Prima Secundae
Lecture 43: Fruition and Intention: Acts of the Will

Transcript
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To the second one proceeds thus, it seems that phooey is only of what? Men, right? It's always the thing that Descartes said, right? That is, automatons or machines, you know, the other animals. For Augustine says in the first book of the Christian doctrine, that it's us men who, what? Enjoy and use, right? Right. Therefore, the other animals are not able to enjoy, right? Moreover, to enjoy is of the last end, right? But to the last end, the brute animals are not able to arrive. Therefore, it's not of them to, what? Enjoy, right? Moreover, just as the sense, desire, and power is under the intellectual one, so natural appetite is under the, what? Sense, huh? So that's when we used to talk about the, what? You know, the plant wants sunlight, or it wants, you know, a lot of food, you know? It's a big eater. You talk about the natural appetite there, right? If, therefore, to enjoy belongs to the sense, desire, it would seem, for a like reason, it would pertain to the natural one, right? Right, huh? Right, huh? Okay? So the plants would be, which is clearly, what? False, huh? Because it is not of them to be, what? Right. Yeah. You require knowledge, I guess, to enjoy, right? Therefore, huh? The sense, desire, it doesn't belong to it to enjoy, right, huh? And thus, it does not belong to brood animals, huh? You've got to stop it somewhere, right? Can't have the whole universe enjoying itself. But against this is what Augustine says in the book on the 83 questions, huh? To enjoy, what? Food, huh? And every, what? Body. Body pleasure. Is not absurdly estimated to be so, what, for the least, right? So Augustine there is being quoted on both sides, right? He's a great man, I guess. You see that one, the cyclical of John Paul II? You know, Augustine? I know. Yeah. Augustinum Ipponensum, something like that. It's Augustine Ippon, but it's really, you know, impressive, you know, you see. You know, I read it, I mean, he's laying it out, you know, in a very, very complete and authoritative way. It's really very impressive, you know? Not that I'm impressed to argue with Augustine, if I want to read it, but I mean, you can see St. Thomas, you know, how much he grew from Augustine. The answer should be said that, as it had from the four said things, to enjoy is not an act of the power arriving at the end as, what, carrying it out, right? But of the power commanding the carrying out, right? Execution, huh? It's carrying out the sentence, right? In things lacking knowledge, right, there is found a power arriving at the end by way of what? Carrying it out. Carrying it out? Just as by which the heavy tends downward and the light upwards, right? But the power to which pertains the end by way of commanding is not found in them, right? But in some higher nature, right, huh? Which thus moves the whole nature by command. Just as in those having knowledge, the desiring power moves the other powers to their white acts. Whence it is manifest that in those things which lack knowledge, although they do arrive at the end, there is not found in them an enjoyment of the, what, end, huh? But only in those things which have, what, knowledge, huh? But the knowledge of the end is twofold, perfect and imperfect. Perfect, by which is not only known what is the end and the good, but the universal, what, notion, you might say, of the end and the good, right? And such a knowledge is of the rational nature alone, right? So does the dog know what an end is? An end. He knows his own end, right? But he doesn't know what it is to be an end. Only rational changes it. Okay. The imperfect knowledge is by which is known particularly the end and the good. And such a knowledge is in the brute, what, animals, whose desiring powers are not commanding freely, huh, but by a natural instinct to those things which are, what, grass, they are moved. Whence to the rational nature belongs enjoyment in its perfect, what, meaning. But to brute animals, according to a, what, but to other creatures, no way. So the apple tree doesn't, what, enjoy its apples at all, right? But the worm does, and I do. The worm detracts in my enjoyment of the apple, considerably. Especially if you, as they say, especially if you eat an apple pie and half a worm. Yes. So to the first objection, then, from Augustine, that was speaking about perfect fruition, right? Mm-hmm. But in the other quote from Augustine, it's imperfect, huh? Mm-hmm. That's a nice way to get him out of the place. Yeah. Okay. It's a convenient escape. Now, to the second, it should be said, it is not necessary, that fruition be of the last end simply, but of that which is had by each for its, what, last end, huh? So when the cat gets a nice, beautiful, nice warm bed, huh? He's a rabbit, huh? I'm sorry, they'll laugh when I'm in part of this, because I can picture the dog out there as a good boy, and he lays down and he burps. He's