Prima Secundae
Lecture 32: Violence, Fear, and the Will's Involuntariness

Transcript
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See, there's one more article here. Whether violence can be inferred to the will. To the fourth, one goes forward thus. It seems that to the will, violence can be what? Inferred. For each thing is able to be what? Coerced, I suppose, from a more potent thing. But something is more potent than human will to it God. And therefore, at least, by him, it can be what? Forced, huh? Not even forgetting how small God is, right? I'm thinking it can be to your will. Moreover, everything that undergoes, huh? Everything passive is what? Coerced by the active power, right? When it is changed from it, huh? But the will is a, what? Undergoing passive power. For it is a, what? Moved mover. Mover, I guess. Yeah. Moved mover. As is said in the third book about the soul, right? By the good is the unmoved mover, Aristotle speaks there, right? Moral. Since therefore, sometimes something is, what? Moved by the active principle. It seems that sometimes it is, what? Forced, yeah. Moreover, a violent motion is one which is against, what? Nature. Nature. But the motion of the will sometimes is against nature. As is clear about the motion of the will to, what? Sinning. Which is against, what? Nature. Nature. He votes from true birth, huh? Stumbling on abuse. Perfectly said by Shakespeare, right? Votes from true birth, from true nature. And that's from, that's from what play? That's from Lumen Juliet. Yeah. Not so vile that on the earth doth live, but to the earth some special good doth give. Not so good, but strained from that fair use. Revolts from true birth. Stumbling on abuse. Father Lawrence says that, huh? Oh, no, he's a Franciscan. Oops. Yeah. A Franciscan is more suitable, right? To a... Oh, yeah. Yeah, I think so, yeah. Would a Dominican, you know, have delayed to tell the marriage that way? Oh, you presented the fait accompli to the parents. Call the two parents together and say, what would you two think if your father, your daughter and your son were in love, huh? Well, they're giving themselves to each other, right? Therefore, the emotion, the will can be what? Forced, right? It goes against nature. But against this is what the great Augustine says, huh? In the fifth book about the city of God. That if something comes to be by the will, it does not come to be from, what? Necessity. Now, you've got to know that's one sense of the word. Necessary, right? The violence, huh? Forcing. But everything coerced is from necessity. Therefore, what comes to be from the will cannot be coerced. Therefore, the will cannot be. Forced, right? Well, I answer, Thomas says. It should be said that twofold is the act of the will. One which is of it immediately has elicited by it or from it to will, right? Another is the act of the will commanded by the will. And by means of some other power exercised, right? As to walk, for example, huh? Or to speak, right? To speak is not an act of the will itself, huh? But it's commanded, right? By the will meeting, by medium, right? Something in the middle. The motive power, right? As regards to the acts commanded by the will, right? The will is able to undergo, what? Violence, right? Insofar as through violence, the outside members are impeded, lest they follow out the command of the, what? Will. You put me in a straitjacket, right? But as regards the, what? The will's own act, huh? Violence cannot be, what? Inferred upon it, right? And the reason for this is because the act of the will is nothing other than a certain inclination proceeding from a, what? Interior beginning. Knowing. Knowing beginning, right? Just as the natural desire is a certain inclination from a, what? Interior beginning and without knowledge, huh? But what is forced or violent is from a, what? Exterior. Exterior beginning. Whence is against the very definition, you might say, of the act of the will, that it be, what? Coerced or, what? Violent, huh? Just as it is also against the, what? Notion of a natural inclination or motion. So the stone goes up is, what? Cannot be, what? Natural, right, huh? For the stone is, oh, that's the example you're going to use there. I didn't know that either. I think you read this. No, no, no, no. It just came to my mind. Like, even if they carry an angel or something, huh? These, these, yeah. For the stone is able, what? Through violence to be, what? Born upwards, right? Right, huh? Existence. But this violent motion, but that this violent motion could be from its, what? Natural inclination cannot be, right? Likewise, also, a man can be drawn through what? Through drag, through violence, right? But that this be from his will is repugnant to the notion of violence, especially from the outside, right? But now you get the idea of the smallness of God, right? And he's more, he's closer to me than I am to myself, right? Strange, huh? To the first thereof, it should be said that God, who is more potent than the human will, is able to move the human will. And this is not, what, in a violent way, right? According to that of Proverbs 21, it's a marvelous text that Thomas often quotes. The heart of the king is in the