Prima Secundae
Lecture 38: The Movement of the Will by Sense Appetite and Self-Movement

Transcript
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To the second one proceeds thus, it seems that the will is not able to be moved by sense desire. Funny you should even ask that question, right? For the mover and the, what, agent is more outstanding, right, than the patient, right? As Augustine says in the 12th book, in Genesis to the letter, right? Aristotle argues that way too, and he talks about the acting upon understanding, right? That it's even more immaterial, or just as much as the undergoing understanding, because the agent is more, as Augustine says, it's a prestands, he was right, superior to the patient. But the sense desire is below, right? The will, right? Which is the intellectual desire, right? Just as sense is below the, what, understanding. Therefore, the sense desire does not move the will. It's like the corporal moving the general or something, you know, it's just never done, right? Except in that's a jury. Yeah. It would be a church one thing, yeah? Corporal, I need to call it corporal. Sorry. Moreover, no particular power can make a, what, universal effect. But the sense desire is a particular power, for it follows upon the, what, particular knowing of the senses. So, I mean, how do the senses know good and bad, right? Well, it's agreeable to the sense, or disagreeable, right? And it's a very particular way of knowing the good. Very limited in some ways. Therefore, it cannot cause the motion of the will, which is universal. As it were, fouling upon the universal understanding of the, what, understanding. We quote our style sometimes in the rhetoric, you know? We hate the whole genus of thieves, he says. Moreover, as is proven in the Eighth Book of Physics, the mover is not moved by that which it moves, right? So that the motion would be reciprocal, right? But the will moves the sense appetite, right? Insofar as sense desire obeys, what? Reason, huh? And therefore, the sense desire does not, what? Move the will, right? That's a beautiful objection, isn't it? But against this is what in the, said in the epistle, I guess, of James, right? Jacob, huh? For each one is, what? Tempted by his own, what? Yeah. Concupiscencia means sense desire, primarily, right? It doesn't mean the will so much, huh? And abstract and what? But one would not be, what, abstracted from concupiscence unless his, oh, I suppose he's a draw for what he should be doing, I suppose, huh? Another long bite, huh? Unless the will, his will was moved by sense desire, in which there is concupiscencia, right? It gives an appetite to name that. Therefore, the sense desire moves the will, right? You get the authority of James himself, right? Let's see what the Master says now. I answer it should be said, as has been said above, that which is grasped under the, what, aspect of good and suitable, right, huh? moves the will by way of, what, an object, right? Now that something seems good and suitable happens from, what, two things. What does he mean here? From the condition of what is proposed, and of the one to whom it is, what, proposed, right? That's even true about the mind, isn't it, huh? It seems so to your mind, huh? It's partly because of what somebody says, but also what's inside you, right? It finds it simple or not, you know, custom, things of this sort, right? For convenience, or suitable, is said, secundi verationum, by a relation, right, huh? Whence it depends on, what, both of the extremes, huh? And hence it is that gustus, diversely disposed, right, not in the same way, take something as suitable, and it's not been suitable, right? So if you have experience in wine tasting, and so on, you know, and say, well, eat this first, it's going to taste differently, you know? And, uh, yeah. Whence the philosophy says, in the third book of the Ethics, such as a man is, so does he end the purity of, right? Here, Thomas will come back to that, he's talking about the permanence of damnation, and that sort of thing, right? Because qualities, you know, in the squisquiesce, you can't change that qualities once you're, once you're dead, right? Where the tree falls there, it's a lie, right? It's in Scripture, right? Your will could be fixed in the bad, you know, that's a terrible thought. Aristotle says in the third book on the soul there, when he's talking about, people make bad decisions, right, bad acts, and so on, and they pursue something because it seems good here and now, right? And they don't look at the whole picture, right? They don't look before and after, right? That's where he says that man is the animal, he has a sense of, what? Time, huh? Yeah? You realize how much your life is to have with time, right? But it's only because in time, you can change, although it's hard to do, qualities, huh? How you are, right, huh? And then that habit, your disposition has