happy. He's happy. To the third, it should be said that the sense of desire follows upon, what, some knowledge, huh? But the natural appetite does not follow upon some knowledge, especially in those things which, what, lack knowledge, right? We have some natural desire, too, right? Do you know that? They just have food, not. To the fourth, that's the implying insight, right? Augustine there speaks of imperfect fruition. Which, from his way of speaking, appears. For he says that, Fui, non audio, absurde exista mantra. Envis, huh? Just as, what, uti would be said most, what? Yeah. We haven't got to uti yet, so. So that would be most absurdissimi, huh? Time for one more. Let's see. Whether fruition is only of the last end. To the third one proceeds thus. It seems that fruition is not only of the last end. For the apostle says to Philemon, Thus, brothers, brother, I enjoy you in the Lord, right? I enjoy your company. But it manifests that Paul does not place his last end in man. Therefore, it's your only woman. Therefore, in joy is not only of the last end, right? Remember, this is recorded. Moreover, fruit is by which someone enjoys. But the apostle says to Galatians, The fruits of the Holy Spirit are caritas, charity, gaudium, joy, peace, and others of this sort, which do not have the notion of the last end. Therefore, fruition is not only of the last end, right? Moreover, the acts of the will reflect upon themselves, right? For I will myself to will. And I love myself to what? Love, huh? I like that like Mozart, huh? I like that like Shakespeare. Yeah, I like that like Shakespeare, and so on. Therefore, someone enjoys, what? His own enjoyment, huh? But enjoyment is not the last end of man, but only the uncreated good, which is God. Therefore, fruition is not only of the last end, huh? I like that joy that you're enjoying. The against is what Augustine says in the Tenth Book of the Trinity. One does not enjoy that which one, what? Takes for the use of the will, right? The facultate. Popter, alio, appetitum. Yeah, that's for the sake of something other than itself, right? But only the last end is the thing that is not desired in account of something else, right? Therefore, of the last end alone, is what? Yeah. Okay, let's go back and see a ton of sentences. I answer it should be said, that it has been said, to the knowledge, I mean to the notion of fruit, two things be tamed. To wit, that it be laxed, right? And that it, what? Quiets the appetite, puts to rest the appetite by a certain sweetness, right? Or pleasure, yeah. But the last is twofold, simply, right? And secundum quid, right? This is the thing you meet so often. Simply, what is not referred to another, right? But secundum quid, what is the last of what? Some things, right, huh? So the last theorem, book one of Euclid, right? Some things. So what is therefore simply last, in which something, what? Delights, as in its last end. This is property called what? Fruit. Fruit. And one is properly said to what? Enjoy. Enjoy, huh? But what, however, in itself is not delectable, but is only desired in order to another, as a bitter potion, or health, right? In no way can be called what? Enjoyment, right? Perfect. Yeah. But what, however, in itself has a certain, what? Pleasure. To which some things preceding it are referred, is able in some way to be called a, what? Fruit, right? But not properly, and according to the complete, what? Notion of what? Fruit, right? In it, we are said to, what? Enjoy. Once Augustine, the 10th book of the Trinity says that we, what? Things known, in which the will, pleased, rests, right? But it does not rest simply, except in the last. Our hearts are restless, right? Because as long as something is expected, the motion of the will remains suspended, right? Although, it has arrived at something, right? Just as in the local motion, that which is middle in the magnitude, is both a, what? Beginning and an end. It is not taken as an end in act, except when someone rests. It goes back to the physics there, right? I didn't get that too much time. Okay. Not the first one about enjoying your, right? In the Lord, right? He says, huh? To the first, therefore, it should be said, as Augustine says in the first book on Christian doctrine, if he said, I enjoy you, and did not add in domino, right, in the Lord, he would seem to place the end of his love in him, right? But because he adds that in domino, he places it in God, right, or in the Lord. It signifies in him that he enjoys, right? And thus, the brother sits himself to enjoy, right? Not as the end or the terminus, but as we're a, what, middle. So I don't come to rest in you, right? But I love you in the Lord. Or I enjoy you in the Lord, right? So you're kind of like a middle. But I enjoy you. But it terminates in God, right? Enjoy you in the Lord. Enjoy you in yourself. Enjoy you in the Lord, right? It's like an interesting way of speaking, huh? So we're going to enjoy all the saints and angels in heaven? You know, love. In the