Prima Secundae
Lecture 39: The Will's Motion: Exterior Principles and Divine Causality

Transcript
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In the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Dios, gracias. God, our Enlightenment, Guardian Angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more quickly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Pray for us. Help us to understand what you are doing. Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, amen. So we're up to the fourth article here, I guess, in question nine. To the fourth one goes forward thus. It seems that the will is not moved by something outside. For the emotion of the will is voluntary, but it's of the nature of the voluntary that it be from an intrinsic beginning, just as it's of the ratio, right, the definition of the natural, that it be from an intrinsic or inward beginning. Therefore, the emotion of the will is not from something outside. That's convincing enough, right? But we have to learn to consider more carefully. Moreover, the will is not able to undergo violence, as has been shown above. But the violent is that whose source is outside. Therefore, the will is not able to be moved by something outside. Exterior. Moreover, what is sufficiently moved by one mover does not need to be moved by another. But the will sufficiently moves itself. Therefore, it is not moved by something outside. Exterior. But against this, the will is moved by its, what, object, as has been said. But the object of the will can be some exterior thing proposed to the, what, senses, huh? Therefore, the will is able to be moved by something on the outside, huh? Thomas says, of course, this encounter is correct, but we don't want to talk about something in addition to that, right? I answer it should be said that according as the will is moved by its object, it is made known or manifest, that it is able to be moved by something, what, outside. Well, that's being moved in a critical sense, right? From the third kind of clause. But in the way in which it is moved as regards the, what, exercise in its act, as opposed to the, what, specification. Still yet, is it necessary to lay down that the will is moved by some exterior, what, beginning. Sorts, huh? For everything that sometimes is acting in act, and sometimes only in ability, it needs to be moved by some, what, yeah, by some mover, right? Now it is manifest, however, that the will begins to will something, when this before it did not will, huh? Found that word order there, huh? Got to tell guys who read Thomas a lot, because I'll tell them the, sometimes I just like to do it, give it to all the word order there. I told you about the difficulty of that Latin that we have with, oh, with the great, right? And Warren tells me that that's the German word order. I don't know. So it is manifest, however, that the will begins to will something, when before it did not will this, huh? It is necessary, therefore, that it be, what, moved by something to willingness, right? And as has been said, the will moves itself, insofar as to this that it wills the end, it leads itself back to willing those things which are, what, for the end. So insofar as it's an act, right, in regard to the end, it moves itself from ability to act as regards the means, right? But now Thomas is going to bring out some interesting thing here. But this is not, is not able, however, to do this, except by, what, the middle of counsel, right? Which says, you know, this is the connection between the two, and so on. For when someone wills to be, what, healed, right? He begins to think, huh? In what way this can be, what, achieved. And through such thinking, it arrives that it is able to be healed through medicine. And then it, what, wills this, right? But because it does not always will enact health, right, it is necessary that it begin to will to be healed by someone moving it, huh? Or by something moving it. And if it moves itself to willing, it is necessary that by means of counsel, which is the act of reason, right, it moves itself, right, or does this, from some, what, will being presupposed down at the end. But now the old argument, they can't proceed forever at these movements, right? This over cannot go on forever, right? Whence it is necessary to lay down that in the first most of the will, the will is, what, brought forth from the instinct of some exterior mover, huh? As nobody other than Aristotle himself, right? This is a passage that Tom Sofney refers to. As Aristotle himself concludes in a certain chapter in the Eudemian, what, ethics, huh? So that's an important thing in the Eudemian ethics, it's not going to be explicitly in the, what, Nicomachian ethics, huh? And I sometimes say this is the second argument for the, what, unmoved mover, right? That it's not just, like you have in the physics theory, you're talking about the natural motion, right? Going back to unmoved mover, but even the, what, movement of the will, right? If you can call that a movement, right? Not thanks to your