changed, then how you are is different, and then things seem different to you, right, than they did before. So, it's kind of funny for us to think, too, you know, won't be any children in heaven, right? Now, some of the cute little things that little children do, you know, and your parents and so on, grandparents get a kick out of these little things that little children do, but there won't be any children in heaven, right? They'll all be back at the age of 33, I guess, is the night. And there won't be any, you know, all those little winning ways that children have sometimes, huh? They won't be around anymore, huh? We probably won't miss them. No, you know, some people, you know, it's, you know, how they think that they can, their pet dog, their pet cat, and they can't be happy, you know, huh? Yeah. Well, I suppose some mother would think, you know, huh? I hear mothers often say, you know, well, you know, that all of a sudden, they grow out of that age, you know? I remember my mother saying that at the time, after dinner, you come and sit in your mother's lap, you know, and then, I guess at an age, you don't do that anymore. And they kind of miss, you know, this rapport with the children, you know? And so I can imagine a mother, you know, saying that even more than a dog or a cat lover, you know, that they can go with children, you know? Even by the grandparents, there was always, you know, the kind of spice of life was, you know, when the husband comes home from work, you know, and the mother tells, you know, what so-and-so did today, you know, and they always get a kick out of that, and so on. And I hope you do that. It's interesting. But sure how much our life is, you know, different times of life, you know? We're not the same exactly, right? We can change to some extent, huh? Now, it is manifest that according to passion, that's another word for emotion, right? That according to the passion, the undergoing of the sense appetite, man is changed to some, what? Disposition, right? But disposition is a, you know, from the categories, is a more general word, a more weaker word than, what? Habit, right? So people can be angry all of a sudden, right? Or have some other emotion, right? And they're disposed. To the second one proceeds thus, it seems that the will is not able to be moved by sense desire. Funny you should even ask that question, right? For the mover and the, what, agent is more outstanding, right, than the patient, right? As Augustine says in the 12th book, in Genesis to the letter, right? Aristotle argues that way too, and he talks about the acting upon understanding, right? That it's even more immaterial, or just as much as the undergoing understanding, because the agent is more, as Augustine says, it's a prestands, he was right, superior to the patient. But the sense desire is below, right? The will, right? Which is the intellectual desire, right? Just as sense is below the, what, understanding. Therefore, the sense desire does not move the will. It's like the corporal moving the general or something, you know, it's just never done, right? Except in that's a jury. Yeah. It would be a church one thing, yeah? Corporal, I need to call it corporal. Sorry. Moreover, no particular power can make a, what, universal effect. But the sense desire is a particular power, for it follows upon the, what, particular knowing of the senses. So, I mean, how do the senses know good and bad, right? Well, it's agreeable to the sense, or disagreeable, right? And it's a very particular way of knowing the good. Very limited in some ways. Therefore, it cannot cause the motion of the will, which is universal. As it were, fouling upon the universal understanding of the, what, understanding. We quote our style sometimes in the rhetoric, you know? We hate the whole genus of thieves, he says. Moreover, as is proven in the Eighth Book of Physics, the mover is not moved by that which it moves, right? So that the motion would be reciprocal, right? But the will moves the sense appetite, right? Insofar as sense desire obeys, what? Reason, huh? And therefore, the sense desire does not, what? Move the will, right? That's a beautiful objection, isn't it? But against this is what in the, said in the epistle, I guess, of James, right? Jacob, huh? For each one is, what? Tempted by his own, what? Yeah. Concupiscencia means sense desire, primarily, right? It doesn't mean the will so much, huh? And abstract and what? But one would not be, what, abstracted from concupiscence unless his, oh, I suppose he's a draw for what he should be doing, I suppose, huh? Another long bite, huh? Unless the will, his will was moved by sense desire, in which there is concupiscencia, right? It gives an appetite to name that. Therefore, the sense desire moves the will, right? You get the authority of James himself, right? Let's see what the Master says now. I answer it should be said, as has been