Lord? I guess that might explain to some extent. That's what I always thought of when, in morals, at least in Latin, when they speak about marriage, they always speak about the use of marriage. You know, as people enjoy it. Even though it may have much happiness. But they always speak of his use. And I think that's the sense that it's a means to an end. Because our focus, at least nowadays, is always like it's an end in itself. Yeah. Thomas says in one of those works, which one is it now, in the little works, where he quotes one of the sapiential books, run into your house and play with your thoughts. And he's saying, well, what way is, you know, contemplation might play, right? And then, of course, private is because it's, what? Yeah, and it's kind of for its own sake, to some extent, right? You know? But it's not. Fully, for its own sake, right? Can we play so we can do something more serious later on? It's like a playboy, right? They play the end of life, right? You can just be here and play these video games. Shout that kid. That's terrible. To the second it should be said that fruit is in a different way compared to the, what? But tree, producing it, right? Another way to man, what? Enjoying it. To the tree, producing it is compared as an effect to a cause, right? But to the one enjoying it is something last expected in delighting, right? It seems that tree and the tree is fair, right? Because all the work of producing these fruit. And we expect the tree to produce the fruit. Fruit, and we enjoy it, yeah. Those things, therefore, which are enumerated by the Apostle, right? Are called fruits, right? Because they are effects of the Holy Spirit in us, right? Once they are, what? Called fruits of the Spirit, right? Not, however, thus that we enjoy them as our, what? Blast in. Or, in another way, it should be said that they are called, what? Fruits, according to Ambrose, right? Because, for themselves, they should be, what? Sought. Sought, yeah. Or asked for, yeah. Not, however, that they are not referred to Beatitude, right? But because, in themselves, they have, whence they ought to, what? Pleased us. Pleased us, right? One of the fruits of the Spirit is faith, you know? But it means something different than the theological virtue of faith. But it's kind of an intensity of belief, right? Do you know? But it's delightful, right? To have this certitude, right? In a, in a, in a way, right? So the insiepsis have it. Only nobody's spots are deviant. They have in themselves once they should use us, right? Interesting, we used the word play there for Shakespeare's dramas, right? Do you know that we had the English word? Oh, yeah. It's play rather than drama. Drama is kind of the Greek word, I guess. To the third, it should be said, that it has been said above. An end is said in two ways. In one way, the thing itself, right? Another way, the, what? Obtaining of the thing, huh? Which are not two ends, right? But one end, considered in itself, and applied to, what? Another. God, therefore, is the last end as a thing which is last. But fruition, enjoyment, is as the, what? Obtaining of this last end, huh? Just, therefore, there's not another end, God, in the enjoyment of God, right? So, for the same, so also there's the same, what? Notion of enjoyment. That by which we enjoy God. God, and by which we enjoy the, what? My enjoyment. Yeah. And the same reason is about creating the attitude, which consists in fruition. You get that? What he's saying there? Injection's kind of strange, you know. Can you, can you be pleased that you are pleased? So, you go in the restaurant and go over a meal. And some of you are not pleased with it. But if you're pleased at the meal, then you are what? Pleased, and you're pleased. Pleased that you're, yeah, that you're pleased at the meal. But I hope. Yeah. But I'm pleased with it, right? I'm pleased that I'm pleased, right? I hope piece of music. So, I used to kind of be pleased with it, but you're pleased, right? Mm-hmm. Pick up a theory of your place, and I'm pleased with it. That's for some people. That's for some people. Well, should we do the last article? Okay. That's kind of a short article, huh? It seems that fruition is not except of the end, what? Had, right? Augustine says in the Tenth Book of the Trinity that to enjoy is to use with joy. Not of, what? Hope, but of the thing itself, right? But so long as it's not had, it is not a joy in the thing, right? Of the thing, but of the hope. Therefore, fruition is not except of the, what, end had, right? Moreover, as has been said, fruition is not properly said except of the last end. Because only the last end quiets the appetite, huh? Our hearts are restless until they rest in thee, right? But the appetite is not at rest except when the, except in the end, now had, right? Therefore, I guess the having of it is kind of the word of hope, they say, huh? In addition. Therefore, fruition, properly speaking, is not except of the end had. More of it to enjoy is to grab the