Prima Secundae
Lecture 40: Nature and the Natural Motion of the Will

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to be to get married, right? You see, there's a sense of it just very true, right? So your body and maybe the ability of your body comes from your parents, right? Where is it there? I was told to someone where the guy says, I said to him, you know, you should have knocked your father down, right? But he knocked his father down before him, and my son will knock me down someday, too. He runs in the family, right? That comes from your parents, I guess. I don't know if an irascible father has a irascible son that comes from that. So, the first objection was taken from the angel being above us, right? To the first thereof, it should be said, the angel is not in this way above man that he be the cause of man's, what, will. So my guardian angel is not the cause of my, what, will, huh? It didn't create my soul with its understanding and will. As the celestial bodies are the causes of, what, natural body, natural forms, upon which follow the natural motions of, what, natural bodies, huh? Now, what about the angel moving us, huh, in the intellect? To the second it should be said that the understanding of man is moved by the angel on the side of the, what, object, huh? which is, what, based form by the power of the angelic light for, what, knowing. It's what's doing in the light of our mind, huh? And in this way also, from the outside, a creature is able to be, what, moved right in the side of the object, huh? Now, to the third, it should be said that God moves the will of man as a universal mover to the, what, universal object of the will, which is the good. And without this universal motion, man is not able to, what, will something. He can only will it as being good, right? But man, through reason, determines himself to willing this or that, which is, what, either something truly good or appears to be good, right, huh? But nevertheless, sometimes, especially God moves some to, what, determinately willing something, right, which is good, just as in those whom he moves through grace, huh? We won't talk about that later, he says. Great stuff, you know, you'll have to think about, huh? I'm a breaker now, so we can. We're up to question 10 by now. Then we're out to consider about the way in which the will is what? Moved? Is that where we are? Yeah. And about this are asked four things. First, whether the will is moved naturally to something, right? Secondly, whether of necessity it is moved by its what? Object, huh? Third, whether of necessity it is moved by the lower desire, the emotions, right? And fourth, whether of necessity it is moved by the exterior mover, that is God. And the king is in the will of the king, isn't it? To the first one proceeds thus. It seems that the will is not moved to anything naturally, right? For the natural agent is divided against the voluntary agent, as is clear in the beginning of the second book of the, what? Physics, huh? Therefore, the will is not moved to anything, what? Naturally, right? Okay. I gave a talk on the subject once. If I had it somewhere, I don't know. Whoever that which is natural is in something, what? Always. Just as it's always in fire to be hot, right? Because it's natural. But no motion is in the will always, huh? I'm sleeping in my willingness. Therefore, no motion is, what? Natural to the will. Moreover, nature is determined to the one, right? But the will has itself to opposites. And this is a contrast to Aristotle makes there in the first part of Book Nine of the Wisdom, huh? Therefore, the will wills nothing, what? Naturally, right? But against this is that the motion of the will follows the action of the understanding. But the understanding understands some things, what? Naturally. Naturally. Therefore, the will naturally wills something, huh? The answer should be said. That, as the great Boethius says in the book on the two natures, the two natures of Christ. The great guy is Boethius, huh? Respect for him. I was thinking about Boethius this morning because I was reading the chapter there on whether God knows future contingents, you know? Of course, kind of the ability to know this is that everything past, present, and future is present to God, right? And it goes back to what, you know, Boethius taught us about eternity, right? And that's kind of a marvelous thing, you know, because beginning of the Constellation of Philosophy, he announces that he's in the academy, in the school of Plato, right? But then he gets to the fifth book, huh? Lady Wisdom, right? He introduces Aristotle as a true follower. What's the significance here, right? That goes back to what I sometimes call the central question, right? Does truth require that the way we know be the way things are? And so you have to kind of see that these don't have to be the same in man, right? Before you can see that God's way of knowing can be different from the way things are. So he knows, what? Time eternally. Without any falsity, right? In fact, he knows time better than we know it, right? He told me, right? Okay. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. So as Boethius says in the book on the two natures, and the philosopher before him, right? In the fifth book of wisdom, the metaphysics, nature is said multiplicity, right? Sometimes it is called the what? Intrinsic principle in what? Moveable things. And such a nature is either matter or a material form, as is clear from the second book of the physics, right? Thomas would be more brief here, because a lot of pieces of Thomas will kind of repeat the whole teaching almost, right? Well, the first meaning of nature is what? Birth, huh? Birth, yeah. And of course, you see that kind of, you know, in the words nativity, right? Which means your birthday, actually, right? And prenatal and postnatal and so on, right? Before and after birth, right? That's the first meaning of birth, right? But because birth, in the case of birth, the baby comes from within the woman, right? As opposed to the apple pie, which is cracking upon something outside of it. It doesn't come from within. So you see kind of that difference, you know, that nature always keeps the sense of something within or from within, right? And then the second meaning of nature is the source of the baby within the mother, right? And then the third meaning kind of generalizes it, right? That's the meaning that you have in physics, right? And then nature is any intrinsic principle of ocean and the rest, right? And then you see that that can be both matter and form in different ways, right? And the one that Aristotle comes to at the end of those meanings is the one that he gives here, right? He's not giving all the meanings here, then, right? Just the third and fourth and fifth meanings and the thing. And then the last meaning here. Quae libit substantia, right, huh? Or etium quadribidens, huh? Nature means in that sense what a thing is, right? So I asked this to say to my colleagues, why does Heraclitus say nature loves to hide? What's the first reason we're saying that? Nature loves to hide. Yeah, that's what's within is hidden, right, huh? Nature loves to hide. These guys don't study it. And according to this, that is said to be, what, natural to a thing that belongs to it by its own, what, substance, what it is, huh? So you see Thomas often, you know, he's talking about what it is. He'll say the substance or nature of a thing, right? Kind of using different synonyms in some senses of these words. And this is what belongs to a thing per se or through itself. Now he says, in all things, those things which do not belong to something per se, right, are reduced in something that is within per se as in a, what, principle, right? So, in a sense, I think what you've got here is a, what, an axiom, right, huh? So you have the through itself and the through another, right, huh? And the through itself is before the through another, right, huh? And the through another is so because of the through itself, right? You can apply that to all kinds of things, right? In a sense, you can apply it to the question of the unmoved mover, huh? The moved mover is a mover through itself? No. So if I move this class, I get my class wet here, but my book, right, this is a moved mover. It's a mover through something else, right? So eventually you have to come to something that is, what, a mover through itself, and that's going to be an unmoved mover. In the same way you talk about in our thinking, right, some statements are known through other statements, right? Well, there aren't some statements known through themselves, right? Then there would be no statements, right? No, we don't, right? Sometimes we will this through something else, right? But if there is nothing we will to itself, would we, what? We wouldn't will anything, right? So, so, in all things then, those things which are not within... per se, are reduced in something that is within per se, as in a what? Principle, right? So sometimes you'll see Thomas Aristotle saying that the through itself is before and a beginning of the through another, right? The through itself is before and a cause, right? The beginning or cause. And therefore it's necessary that taking in this way nature, right, for what a thing is, always a beginning in those things which belong to a thing is something, what? Natural, right? That's why the natural road in our knowledge, right, is always a beginning, right? And this manifestly appears in the understanding. For the beginnings of our understanding knowledge are things, what? Naturally known, naturality are known to. Just as what? And likewise, huh? The beginning of voluntary motions must be something naturally, what? Will, will, huh? Now this is the good in general, right? In which the will naturally, or towards which the will naturally, what? Tends, huh? Just as every power naturally turns towards its, what? Object, right? And secondly, and also, the last in, right, huh? And this is the famous proportion of Aristotle, which has itself in this way in desirable things as the first, what? Begings or demonstrations in understandable things, right, huh? And universally, this is the third thing, all those things which belong to the one willing, according to his very, what? Nature, right, huh? For not through the will do we desire only those things which pertain to the power of the will, but also those things which pertain to, what? Yeah, and to the whole man, right? Whence naturally man wills not only the object of the will, but also those things which belong