Prima Secundae
Lecture 36: The Will and Its Acts: End Versus Means

Transcript
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To the second one proceeds thus, it seems that Voluntas, I don't know exactly the best way to translate Voluntas, but it's got the same name as the, what, act of the will, as the will itself does, right? So, it's like understanding the fundamental act, there are reasons, same name as the power sometimes. So it seems that Voluntas, willing, is not of those things which are to the end, but only of the, what, end. For the philosopher in the third book of the Ethics says that the will is, Voluntas is of the end, choice, Lectio, of those things which are, what, to the end, right? Moreover, for those things which are diverse in genus, diverse powers of the soul are ordered, as is said in the sixth book of the Ethics. But the end and those things which are for the end are in a diverse genus of good. For the end, which is the, what, honest good, or the lectabulae, the pleasant one, is in the genus of quality, or of action, or of passion. But the useful is in the, what, what, what, aliquid, huh? As is said in one ethic or, therefore, if the will is of the end, it will not be of those things which are for the end. Moreover, habits are proportioned to powers, since they are their perfections. But in the habits which are called the operative arts, other is the one that is ordered to the end, and the other that is towards the end. Just as to the sailor of the boat, right, the gubernator, pertains the use of the ship, which is its end, but to another art pertains the making of ships, right? The structure of the ship, which is in account of the end. Therefore, since the wills of the end, it will not be of those things which are towards the end. But against this is because in natural things, through the same power, something goes through the, what, middle, and arrives at the end. So the stone, right, so the same thing goes falling and arrives at the end. But those things which are for the end are certain means by which one arrives at the end, as to a turn. Therefore, if the wills of the end, it's also those things which are towards the end. Somebody started to fight like this there, huh? Now, Thomas says, I answer, it should be said that the will is sometimes, voluntas, the word voluntas, huh? Sometimes the power itself is called, right, the voluntas. Power by which we will, right? Sometimes the act of the will itself. If, therefore, we speak of the will according as it names a power, thus it extends both to the end and to that which is to the end. For to those things a power extends, each power extends itself, in which, to all those things in which can be found in any way whatsoever, the notion or the definition of its object. Just as sight extends itself to all things that partake in any way whatsoever, a color, right? But the notion of the good, which is the object of the power of the will, is found not only in the end, but also in those things which are, what, towards the end, huh? Okay? But that's not, of course, the sense in which we're concerned with primarily in this article, right? If, however, we speak of voluntate according as it names properly an act, thus properly speaking it is of the end only, right? For every act named from the power itself names a simple act of that, what, power, right? Just as intelligere names a simple act of the, what, understanding. So what's his name? The philosopher has a book on the human understanding, right? That name is the power, right? Yeah. Or a lot. Right. But that also is, what, the name of an act, right? Understanding. But it names the simplest act of that power. But that is a simple act of a power in which it, what, by itself, such the object of the power. But that which is good for itself, right, and willed is always the end, right? Whence will is property of the end, right, huh? But those things which are towards the end are not good or willed on account of themselves, but in order to the end, right? So I get up in the morning, I open a little box, and there should be three pills in there. Because David said, hey, there's four pills in there, let's go, let's start doing a fourth pill in there. I must have dropped two of one kind in there, you know. Then I get a lecture, I get the, you know. I don't have double the same. So I think I eliminated the proper one, but a little bit. You think we would have eliminated that problem if you had been bumped off at seven? Yeah, that would have solved all my problems. That's not a bad problem right there. So they're not willing to account of themselves, but from order to the end, right? Whence the will is not born towards them, except insofar as it is born towards the end. Whence what it wills in them is the end, right? I don't know where I will to take my pill, right? I was willing to help, right? Or preservation of my health, I guess. Preservation of my life. Or pretending