mover of the intellect. No, because you're talking about the counsel there, right, huh? Yeah. Okay, yeah. So you have to move myself by counsel, the will would have to move you before that, right, huh? Because you can't go on forever, you're saying, right? And therefore you have to have something outside, right, that initiates this movement, huh? So I get up in the morning there, and I'm not thinking about, not willing to get out of bed, right? I must depend upon God to eventually, you know, issue this command to me, huh, time to get up now, okay? Especially given the time, right? That's very fascinating, that thing, you know. I was always struck by that, huh? You never stop and see that, right? See, that dependence that we have upon God, huh? There is kind of an argument for the unmoved mover, right? This is something almost like Newman's argument from conscience. I'm reading an essay, but I saw the presentations of what he made on conscience. Not on that, as such, but he's touched on conscience. It makes an interesting point, at least according to Newman, he said that if a man is accustomed to follow his conscience, always never act against his conscience. Even if he's in error, eventually he'll find a way to God, because he's acting reverentially towards his conscience, which is really towards God. And he'll be led out of that, because he's predisposed already, and he used the word prejudice, he's prejudiced always to act whatever God reveals to him, to act that way. So that even if he's in error, God will lead him out of it. How about the inclination of nature? The will has a nature, and so because the will has a nature, it won't enter an inclination. That's not a sufficient act to... No. Even in the natural motion, right? The first argument for the unmoved mover, right? You don't go back just to nature alone, right? Yeah. That's because you're going from the ability to act, right? You have to go, at least into something you already can act. Well, if that's going from the ability to act, you have to go back, and you can't have this infinite regress, right? Because there would be nothing first. Right. Without the first mover, nothing else is a mover. Now what about the first argument there, huh? To the first, therefore, it should be said that it is of the, what, notion of the voluntary that its beginning be, what, within, right? Thomas is admitting that, huh? But it is not, however, necessary that this intrinsic beginning be the, what, first beginning that is not moved by, what, another, huh? Whence, although the motion of the will has a proximate beginning that's within, right, nevertheless the very first beginning is from the, what, outside. And then Thomas makes a comparison, just as the first, what, beginning of natural motion is from the outside, which to it moves, what, nature, yeah, yeah. And there you see, again, the likeness of the two arguments for the unmoved mover, right? God is the unmoved mover behind all natural motion, but also the unmoved mover behind voluntary motion. That's always fascinating when I saw this. And again, I kind of admire this thing in Aristotle, but he saw this, right, as well as the first argument for the unmoved mover, huh? Yeah, it'd be interesting to see how much of this is in do with his argument. I don't, he's probably not very developed, that's my impression here. Now, the second one, which is taken from what the violent is. To the second should be said that this does not suffice for the meaning of the violent, that the principle be outside, right? That's not, that's not a complete definition. But it's necessary to add that the one undergoing in no way, what? Or in no way gives strength to this, right? Yeah. Which does not happen when the will is moved by something outside, huh? For he itself is, for the will itself, which, what? Will. Wills, nevertheless moved by, what? Another, huh? But this motion would be violent if it were contrary to the motion of the, what? Will. Which the thing proposed cannot be since, what? I think. Yeah, yeah. Now, how about the will being sufficient? To the third, it should be said that the will is regards, what? In some respect, sufficiently, right? It's enough to itself. And in its own, what? Order, right? That is as the proximate agent. But it's not able to move itself as it guards all things. Once it needs to be moved by another, as from a first, what? Mover, huh? Just started, yeah. So its power, you know, is in everything. And later, right? Even the sinner, right? But God always moves things in accordance with our nature, right? So he moves the will in accordance with his nature. So if the will is willing with it, it's moved to will. I was reading Thomas in the Superconjentiles this morning about the gods knowing the future contingents, right? But Thomas often makes the point that God's causality doesn't destroy necessity and contingency, right? He wills that some things will happen, necessarily. Other things will happen by chance, even, right? Nevertheless, they will happen, right? But in the way they're going