to the, what? Yeah, as the knowledge of truth, which belongs to the understanding, and to be and to live, and other things of this sort, which regard his natural consistency, right, which are all comprehended under the object of the will, as under what? Yeah. Some cartoon from, you know, the 40s, and the man on the street was being interviewed, and he says, What do you think of life, sir? And he says, I'm in favor of it. Yeah, King's been pretty strong coming out to what he's saying now, you know, didn't he? Yeah, yeah. He's pro-life from section on, you know? So, he's saying right, right, right, right, right out, so. So, his son-in-law was, was asking about, uh, Romney, and what's Romney's position, you know, huh? So, he's up in the thing, but he's, apparently, for a reversal of, uh, Roe versus Wade, and so on, so. So, he's got some good things here. You know how strong he is, but, yeah, coming out. Yeah, well, that's a good question, you know, but, I mean, they, they do so under the aspect of, what? A parent. Yeah. A parent. Yeah, to escape misery, right, huh? What time is suicide? No, a martyr. So, I was thinking the term of a martyr. Well, that's what St. Paul says, that, for me, the better thing is to die and be with Christ. But, it's more necessary for you that I see him. So, the better thing is, obviously, to die and be with Christ. Yeah. He doesn't want to die, even, you know. No, no, no. Even, uh, Thomas More, right? Well, that's, like, in some way, that's what St. Bonaventure, I remember reading, something, kind of vague memory, and he's talking about comparing these things that we will in different ways than we will to be, so it's something we will least of all, sort of like he compared you to some ways, um, to die, and when you saw it, it's always the soul of the purge. Do they want to be there? Do they not want to be there? Well, they want to do what God wants, but they really want to get to heaven. So, they kind of, the least amount of willing possible, they want to say that, but they really want to be with God. So, and he, I think he said something, he's like that sometimes with the martyrs. I forget. For instance, happiness, you can't, you know, want to be happy. Yeah, yeah. These other things, that seem to be kind of lower, um, where they are. No, I was thinking of the case of suicide there, you know, which is a more difficult case, but he's trying to escape misery, right? He thinks he's seeing suicide as a way of escaping misery, you know? I went to the story the other day, they're out there trying to get people to sign this petition, you know, to get the, yeah, yeah, give the guy a rough time, but, uh, if they want to see, get into New England, you know, they get on Washington up there in Oregon, you know, and get into New England here, and they chose Massachusetts as the one to work on. Get one out when you came here, you know? Yeah, yeah. That's bad enough. Yeah. To the first, therefore, it should be said, huh, that when the will is divided against nature, right, as one cause against another, right, huh, some things come to be naturally and some things come to be, what, voluntarily, right? And there is a different way of causing proper to the will, which is to be the lord of its own acts, right? Which is, uh, other than the mode or way which is suitable to nature, which is determined to what? To one thing, yeah. What did Shakespeare say? Nature not being able to be more than one. Speculating there is the causes of Coriolanus' downfall. Nature not being able to be more than one. Now, this is what Thomas will say here sometimes, and because the will is founded, right, as a foundation in some nature, right, is necessary that the motion which is proper to nature in regard to what? Yeah, in some way, is partaken of in the what? Will. Will, just as what is of the before clause is partaken of in the after clause. For what is before in each thing is its what? Being, which it is, which is through its nature, right? Then to will, which is through the what? Will. And hence it is that the will naturally will something, right? But sometimes Thomas says that the nature of the will itself requires this, right, rather than talking about the prior clause, right, being the nature of man or whatever it is. Sometimes you'll point out, you know, that distinguish between will and nature, you're not denying that the will has a nature, or what it is, right, that makes it to be what it is. But you're dividing against what is only nature, right? You see that kind of distinction elsewhere, huh? Yeah, yeah. So sometimes Aristotle will divide wisdom against science, right, or in Greek there's Sophia against episteme, right, like in the ethics, right, in the sixth book, where there are different virtues, right, episteme and Sophia, but in the metaphysics, right, which is about Sophia, he speaks of Sophia. This is this episteme, right? Okay. So, you're distinguishing what is just this, right, from something that is something more, right? It's a distinction that's important to see, right? You gave another example of dividing cat from a kitten. Yeah, that's different. That's a different distinction, I think, a different kind of distinction. I'd like you to speak a distinction between 2 and 2 plus 1. I mean, you might give 2 plus 1 a new name and call it what? 3, yeah. And then 2 is just 2, right? 