you're healthy. Yeah, yeah, preservation of my life, if you're that way, yeah. I don't have to be healthy, but keeping me alive, I guess, I don't know. Just as to understand properly is of those things which are what known, say, kundum se, by themselves, to with the beginnings, right? But of those things which are known through principia, there is not said to be what? Understanding, except insofar as they are considered, except insofar as what? The beginnings are considered in them, I guess. The principles themselves are considered in them, right? And this is the famous proportion of Aristotle. For just as the end has itself in what? Desirable things. Has the beginning in what? Understandable things, right? It's said in the seventh book of the, what? Ethics, right? That's the famous proportion of Aristotle has. So just as one's mind is sitting to principles, from that, to a set of conclusions that are on, right? So because when desire is the end, then when it comes to desire, the what? Because of that, what is for the end, right? So sometimes when they speak of the end, of the principles, they'll say that it's one thing to come from the, what? Principles to the conclusion. Another thing to see the conclusion in the principles, right? That's kind of the circle in their inner knowledge that they'll talk about sometimes, huh? So if the mind begins knowing the principles, it doesn't know what follows from them, right? And then it moves from the principles to the conclusion. And then it, what? Comes back, right? Right? That's why Aristotle's books are called the, what? Prior and posterior analytics, right? Because completion is to go back to the beginning and see it in the beginning, huh? I think that's the way that St. Bonaventure, the mind's journey to God, he says, you see, you become the reason from the effect to the cause, and then you see the cause and the effect. So in some way, come back to, I guess, the more perfect is, you see, he says, through is the word he uses for, yeah. It fills up a lot, through. Yeah. And then in is the more perfect. Yeah. But I see all these conclusions on God when I see him face to face, right? Or if you don't see them, the angels point them out to you. Yeah, he said they will, yeah. You wonder what kind of conversation there will be in heaven, right? You'd be so absorbed in God, you're not going to go and talk to somebody else, you know? Yeah. That's what somebody asked me the other day. Will we have time to read when we're in heaven? I said, just imagine yourself, face to face with God. The first moment you see Him, you're going to pull out St. Thomas and read about the B-30 vision? No. So, you know, Thomas is not simply denying altogether, is he, here? Because he says that the will is not born towards the means, except insofar as it's born towards the end. So if I'm willing, what? But taking a medicine to preserve my health or something, right? Then I'm willing the medicine insofar as I'm willing the end, right? So it seems to be admitting, right? In that way, it can be of both, right? Simply or properly or by itself. So the first thing in the text from the philosophy says, speaks of the will according as it properly names a simple act of the will, right? Not however it names a what? Power. It's kind of funny because you see that, you know? It's Aristology 9, the other part I don't think he is, but it's interesting, curious that he just says only that, don't you? Reading Thomas there, and you go from Thomas' commentary, which is based on the Latin text he has, you know, as you go to the Greek of Aristotel, it's not exactly translated, you know, correctly, you know? In the very beginning of the metaphysics there, the first thing is, as soon as you translate it in English, all men by nature desire to what? Know. And what is the word to know there in the Greek, huh? No. And in Thomas' translation there, one that he uses, it says, all men by nature desire to what? Yeah. Which could mean to know, but it's terrible with the word scientia, right? Mm-hmm. Rather, but the Greek word is identia, which would mean to see, to understand, right? Mm-hmm. So read, read, it seems to me the correct translation of that first sentence is, all men by birth want to understand, right? So Thomas doesn't have it for understand, but this word share, which is more tied up with something that comes after understanding, right? Mm-hmm. This is more to know the conclusion, right? Mm-hmm. And it's interesting, Thomas, the commentary there, he says, well, that's because they want to understand, you know? So this is going back to the word Aristotle has, but it doesn't have it in his, what? Translation, right? Hmm. So is that, is to know, in this sense, he says, he was saying, now it says, if I had just heard you correctly, the reason why we want to know is so that we might understand. No, that's a thousand upon to understand, right? A thousand upon to understand, right? Yeah, yeah. In