Prima Secundae
Lecture 37: What Moves the Will: Understanding and Sense Appetite

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In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Deo Grazius. God, our Enlightenment, Guardian Angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor, pray for us. Help us to understand all that you're written. Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, Amen. Before we go into question nine, let me just come back to something that I want you to see here. Remember the old rule of two or three or what? Or both, right? Okay. And I'm going to apply it to theology here, but before I do, just exemplify it a little bit here. Just take the Our Father, right? You get seven petitions, huh? Held be thy name, thy kingdom come, and so on. Seven of them. Now, how do you divide the seven into two or three? Or would you do it into both, then? Well, sometimes you say people divide it into four and what? Three. Three. And these are all about the good. And these three petitions are about the bad, right? That's a perfectly good way to divide it, right? Now, Thomason, in the Summa Theologiae, he divides them into, what? Three, huh? And it would be the end, right? The means to the end. And the impediment sum to the end, right? So, here it's easy to see how these two come together, right? Because, in a way, you could say, you could divide it into these two if you wanted to, and then subdivide the end into the good, rather, into the end itself, and the means to it, right? Like our Lord said to anybody, he says, Lord, Lord, we'll enter the kingdom of God who does the will of my Father in heaven, right? And we're asked to be associated with the saints here in heaven, you know, who've done the will of God by company to start our care and says, huh? Okay? Now, there's another, I think, division. There's one that Gus can get sometimes, where he'll divide these three against these, what, five, huh? And I think the basic division is, these three here are fully answered only in the next life. So, God is not sufficiently avowed or praised in this life. The kingdom of sin has come fully in this life, huh? And when you say there will be done in earth, it is in heaven, you're applying, right? We're trying to do that, but it's not done as well as it's done in heaven, right? Not perfectly. So, these are fulfilled only imperfectly in this life, but fully in the, what, next life, right? And these ones here are more or less for this life, right? Okay? So, I guess you won't be receiving communion now in heaven, right? And things like that, and won't be sitting there, and won't be temptations, right? And the evil one will be excluded, or so on, huh? Okay? So, if someone says, should you divide these seven into two or three, I'd say both, right? So, sometimes I state the rule as the rule of two or three or both, right? Okay? And in this case, you have actually two divisions into two, right? And you don't want to neglect any of these, because they all illumine something, right? Okay? Now, let's apply this to theology, right? Here's somebody in Rome, Father, right? What part of theology are we in, in this course, I'd say, right? What would they probably say? More. Yeah. And they're dividing theology, therefore, into what, two? Yeah. So, this is one way of dividing theology into dogmatic, moral theology, kind of a common thing in seminaries, in places, like you've seen elsewhere, right? And sometimes people are even more in this area, more in that area, right? Now, is there also a division of theology into three? In himself, that's the beginning of all things, God's the end of all. Yeah. Like we're told in the Apocalypse, right? Where God says, first, I am the Alpha and Omega. And then he says, more precisely, or fully, I am the Alpha and Omega, the first and the last. And finally, he says, I am the Alpha and Omega, the first and the last, the beginning and the end, right? Okay? So, one part is about God in himself, right? Another about God is the beginning of things, fish and cause, maker, and so on. And then God is the, what? In. And those are the three that Thomas follows most precisely in the Summa, what? Contagentia, that's right. Okay? So, the Summa Contagentia, the first book is about God and himself, the substance of God and the apparitions of God and so on. So, the second part is about God as the beginning of the universe, the creation and so on. And the third part is about God as the end and then his providence, right? Moving things towards the end, huh? Okay? I'm going to take a certain side of this other little division there that you have in the Summa Contagentia, because he does those three things insofar as they can be known by natural reason as well as by faith in the first three books, right? And then the fourth book, he does those same three things, right? But in regards to those things like the Trinity and the Incarnation and our final stage, right? Which can only be known by faith, huh? Okay? Now, he alludes to that in the beginning of the Puma Paras. Oh, but let's go back now. So, this is another way