hand of God, and in whatever way he wishes, he, what? Turns it, huh? You know, what's his name, like, uh, we're going to have Clairvaux there, right? He's talking about, you know, draw me, right? You know, Christ somebody speaks of the Father, you know. One will come to the man as the Father draws him. But in the Song of Songs, he's being asked to be, you know, drawn after God, right? Is that violence, being drawn by him? But if this were through violence, already it would not be with the act of the, what, will. Nor would the will itself be moved, but something against the will, right? He's kind of taking the fact that the, what, if God actually does move the will, then it's not by violence that he moves the will, right? But because he's the source of the will, right? And he's closer to the will than the will is to itself. It's hard to understand, right, huh? Not a second here. Not always is a motion violent when the one undergoing is changed by its, what, active principle. But when this comes about against the inward, what, inclination of the passive. Otherwise, all alterations and generations of the simple bodies would be unnatural and, what, violent, huh? They are natural on account of the natural aptitude, natural aptitude within the matter, right? Or subject to such a, what, disposition, right? And Aristotle speaks of nature as being both what matter and form, right? So the generation of fire in the old physics, right, from paper or something, right? Is, what, natural because of the matter, right? I mean, natural aptitude for this form of fire, right? And likewise, when the will is moved by the desirable according to its own, what, inclination, the motion is not violent, but, what, voluntary, right? That's something I know, Father Merkelbach pointed out, that when you acquire a habit that you're more disposed of. To the third, it should be said, huh? That that to which the will tends by sinning, although it is, what, bad and against the, what, rational nature and truth, right? Is apprehended, nevertheless, as good and, what, suitable to nature, insofar as it is suitable to man according to some passionate senses, right? Or according to some corrupt habit. I was just thinking about this the other day, about the devil never attempts at something that's just bad, good, so that's hard to see. So I, I just remembered exactly what it said in Genesis about it, and the woman saw that the tree was beautiful, and the fruit was good for food, and desirable for acquiring wisdom. Wow! Who can resist? You just forgot about the other stuff. Is it too late now to go to the other article, or what? Careful, go out and go out if you can. Want to do another article? There are eight articles, so I mean, four are four of the eight, so we can, we can, uh, okay? Ten half, but two lies in the, in the middle. So is eight, yeah. Ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha Ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, Amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Amen. Help us to understand the literature of it. Sing a text from Thomas there where he says, there's three teachings, right? Where a man teaches a man, right? Then where the angels teach us, and then where God teaches us, huh? And he speaks the difference of these three, of course, the ascending order, right? So we're invoking Thomas, a man teaching us, right? And the guardian angel, that's a higher teacher than Thomas. And then God himself, right? Who's the Das Galas, Ho des Das Galas. You should have to bless the mother, because she's the mother. One of the titles of our enlightenment is Mother of the Light. Of the Light? Mother of the Light. And we used to announce in college that Mother of Wisdom was kind of an indication that they had at the beginning of class, the good old days. Okay, so we're up to the fifth article, right? Mm-hmm. This might seem to contradict the fourth article, because the fourth article is saying that you cannot move the will violently, right? Right. But it's kind of a contradiction in words, almost, huh, to say that, huh? So just as if you move a natural body violently, are you moving it naturally? No. Because that's not coming from within, right? Right. And so when you move the will, if you could, right, it wouldn't be voluntary, right? It wouldn't be an act of the will, because it wouldn't be coming from within. You know, it's in the Bible, that article where he says, in the second paragraph, just as a natural desire is a certain inclination from a, what, inward beginning, and without knowledge, right, huh? Right. But right before that he said, the act of the will is nothing other than a certain inclination proceeding from an inner beginning knowing, right? Right. And then what is forced or violent is from an outside beginning, right? Whence it is against the very definition, you might say, of an act of the will, that it be coerced or violent, huh? Just as it would be against a, what, definition of a natural inclination or motion. And notice he develops a likeness there, right? A stone, by violence, can be thrown, what, borne upwards, yeah. But that that violent motion of going upwards should be from its natural inclination, cannot be, right? You