said above, that which is grasped under the, what, aspect of good and suitable, right, huh? moves the will by way of, what, an object, right? Now that something seems good and suitable happens from, what, two things. What does he mean here? From the condition of what is proposed, and of the one to whom it is, what, proposed, right? That's even true about the mind, isn't it, huh? It seems so to your mind, huh? It's partly because of what somebody says, but also what's inside you, right? It finds it simple or not, you know, custom, things of this sort, right? For convenience, or suitable, is said, secundi verationum, by a relation, right, huh? Whence it depends on, what, both of the extremes, huh? And hence it is that gustus, diversely disposed, right, not in the same way, take something as suitable, and it's not been suitable, right? So if you have experience in wine tasting, and so on, you know, and say, well, eat this first, it's going to taste differently, you know? And, uh, yeah. Whence the philosophy says, in the third book of the Ethics, such as a man is, so does he end the purity of, right? Here, Thomas will come back to that, he's talking about the permanence of damnation, and that sort of thing, right? Because qualities, you know, in the squisquiesce, you can't change that qualities once you're, once you're dead, right? Where the tree falls there, it's a lie, right? It's in Scripture, right? Your will could be fixed in the bad, you know, that's a terrible thought. Aristotle says in the third book on the soul there, when he's talking about, people make bad decisions, right, bad acts, and so on, and they pursue something because it seems good here and now, right? And they don't look at the whole picture, right? They don't look before and after, right? That's where he says that man is the animal, he has a sense of, what? Time, huh? Yeah? You realize how much your life is to have with time, right? But it's only because in time, you can change, although it's hard to do, qualities, huh? How you are, right, huh? And then that habit, your disposition has changed, then how you are is different, and then things seem different to you, right, than they did before. So, it's kind of funny for us to think, too, you know, won't be any children in heaven, right? Now, some of the cute little things that little children do, you know, and your parents and so on, grandparents get a kick out of these little things that little children do, but there won't be any children in heaven, right? They'll all be back at the age of 33, I guess, is the night. And there won't be any, you know, all those little winning ways that children have sometimes, huh? They won't be around anymore, huh? We probably won't miss them. No, you know, some people, you know, it's, you know, how they think that they can, their pet dog, their pet cat, and they can't be happy, you know, huh? Yeah. Well, I suppose some mother would think, you know, huh? I hear mothers often say, you know, well, you know, that all of a sudden, they grow out of that age, you know? I remember my mother saying that at the time, after dinner, you come and sit in your mother's lap, you know, and then, I guess at an age, you don't do that anymore. And they kind of miss, you know, this rapport with the children, you know? And so I can imagine a mother, you know, saying that even more than a dog or a cat lover, you know, that they can go with children, you know? Even by the grandparents, there was always, you know, the kind of spice of life was, you know, when the husband comes home from work, you know, and the mother tells, you know, what so-and-so did today, you know, and they always get a kick out of that, and so on. And I hope you do that. It's interesting. But sure how much our life is, you know, different times of life, you know? We're not the same exactly, right? We can change to some extent, huh? Now, it is manifest that according to passion, that's another word for emotion, right? That according to the passion, the undergoing of the sense appetite, man is changed to some, what? Disposition, right? But disposition is a, you know, from the categories, is a more general word, a more weaker word than, what? Habit, right? So people can be angry all of a sudden, right? Or have some other emotion, right? And they're disposed. in a certain way, right? Whence it follows that a man in some passion, something seems suitable to him that does not seem to him existing outside the passion, right? Maybe to hit somebody or even kill them, right, huh? Might seem a suitable thing to do, right, huh? And then later on you regret this when your anger has, you know, gone down, right? Just as, oh, it's the same example. Okay. It's probably more known to us. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I told you about the metaphor of Shakespeare, you know, he speaks of the two lovers. They're in the very wrath of love, he says. Clubs cannot part them, right? Yeah. But it's a beautiful metaphor because you're using, what, two strong emotions, one in the irascible, one in the concubiscible, but they have a certain likeness that allows us to be a magnificent, what, metaphor, right? Including, I guess, separate them by clubs. And in clubs they separate the two dogs that are fighting, you know, and you club to separate the man who is there sometimes, see? And so that's why those powers are named, the one in the irascible appetite and the other in the concubiscible appetite, right? Go at each other in different ways. The irascible man. But they're real well known, because they're intense, so. I think Pope John Paul uses that same kind of coupling of those two with when he's talking about work. It's part of his poem, I think he's talking about mining in the earth. And he refers to it as, I think he puts together anger and love. It's kind of the anger for the difficult good. It's good, so you love it, so you sort of direct your anger to do this great, hard overcoming obstacles and get out of the mind of the good. You know, I always go back to what Shakespeare says, things in motion, soon it catches the eye and what not stirs, right? So the emotions that are more like emotion, you even get their name to those faculties, right? So desire is more like emotion than love is, or liking, you know? And joy is, because joy is kind of resting in the thing that you wanted, right? But wanting is a kind of seeking of it, huh? I was noticing, incidentally, the third word that Aristotle uses is there, at least in the metaphysics there. He calls it sometimes a methodos, right? Sometimes he calls it an episteme, and then sometimes he calls it a zetesis, huh? I noticed when I was reading the prayerment the other day, that at the end of the prayerment he says, in this zetesis and methodos, huh? A zetesis you translate it as a seeking, a search, right? And then I was noticing at the end of the summary there of the early philosophers there, you know. And in this zetesis, right? You know, we're in the zetesis. Well, zetesis means a search, a seeking, as they say. And episteme, which means coming to a halt or a stop. Episteme I translate by a phrase, is reasoned out knowledge, reasoned out understanding. But that's something perfect at the end, right? In the beginning, it's a zetesis, right? So you can say philosophy in the beginning is a zetesis, huh? It's like you gave each article here. There's a pro and con, son. There's a zetesis, it's seeking, it's searching for the truth, right? And then finally, it's, if you're good at it, it's reasoned out, huh? Now, in Euclid, in geometry there, you don't need the zetesis of any length, you know, but as you get to the more difficult sciences, the search, you know. Modern philosophy, of course, is a zetesis without any episteme. And they even admit that that's what, God bless him, David Tracy, is a nut out of Chicago. And he said on the, I think it was the 50th anniversary of Bernard Lonergan's great work, whatever it was, insight, and he's writing that, well, theology is all about the journey. We don't really know where we're coming from. We don't even know where we're going, but we're going. Why? Why bother? Yeah. Thomas says in the commentary on the Epistle of St. Paul, that if a man is at this stage and doesn't know the Articles of Faith and the commandments, you know, time is going against him. Time's running out. Yeah. And in this way, right, on the side of the object, right, what seems suitable, the sense appetite moves the what? Well, so you start from a distinction that something suitable is partly on the side of it and partly on the side of what? You, right? And sometimes I see people, you know, they see something that's kind of good and you try to, you know, interest them in something, you know, but it's not for me, they say, right? You know, it's fitting them, right? And so this is not for me, the opposite being, it's for me, right? This is my thing, right? It's the thing, right? And sometimes I listen to both such music, I say, now, am I really correct that this is the best music I've ever written? I probably maintain that, you know, but it probably fits me in some way, this is for me, you know, this is my thing, you know, this is my music. That could be deceived, right? Or Shakespeare, you know, so I thought, you know, you can see this with food, right, too, right? We're talking about the nutritional value of insects now, you know, I see in the papers, you know, that it won't be long before you'll see in the supermarkets, you know, you know, insect sections, I don't know. I don't know. You know. Give it a whole wean in the ant farms, you know. We can order the market on the same you know, in Africa, you know, they, you know, rub them like that and then eat it, you know, and so on, I guess, have you ever had chocolate-coated ants? I have things