of dividing theology, God in himself, God at the beginning, and then God as the end, okay? Okay? And that's, let's say, most explicitly in the Archantelius, right? Did you see that division? Now, how do you connect these two, right? I thought they were going to be our father, right? The first two belong to dogmatic and the third to moral. Yeah, the moral theology. What you have, what we call moral theology, is found in the, what, third part. And notice the moral theology here, which is mainly in the second part of the Summa, right? Okay, it begins with the consideration of the end of man, right? Which comes under the consideration of God as the end of all things, but especially of the rational creature, right? So, it doesn't mean that all of this here is something more theology, but it kind of fits in there, right? Now, which division do you think is being filed here in the Summa Theologiae, right? And Summa Congentines is very clearly this here, right? Well, the whole of the, what, second part of the Summa, right, would probably be classified as moral theology, right? But the first part and the third part would be more, what, dogmatic theology, right? It's kind of strange, isn't it? I mean, you know, I kind of cheated there because the first time we did some things in the prima part, right? And then we did some things in the third part, right? So, you don't have dogmatic theology showing my immoral bent, you know? But, and then now we're doing a little more things, I've got to do a little bit of that stuff, so, you know? Okay. But I've got following the order of the Summa, right? It was the first to the third before the second, right? Well, how can you get such a kind of screwed up thing here? In terms of dividing theology another way, in terms of divinity, because I was thinking about this today, divinity and humanity, and under humanity, you say, well, but Christ is the way for us, so that would be moral. Yeah. Yeah. And somebody could say in a way that in the first part of the Summa, you talk obviously about God in itself, right? You talk about God as the beginning, right? You touch upon anything that's the end, but not in so much detail, right? And then you take him up again as the end in particular for man, right? And you get the second part, and he means to that end, right? And then you can say, Christ is and the way, the truth, and the life. So he's not only the end, the truth, and the life, but he's the way, right? And the second part, you can say, are what? Tools to get to the end, right? Not tools to make the universe, but tools to get to the end. So it makes some sense to that, right? Although I kind of prefer this division to that, it's more revealing, right? Now, before theology, there's a different division of Savior-doctor, right? Which is intended for all men, right? And not just for the students, that they're going to go through these things in some great depth, right? And you find that in Augustine's ingredient, and in Thomas' catechetical instructions, right? And there, again, the sacred doctrine is divided into what? Three. Three, right? But the basis for the three is not this, but it's faith, hope, and charity, right? So both Augustine and Thomas, according to faith, they take up the creed, right? And then according to hope, they take up the Our Father, and sometimes they don't marry it, but I marry the Our Father, right? Because prayer is tied up the hope. And then the two commandments of love and the ten commandments are taken up under what? Charity, right? Now, in terms of this here, the creed is mainly corresponding to what is later on called dogmatic theology. And obviously the part for the charity that corresponds to royal theology, and probably you would put also the Our Father there, right? So Thomas would take up, say, the Our Father there in the treatise on virtual religion there in the second part, right? Virtual religion's primary act is devotion, right? Then it has the act of prayer coming from that, and so on. So, in a way, we're in moral theology that brings out something, but also you might say we're kind of a lost side of the way compared to summa congenititas, right? The summa congenititas doesn't develop all these details about moral theology, right? It gives some of the basic things, but it doesn't go into the great depth in the second part does, right? So it gets a little bit unbellished, and Thomas just mentioned this division here at the beginning of the, if you go back to the female priest, you'll see that division there, right? But it's a little bit hard to, that was neatly fitting in, as in my favorite book, the summa congenititas. So, now, I was looking at the decision. the other day there, in the first book there, where Thomas is coming in Aristotle, and Aristotle recalls the distinction of the four kinds of causes, right? And he kind of briefly describes the four kinds of causes. And he notes that Aristotle comes to talk about the fourth kind of cause, which is called the telos, right? Or the end, hein? He notes that Aristotle in the text there. He explains the end by saying three