have to change the very nature of the thing. Likewise, man can be drawn by violence, but that this be from his will is the appugnant to the reason of violence, huh? Which is to be outside, and the other is to be, what, inside, huh? So how can the violence cause the involuntary, right? He's going to talk about it in the next article, but we'll see what Thomas does, yeah. To the fifth one proceeds thus, it seems that violence cannot cause involuntary, for voluntary and involuntary are said according to the, what, will. It's an idea, I was talking to Warren about that word voluntary, you know, he was talking about how in Latin and even in French, huh, the word voluntary doesn't emphasize will as much as it does in English, right? That's probably the problem of the world difficulty there in the word, right? And some days you'll say, you know, how do you say it in Latin there? Vult, it doesn't, the stone doesn't want, but they'll say the word vult, you know, the word for will, right? So it's more open to that broader meaning. But, quoting the conclusion of the previous article, but violence cannot be, what, on the will, right? Therefore, violence is not able to cause the, what, involuntary, right? So how's he going to get out of that nada? You heard my comparison between Aristotle's remark about plots and the nazi. Because one of the divisions Aristotle gives of the plot is that it has two parts, huh? The tying of the knots and the untying of the knots, right? And who tie in the must untangle this, not I? It is too hard a knot for me to untie. Shakespeare's split. But Aristotle mentions that the, what, the inferior dramatists, right, they might be better at tying the knot than in untying it, huh? And I think the example of that is when you go and see sometimes a movie or something, or you can maybe read a work of fiction, and you get very engrossed in the tying of the knot, but then you're disappointed in the artist's sweat. Yeah, yeah, resolution of it, huh? Well, I think that's the same thing true in philosophy, right, that the average, certainly modern philosopher, but the average philosopher is better at tying, you know, his own mind into a knot, in our minds too, right, than he is to, what, untie that knot, like in this knot I was creating before, right? So it's tying your mind into a knot, right? He can't be God because he can't be the one of whom he's a son, right? He's the son of God. And most people would have a hard time maybe untying that knot directly, huh? So, but fortunately Thomas and Aristotle and the great Plato, right, they can untie these knots, huh? But the modern philosophers, they tie themselves into knots and they can't get out of them. I remember one time, you know, a teacher, he comes back to some philosophical conference, right, and I guess in the discussions there at the conference, and he got the guy in a contradiction, right? Kassari said, now what are you going to do, you know? The guy says, well, that's a contradiction I've learned to live with. That's called despair. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. So he's making fun of, you know, is it some of the modern philosophers who don't think that matter exists, you know, and they have to get through writing all about this, and they go out to a nice dinner in the restaurant, you know? That's a contradiction they've learned to live with, you know? A contradiction they have to live with to live. That's what Chester did, you know, Innocent Smith and the book Man Alive, Professor's saying how everything's miserable, we're all, we all should commit suicide, and so forth, and he says, really, you really think that, Professor, you really think we should all just kill ourselves? He says, oh, yes, oh, yes, yes. So the guy pulls out a revolver and points it at the Professor. I was like, he finds reason to live. It's one thing to ask for death, and then I see it coming, right? That's a parable I do. So, more of that which is involuntary is with sadness, as Damascene says, and the philosopher says, and Aristotle talks about that, quotes the great Sophocles, right? But sometimes one undergoes, right, violence, but nevertheless has not been, what, saddened. Therefore, violence does not cause the involuntary, kind of like a strange objection. More of that which is from the will is not able to be involuntary. But some violent things are from the will, as when someone with a, what, heavy body goes up, right? And when somebody flexes his members, his limbs, against their, what, natural flexibility. Therefore, violence does not cause the, what, involuntary. But against this is what both the philosopher, meaning Aristotle, of course, and Damascene say, right? That something is involuntary by, what? By violence, huh? Now, Thomas got to see a, what, distinction, right? I am sure it should be said that violence is directly opposed to the voluntary, just as it is also opposed to the, what, natural, right? Of course, even more clearly opposed to the natural, because in the word nature there, you always keep the idea of something within, right? So the first meaning of natural, or nature, is birth, right? And of course, the thing about birth is that it comes from within, right? So the