to happen, right? So it's not only what God wills will happen, but in the way he wants it to happen, right? He wants some things to, what? Happen by chance. Other things to happen by, what? Necessity, right, huh? Some things to happen by will, right? He's quite a guy. I guess he likes to play games, too. Play hide and seek with him, yeah. It's funny how you meet people by chance, right, huh? You know, and it can influence your life a lot, right? You pick up a book by chance, you know, and all of a sudden you're a communist or somebody else. You're saying the nation's way older, right? Yeah. They happen to be sick and the only books they have, why do you think? Yeah. Winning the lottery by chance, that changes your life. That was an iconic, he wanted to be Dominican, right? And then he, you know, had bad health, you know, so he was almost a veteran for a year, right? Well, what does he do now? He's Thomas Carroll, right? And he always thought that this was like Thomas being locked up in the tower there where it was. He read things, you know, memorized things and just thought about them. Fifth article, whether the will is moved by a celestial body, right? To the fifth, one proceeds thus. It seems that the human will is moved by a heavenly body, right? For all, what, motions that are various and multi-form are reduced as in a cause in a, what, uniform motion, which is the motion of the heaven, as is proven in the eighth book of the, what, physics, huh? But the human motions are various in a multi-form, beginning after they were, what, and they're not before. Therefore, they're reduced in the motion of the heaven as in a cause, which is uniform according to nature, right? I think some of them have done this thought, I think, you know. Anyway. Moreover, according to Augustine, the third book on the Trinity, the lower bodies are moved by the higher, superior bodies, huh? But the motions of the human body, which are caused by the will, cannot be reduced, what, to the motion of the heavens as a cause, unless the will also is moved by the heavens, huh? And therefore, the heaven moves through the human will, right? That's a nice use or misuse of Augustine, isn't it? Moreover, through the observation of celestial bodies, the astronomers or the astrologists are able to forenounce some true things, right, about future human acts, huh? which are from the will, right, huh? Spring comes, young man's thoughts turn to love, as the poet says. They predict this, right? Which would not be so if the heavenly bodies were not able to move the will of man, right, huh? And therefore, the human will is moved by a celestial body, huh? Of course, all kinds of allusions to this in Shakespeare's plays, right, you know, especially in the Renaissance, huh? In the sonnets, huh? But against this is what Damascene says in the second book, that the celestial bodies, huh? Unless he doesn't even look at the orthodox, huh? Orthodoxy, then it just says. In the second book, as if this is the book, you know, of Damascene, huh? Not that he didn't write other things, but this is the one. But, he says that the celestial bodies are not the causes of our acts, right, huh? They would be, however, if the will, which is the source of human acts, was moved by the celestial bodies. Therefore, the will is not moved by the celestial bodies, huh? I answer it should be said, Thomas says, that in that way in which the will is moved by an exterior object, huh? And that's the distinction he had in the previous article, right? Is manifest the will, is he able to be moved by, what? A celestial body, right, huh? Insofar as exterior bodies, which are proposed to the senses, right, can move the, what? Will. So if the sun was shining out there, we can go out and get some sun or something, right? And even, what? The, what? Organs of the sense powers are subject to the motions of the celestial bodies, right? But in that way in which the will is moved, as regards now the, what, exercise of its act, to will or not to will, right, huh? By some exterior agent, some also laid down, huh? Quidom, huh? That the celestial bodies directly press upon, huh? Impression upon the human will, right, huh? Now Thomas is not going to agree with this, right? But this, he says, is impossible, right? Now what's his reason for saying that? For the will, as is said in the third book about the soul, is in reason, right, huh? Okay. When Aristotle says that, it doesn't mean it's in the, the power called reason, right? But it's in that part of the soul that is, what? The highest part, the immaterial part, right? Okay. It falls upon having reason, right? It's an intellectual part of the soul. But reason, huh, is a power of the soul that is not, what? Bound to a body organ, right? So you have to read the diorama before you do metaphysics, right? Otherwise, no, there's any material things around, right? You think we're all material things, right? Like people think today that the brain is the organ of what? Thoughts, huh? Thoughts are going on. You're soul chizing up in your head