2 plus 1 is not just 2. So, it gets a new name, right? But still there's a 2 in what? In 3, in a way. Right? So, that's a little bit like what you're saying, right? That in the will, there is a nature, but it's not just a nature, right? The same thing you said about reason, right? So, sometimes you see Thomas make a distinction between nature considered, I mean, will or reason considered as a nature, right? And then consider it as reason or will, right? And then consider it as reason or will, then it's open to opposites and so on, right? Whereas a nature is determined to one, huh? It's the idea that nature is always before, in a sense, what a thing is, huh? We often say, Thomas says, that a nature of a thing is what's what? It's first in it, huh? Mm-hmm. The nature of a thing. It's got to be what you are before it can be anything else. LAUGHTER A thing has to be what it is before it can be anything else. It's almost obvious if you stop and think about it, right? Mm-hmm. I guess it is kind of obvious, huh? Yeah. Thomas says, even in God, which is, uh, secundum rationum, right, huh? Is God's nature or his being first? I guess he is. Hmm? No, Thomas says it's nature, yeah. Yeah. Okay. And you kind of see that the way you perceive theology, because when you take up the, the, uh, substance of God, as we say, right, that, that part of theology, um, you show the nature of God is the same as God, right, huh? I mean, you show that the nature of God is the same as his being, right, huh? Mm-hmm. That's kind of like a conclusion, right? Mm-hmm. You know? So you begin with, uh, consideration of the nature of God, and you find out that it's not a body. Mm-hmm. You know? You take the order and the summa there, it's not a body, pure act, and so on, right? And eventually you see that it's his being, yeah. So even in God, you see, the nature of God is first. I was thinking, maybe, yeah, I'm confused by it, but, because we speak of a thing acts through its nature, so I think, okay, well, then what's it for that? I guess in him you can't say that. I mean, in our way of thinking, right, we'd say, um, now that we know God exists, right, after question, um, two, I guess, in the summa, right, huh? Now we're going to take up what God is, right? Mm-hmm. And we take up what God is, the substance of God, before we take up his operation, right, even though, I mean, I'm going to do the same thing, right, huh, you know? But in our way of thinking, right, we take up the substance of God before his operation, and, uh, we take up, you know, the simplicity and perfection of the substance and infinity of it and so on, right? Right, but, uh, it's under the genus of, what, the divine substance, right? Coming back, consubstantial, right? Mm-hmm. Not one in a being, but consubstantial, let's go back in the new, new, uh, come, uh, common parlor. Come advent, I guess, yeah. Come substantial. Om ovusia, right? Om ovusia. Now, to the second objection there about the will not always being in its act, right? To the second it should be said that in natural things, that which is natural, as it were, following form only, right, is always in act, right, as hot in fire, right? But what is natural, as following upon matter, is not always in act in it, but sometimes according to, what, potency only, right? For form is act, and matter is, what, ability, yeah, potency. Emotion, however, is the act of what exists in, what, ability. Em, according to the definition there. Hence, those things which pertain to motion, which follow upon motion, are not always existing in actual things, right? So the stone is not always falling to the ground, right? Just as fire is not always moved up, right? But the only one is outside its own place. And likewise, it's not necessarily that the will, which from potency is reduced to act, when it wills something, right, which is like motion in that sense, right, it's not necessary that it's always, what, it always wills and act, right? But the only will is in some, what, determined disposition. But the will of God, who is pure act, then, always is in the act of what, willing, right? There's no potency there to be actualized. So sometimes you want to get somebody to love us, you know? So can we get God to love us? Don't forget about me. It's, you know, we're getting to love you. And you show them, oh God. It's strange, yeah? Shakespeare says, stranger give them welcome. To the third it should be said, huh? To nature always responds something one, proportioned nevertheless to the, what, nature. To nature in general responds something one in genus, right? And to nature taken in species, there corresponds the one in species. To the individual nature, there responds something one individual. But since, therefore, the will is an immaterial power, just as the understanding is an immaterial power, there corresponds to it naturally something, what? Something one common, right? Do with the good, right? Just as to the understanding, something one common, as the true, or being, or the quadquedest. I don't know what it is. But under the good in general, many particular goods are contained, to none of which the will is, what? Determined naturally, huh? 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