chair that Carminger makes by art doesn't come from within. And when he contrasts art and nature, we say, well, nature is what? From within, huh? So the woman makes an apple pie, the apple pie doesn't come from within the woman, right? And that's by art, not by nature, that she makes the apple pie. And by which it gives birth, the baby comes. so within. And then all the other meanings of nature have the sense of something within. An account of this, just as in things which lack knowledge, natural things, violence does something against nature, right, like you throw the rock up, maybe you tie a plant and make it grow in a certain way, or it doesn't want to go. So also in knowing things, it makes something against the will, right? Now what is against nature is said to be what? Unnatural, right? And likewise, what is against the will is said to be involuntary. Whence violence causes the involuntary, right? It's not until you get to the reply to the first objection that you see more clearly how, what this means, right? Because it doesn't mean that the violent is making something, what, voluntary that isn't voluntary, or that's moving the will. So he says to the first, it should be said that the involuntary is opposed to the voluntary. But it has been said above that the voluntary is said that only the act which is immediately of the will, like the will, like the act of loving, right, the act of wanting and so on, but also the act which is what? Commanded by the what? Will, right? So am I going through the red light is what? Voluntary, yeah. Now as regards the act which is immediately of the will itself, violence is not able to infer or act upon, you might say, the will, right? And to make something voluntary that is, what, by violence, yeah. Whence such an act, violence can never make what? Involuntary, right? But as regards to the other act, the act commanded by the act of the will, but not an act of the will itself, right? The will can suffer what? Is he able to suffer violence, right? And as regards this act, the violence makes the what? Involuntary, right? So not in the primary act, right? But in the, the, what, commanded act, right? Okay? So you do violence to the kid there and he doesn't want to go to bed, right? You pick him up and take him down and put him in bed. Okay? You haven't covered his will, but he's in the bed now that he doesn't want to go to, right? And so, did he go voluntarily to the bed? Not if you had to pick him up and carrying him, kicking and screaming, as you see sometimes kids being carried out or even a church or something like that, huh? Now, you apply to the, so you see the distinction there, right? So this doesn't contradict the previous article, right? Now, the second objection here, huh? The second should be said that the natural is said what is according to the inclination of nature. So the voluntary said what is in accordance with the inclination of the will. But something is said to be natural in two ways. In one way, because it is from nature as from an act of, what, principle, just as to eat something is natural to fire. Another way, according to a passive beginning, when nature is what? There's a nature inclination to receiving the action from a outside, what, principle. Just as the motion of the heavens is said to be natural on account of the natural aptitude of the celestial body for such a motion. Although the mover is what? Is voluntary, right? So he thought that the plants would be moved around by the angels, right? And separate substances. So it's voluntarily part of the, what, separated substance, who has a will. But inside of the heavenly body, it's naturally actively moved by these separated substances. So it's natural in the side of matter. So in the, in the second book of, uh, natural hearing or physics, right, Aristotle shows that nature is said of both matter and form, right? So he concludes that form is more nature than what? Matter, yeah. So that's, that's a fundamental distinction, huh? Now seeing, whereas I was reading, uh, Thomas Terry's talking about, um, the Holy Spirit is given with sanctifying grace, huh? And there's a nice quote there from St. Paul. And the question is, which is before, right, huh? Does the soul receive, uh, the Holy Spirit through grace, or does he receive grace through the Holy Spirit? You know, which is before by nature, right? But Thomas is making a somewhat, somewhat distinction there, right? If you think of, of the matter, right, um, subject, then it's being disposed to receive the Holy Spirit by grace, right? They're thinking of the active principle, right? And it's also the other in this case, too. Uh, then he receives grace through the Holy Spirit, right? And, uh, he said, you know, simply as before, right? And some of the others before, right? I used to ask the question about the Hail Mary, right? We say, uh, full of grace, the Lord is with you, right? I said, well, is the Lord with you because she's full of grace? Or is she full of grace because the Lord is with her? Or are both, what, true in some way, right? But by different, what, different causes, right, huh? Because through grace, you might say, she is disposed to receive the Holy Spirit as her spouse, you