But it's part of their frustration. It cannot be to cut off. You say, there's nothing quite like the feeling you get when you can say, I did it myself. So, that's part of their frustration is that nobody made it. There's some, some guy there, I think it was in Time Magazine maybe, I don't know, there's no help, right? You know, and I saw him being interviewed on TV, you know, it's a short thing, you know, but I guess there's a little, a little bit of this fashionable thinking now that's going on. I call it whistling past the graveyard. Yeah. I call it whistling thinking, you know, there's no, there's no hell, you know. Yeah, if I can do what I want. So, it's contrary to God's niceness, you know. It is. Yeah. And if anybody would punish people like this, it can't be very nice. It's one of the attributes of God's faith, how it's missed. Yeah, the niceness. That's right, Pius XII said there's several truths of our faith that are hard to believe, because they're all hard to understand. Yeah, but there's some that are hard to believe this Trinity, the Incarnation, maybe the Idris, and the Fortnite is eternal damnation. Yeah. It's hard to believe that. Yeah. Apparently, Origen thought, too, you know, that there would be, you know, the demons and so on, right, that they could, you know. They could reconcile themselves. Yeah, yeah. People kind of false imagine all the things that they do, you know. Well, let's, let's, let's, let's, let's, give them a break. Yeah. Take it down there long enough. Yeah. It's just that we don't understand the goodness of God very well, you know, very fully. So, we don't understand the evil of the sinner very much, you know. It's been a long time since I heard a sermon on hell, huh? Come to the monastery. What? Come to the monastery. We preach about it once in a while. Especially on a hot summer. Hot summer day. It's a hot topic. Right. There's, there's, there's, I saw a version of Jane Eyre the other day, you know, and there's a new version of Jane Eyre out, you know. And, you know, in the little trailer they have, you know, the crusty clerics say, do you know what hell is? Do you know who goes, you know? And before Jane Eyre is getting this very strict upbringing, you know. I don't know if the, the movie guy that was trying to, you know, present it as kind of a harshness, you know, that's, that's false, you know. What is hell? He's saying, you know, to Jane Eyre. You know, we had an old copy of Jane Eyre around the house that the parish priest would give my mother when she was a little girl, you know. So, kind of interesting, you know, the gift that the priest would give to the lady, you know. To the third should be said, that beatitude does have a beginning from the condition of the one, what? Partaking in it, right? But it lacks an end at account to the condition of the good, the partaking of which makes one, what? Blessed, huh? Once it's from a different thing, that there is a beginning of beatitude, and from another, that it lacks, say, what? And, uh, but that's a good example of a Dalit guardra, though, right? Because if something has a beginning, you think, well, has an end, right? Yeah, anything that comes into existence, you say, can go out of existence, you know. It can seem that, that, uh, it necessarily is if it comes into existence, right? Because it wasn't always, right? So, you have to see that, in this case. So, you have to see that, in this case. So, you have to see that, in this case. So, you have to see that, in this case. So, you have to see that, in this case. So, you have to see that, in this case. So, you have to see that, in this case. So, you have to see that, in this case. So, you have to see that, in this case. So, you have to see that, in this case. 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