there, right? So it's in the third book of the soul that Aristotle shows us, right? Whence it remains that the will, like the reason, which it follows upon, is a power or ability, omnino, huh? Altogether, right? Immaterial and what? Not bodily, right? Bodiless. I went to a funeral the other day with my wife there, and the priest is talking there, you know. He said, well, there's this part of us, you know, that's not material, you know. I wasn't too sure what it was, you know, but that's the part. The person who's died is still up there, you know, in heaven, right? And she's still looking down upon us, and so on, right? Where she is. Yeah, you never see that, you know. Let's have another funeral there where the son got, and he says, now, there is a purgatory, he says, so I want you to continue praying for my father, that's what you want. My brother's funeral is very clear, I do, you know. That's what he wants, you know, to be praying for him, right? Heck, that St. Francis wanted the brothers to pray for him. What about the rest of us, you know? Yeah. Any of the saints, you know. Yeah, yeah. There's no way to visit him, you know. It's like it's an insult to somebody, to suggest that they didn't make it the first time. First try. Second strain. I remember when my father died, people go up and say, well, now I suffer, he's over, and I said, I hope so. It wasn't Father Groeschel, I don't remember his tape, something about, you know, Uncle Louie, and they're all kinds of, oh, he's suffering. No, it ain't, not for Uncle Louie, he's cooking only in purgatory. Right? When I was young, it seemed like they were a little more, you know, open to saying those things, you know. History, you know, you look, a nun, you know, she's going to be in purgatory until, you know, resurrection day. He's like, oh, my God, a nun is in purgatory. You know? A young girl died in the village, 12 years old, and she said, is she in heaven? No, she's in purgatory. How long has she been to the end of the world? A little 12-year-old girl from, you know, rural Portugal at the beginning of the 20th century. Once it remains that the will is a power entirely immaterial and bodiless, right? But it is manifest that no body is able to act upon a, what? Yeah. But rather the reverse, right? Because one is higher than the other. In that bodiless things and immaterial things are more, what? Formal, right? And everything acts insofar as it's an act, right? So what is more formal is going to act upon what is less so. Here, a more universal power than any bodily things. Whence it is impossible that a celestial body press upon or act upon directly. on either the understanding or the, what, will, huh? Connerstall talks about how the Greeks thought that this was so, right? He quotes, you know, Pedocles seemed to say that, right? He quotes Homer, you know, that he lay there, you know, thinking of the thoughts after he got hit in the head, you know? My brother Mark, you know, he was climbing mountains, and Brother Edmund, the Christian brother, and, you know, he had a fall, right? He was unconscious a little bit, right? When he came to, he said, I wish I had thought about it, pretend that my whole philosophy had changed. You know? And he was blown in the head, you know? He lay there thinking of the thoughts, Homer says, we all hear this, we remember this phrase there in the Aristotle quotes from him in the third book of the soul, right? He lay there thinking of the thoughts, so he's blown in the head. An account of this Aristotle, right, in the book about the soul, the opinion of those saying that such is the will in man, right, as the father of gods and men, right, the heavenly bodies, make in the day, right? To wit, Jupiter, through whom the whole heavens are understood. He attributes this to those who lay down that the understanding does not differ from sense, right? They both have a bodily power, anyway. So, all sensitive powers, since they are the acts of bodily organs, parachidens are able to be moved by the celestial bodies, right? When the bodies are moved, of which they are the, what, act of the power, right? But because it has been said, or has been said, that the, what, intellectual appetite, namely the will, in some way is moved by the sensitive appetite, we saw that before, right? Something seems suitable according to the way your body is disposed. Indirectly, the, what, motion of the heavenly bodies can be down, right, into the will, right? Insofar as they affect the sense appetite. Right. Insofar as through the passions of the, what? Yeah. It happens that the will is moved, right? Okay. So the man who's under the passion of anger, or lust, or whatever it might be, right? This can seem, what? Good, right, huh? I used to say that when I talked about, you know, virtualizing the middle, nothing too much, and so on. And I said, even the drunkard admits, what, nothing too much, right? Just, he doesn't think he's had too much, right? Everybody else knows he's had too much, but he, he denies it. He still admits the principle, but he