things about it. He contrasted with the third kind of cause, the mover or maker, is at the beginning of something, right? And the end is at the what? The end of things, right? It's last, huh? So I'm the cook tonight, let's say, right? So I get to get all my ingredients and so on, and then I start to work at it and finally, at the end they get this beautiful meal, see? That was the end, that was the goal of all my activity, right? So I, the third kind of cause, the mover or maker, right? I'm at the beginning of this, right? And this wonderful meal, waiting for its early eating of it, is at the end, even in time, okay? That's one way he notifies this cause, right? Then the second thing he does, is that this kind of cause, is that for the sake of which. Who henica, in Greek, right, huh? Who use gratia, right? I guess I see a matter, right? In English, we usually say that for the sake of which, huh? But Thomas notes that in this second notification of this cause, huh? The end is not said to be, what, last, but to be first. The last shall be first, and the first shall be last. That's a little different one from what our Lord was talking about, but it's interesting, right? And how can it be last and first, right? What's last in time, or last in being, right? At least these kinds of ends that we're familiar with, huh? But it's first in, what, intention. And that's how important it is to look before and after, as Shakespeare taught us, right? And then the third thing he says is that the end is something, what, good, right? Or at least it appears to be good, right? But first of all, it's something, what, good, right? Because your parenthood is only moving people insofar as it resembles or has some element of it, what's really good, huh? And I'm kind of struck by that because when you take up the word cause more formally or fully in the fifth book, it's taken up under the word beginning, right? And as Aristotle points out, every cause is a beginning. Not every beginning is a cause, but every cause is a beginning. And he defines beginning as what's first in being or becoming or knowing. So the idea of being a beginning is to be first. And so the end as a cause, it's got to be in some way first, right? So that first notification that Aristotle gives that it's at the end, which the word itself indicates, I mean, the word end, right, doesn't seem to fit it as a cause, right? But that second thing he says, that's that for the sake of which, where it is first, not in time or being, but always first in intention. That's, I mean, the definition of this is a kind of cause, right? But it's interesting that the word that we, the common or basic word we use for that is end, which touches upon its being last, not first, okay? Of course, the word end has got other meanings, huh? And I used to, you know, when I talked in college there to students about this, I'd always say, you know, happiness is the end of life, the end of life is death. Therefore, happiness is death. I get the idea that the word end has got more than one meaning, right? And so you've got to kind of distinguish the sense in which it is a cause, right? And Aristotle kind of plays on that, right, in the first book of Nicomachean Ethics, right? That what's last is not always the end of the sense of death of the sake of which, you overcook the meat, you've got burnt meat, you know, is that the end you're, that's the sake of which you were doing it? No. So, I noticed there's another word that I use in English sometimes. I'm trying to explain that the meaning of end when I say end is a cause, it is the meaning of end that is a purpose, right? And I think the etymology of purpose actually is put forward or put before, right? So the word purpose fits more end insofar as it's first in what? Intention, huh? But yet it's not the basic word we use here, which is end, right? And I suppose it's more known to us that the end, even that kind of cause, is last in time than the way in which it's, what, first invitation? What does that mean, you know? It's a little more hidden to us, right, huh? To our senses, right? We see that the meal, the cooked meat or the eating of it, right, comes last in time, right, huh? Things in motion, sort of catch the eye, as Shakespeare says, right? So that first meaning of end is end of the table, then end of the motion, right? It's not until the third sense that you have the sense of that for the sake of which, right? So we take the word that starts with something more known to us to name this kind of cause, even though it doesn't really name it so much insofar as it's a cause or a beginning, right? Like the word purpose does, that's a little more, you know, a kid would have a hard time doing what you mean by purpose than by end, right? It's the end of the play this time now, right? Coming in, right? The end of school. Well, that might be good, yeah. The end of school, recess. Yeah, but I say, you know, stop playing, you've got to come in now, right? My father's father was a tough man, you know, he'd say, come in, you could be able to bat, you would drop the bat and come