fruit, right? Right. To hold the fruit. But one does not grab the fruit, does not capture the fruit, except when the end is had, right? Therefore, fruition is not except of the end had, right? But against this, to enjoy is by love to adhere in something on account of itself, huh? But this can come about with a thing not, what, had. Therefore, to enjoy can be also of the end, not had, huh? It seems to me there must be some kind of distinction here that Thomas has to see, huh? The answer should be said that to enjoy implies a certain comparison of the will to the last end, according as the will has something for, what, the last end. But the end is had in two ways. In one way, perfectly. In another way, imperfectly, huh? Perfectly, when it's had not only in intention, but also in reality, huh? Imperfectly, when it's had in intention, but only. There is therefore a perfect fruition of the end, when it's had really. But imperfect is of an end not had really, but in intention only, huh? So to the first, therefore, it should be said that Augustine speaks of perfect fruition, huh? To the second, now, which has got to be at rest, huh? That the rest of the will is impeded in two ways, huh? In one way, on the side of the object, which to it is not the last end, but is ordered to another, right, huh? In another way, on the side of the one desiring the end, was not yet obtained, I guess, the end, huh? But it's the object that gives the species to the act. But from the agent depends the way of acting, that it be either perfect or imperfect, according to the condition of the agent. And therefore, that which is not the last end, fruition is spoken of improperly, right? As it were, falling short from the very species' enjoyment. But of an end, of the last end not had, there is fruition properly, right? But imperfect, on account of the imperfect way of having the last end, right? I mean, they're in the Song of Songs, they're there, my teacher there, Bernard Clairvaux, has a time, you know, where the bride is, what, at rest, right, huh? And then now he's called out to do some good work, right? And so, but there is that fruition there, right, huh? And he wants the bride not to be disturbed, and she's trying to contemplate it. So there's a kind of fruition there, right? But it's imperfect, right, because he doesn't really possess the groom. To the third, it should be said that, to, to, what, take up the end, or to have it, someone has said, not only, but also according to, what, tension. No, we better stop that, right? In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas, Deo Grazius. God, our Enlightenment, Guardian Angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, or to illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor, help us to understand what you have written. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, amen. I was reading across some texts there, Thomas, the other day, they were always talking about the bad angels, you know, the demons, right? Now, they don't strengthen the light of our mind, right? But they do act on our images, right? And suggest things, right, huh? You see? But the good angels are, like the great angels, right? They strengthen the light of our mind, so we can judge better, right? But judge means to separate the true from the false, by some beginning our knowledge, huh? So that's not what the devil wants to do. He wants to deceive us, huh? I mean, there's two sermons there, I just got to reading them, and Bernard Clairvaux, there, about the little foxes, you know, cats of little foxes. The second sermon, I guess, is really kind of addressed to the heretics in his time. I guess they'd be the Albigens and people like that, huh? You know, for marriage is forbidden, right? And certain foods are forbidden, and so on. And he says, how come they don't have a name, like the Nestorians or the, you know, the, usually, you know, the sect of heretics, and you're not the founder, right? I said, they don't have a name because it probably came from the devil, right? It's like, you know, so on. But it's really interesting to read, huh? Okay, let's just for a second look at the premium to aid here, question eight, just so we can recall where we are, right? Look at the premium to question eight. He says, then we're not to consider about the acts of the will in special, in particular. And first, about the acts, which are immediately of the will itself, right? As elicited by the will itself. Secondly, about the acts commanded by the will, which might not be acts of the will, right? That's the first division into two. The will, however, is moved both towards the end, and towards those things which are to the end, huh? First, therefore, we're not to consider about the acts of the will, but which it is moved to the end. And then about the acts, which is moved to those things which are towards the end, huh? And then the acts of the will towards the end seem to be three. To it, to will, to enjoy, right? To it, and to what? In ten, yeah. And