other words, it's more fundamental to understand, right? And so, he's kind of, you know, almost correcting in a sense, you know, getting back to Aristotle's word without having it in translation, you know? Or again, he has a famous comparison there where he says that the Philomuthos, right, is in a way a philosopher, right? Because philosophy begins in wonder and the lover of fiction, the lover of plots, right, the lover of myths is moved with a certain wonder in reading these stories, right? You know, the Latin translation has the, the philosopher is in a way a Philomuthos, see? And I think the Greek is saying that the Philomuthos is in a way a philosopher. In other words, it's not that the philosopher is in a way, you know, but a perfectly a Philomuthos. But the Philomuthos, in a sense, is what? Something like the philosopher has something of the philosopher's character, right? And therefore, we used to say, you know, when I was in college, you know, that to read literature in a sense, for some people, is a dead end, you know, go beyond that to philosophy, right? So it's kind of a, it's kind of a substantive philosophy, right? And it's more interesting to think about God than to think about, you know, whodunit, you know, and stories like that. But if you're not capable of thinking about God, you might find this is a nice substitute, right? And Aristotle's making that point, right? And there's a famous text, I want you to point out there from Albert the Great, right, where he says, poetry dot modem ad mirandi, it teaches us how to wonder, right? In other words, it's from reading Homer, that the Greeks learned how to wonder, and that kind of was a stepping stone to the wonder of the, what, philosopher, yeah. But the text says it reversed, right? Okay. And the article goes with, what, the philomuthos, right, huh? Well, philomuthos is in the way a philosopher, right? And it said in the beginning of John's Gospel, how do you translate that? In the beginning was the Word, and the Word was towards God. And the Greek seems to say, and the Word was God, huh? But in Thomas' Latin translation there, and God was the Word. I mean, there's no article in there, you know? Yeah, yeah. If you have the article, you might see that maybe the subject of the sentence is the Word, right? I was going to start with that, because, you know, I'm thinking about it again, I'm getting to say John's Gospel, right? And then here, right, Thomas' Latin text has got the, and the philosopher is in a way a philomuthos. And that should be the reverse, I think. And in both cases, you've got the article, you know, with the, that should be the subject. So you'd say, oh, philomuthos, the philomuthos is in a way a philosopher, right? Because he has a certain wonder of the philosopher, right? But not fully developed, right? I was just reading an essay by Flannery O'Connor on teaching literature. She makes this point, but it's kind of a critique of the poverty of the instructors in English literature, is that mostly, she says, they'll do anything to teach literature. They teach sociology, they teach history, they teach all kinds of things that are interesting, but they're not literature. Well, my own development there, you know, thinking back upon it in light of these words of Albert the Great, poetry, Doc Modum Abirandi, right, huh? See, my brother Richard had it, Bill had it in those old days, you know, but he, before me, because he's four years older, and the piece of works of Aristotle, right, you know, the Oxford translation, but I mean, what's there? And I remember, looking up, looking at the piece of works of Aristotle, the only thing that caught my attention was this book called The Politics, right? I was interested in little things at that time, you know, this time of Cartier and so on, right, and these things, you know? And then, when I was a freshman in college, I had taken an English course, but I knew my grandma and such stuff, so they put me in a special English class, right? And among other things, the professor said, we're going to read some plays of Shakespeare you probably didn't read in high school, right? And so this was the occasion of me to get a complete volume of Shakespeare's plays, right? And that first year in college, on my own, I read not just the plays we read for that class, but all of Shakespeare's plays, right? Which I continued to read more and over again, ad nauseum, every time I had to use bookshop and I'd come out with a new edition of Shakespeare, I said, what? You've got that play already, you know, four or five editions of the same play, you know? And so when I get cut off in the twelfth night, you know, I read in four or five editions I have, you know, and if I find one that's a nice looking edition, you know, it stimulates me to read the play again, you know, again, and so on, and I'll attach that bishop there the other night, as I mentioned. But at that time, I