in for out, you know. He was a boxman, you know. Oh, my God. Yeah. But that sense of end is more known, right? Yeah, purpose, that's kind of, you know, it's metaphysical, they say nowadays, you know. It's more known how, what the result of your action was than whether you intend it or not, right? A lot of times you don't intend what is the result of our, what, actions, right, huh? You're trying to weave it around cars here, right, to get ahead there, right? Not to cause an accident, but it's often the result of their action. Okay, question nine here. What moves the will, right, huh? What moves the will, right, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, That's a good question, right? Then we'll have to consider about the mover of the will. I think it's better to translate it that way than say motive, because then you're talking about the end again, right? And about this six things are asked. Whether the will is moved by the understanding. Secondly, whether it is moved by sense desire, power sense desire. Thirdly, whether the will moves itself. Didn't we say in natural philosophy that nothing moves itself, right? Does the will move itself? Here's what he's going to say about that. Now those three are all inside of us, right? The will, of course, and the sense desire, and the understanding, right? And now the next three articles, you can divide these into two, right? Are dealing with exterior things. Whether it is moved by some exterior, what? Beginning. Whether it is moved by the celestial body. In Shakespeare's plays, you have these people thinking that they're influenced by the stars. They wandered too close to the earth or something, right? And led to these terrible disasters in these families and so on. In that Roman Empire. In that Roman Empire. In that Roman Empire. In that Roman Empire. To the first, therefore, one proceeds thus. It seems that the will is not moved by the understanding, right? For Augustine says upon that verse of Psalm 118, my soul, what? Wants to desire, what? The justifications, huh? The understanding, what flies before, I guess. People, what? And there follows a slow or no affection, huh? We know the good, nor does it delight to do it, huh? Well, Augustine must know, right? Yeti says, huh? Give me grace, but. But this would not be if the will was moved by the understanding, right? Because the motion of the movable thing follows the motion of the mover. Therefore, the understanding does not move the will, huh? So he doesn't move it the way I move this glass here, right? Moreover, the understanding has itself to the will, as showing to it what is desirable. Just as the imagination demonstrates what is desirable to the sense-desire. But the imagination demonstrating the desirable does not move the, what? Sense appetite, huh? Nay, rather, sometimes we have ourselves to those things that you imagine, just as to those things that are shown to us in a picture, from which we are not moved, as is said in the book about the soul, right? Now there you get some stuff in the diagonal, right? That's where the objection comes from, right? Moreover, the same with regard to the same thing is not mover and moved, but the will moves the understanding. For we understand when we, what? Will. And I, myself, am a philosopher, which is a lover of wisdom, right? So that love is a, what? Mover, and it's an act of my will, right? It's making me turn over these pages. Turn over thoughts. Therefore, the understanding does not move the will, right? Kind of strange, huh? I like husband and wife, huh? Where the husband moves the wife to do some things, but the wife moves the husband to do some things, too, huh? You had this Cheserton impersonator, did I tell you about him? We went to the pro-life dinner there, you know? And the, you see him on stage on EDVTA, you know? And this guy impersonates a number of people, I guess, but one of them is Cheserton, you know? He was the speaker, right? So he came in with this key, you know, this thing up there, you know, and so on. But he was talking about marriage, you know, and divorce and so on. And I think he was going to use that line that I'd heard, it was Cheserton said, you know, that it's stupid, you know, to give incompatibility as a reason for divorce, he said. For men and women are essentially incompatible. I think very well. But he was kind of touching upon it anyway, you know, and I guess Cheserton said, now what you've got to know is that a man is a selfish beast, right? And it's a woman, nodding your head, yeah, that's exactly what a man is. That's the way they look about a man, anyway. And quite to a man, a woman seems to be madly, irrationally sensitive, right? You know, beyond any... Warren Murray has told me this one where he heard someone said, a man, the difference is this, a man will spend $2 for a $1 thing he needs. A woman will pay $1 for a $2 thing she doesn't need. A lot of truth to that, you know, you go to the crystal tea store, she goes, don't you love a bargain? This is obviously, you know, for women, you know, they can't resist a bargain, you know, whether