might say, right, huh? Um, but the Holy Spirit is the one who gives the grace, who is the mover, right? He's the cause of the other. But this, he has to give this enough talking about the, um, uh, corollary that Aristotle gives. And the two things can be causes of each other, um, but in different ways, right? So I'd say, you know, is, um, is making money the cause of money? Or is money the cause of making money? Or is studying the cause of knowing? Or is knowing the cause of studying? Did you study? What? Both, yeah. But by different kinds of cause, right, huh? You know? I'd say, is it reproduction the cause of the baby? Or is the baby the cause of reproduction? Yeah. Well, that's the right reason. Both are true, right, huh? Okay. So two things can be, in a sense, uh, causes of each other, but by different kinds of cause, right? I can't be my father's father, right? But these other kinds of causes, this is possible, right? By this being done to them, they're already inclined to move in that way. To be moved, to be moved is a passive thing, right? Okay. And that's, like, nature in the sense of, what? Matter, right? But for our own will, it's not, it may be involuntary to do something that we are, or is supposed to be doing. And even, like the example you gave, Father Michael, about someone who does things, how does that happen? That's more voluntary, but it's from an insight, because a volunteer is an insight. So you don't work if it's not doing violence, do you think, because you already have that? No, I thought it was, it's perfect, exactly the opposite. You're more than opposed to it. That goes on to make a similar distinction, he says, and likewise, something can be called voluntary in two ways, right? In one way, according to action, right? As when someone wishes to, what? To do something, right? Another way, according to passion, undergoing, right? When someone wishes to undergo from, what? Another, right, huh? When someone wishes to undergo from, what? Another, right, huh? When someone wishes to undergo from, what? Another, right, huh? When someone wishes to undergo from, When someone wishes to undergo from, what? Another, right, huh? When someone wishes to undergo from, what? When someone wishes to undergo from, what? Another, right, huh? When someone wishes to undergo from, what? When someone wishes to undergo from, what? Another, right, huh? When someone wishes to undergo from, what? When someone wishes to undergo from, what? Another, right, huh? When someone wishes to undergo from, what? Sense, what? An action is inferred from something, what? Exterior. The remaining, however, in the one who undergoes the will of undergoing, right? It is not simply, what? Violent, huh? Because the one who undergoes does not confer something upon this by acting, right? But it confers nevertheless by willing to undergo, right? You know? Whence it cannot be said to be, what? Involuntary, right? It's kind of like maybe the guy who's a drinker. Yeah, or the lady says yes, right? I won't hear you. She wants to have to say something, though, right? And courts testify against, I don't know, Vinnie the Killer, sitting in the front row. You know that if you tell the truth, you're dead. So, right as the lawyer is calling on you to start talking about it, a woman runs into the courtroom, sticks epoxy all over your mouth, clanks your mouth shut, and you can't talk. So, is it involuntary? You can see it's voluntary, because you wanted that in the first place. That's an example of the child, then, you see. If the child wants to be picked up, you know, he wants to be picked up and carried, you know? Well, then, that's voluntary, right? Okay? Voluntary, right. Well, if he doesn't want to go to bed, then it's involuntary, right? To the third, it should be said, that as the philosopher says in the Eighth Book of Physics, the motion of the animal at which sometimes it is moved against, what? The natural inclination of the body, although it is not natural to the body, is nevertheless in some way natural to the animal, to whom it is natural that he be moved according to his appetite. So, he's saying, if you consider the fact that my body is heavier than air, right? Then, to go uphill is against the nature of my body, right? But not against the nature of me as a man who has this ability to walk up the hill and the will to do so, right? And therefore, it is not violent simply, but in some respect, right? So, I'm doing violence to myself when I get up in the morning, right? Sometimes it's more violent. Especially if you have to end up sleep, right? And likewise, it should be said when someone flexes his memories against their natural, what? Disposition, right? For this is violent in some way as regards a particular member, but not simply as regards the man himself. So, Article 6 here now. Now, mitus, I guess, would be what? Fear of some sort? Fear. Okay. I'm rereading Washington Irving's History of Muhammad and his Successors, right? Of course, as they conquer the whole Near East and so on, they usually, if they like you, they'll say, you know, you've got two choices. Either you become a Mohammedan, right? Or you agree to pay tribute to the Caliph, right? Or you die, one of