turned from a practical philosophy, you might say, right? I went to the politics first, but then it led me to the ethics, right? Which is kind of an introduction to life for reason. But then, from then on, I was more a looking philosopher than a practical philosopher, right? And there are things that probably affected this, you know, but when I taught St. Mary's, when I taught Assumption, sorry, people were very much into teaching the ethics courses and so on, right? But I think that that wonder that I got from reading Shakespeare's plays maybe disposed me for the wonder of the looking philosopher, right? And therefore, it's this example. Yeah. What the great Albert the Great was talking about, right? The dark word of Mad Morandi, right? But that's why we used to, you know, think, and I think once you're down to get this, you know, that if there'd been no Homer, there would have been no philosophers, right? That Homer was necessary, right? The wonder that Homer's Iliad or Odyssey arouses was the stepping stone to the wonder of the, what, philosopher, right? They couldn't have gotten to that one without that. It was particularly, you know, the time when Einstein invented his great theories, the fiction he was reading at the time. Oh, I'll help you. Some interesting remarks, you know, about Schwab-Om, C.G. The martyred is the admirable stories, you know? So. Now, second objection. To those things which are, what, diverse, and genus, in genera, ex equo se habensiam, having themselves, what, equally, are ordered diverse, what, powers, right? Just as sound and color are diverse genera of sensible things. And so by different senses, you know, what? Yeah. Yeah, by different senses, by different powers, you know color and sound, right? But notice they're diverse genera, ex equo se habensia, right? Is color a more sensible thing than sound? No. Ex equo, huh? Dividing sensible, right? Then the taste of something and the smell of something would be another ex equo, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. But utile, the useful, and the anestum, right? It's always a question of how you translate anestum on honorable good, right? But it means that I think there's good in itself, right? But utile and anestum non ex equo se habensia, right? Mm-hmm. It's not as very difficult, right? But as what? Say, what is sekundum se as such? And what is what? To another, right? What is through itself and what is through another, right? Mm-hmm. And things of this sort are always referred to the same power, right? Just as through the seeing power, one senses that both color and light, which color is what? Seeing, right? Mm-hmm. The same thing we said about reason, right? Could there be one power that knows the axioms, the principles, the beginnings, another one that knows the conclusions? Well, they're not known ex equo, are they? Because the beginnings are known to themselves, and the conclusions are known to the beginnings, right? So they can't be, what? Pertaining to different powers, right? So it must be the same power that knows the beginnings and knows the conclusions through the beginnings, right? And if you see the exactness of Aristotle's analogy there, right? Or proportion, right? It must be the same power that, what? Wants health and wants medicine for the health, right? But you can't want what is for the end without wanting the end, right? It's going to be the same power that wants both, right? Maybe by different acts in some cases, right? Now, what about diverse habits and diverse, what? Powers, huh? Let's go back and see what the objection was exactly. Habits are proportioned to powers, right? Is there perfections? But in habits, there are different arts that have pertained to the end and what is for the end, right? She says, to the third, it should be said that not whatever diversifies the habit diversifies the, what? Power, right? What might diversify habits might not diversify, what? Powers, right, huh? For habits are certain determinations of powers to some special acts, huh? So Aristotle has a different habit for the beginnings. She calls nous, called intellectus amatin, right? I call it natural understanding, right? And then what? This reasoned out understanding, which is episteme or shempsia, right, huh? They're different powers, right? They don't pertain to different, I mean, different habits, rather. But they're not different powers, right? But nevertheless, he says, there is some operative art that considers what? The end. Yeah, and that which is towards the end, huh? Or each operative art considers both the end and that which is for the end, right? For the, the, the, uh, yeah, the governing art, huh? You know how Peter's always comparing the head of the ship, you know? You don't point anybody to be the head of the ship, the guy who has the knowledge, right? You don't just put anybody, should be just anybody at the head of the thing like Barack Obama. Well, for the