they need it, you know. And we go to the sewer market, you know, and it's a good price, and the meat was, you'll buy it, you know, huh? Get the airspace getting filled up, you know, the fridge getting filled up. There's more room in here, you know. That's just a good price, you know. If I go into a store, maybe the bottle of wine is $1 cheaper somewhere else, I'm going to run it down to some other place, you know. I need this bottle enough. No, I've got to go drive to this store and that store, you know, just to save a dollar apart from the gas. But against, this is what the philosopher himself says in the third book about the soul, that the, what, desirable, understood, is the unmoved mover, right? The will is the, what, move mover, right? I answer it should be said. To that extent, something needs to be moved by another insofar as it is in potency or ability to more than one thing, right? For it is necessary that that which is in potency be brought down to act through something that is already an act. And this is to move it, huh? But there is found a, what, two ways, huh? Some power the soul is found to be in power to, what, in potency to diverse things. In one way, as regards to do or not to do. That is the question, to do it or not to do it, right? In other ways, as regards to doing this or that, huh? Just as sight sometimes sees an act and sometimes does not see, right? And sometimes it sees the white and sometimes it sees the, what, black, right? Therefore, one needs a mover as regards two things. Either as regards the, what, exercise of the act itself or the use of the act. That's what she's moving. That's one there. She's giving me another way of saying it. And as regards to the determination of the act, okay? Like is it black or white, right? So should I eat now or not eat? One thing, right? And should I eat, you know, something sweet or something bitter? Okay? Is it a sweet chocolate or? It's the decisions, you know? Okay. Salmon. Don't eat salmon. No, no. No question about that. I'm determined not to eat it. There's no choice. I thought somebody's house would be serving it. Oh, it's a terrible experience. Of which the first is on the side of the subject that sometimes is found acting and sometimes, what? Not acting. Another is on the side of the object by which the act is, what, specified. Now, the movement of the subject is from some, what? Agent, right? And when, and since every agent acts in account to some end, as has been shown above, the beginning of this motion is from the end, huh? And hence it is that the art to which pertains the end moves by its command the art to which pertains that which is to the end. As the, what, ship governing, commands the making of the ship, right? As it's said in the second book of the physics. We're talking about that before class, right? I was saying, there's a double comparison there. He says that the art that uses the product commands the art that forms the product. And the art that forms the product commands the art that, what, prepares the matter, right? So my father's company, they would make farm machinery and farm wagons and things of that sort, right? But they had an experimental farm where they would go out and test these things, right? And so the use of these things, you'd see that maybe there's a defect and then you have to, what, redesign the product, right? So the art that uses it, the farmer's art, you might say, commands the art that forms the product, right? And my father's engineer would say to me, you know, we've got some interesting ideas, he says, but now we're going to find out if they're any good. Because he'd make something according to this and then take it out and experiment with it, right? And see if it develops certain problems, right? And use some. So that art is commanding the art that forms the product, which is my father's art there, the company's art. But they command now the wood or the steel or the size of steel, the shape of the steel that they want to be delivered from the steel company or from the lumberyard, right? Because they know what they need, right? And my father knew that you had to have, you know, steel that wouldn't snap when it gets out on the farm, right? Because they're cheap products, you know, but we're equal to the grain king. That's just, I mean, my father's wagons, grain king, huh? They're the best wagons made in Minnesota, right? So when farmers were out in the field there and they had some cheaper wagon, you know, and it snapped, it's come down at his hill and said, who makes a good wagon? They said to my father, right? We're out in Machinery Hill one day and in Minnesota State Fair, you know, and there's, you know, farm companies there. And they went next to my father and they got some, a long girl there in a low-cut dress and so on. And my father's laughing. He says, they go in there to see the girl and they come over here to see the wagons. As far as I'm dumb, you know, you know what that girl's there for. Not going to take it in by those cheap wagons over there, you know. Okay. So he says, hence it is that the art to