the three, right? If they don't like you so much, then they say you've got two choices. Become a Mohammedan or die. And sometimes they don't give you a choice at all. My choice is to die and fight them, right? But I get these people become Mohammedans, as you could imagine. But Father Owen Bennett said, Islam is tyranny tempered by assassination. But true. The sixth one precedes this. It seems that fear causes the involuntary, simplicitary. For just as violence is with respect to that which is contrary in a present way, right? It's kind of an easier word. To the will. So fear is with respect to some future evil that is repugnant to the, what? Will. But violence causes the involuntary, what? Simply. Therefore, fear the involuntary, simply what? Causes, huh? Are you going to convert or are you going to get your head chopped off, huh? Moreover, what is as such, so, right? Anything added remains such. Just as what is by itself hot, whatever it is joined, nevertheless is what? Hot, huh? Ipsumente, huh? As long as it remains, it's not destroyed. But that which is done through fear in itself is what? Involuntary, right? Therefore, also coming fear, the approach of fear, is involuntary, right? Moreover, what is under some condition, such, and is secundum quid, such, right? But what is without a condition is such, such is simply so. Just as what is necessary from a condition is necessary secundum quid, huh? So that's necessity that Gerstall talks about from the end, right? It's necessary to eat. It's not necessary in the way that two must be, what, half or four. And sometimes people go on these, you know, strikes, you know, and they don't eat, right? So it is necessary. You don't necessarily eat, do you? If you want to live, yeah. And out of the condition, yeah. Okay. So what is necessary, absolutely, is necessary secundum quid, right? You find that kind of distinction quite often. But that which is done through fear is involuntary, absolutely. It is not, however, voluntary, except under condition, that one avoid the evil that he, what, fears. Therefore, that which is done through fear is simply, what, involuntary. I'm not sure I found that. I found that exactly. But against this is what Gregory Nyssa says, and also the philosopher, that the things which are, what, done through fear are more voluntary than what? Involuntary. Involuntary, right? So if I give up the faith and become Mohammedan, to avoid having my head shut off, this is more voluntary on my part than what? Yeah. Well, he says, I answer, it should be said, that as the philosopher says in the third book of the Ethics, this is Nicomachean Ethics, that's where I stopped in the first part of the Nicomachean Ethics of the third book, it talks about the voluntary and choice and so on, right? In the second part, he talks about the first two virtues, right? Courage and temperance. He's already in the second book of the Ethics defined moral virtue as a habit with choice, right? Existing in the middle towards us is determined by right reason. And so he wants to talk about choice and voluntary and so on to understand virtue better, right? Beginning in the third book. And Gregory of Nyssa, I guess, he must be named from his town, right? I often wonder how to refer to these guys, you know. He said, Augustine of Hippo, you see that sometimes, don't you? Augustine of Hippo. So Thomas would be Thomas of what? Aquino. Aquino or something, yeah, whatever it was. But if you say Thomas Aquino is making a thing out of it, it seems like a name, right? I don't think they call it Augustine Hipponensis or something, you know? Yeah, Augustine Hippo. Hippo. Hippo, right? Augustine Hipponensis, you know? Augustine Hipponensis. Augustine Hipponensis. Augustine Hipponensis. Augustine Hipponensis. Augustine Hipponensis. Augustine Hipponensis. Augustine Hipponensis. Augustine Hipponensis. Augustine Hipponensis. Augustine Hipponensis. Augustine Hipponensis. Augustine Hipponensis. Augustine Hipponensis. Augustine Hipponensis. Augustine Hipponensis. Augustine Hipponensis. Augustine Hipponensis. Augustine Hipponensis. Augustine Hipponensis. Augustine Hipponensis. 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And then somebody didn't want to get them back in, right? But they were admitted back in, in the judgment of the church, but they had to do what? Penance of some sort, right, huh? They're not saying that this was, well, voluntary, yeah, yeah, yeah. For each thing simply is said to be, right? According as it is an act, right, huh? But according as it is only in our, what, apprehension, it is not simply, but, what, they couldn't have quit, right, huh? Now, this which is done through, what, fear, according as it is an act, according as it comes about, huh? Or it is an act, according as it comes to be, right, huh? For acts are found in the, what, singular, and the singular as such is here and, what, now. And according to this, or by this, it comes to be an act, according as it is here and now, and under the other individual, what, conditions, right, huh? Thus, that thing that comes about through fear is voluntary insofar as it is here and now, insofar as in this case, there is the impediment of a, what, that is fear, just