ruling art considers the end as what? What it is doing, or about, but that which is towards the end is what it, what commands, right, then? For the ship-making art considers that which is what? Towards the end as what it does, right, then? But that which is the end is that to which it orders what it does, huh? And again, in each operative art, there is its own end, huh? And also what is towards the end, which properly pertains to that art, right, huh? Okay? So he's saying that what may be sufficient to distinguish habits is not sufficient to distinguish powers, right? Just like geometry and arithmetic, geometry and natural philosophy, right? Different habits, right? But not different, what, minds, huh? He said in a faculty meeting you might think they are different minds. That's a bit of an exaggeration, huh? So Aristotle had the best balanced mind in history, I think. Anatomy, he does historical research, you know, does logic. He does very concrete things and very abstract things, you might say, and does them all. Is there any evidence that he did something in between, like did he write poetry? There are some things he has set up, you know, that are lost, yeah. It's like Thomas is something of a poet there, they see, in the prayers he writes. Third, one proceeds thus, it seems that by the same act, the will is born towards the end, and in that which is towards the end, right? Because according to the philosopher, where there is one for the sake of another, there is one only. It's kind of interesting, huh? That's from my book, The Topics. But the will does not wish that which is for the end, to the end, except on account of the end. Therefore, by the same act, it is moved, what? To both, huh? Moreover, the end is the reason for willing those things which are for the sake of the end, just as the light is the reason for the seeing of color. But by the same act is seeing both light and color. Therefore, the same is the motion of will by which it wills the end, and those things which are what? Or the end. Moreover, the same in number is the natural motion which is through the middles to the what? Last, to the end. Therefore, there is the same motion of the will by which the will is born towards the end, and in those which are to the end. Yeah, I've got a good theological argument to add to that, at least appearing. Mr. Pius IX, when he defined the Immaculate Conception, he said, it was one and the same decree of God's will, the will of the Incarnation and his mother. And that's kind of the end and means to what's saved. Yeah, yeah. But against this is that the acts are diversified by their objects. But those are diverse species of the good, of the end, and that which is useful for the end, which is called uselessly today. Therefore, not by the same act as the will born towards what? Both, huh? I answer. It should be said that since the end is willed by itself, right? But that which is for the end, as such is not willed except on account of the end. It is manifest that the will can be born towards the end, without this that be born in those things which are, what? Towards the end, huh? It's possible for me to want to be healthy without wanting to take medicine, huh? But in those things which are for the end, as such, one, the will cannot be born unless it be born at the same time towards the, what? The end itself. Thus, therefore, the will is born towards the end in two ways, huh? In one way, absolutely by itself, right, huh? In another way, as the reason for willing those things that are, what? Towards the end, huh? Just like the reason can, what? Can see the beginning by itself, right? And as a reason for the conclusion. It is manifest, therefore, that one and the same, yeah. Therefore, it is manifest, therefore, that one and the same is the motion, the will, by which it is, what? Born towards the end, according as it is the reason for willing those things which are for the end, right? And in those things which are for the end, right? But another is the act by which it is born in the end, right, towards the end. Absolutely, right, huh? And sometimes this precedes, what? In time. In time, huh? As when someone wills, what? Health, right? And afterwards, celebrating in what way he can be, what? Healed. Healed. He wishes to, what? A guru. They might be healed, yeah. I don't know, because that's the man, I guess. I think so. Just as it also happens about the understanding. For first, one understands the beginnings by themselves. Afterwards, one understands them in the, what? Conclusions. According as one has sensed the conclusion on account of the beginnings, huh? So he's saying that the will can be moved towards the end absolutely by itself, right? And then it can be moved towards the end as the reason for willing the means, and then it's by the same, what? Act, yeah. Of course, in the case of God, there can't be any, what? Multiplicity of acts, right? Right. So he can will us