which pertains the end, right, moves by its command the art to which pertains what is towards the end, right? Now it's more clear, as Aristotle says, that the use of the formed product is what? The end of the formed product. But the ratio, there's a proportion, right? That the use is to the formed product is the formed product is the raw materials. So the formed product is the end of the, what? The wood and the steel that's being, what? Yeah. Steel's not being delivered to fall on my toe, although one of them did one time. Took me and sold me up at the hospital, right? Ooh. Now the good in general, which has the notion of the end, that's the third thing, Aristotle said about the end, right? That it's something good. It's the object of the will. And therefore, in this way, the will moves the other, what? Powers of the soul to their acts, right? Because its object is the good, and the good is the end, right? For we use the other powers when we, what? Wish, yeah? For the ends and the perfections of all the other powers, huh? Are comprehended under the object of the will, as certain, what? Particular goods, right? Huh? And always the art or the power to which belongs the universal end moves to acting, the art or the power to which pertains some particular end, comprehended or included under that universal end. just as the leader of the army, right? Who intends the, what? Common good, the victory of the army. And also the order, huh? Of the whole army. Moves by his command someone from the tributes, right? Who intends, what? What order? The order of one squad, let's say. But the object moves by determining the act, right? In the manner of a, what? Form, right? Of a beginning that is a form. From which, in natural things, an action specified as heating from heat. But the first universal principle is, what? Being and the, what? Truth. Truth, yeah. Which is an object of the, what? Understanding, huh? And therefore, in this way of motion, the understanding moves the will as presenting to it, it's, what? Object, yeah. So the will is moving the, what? Reason and even the other powers, right? Because its object is the good, the end, right? To which all the other ends are subordinated, right? But the reason is moving the will and presenting to it its, what? Object, right? Like its form. Sometimes they distinguish between the good and the true. It's kind of interesting when Aristotle's talking there about, or Thomas is talking about the division of the fifth book of wisdom, right? All these words there, right? These words that are equivocal by reason. And he divides it into three, right? I divide it into two or three, but he divides them into three, right? And he says the first group of words, he says, pertain to beginnings or causes, right? The second group of words pertains to the subject of science, right? And the third to, what? Properties, right, huh? Of course, the first word in the third section is perfect. And so when you take these things like, words like being in one, they would be found in the second section, right? The subject of wisdom. When you get to things like true and good, you're talking more about the perfection of being, and therefore they're more like properties, right? But sometimes you have, like in this, in the De Veritate, the dispute questions on truth, that the good is defined as what is perfective of another in the manner of an end, right? Right? The true is perfective of something as a, what? Form, huh? It's going to form your mind, right? With the truth, right? And that's kind of what he's saying here, right? Touching upon that difference, right? That the true is more of a form. And so when you get to logic, say, the fundamental act of reason that everything else presupposes is understanding what something is, what makes something to be what it is. That's more like the form, right? The fundamental act of the will here is going to be in regard to the end, willing the end, huh? So the idea of end and form kind of correspond to this. It's hard to see, but you've got to think about that. Related to that, Father Harden always says, speaking about the use of your will, he says, The most important use of your will is to direct your mind to what you think about. Because you'll think about what you want to think about, and you won't think about what you don't want to think about. See, Thomas will raise other places this question, if one moves the other, where does it all begin? And all begins with the mind, right? But we'll see that later on, maybe more, he'll touch upon that. So the first objection, where he has a quote from probably the greatest mind in the church, that would be for Thomas, right? Okay. I'm not saying he's greater than Thomas, but it's supposed to be, you know, a time when Augustine appeared to Thomas, right? He says, well, they're both pretty good, he says, but you're better, because I had a little, you know. Spleen there when I was young, but you didn't. Thomas chased the one out. So Thomas is a little more pure than Augustine. So I guess I was too, yeah, you know. I don't know how many that, how many that is, but I should guess a bit, a bit of all that, and there's this humility, you know. There's a really good, Bernard, clever one, humility, you know. I think when Thomas gets to talk about the different steps in humility, he follows Bernhardt, you know. I was reading some modern theologian one day saying, you know, Thomas didn't take Bernhardt, you know, seriously, you know. He didn't, you know, I was really angry about that. I think he expected him a great deal, you know. That's probably why he didn't dictate a commentary on the song of songs on his deathbed. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So he says, the first objection here. The first effort should be said that from that authority is not had that the understanding does not move the will, but does not move it from, what, necessity, right, huh? It's interesting, no? To the second, huh? Comparing the understanding to the will as imagination of the sense appetite, right? Of course, the text there in the Vianima, Christoph, Saul's up there, you know, so Thomas is... He had cribbed notes. He had cribbed, yeah. To the second, then, it should be said that just as the imagination of the form without the, what, estimate of it being suitable or harmful, right, huh? Does not move the sense desire, right? So neither does the apprehension of the true without the notion of the good and the desirable, right? So I was doing a theorem in Euclid this morning. I wasn't thinking about, this is good, huh? Even number times itself could be a number, right? Odd number times itself would give you a what? No, what? Odd number times itself? Oh, yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah. That's proven this, huh? I need to know. So neither does the apprehension of the true without the notion of the good or the desirable. Whence the speculative, huh, understanding does not move, that's the action, right? But the practical intellect, right? As is said in the third book about the soul, huh? That's how it solves that, there. Parashar also talks there in the third book about how there's not necessity there, right, huh? He takes the example of the continent man and the incontinent man in the seventh book of the ethics there. And they both have strong emotions, but the one man follows his reason and not his emotion, the other man gets into his emotion, and so neither the emotions nor the reason move necessarily, right, huh? If there's both these continent men, these incontinent men. I guess some of these famous scenes, I think it's unfortunate to see how it's supposed to have been irascible by nature, you know, huh? Like a dog, you know? I was taking out the bowels there for the town to pick up, you know, this morning, you know, and this one comes up the street there with a little mutt, you know, a little tiny dog, and I felt like saying, you know, he's not giving much protection for you, ma'am, you know? He's going to need you to protect him, right? I was just thinking, I wasn't going to say this, you know, I just kind of struck me because it's kind of like a little tiny thing, you know? But as soon as she started to walk by you and I came out to the top, and I'm like, argh! She says, stop, stop, she says, you know? But he's a little thing, you know, that needs to be protected for it, it's going to protect you. Still, he came out, argh, like that to me. So some people are given to anger, and you read about people who do horrible things in the newspaper every day, because out of anger, you know, they strike somebody and so on. But then the man like St. Francis de Sales, I guess, who overcame this, right, became known for his mildness, right? So he went beyond being confident, he got the rich, I guess, of mildness, and powerful men to have a irascible side to them, right? And they say, Kennedy, you know, if you can have that, you know, then your homework, you know, and you're important to him, he'd chew it out, and, yeah. And as I say, at Mary's College, and LBJ came through to give a talk, you know, and they had him on a kind of side room, and he was just chewing out the support, and so, because, so these guys, they're irascible, you know, and I think he's been a kind of driving, you know, you know, the way, you know, the way Patton could, you know, aid me with the soldiers that have got traumatic distress, and so on. Get out there and find a colorist. So Pius XI was supposed to be, supposed to have been very irascible. Yeah, yeah. One time he got in an argument with a cardinal, and he got so mad, and he took his red hat, threw it on the floor, he says, you're not a cardinal anymore. Oh, just like that. That's Pius XI, too. Pius XI, yeah. Then he reinstated it. He was Pope when I was born, you know. He was my first Pope. Pius XII seemed to be forever. And then John Paul, I guess. To the third, it should be said that the will moves the understanding as regards the exercise of the, what, act, to do it or not to do it, right? So I was, my will moved me to pick up Euclid and do him rather than not do him this morning. And this is because the true itself, which is a perfection