that are called chocolate-coated ants. I think what tastes of ours. No. I had chocolate-coated ants. I didn't know what I would have eaten if I'd have known it was, but it tasted fine until I knew what it was. I think there's more chocolate than ants. kind of reason these subsistences. I guess that was frog legs. The other thing is to eat frog's legs. I was always too, I couldn't. Tastes like chicken to me. That's what he said, chicken, that's what he said, yeah. Oh, yeah. Down in southwest don't feed snakes sometimes. I mean, that's what he said. Have you ever had that? Would you call it hamburger help when you eat food? It's fine. It's fine. Get a macaroni and cheese in there. Now, the first objection was saying that the will is more what? Prestantius, as Augustine says, right? To the first therefore, it should be said that nothing prevents that which is simply and secundum se, prestantius, right? To be towards something weaker, yeah. Now, this is again that famous distinction there of simply in some way, right? The will simply is what? Yeah, more outstanding, I suppose, kind of the prestantia right now stands out, right? More outstanding than the sense desire by regards the one in whom what? The passion dominates, right, insofar as he is what? Subject to the passion, then the sense desire is preeminent. I was reading the next greatest poet or the only rival of Shakespeare who is who, who, Homer, yeah. Of course, it begins there in the first book, right? With the, what, dispute between Achilles and what, Agamemnon, right? And they both have this anger, right? It's the kind of being, and I was reading Latimer's translation there, and Latimer's just talking about the character of these men, right? And they're, you know, probably noble men, but still they're kind of dominated by their anger, right? And so, to the extent, you know, that Achilles doesn't come in until his best friend is killed, right? The man whom he said was questioned to the father, I'll bring him back alive, you know, don't worry about your son, you know, he's responsible for the death of his friend, you know? So, they're dominated by anger, right? And then when Hera wants to get her way in the war there for a while, she dresses up, you know, and puts her perfect mask on, and she distracts the Zeus of the governance of the universe. And then, you know, he doesn't, until later on, he picks up, and, you know, something has gone wrong in the valley, you know? Too late. Yeah, yeah. Homer's a god, so very human, you know? So, it's, you see those fragments, I have the, you know, natural theology fragments, I called, you know, where Heraclitus and other great thinkers there make fun of the, the gods and the emotion for the statues and so on. But Heraclitus says, if a man should talk to his house or something, you know? So, in some, what? I think you'd say, in some way, the emotion can be more powerful than the will, right? But not simply, not simply. To hold the will, you know, a man responsible for following his passion, right? Okay. Now, the second objection is interesting, huh? To the second, it should be said that actions and choices of men are about singulars. Now, this is a very important thing, right? That what you do is something, what's singular, you know, universal. You don't commit adultery in general, shouldn't you? But you commit adultery with this woman under these circumstances, right, huh? Okay. So, you've got to realize that actions and choices of men are about the singulars, huh? Whence from this very fact, huh? That the sense desire is a particular, what? Power. It's about the particular, it's about that. It has a great power towards this, that through it, a man is thus disposed, that to him something seems thus or otherwise about singular things, right? Okay. So, the man knows universal adultery is wrong, but this woman in particular seems a very desirable writer, and the act he's going to perform is in this, what? Singular thing, right? So, the senses and the sense desire, both of them, seem to have a greater, what? Power to move him about the singular than the universal does, huh? Mm-hmm. It's kind of, what? Remote, right, huh? So, I still don't even talk about that in the ethics there, that the universal doesn't move you unless you, what? Apply it, right, huh? So, that's an important way to see how the senses and the sense appetite can be so influential. And it kind of shows, too, and I suppose how the fiction can be very powerful, right? Because it's universal singularized, right? Or the singular universalized, they say both, you know. But it's kind of a, well, of course, that kind of involves the whole man, right? Universal singularized and singularized. That's a good way, the way it turns, in a sense, the basis of the objection, right, which is based on the universal singular, and the fact that the singular is in, but actually it's in singular. So, going back, you