only insofar as he wills himself. And he's willing himself as, what? As the end of creation, right? One of the sayings I like from St. Bob Venture is, God is the beginning of all things precisely because, you know, it's the beginning of all things precisely. It's interesting, you know, where in the apocalypse there, where he said, I'm the alpha and the omega, right? And then he says sometimes, the first and the last, he adds that. And then the beginning and the end, right, huh? Well, we understand the beginning there as meaning the, what, mover or maker, right? Well, when you go back to Aristotle, you know, and when Thomas is talking a lot of times, when Aristotle says, in these signs, which there are beginnings, causes, or elements, right? Thomas has to stop and explain what that means, beginnings, causes, and elements. And sometimes he takes it, you know, in the way Aristotle does in the fifth book of wisdom, where beginning is more general than cause. So every cause is a beginning, but not every beginning is a cause. And cause is more general than element, right? Every element is a cause, like in the line of material cause, but not every cause is an element, right? But then he gives another explanation of it, you know, where elements is, what, kind of taken as a synonym for the material cause, and beginning for the mover or maker, and then causes for the form and the end, right, huh? Okay. So there's a way in which Aristotle will sometimes use the word beginning to mean not just any beginning, not just any cause, but the mover or maker. And that must be the way it's being understood in the, what, apocalypse, right? You don't mean God is a beginning like a point is a beginning. You don't mean he's a beginning like matter is a beginning of many things, right? Or even the intrinsic form of a thing, but in the sense of the mover or maker, right? So Thomas has stopped there in the beginning of the commentary on the physics, right, but explains that and explains it elsewhere. You can see kind of the use of the word archaic, which is the word being used there in the apocalypse, right? It's kind of a little bit of Aristotle and Thomas there to see the appropriateness of the way the scripture is speaking there in the apocalypse. So Thomas will argue that God doesn't, what, reason either, right? He sees everything in himself, right? That was an interesting guy to God there, you know? Kind of beautiful there at the beginning of the, of the, some kind of chantiles there where Thomas is talking about the desirability of this knowledge, right? And he says four things, huh? No study, he says, is more, what, perfect, more sublime, right? More useful, or more delightful. And he backed each up with the reason, you know, in the text there. It says, most perfect, he quotes the Ecclesiasticus, huh? I think it's Ecclesiasticus, or maybe it's the Book of Wisdom. But, uh, blessed is the man. He partakes of wisdom, right? So the man is perfect when he reaches his end. His end is perfection. But then he says, sublime, because he becomes like God, right? Built who made all things in wisdom. And because likeness is a cause of friendship, then this makes it kind of a friendship between God and man equals. Scripture is saying that. His wisdom, the wise man is a friend of God, right? And he goes on, most useful because the desire of wisdom leads to the attitude and so on. And then there's no boredom or anything like that, he says, in his study. Beautiful text there, you know, huh? Thomas must have enjoyed thinking, you know? You remember thinking about the lie there, you know, Thomas? One of the brothers says, you know, there's an elephant in the street. Thomas goes over to look, because there is no elephant there, you know, and they're laughing. Thomas said, I'd rather feel there's an elephant in the street than one of my brothers could tell a lie. Something like that. So, quoting Aristotle then, that first objection, where there is one on account of another, there there is one only, right? It should be said that that argument, or that reason, proceeds according as the will is born towards the end, as it is the reason for willing those things that are, what? Yeah, yeah. You say the same thing about reason there, right? When it's born towards the beginning as the reason for the conclusion, and by the same act it sees the conclusion and the beginning, right? To the second it should be said, this is the comparison to color there, to the second it should be said that whenever color is seen, right, by the same act is seen light, right, huh? But nevertheless, light can be, what, seen without, what, color being seen, right? And likewise, sometimes somebody wishes those things which are, what? To the end. Yeah, whenever he wishes that. He wishes in the same act the end, but not over the reverse, that's whenever he wills the, does he will the, yeah, yeah. I wonder, I hadn't heard this before, you can see light, not