as, and this is a common example here I was talking, is the projection of the, what, rich in goods, right, in the sea, becomes voluntary in the time of the, what, tempest, on account of the fear of the danger, right, and it's in Jonah, isn't it, there, that he's just throwing things over, because. Whence it is manifest, it's simply, it is voluntary, right? So if I throw the things out of the boat to keep the boat from sinking, is this voluntary? Yeah. Even though it's so much against my, my will, right, huh? I don't want to lose these goods, right? Like, given the circumstances. Okay? Whence there, what, belongs to it, the notion of the voluntary, because the source of it is within, right, huh? But, what is taken, huh? But, that one takes that which comes about to fear, right, huh? As, outside of this case existing, insofar as that you pugnate the will, this is not accepted according to, what? Yeah. Do you want to lose your goods? Well, considered as such? No, I don't want to lose my, all my goods have bought in Tokyo, or Hong Kong, or where it was. Okay? But, given the circumstances, what's actual here and now, I choose to save my life. Yeah. And, therefore, it is involuntary, secundum quid. That is, insofar as it's considered outside, is existing outside the case, right, huh? So, if you're at one edge of the cliff, and my lovely pet dog is in the other edge, whom do I rescue? I don't lose my dog. You see? But, did I voluntarily save your life, right? Given the circumstances, I can't save both the dog and you. Even if I did it differently first. I don't want to lose you, I don't want to lose the dog, right? Given the circumstances, I should lose the dog, I guess, huh? We're saying, what's here and now, is what? Real, right? What is in that consideration, is only in the, what? The mind, right? So, throwing the goods away, in the, taking all the circumstances into account, is more voluntary than involuntary, right? But, considering the abstract, losing all these goods that I've invested my money in, and therefore all this money, that's contrary to my will, right? He gives the same argument with the guardian angels. Does the guardian angel become sad if you suffer some loss, ultimately the loss of your soul? If you're sad, he says, well, and one who asks, one who asks, no. Absolutely speaking, he doesn't want to be lost, because his will is God's will, and God wants all men to be saved, so he wants that to be done. But, considering the here and now, you, because of your sins, you deserve to go to hell, he'll throw you right down. Like, he's used the example of the merchant with the ship. You ask him, absolutely speaking, when he's loading the cargo, do you want to throw this stuff over? He says, no, absolutely not. But, when you know the storm, he says, come on, get rid of this stuff, come on, it'll help us. I was going to say, John, the Amazin, who first brought out that distinction between the antecedent will of God and the consequent will. Because when it says, you know, God's will is all men to be saved, right? And people say, well, then God's will is not always fulfilled, right? Because I'm not saved, you know? You say, well, that's not God's will, simpichitare, right? Because I take into account all of the circumstances of how the man has acted, and so on, right? You can see how often this simpichitare, secundum quid, can come up as a fallacy. To the first, therefore, it should be said, that those things which are done through fear and through what? Force. Force. Not only differ according to the present and the future, but also according to this, that in that which is done through what? Force, the will does not consent, right? But it's all together against the, what? Motion of the will, right? So the kid being carried down to the bedroom, right? But that which is done through fear becomes voluntary, right? In the circumstances, right? Therefore, because the emotion of the will is born towards it, although not an account of itself, but an account of something else, to repel the evil that is feared, like the boat sinking, right? It suffices for the, what, notion of voluntary, that it'd be, what, voluntary in account of something other than itself. It doesn't have to be willed in itself, huh? For the will is not only what we will on account of itself as an end, but also that which we will on account of another, as an account of an end, right? So, you know, all these amputation of legs and so on, things of that sort, who would want this in itself, right? To have a leg or something like that, but to save the body, I guess, you know? Chemotherapy or whatever. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I mean, you know, there's some war and all these people losing their legs and so on, you know, but it currently was necessary to save their life, right? Even today, yeah. It's clear, therefore, that in that which is done through force, the will, interior will, does nothing, right, huh? But in that which is done through what? Fear. Fear. The will does something, right, huh? I think we sometimes get confused in English, don't we, sometimes, because we speak of if, you know, man's being tortured or something like that, but this is a violent...