know, we saw earlier in this book here where he talked about the, what, why we have to have the secunda secunde, right? Because we have to descend more to the singular, to the singular, right? Why did Pius XII make, who was it, the... St. Alphonsus. St. Alphonsus, again, the patron both of moral theologians and of confessors, right? Rather than Thomas, why? Because he descended more to the particulars, right? And that's necessary for the excellence of moral theology or that practice. Yeah. St. Al, you know, in the beginning of the premium to wisdom there, right, he's kind of going through human knowledge and starting with sensing and then memory and then experience and then knowledge universal and science and so on. And he makes this comparison there between art and experience, which is better, right? And he says, as far as acting in certain experience, he says, doesn't seem to be inferior to art, but even, what, more successful in some cases, right? And I used to take the example there of little medical problems, you know, like being nauseated to your stomach, right? You talk to people, you know, about nausea and so on. Some people find they eat this particular thing or drink this particular thing, then they kind of get over their feeling of nausea and someone else, oh, why? That make me worse, you know? You see? But as far as curing me, I might know better than, what, the medical doctor, right? What would, you know, because it might be curing nature, right? Some people say ginger ale or something like that, right? 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And it gets strong right away. I mean, I just, you know, on the road there, you know, at the Best Western or something, you know. And then you've got a tea bag, that's all, you know. You just, and I throw it away, you know. That's it. You know, I don't get four minutes, you know. But I know some experience is going to make it bad, right? And they would say, well, okay, but now why does it get bad, right? You know, see? Well, it gets too strong. Well, it was just a question of being too strong, you can dilute it, right? But it still doesn't taste bad. Well, then a chemist, you know, a man of art said, you know, well, there are different chemicals, you know, and there are different release times, right? So that if you, you know, after six or seven minutes, you start to have different chemicals being released, which are undesirable for a good-tasting cup of tea, right? So he's wiser about tea than I am, right? He knows why, you know. But I know from experience, sorry, get a good cup of tea, I'll get it, without knowing nothing about these chemicals, right? But I know from experience that if you leave it in that time, you know, you know, you see what I mean? But if it cooked the meat too long, you know, it loses flavor, right? And you know that the cook knows these things, right? It's like the construction workers, they're always kind of rolling their eyes about the architect because, like, well, what does he know about building a building? Yeah. You know, he doesn't know these materials, and what Father Robert and I was joking about, the field conditions, the architect always sort of leaves a blank, says, well, this will be determined by the field conditions, you know, so the worker's got to figure that out. Yeah, yeah. I used to go, you know, when I went to my father's factory sometimes, you know, we make a farm wagon, you know, and go out to the woodlot there on the property, and, you know, I'm starting to go forward, he says, no, I don't want to lease it. That's right. What's wrong with that? I don't want to, you know, he kind of knows our way, you know. You know, these guys have been making wagons for 30 to 40 years, you know, and they just, I saw him on that board there. So, they have the experience. But this is what he's saying here, right? So, in the light of what he says in many places, you see that kind of solution to this objection, right? The fact that it's about the singular, although it seems to make it inferior to the universal as far as knowing, right? As far as doing, it's more important, right? I'll make an exception for this woman, because he's just something remarkable, you know? What's that movie? It's the one with Martin Dietrichen, the one's called Blue Angel, and the one where the, he's a professor, you know, kind of a pedantic professor there, but in the German universities there, you know, where everybody's taking attention when you get in, you know, and so on. And then his students have been hanging out with Blue Angel, you know, and watching Barney and D.K. He goes down, he gets seduced by her, right? You know? So, this woman, you know, destroys the whole man's life as a teacher. Shakespeare's in the play there, huh? Measure for Measure, huh? Angelo, right? The angelic one. He's always smiled when he grabbed the men's weaknesses, you know? But it's not until