doesn't see in this case that he's had too much, right, huh? Okay. So the way your body's disposed, right? It can seem good to you to have some more, right? I was reading this little book on the, you know, taverns and inns of New England, right, huh? We were talking about the Puritan days, right? There's one chapter in the Puritan days. And actually, instead of coming to town and going to the tavern to get a drink, right, somebody would be appointed to go right there and unwelcomed, right, sit right there and watch him drinking, oh, he's had enough, and then, you know, they cut him off, right? I said, what a, what a, what a... Yeah, what a nuisance. Yeah, yeah. The town nuisance. And the official amount was half a pint. That was... That was enough? Yeah, I mean, more than half a pint was... Half a hundred what? A wine, wine, wine, wine, wine, wine. Wine and beers. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I said, glad it wasn't too much in that. You all heard the, you know, the scarlet letter, right? You know, that one. But I guess for a guy who was convicted of being a drunken, right, you know, he'd have to wear a D on himself instead of an A, you know? The adult had to wear an A, but he'd have a D. You know, for a year on your back, you know, you couldn't appear in public without this D on your back. It wasn't just a scarlet letter. It was the D letter, too, huh? For a drunken, that's what it stands for, huh? Okay. Yeah, yeah, yeah. It could be a nasty sound. I think it's a nice sound, yeah. It's a little bit of a strict day, you know? Okay, to the first objection, right, taken from the physics, huh? To the first, therefore, it should be said that the multi-form, right, motions of the human will are reduced to some, what? Yes. Which, nevertheless, is superior to the understanding and the, what? The will. Which cannot be said of any, what, body, huh? But of some superior, immaterial, what? Substance, huh? Like God or your guardian angel or something, right? Whence is not necessary that the motion of the will be, what, reduced to the motion of the heaven as to a cause, right? Well, I remember reading in the Reims New Testament when you read about the demons, and they were commenting on the term lunatic, which is one way of translating it. Mm-hmm. And they made an interesting observation. They said that this is, the term, you lunatic, associated with those who are possessed or out of their mind, was an effect of the demons, because they want us to think that material things are bad. Mm-hmm. So the influence of the moon is bad. So God, either God is the source of bad, whether it's really two gods, or they leave the human reason to error about the influence of these things. It's kind of interesting. Mm-hmm. Now, what about the second thing here, right? The lower bodies are moved, but the higher bodies. To the second should be said that the bodily human motions are reduced to the motion of the heavenly body as in a cause, insofar as the, what, disposition of the organs, right, that is suitable for motion, is in some way, right, from the impression of the celestial body. So, you know, is there some truth to that, or not? Mary Warren just told me about watching this thing where they were talking about people born at different times a year on the different heavenly bodies and so on, and there's a correlation there, right, huh? So they had the scientists there who were trying to, they said, there's this kid. So, there may still be some truth there, right, huh? Where the plants were in your birth, right, huh? Confluence the way your body was, what, formed, the disposition of your body, right? Comes up in King Lear, right, huh? In other places, huh? And insofar also, he says, as he sends appetite, the emotions, are moved from the impression of the, what, celestial bodies, right, huh? And further, insofar as exterior bodies are moved according to the motion of, what, celestial bodies, right? From whose, what? Yeah. The will begins to will something or not to will, right? Just as when the cold comes, right, one begins to, what? Want to make a fire. Make a fire, right? And I put my hat on today, right? First time this really thing there, you know, getting a little cold, and, you know, my Aunt Margaret used to say, you know, we're weak in the head, you know, and if you don't keep something on top of the head, we get a cold kind of easily, you know, when it's in the family, you know, so she said that, you know. So I've noticed that myself, you know. When it gets cold, and I'm walking off that head, I get a little cold, right? So this is due to the heavenly bodies, right, that the, it got kind of cold now, you know, and it's snowing this weekend a little bit, and slush tomorrow morning, you might wake up, maybe, you want to wear a hat. Yeah, yeah. So I have been moved by that, right? The way my body has been. As it chills, chills my body, I might want to put a sweater on it, put something on it. It's a little bit warm, right, yeah? Or you do wife tell you to do all this. And you want to avoid