of the understanding, is contained under the universal good as a particular good. Truth is one of the goods, right? But as it guards the determination of the act, which is on the side of the object, the understanding moves the, what, will. Because also the good itself is grasped according to a certain special notion comprehended under the universal notion of the, what, true. And thus it is clear that it's not the same, the mover and mover, according to the same. That's interesting, right? Involved in that is the idea that, in a sense, the good is a particular, I mean, the true is a particular good, and the truth about the good is a particular truth. So in one sense, true is more universal than, what, good. And in one sense, good is more universal than, what, true. And it's rather unusual, right? It shows they're not a genus of species, right? Like animal and dog, right? Well, animal is more universal than dog or cat or any other species, right? And the species can't be, you know, dog can be a particular kind of animal, but animal can't be a particular kind of dog. You know? But it's curious, you know, that true and good are, like, both are more universal than the other, right? See, how can that be, you know? That seems impossible, right? At first, if you're thinking about, you know, come from the categories, let's say, right? But you're thinking about genus and species, right? Color is more universal than green, let's say, right? It doesn't make sense, you know. If color is more universal than green, then green could be more universal than color. It doesn't make sense at all to me, right? So how is it that, that, say, so green is a particular color? And color in no way can be a particular green, can it? Genus, eh? No, it doesn't make sense at all. But yet you can say that the truth about the good is a particular truth, right? The truth, right? The truth, right? The truth, right? The truth, right? The truth, right? And some of the ancient Greeks, you know, the sophists who attacked the geometries saying, well, nothing good in science, right? You're not learning about the good, you know. So, I mean, truth is something more, what, universal than the good, the truth about the good. Yet the good is more universal than the truth because the truth or truth is a particular good, right? Besides, like, one-size music or something, Shakespeare's play, or house even, for that matter. Maybe if you had a car, unless you have to drive it. So, how can that be? That's kind of strange, isn't it? That's very strange. It's true. That's what Chesterton said. Truth is necessarily strange than fiction because fiction is a product of the own imagination. But Shakespeare says there in Hamlin, well, like a stranger, give it welcome, right? If they give strangers welcome, right, it's a thing to do. It's a strange truth, though. I guess we know a lot of strange truths in the Catholic faith, though. It should give them welcome, right? You're a very interesting guy, Thomas, huh? Who would do without Thomas, huh? Of course, De Connick's saying, you know, some of these guys are saying, It's as good if you can do it. I thought that thing with the woman I was talking to when I was first in philosophy. She's a doctor's wife, I guess. And so, I met her in some social affair than she has to talk to me. She's talking about how her husband, as a medical doctor, finds it hard to keep up with all the advances, you know, in medicine, right, nowadays. And I guess some of them don't keep up with it at all, you know. At that time, you know, that's just a dirty secret, you know. Don't tell their patients. Yeah, yeah, yeah. They don't know about the things. And then she kept having a conversation and said, I suppose you'll find it hard keeping up with your field, you know. And I said, Madam, this is the problem with my field. It's catching up. So I never met anybody who's really caught up with Aristotle or Thomas. So even much in Indiana or Charles DeConnick, who's the greatest of guys I've known in this, probably the greatest I know, you know, would not claim to have really caught up with Thomas, you know. And even books I've read, you know, many times, you know, saying, and I know something, you know. DeConnick was saying, you know, he'd been teaching, you know, the physics there since 1935. I had him in the, you know, 50s. But every time he goes through this again, he sees something he didn't see before, right, you know. And I told you about that famous conversation when he and Monsieur Dion were in Rome for the Vatican, to, you know, Parity, you know, with the Bishop of Cardinal Quebec and so on. And when he pointed something out, you know, he kind of said, how could I have missed that all these years? You know. So, I mean, you know, neither one of them would claim to have caught up with Thomas, you know. But all of them go beyond, you know. I mean, he made some particular things, you know, about the animals or something. You might, you know, think about any of these fundamental things, huh? I don't know if anybody's caught up with them, including myself, of course. Yeah.