color. Well, that goes back to the animal, right? Where? He talks about color and light. Yeah, I don't remember that, right? That's essential for the point he's making here, you know. To the third it should be said that in the carrying out of a work, huh, those things which are for the end have themselves as, what, middles, and the end as a, what, term, right? Whence just as a natural motion sometimes, what, stops in the middle and doesn't arrive at the, what, end, so likewise, sometimes someone does something that is for the end, and unless he does not achieve the end, huh? But in willing, it is the, what, reverse. For the will, through the end, comes to, what, willing those things which are for the end, just as the understanding comes to the, what, conclusions, through the beginnings, which are called media, little terms. Whence the understanding sometimes understands the middle, and from it does not proceed to the, what, conclusion. And you need a teacher. Like Euclid there to deduce one. And similarly, the will sometimes wills the end, and there, or less, does not proceed to willing that which is for the end, right? That's why I ask the students, can you love wisdom without loving logic? Yeah. We're out of here. Yeah. But maybe it's not until you see the need for logic, right, huh? And that you're going to love logic for the sake of what? Wisdom. Wisdom, right? This is the beginning of the book of Psalms. One thing we all have in common is everybody wants to be happy. Two things differ. This is the roads we take. This is the roads, because not everybody's happy. Yeah. So everybody wants happiness, but I want a path that includes, you know, sex, drugs, and rock and roll. Yeah. Somebody else wants virtue. Yeah, yeah. But Thomas sometimes says, virtue is the road to happiness. In fact, this is the road to misery, right? And so it's good to know what the road to happiness is, and what the road to misery is, so you can avoid going down that road, huh? But you're always reading in every type of morning paper, you know, and I've looked at it very much, but you look at the morning paper, and you've got to find many examples of misery, right? And how about the road to the man take down that road, you know? Yeah. To that which is what objected, in contrary, is clear the solution to those which things are said above. For utile and anestum are not species of good, ex-equo divisae, ex-equally divided, but they have themselves as that which is an account of itself, and that which is an account of, or through itself and through another, right? Whence the act of the will in one of them can be born, without this that is born towards the other, but the reverse is not possible, right? The same thing you said about the mind, right? It can be moved towards the axioms without the conclusions, but not vice versa. So maybe you can love wisdom without loving logic, huh? It's an academy of logic without loving wisdom. Lodging is not for its own sake. That always makes me think of what St. Thomas says about how the angels are purified, like purification, enlightenment, and perfection, in terms of communicating knowledge. He says, well, how can the angels that see God, how can they be purified? And he says, well, one way is to remove obstacles. That's what happens to us. But with them, it's kind of like pointing to conclusions. They see the principle, they see the vision. They might not see all the conclusions at all, so the higher angels point out. That's the way their mind is concerned with everybody's mind. I always tell the story of how I learned a little bit of Greek, you know? And so my brother Richard, he decided that Kosteric would be my advisor, period. And so he had me meet Kosteric before I even got into college. And so I got my courses for my freshman, you know, thing. Kosteric looked at me and he says, Dwayne, he says, where is your Greek? Why aren't you taking Greek? I said, Greek? I said, well, the other thing I'd rather take. He says, that's not a reason, he says. If you're going to study philosophy, he says, you take Greek. What the hell is that supposed to do? I took Greek, you know, stumbled through Greek, Father Peter, you know. And whatever, you know, Greek, I know what it is. That's because I forced me to take that semester of Greek, you know, and then started reading Aristotle and halfway through in Greek, you know. But it's been very useful to me, you know. Lots of things I know. I'm even correcting tongues a little bit, you know, translations here, you know, reading St. John's Gospel in Greek and so on. So, but I didn't want to take Greek. Or you didn't want to eat your Brussels sprouts either. But I didn't realize how it was necessary, you know. Because you already did, right? If I realized it was necessary, then I would have, wanting philosophy, I would have wanted Greek, right? Yeah. Yeah. That's a good place to stop. We'll get to the question nine next time, okay?