her wrath, therefore. No, it was me and the heavenly bodies. By means of your counselor. Yeah, yeah. So in these various ways then, the heavenly bodies can influence, right? They're not directly acting upon the will. That's he's saying, right? So he gets three ways there, right? In which the heavenly bodies can influence the will, right? But the way in which they cannot is to directly act upon the will. So this motion, he says, at the end of the will, is from the, or on the side of the, what? Object presented outside, not on the part of an interior instinct, right? That's the way in which God uniquely can, what? Move us, right? Thomas will speak of the angels as moving us. You know, by way of persuasion, right? That's more on the side of the object, right? Now the third one, huh? How about the way the astrologists can predict things, right? To the third, it should be said, that as has been said, the sense appetite, sense desiring power, is an act of a, what? Yeah, it means like a form of the, that. Whence nothing prevents from the impression of celestial bodies is some to be, what? Yeah, disposed for, yeah. To be irascible, right, huh? Or to be, what? Desiring, right, huh? Or some, what? Passion of this sort, right, huh? Just as from a natural, what? Complexion, right? And I know people, some people, when they drink, they get lustful, right? But when they drink, they get irascible. So something about, you know, is there a force or reason is a little bit diminished, right? Or a lot diminished. You're, what you're naturally, haggly, to use the Latin word there, comes out, right? And somebody might be lust, might be, gets amorous, right? And the other person gets irascible and ready for a fight, you know? And almost, you know, every week at least, you know, I read newspaper about somebody who suddenly shoots somebody or they hit somebody or something, but they were drinking and they got in an argument, you know, about, what's the last one you were arguing about? There was something silly, you know? And they, yeah, I read. They got in a fight about a soccer game, I guess. They got in a fight about a soccer game. And now the guy's in real trouble. You mentioned Alfalfa from our gang. Yeah. He was killed in a shot. He was a young man. He was drunk. Oh, man. And he wanted 50 bucks back from this guy and he got shot and he was killed for 50 bucks. There was an argument about a dog apparently. A dog. He borrowed the dog from somebody. Something happened where the dog was borrowed by this guy for hunting or something and it got lost. He offered a $50 reward when we found him. Somebody found him. So then he went to the owner. He said, I want my 50 bucks back. I returned your dog and I knew him for 50 bucks or something like that. So he's silly, you know? But he was drunk, so that's what happened. And therefore, okay, so he says, most men, right, follow their passions, right, which the wise alone resist. And therefore, utt and pluribus, for the most part, right, are verified those things which are pronounced or predicted about the acts of men according to the consideration of the celestial what? Bodies. Bodies, huh? But nevertheless, as Ptolemy says in the centiloquio, right, the wise man dominates, what? The star. The star, so. To it, because resisting the passions, right, is impeded through the what? The impede. Yeah. Through free will, right, and in no way being subject to the motion of heaven, so. The effects of these celestial bodies, so. There's a star. It's not when there's a horoscope in the papers every day. People aren't wise. People follow. Not many men are wise. Many follow my parents. Yeah. The wise man's a guy who writes the horoscope. Or as Augustine says in the second book on Genesis to the letter, right, it should be what? Judge. Judge, yeah. That when two things are said by the astrologist, that they are said by a, what, most hidden instinct, which human minds not knowing undergo, right? Yeah, not be ignorant, or they undergo it unknowingly. That comes about to what? Deceiving men. It's an operation of the, what, seducing spirits, so that the devil is, I suppose, helping you to make these predictions sometime, right? Not whether the will is moved by God only as from an exterior. principle, right? To the sixth one proceeds thus, it seems that the will is not, what, moved by God alone as by a, what, outside beginning, huh? For the lower is naturally apt to be moved by its, what, higher, superior, just as the lower bodies by the celestial bodies, but the will of man has something, what, above it, after God, namely the, what, angel. Therefore, the will of man is able to be moved as by an outside beginning, also by the angel, right? So is your current angel able to move your will? Moreover, the acts of the will follow the act of the understanding, but the understanding of man is reduced in its own act, not only by God, but also by the angel through, what, enlightenment, as Dionysius says, right? Therefore, for the same reason, the will, right? So we say a little prayer for our grand