he met this one. It makes it just terrible. It's a really beautiful play, though. That's taking the scripture, right? The words, measure for measure, right? Shakespeare, right? But also, people are influenced and they're more judged by literature in a way, you know, and even these terrible fictional things on TV, you know, there. That's what Father Owen Benning used to say. That's why he wanted, in fact, I took a directed study with him on literature and aesthetics, and he said to me, because he studies the priesthood, he said, most people are not going to read the saints. They're not going to read scripture or theology. But they'll read good literature. So the priest knows good literature can influence people more than preaching about the wonders of scripture or St. Bernard. Okay, now, what about the moving each other, right? I'm not saying the objection in the hand before, the reason and the will, right? To the third, then, it should be said, that as the philosopher says in the first book of the politics, reason, in which part of the soul is the will, right, moves by its command the irascible and conquistable, right? Not by a despotic principle, as the slave is moved by the master, but by a royal or political rule, as free men are, what, ruled by the one governing, right? Who, nevertheless, are able to, what, move against us, right, huh? Whence the irascible and conquistable are able to, what, move to the contrary of what the will is moving as. And thus, nothing prevents the will sometimes being moved by them, huh? Aristotle raises that question, you know, whether the emotions should be ruled as a father rules his son or as a master rules his slave, right? What does Aristotle answer, right? Yeah, yeah. Probably you might think Aristotle's the same as the master's slave, you know? But no, that might be, that might be the Stoics something, you know? But no, how does the rule of the master over the slave differ from the rule of the master over the, I mean, the father over the son, right? He thinks of his own good. Yeah, he rules the slave for his own good, right? The father rules the son for the good of the father, yeah. I mean, of the son. And the second difference Aristotle points out is that the, what, slave has nothing to say about whether he should go out to the field today or not, right? But the son is something about whether he should do this or that, right? You know, so since the father consults the son someone as to his, what, inclination, son. I think I told this example, my father was telling me one time about his business friend, and I had an example that he had all kinds of hopes for the son, right? So he sent him out to Amherst, he had a kind of prestigious school out here in the east, you know? And the son flunked out the first year, right? He wasn't suited to Amherst, but not the college period, right? Finally, the father realized this, despite all his hopes he had, the business friend, you know? So he said to him when he came back, you know, after flunking out, he said, what do you really want to do, he says in life. He wanted a filling station, you know? So, because the father had the money, you know, buying a filling station, set him up in the business, you know, huh? Well, he was telling us, you know, to say that that's the way he would act too, you know, huh? He would, you know, we'd be working in the factory there, and one of his business friends would come through with my father, you know, and the guy would see me working down there doing the menial stuff, and he said, oh, learning it from the bottom up, you know? We had no intention of going on, you know, and taking care of the company, you know? But, you know, but you're kind of a busy friend, kind of just making a conversation, you know, learning it from the bottom up, you know? Like, you know, the business. But my father would not, you know, kind of force us into that, right? But sometimes you have a father who's a lawyer or a doctor, something like that, and his son's got to be a lawyer or his son's got to be a doctor. I know some families like this, you know, and, well, sometimes his son is suited to that, but sometimes he isn't, right? And so a parent has to have some, what? That's great. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I suppose as a faculty advisor, you know, you've got to consult someone with the students. You can't really, simply say, you shall take this. Okay, sorry. You've got to be a Greek, yeah. You've got to be a Greek, yeah. No choice. He's got to put the foot down, but. So just as a son, then, or the free man can, what? He's just in some way, like people are resisting the goddess of Obama. So we can, the sense desire, right, can move against reason, even though it's superior, right? Just as a father, the spirit of the son, right? David had some trouble with his son, didn't he? Take a little break now. Yeah. Yeah. So whether the will moves itself, it seems that the will does not move itself. Is he going to contradict the principle? Omne ina movens in quantum vivus modi, est in octu, right? Every mover as such is an act. What hover is moved is in what? Ability or potency. For motion is the act of what exists in ability insofar as it is in a such sort. The same thing is not in potency and in act with regard to the same. Therefore, nothing moves itself. Okay, that's it. Moreover, therefore, neither does the will move able to move itself. However, the mobile moves at the presence of the mover, right? But the will is always present to itself, right? Therefore, if it moves itself, it's always being moved. Oh my God. It's clearly false. It's clear, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Moreover, the will is moved by the understanding, as has been said. If, therefore, the will moves itself, it would follow that the same thing is moved by two movers immediately, right? Which seems unfitting. Therefore, the will does not, what, move itself. Against all this is that the will is the lord of its own act, right? And in it is to will and not will, which should not be, if it did not have in itself, in its power, to move itself to what? Willing, right? Therefore, it moves itself, right? It would have any free will, right? I answer, it should be said, as has been said above, that it belongs to the will or pertains to the will to move the other powers by reason of the end, which is the object of the will. So, but as has been said, but as has been said, and this is the famous proportion of the philosopher, in this way, the end has itself in desirables as the beginning, right? In understandable, so, not as manifest, however, that the understanding, through this that it knows the beginning, right, reduces itself from potency and act, as he guards the knowledge of the, what, conclusions? So, being an act with the guide to the beginnings, right, it moves itself to the conclusion that it was an ability, right? And in this way, it moves itself, right? So, that's the greatest compliment that Monsignor paid me, right? You can move yourself. And likewise, the will, through this that it wishes the end, right? It moves itself to willing those things which are, what? To the end, right? So, I wanted to be happy, right? And when I realized I had to be wise to be happy, then, I was able to pursue wisdom, right? And even logic. So, to that first objection from the physics, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that the will is not, by the same, moving, or mover, and is moved, right? Whence neither, by the same, is it in act, and in, what? Ability, yeah. But insofar as in act, it wills the end, it reduces itself from ability to act in regard to those things which are, what? To the end. That to it, in act, it, what? Wills them, right? That's a beautiful portion there, as Dabba has, huh? Connected with the fourth tool of Dabba, okay? What, what, what, what, what reduces the, the will of, regard to the end? And, that's something, you have to go back into nature, right? And to the, the, the intellect itself. That's what intellect gets its, yeah. Yeah, okay. So, in a sense, you don't choose to, to be happy, I mean, you choose to, you want to be happy, right, you know? You naturally know that. And just as a reason, you know, naturally knows the axioms, right? The beginnings, right? It doesn't, uh, move itself to know those, huh? But, the undergoing understanding of the present, well, by the act of understanding, right? But, when you understand what a whole and a part is, you know, you just naturally see that a whole is, that's beautiful, isn't it, Tom? Right, Tom sees those things. The second, it should be said, that the power of the will, uh, is always in act, present to itself, right? But, the act of the will, by which it wills some end, is not always, what? Present in the act, in the will itself. And, through this, it moves itself. Once it does not follow, then it always, what? Moves itself, right, you know? So, thank God, I would always bring myself to study logic, huh? Richard taught me logic, so when I came to the college there, he said, give me the final exam for the logic course. They gave it to me, and gave me credit for the course. And, of course, it was slower, too, I mean, you know, and it sunk in, you know, so. Not that it didn't have much logic at that time, but, you know, more than most people. To the third, it should be said, that not in the same way is the will moved by the understanding, and by itself, huh? But it's moved by the understanding as regards the, what? Object. Object by itself as regards the exercise of the act according to the Ratio in the... So, we have to stop there, or what is it? Yeah, okay. Give the... The will of rest. That's good, though, see, because we divided these six articles into three, right? Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you.