now we're up to question twelve, which is the third of those, right? Last time we were talking about fruition, right, huh? Now we're going to talk about intention. So, then we're not to consider, he says, about intention at the beginning of chapter twelve there. And about this, a fourth or five things are asked. First, whether intention is an act of the understanding or of the, what? Will. Secondly, whether it is only of the last end. Third, whether someone is able at the same time to intend to things. Well, you're distracted, you are. Fourth, whether the intention of the end is the same act with the will of that which is, what? Towards the end, huh? And fifth, whether intention belongs to the brute, what? Animals, huh? Okay, so we go now to the first article. To the first one proceeds thus, it seems that intention is an act of the understanding and not of the, what? Will. For it is said in the Gospel of St. Matthew, chapter six, if your I is, what? Simple. Just what you say, pure, right, huh? Your whole body will be lucid, huh? Whereby I is signified intention, as Augustine says in the book on the Sermon of Our Lord on the Mountain, huh? That's in, what, chapters, is it five, seven, something like that, in Matthew, Sermon of the Mountain. That's all you need to know is in there, I guess, Augustine tells you to live. But the I, since it is a tool of sight, signifies a grasping power, right, huh? And Thomas often calls that first act of reason, the simple grasping, right? Grasping what something is, huh? It's a very, what, interesting. It's taken from the hand, right, and applied to knowing power, huh? But when you grasp something, it is contained in the, what, hand, right? And so when the mind grasps something, it's contained, in another way, in the mind, huh? So we say that knowing takes place by the thing known being in the knower. Why, love is the heart being in the thing loved, right? Kind of the reverse, huh? Therefore, intention is not an act of the desiring power, but of the grasping power, the knowing power. Or, Augustine there says that intention is called a light, huh, by the Lord, huh? Where he says, if the light which is in you are darknesses, and so on. But light pertains to knowledge, right? Therefore, intention, huh? So two quotes here from Augustine, huh? Moreover, intention designates a certain ordering towards the end. But to order is a reason. Shakespeare told us that, right? Looking before and after its order. You know, Homer has almost the same phrase as Shakespeare has, but the one Homer has is, to look before and behind yourself. And this comes in the key points, right? Like in the beginning of the Iliad there, when there's this fight between Agamemnon and Achilles, right? Achilles is going to, you know, draw off on the battle, right? And so on. And he says, you know, Agamemnon doesn't realize how he's insulted me, right? Can't look before and behind yourself, right? And of course, everything goes eventually against him, right? Until Matropos, the best friend of Achilles, is killed. And then Achilles comes back, right? But, you know, the Trojans are encamped out there in the open field, right? And they know that Achilles is coming back tomorrow, right? And Poulidamus, who alone looks before and after himself, right? And he says, let's get back inside the city. And of course, they're so confident, you know, that they've been beating the Achaeans, the Greeks, that they don't listen to him, right? But fools, now, Zeus had taken away their mind, you know? But he uses that phrase, you know, looking before and behind yourself, right? So that when Theobald, one of the editors of Shakespeare in the early centuries, the 17th century, I guess it is, when he sees this phrase looking before and after, he says a phrase almost, what, Homeric, huh? But Shakespeare's phrase, I think, is better than Homer's, right? Because you can extend the meanings of before and after to all the different ways that reason looks before and after. But it shows you the two greatest poets, right, huh? Homer and Shakespeare both see what characterizes reason, huh? Marvelous to see those two, the two greatest poets in harmony, right? It's just, you can do it, sir. I just learned, too, that the etymology for wit, it comes from, it actually traces itself to Videri in Latin in one way, but it's a common root between Latin and Sanskrit, the Veda or Vedan or something, and it refers to C. I didn't know that before. I just might not just want to know it. That's why that first sentence in the metaphysics, right, should be translated Edenite, to understand, huh? I'm more precise than to know. So to order is an act of reason, right? So in tending, you're ordering one thing to another, right, do you? So that's an act of reason. Moreover, the act of the will is not except of either the end or those things which are toward the end. But the act of the will with respect to the end is called voluntas or fruition, right? With respect to those things which are towards the end.