angels to enlighten our minds, right? Students in the lights of our mind, order our images, rouse us to consider more correctly, right? We can't do this for the will as well. However, God is not the cause except of, what, good things. According to that of Genesis 1.31, God saw all the things which he had made, and they were valdebonat. Very good, huh? That's the common good. If therefore by, what, God alone, the will of man is moved, never would it be moved to, what, bad, huh? When nevertheless the will is that by which the sinner won both sins and lives rightly, huh? He's a good angel, a bad angel, that one. Yeah, one on each shoulder. But they're acting in the way of persuasion. But again, this is what the apostle says, huh? So that's St. Paul by Antonia Messiah, the apostle he calls him. He's quite a guy, huh? I guess Paul and Peter are the ones that are called an apostle by Antonia Messiah. He says in the Epistle to the Philippians, chapter 2, verse 13, God it is who works in us to will and to perfect him. Not my angel, but God, huh? That's a good little quote there. Put that back in, there's this encounter there back in, what, article 4, right? But God, the next year principal is moving us right in the end of God. Okay. Thomas says, I answer it should be said that the motion of the will is from within just as the natural motion is from within. Now, though something is able to what? Yeah. Which is not a cause of the nature of the thing moved, right? Nevertheless, the natural motion is not able to be caused except by what is in some way the cause of the what? Nature. Yeah. So the famous example is what? The stone is moved upwards by man, which is violent, right? The naturally tends to go down, which does not cause, or man who does not cause the nature of the stone, right? But this motion is not natural to the stone. But the natural motion of it is not caused except by the one who, what? Causes the nature. Whence it is said in the 8th book of physics, the one generating things moves according to place, the heavy and the light things. The one who gave him this nature, right? That this kind of motion follows the plant, right? So the one who generates the plant, in a sense, is responsible for its growing, in a sense. But, thus therefore man, having a will, can be moved by something, cannot be, can be moved by something that is what? But the voluntary motion that is from what? From the exterior principle, which is not the cause of the will, is impossible, right? You see the comparison he's making there, right? The only thing that can cause the natural motion of a body is the thing that causes the generation of that actual body. It gives it that nature, right? So the only thing that can move the will intrinsically, right, is exercise, something that gives the, what? Yes, of course, the will itself, right? But when you study creation, you find out that the human soul cannot come into existence except, what? Yeah. And even Aristotle knew that, right? In the book on the Generation of Animals, he speaks of the rational souls coming from the outside. Not from the parents, right? So I'm not the cause of the soul of my children, right? Even though the dog is the cause of the soul of the dog, right? And why is that? Well, yeah, it's tied to the matter, right? And it's caused by the transformation of the matter, right? But our soul is able to exist without the body, right? So its existence is not gotten by the transformation of matter. But rather, it gets existence from God, and the body shares in that existence. But it's not, it doesn't get the existence of the transformation of matter. So the will can have its source only God, and therefore only God can move it as an intrinsic principle. For the cause of the will is nothing other than what? God himself. And this is clear, what, twofold in two ways. First, because from this, that the will is a power of the rational soul, which by God alone is caused through what? Creation. Secondly, from this, that the will has an order to a what? Universal good. Whence nothing is able to be the cause of the will, except God himself, who is the what? Universal good, huh? I'll put that in your pipe and smoke, you know? That's very interesting. He says that, huh? Everything, every other good is said by partaking, right? And is a certain particular good, huh? And not goodness itself, huh? And a particular cause does not give a, what? Universal inclination. Whence neither can the first matter, which is in potency to all forms, is not able to be caused by some, what, particular agent, right? So the first matter can come in by, yeah, creation. So you've got to do, uh, dogmatic theology before moral theology, right? Because these things are both coming from what, you know, studying theology. You have to study the deity, you know, before you can study ethics, right? Yeah. We did this, they treated some of the soul, didn't we? Yeah. And go all the way back to the rest of the day, right? And see these things, huh? So do you think your soul came from your mother and father?