Prima Secundae
Lecture 46: Choice as an Act of Will and Reason

Transcript
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In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas, Deocrazius. God, our enlightenment, Guardian Angels, take the lights of our minds, order and lumen our images, and realize us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. We pray for us. Help us to understand all that you have written. I'll be getting a new little division here, in question 13, 14, 15, and 16, which Thomas notes what we're going to transition to now. Consequentary, he said, consequently, we're not to consider about the acts of the will which are in comparison to those things which are, what, towards the end. In English, I think we say, what, for the end, right, rather than towards the end. I don't know if that would be here. But, anyway. And they are three, he says, right? How does he get these three all the time? It's amazing what he does, huh? Illigere, huh? Which means to what? To choose, I guess. Consentere, which means to what? Consent, I guess. You always hear about that in confession. Consentere, and what? Uti, to use, right? But, consul goes before, what? Choice. So, it's going to be divided then into, what? Four parts. Question 13, 14, 15, 16. First, we're not to consider about choice. Secondly, about counsel, which is presupposed to it. Third, about consents. And fourth, about what? Use, huh? So, question 13 will be about choice, right? And question 14, about counsel. And then 15, 16, about consent and use, right? But each question is many questions, huh? Now, about choice, six things are asked. First, whether it be an act. No, of what power it is an act. Whether of the will or of what? Reason, huh? Secondly, whether choice belongs to the brute animals, huh? Shakespeare calls a beast, right? Third, whether choice is only of those things which are for an end, or whether it is also of the end itself, huh? Third, or fourth, rather, whether choice is only of those things which are done by us, huh? Fifth, whether choice is only of things that are, what? Possible, right? And sixth, whether a man of necessity chooses, or freely. Offer, I couldn't refuse, they tell me that, huh? Offer, I couldn't refuse. You've heard that phrase, huh? Business man just leaving, you know. Offer, he got an offer, he couldn't refuse. So, to the first, one goes forward thus. It seems that choice is not an act of the will, but of what? Reason, right? Aristotle himself sometimes spoke as if, you know, it's both, right? Or it's one or the other. For choice implies a certain what? Comparison is in bringing together, right? I guess collatio's got the idea of, what, latio along the side of, right? And collatio, put two things along the side for comparison, right? Sometimes you see in Latin there, they'll say reason is collativus, huh? And discursivus, huh? Well, bringing together and then, you know, discoursing, running, right? From one thing to another. Reasoning, right? So, it implies a certain collatio by which one thing is preferred to a, what? Another. But to, what? Bring together. See, pharaoh means, what, to bring and koan is together, right? But to bring together is, what? Reason. So, when reason reasons, it brings together these two premises, right? And reasons out a conclusion. When you define, you bring together the genus and the, what? Differences, right? Therefore, choice is a reason, right? Choice does involve reason, right? But whether it's an act of reason itself isn't to consider it. Moreover, it is of the same thing to syllogize and to, what? Conclude. But to syllogize in doable things pertains to, what? Reason. Reason belongs to reason. Since, therefore, choice is as a conclusion and things to be done, as is said in the seventh book of Aristotle's Necomachian Ethics, right? It seems that it be, that it is a, what, act of, what, reason, huh? Moreover, ignorance does not pertain to the will, but to the knowing power, huh? But there is a certain ignorance of choice, right? As is said in the third book of the Ethics. Therefore, it seems that choice does not pertain to the will, but to, what, reason, right? Against all, this is what the philosopher himself says in the third book of the Ethics, that choice is the desire of those things which are in our power, right? But desire is an act of the will. Therefore, choice is a, what, also an act of the will, huh? Now, Thomas used to say it involves both, but still, it's an act of one rather than the other. I answer, it should be said that in the name of choice, huh? That's a good word, election, right? Is implied something pertaining to reason or the understanding and something pertaining to the, what? Will. For the philosopher says in the sixth book of the Ethics, this is what I was referring to, that Elexio, right, huh, is either a, what, understanding, desiring, or a, what, understandable desire. It is kind of that point, right, that involves both, right, huh? And it doesn't put one in for the other like it does in the, in the, I said, counter, right? Now, whenever two things concurrent, one together, right, huh, to constituting something one, one of them is, as it were, formal with respect to the, what, other. When's Gregory Nyssa, and I guess this is, my footnote says, this is Nemesios, not Nyssa, but anyway. I was just talking to the father before you guys came in there, because my son gave me a copy of Kagan's book there on the Peloponnesian War, right? Oh, yeah. So I'm reading about it in the journals and so on, and I was struck by one general named Sophocles, right? I said, well, just, just a, you know, a equivocal name, you know, for the thing, or is it the Sophocles that is a playwright, huh? I got kind of curious about Sophocles, so I was looking up some little biographical data in him, right? And he served as a general, right? With Pericles, huh? And he served on the board, you know, that was in charge of the generals and so on, right, huh? He also served as head of the, in charge of the Confederacy, you know, the Treasury of it, like a Secretary of the Treasury or something, and all kind of interesting things about the man, right, huh? Mm-hmm. See? And there's another dialogue called Lachez, where Socrates talks an old general named Lachez. Mm-hmm. Well, he's in the Dalton Asian War, too, and he's associated with Nisias, who has also appeared in the Diablo, right? So these are real guys, you know, so you've got to be careful, you know, sometimes, huh? I know with Winston Churchill, there's a novelist named Winston Churchill, right? But Winston Churchill himself wrote a novel. And so I mean, I was kind of interested in Churchill, you know, in a course, and then there's some correspondence between Churchill and this guy, you know, how we can, you know, write our names to help people with distinction between us, you know? It's kind of a funny little letter, you know? And so you've got to be careful about some of these things, you know? Who is it? Isn't it a philosopher? Is it Euclid or Legara, I think? But it has nothing to do with the elements, right? So you've got to be careful with these names, right? I know with Richard the Great, they thought she was an abbess, but her abbess was Gertrude of Hackaborn, right? And so the two were confused, right? And some of the old editions, like in my edition of some of her works there, she's represented in, you know, the abbess's costume, you know? So here's Thomas, two Gregories maybe, huh? So what can you do, huh? So, whence Gregory, huh? Some Gregory anyway, says that choice is neither desire by itself, huh? Nor counsel solely alone, right? It involves both of these, huh? But something put together from these, right? Just as we say that the animal is put together from the soul and the body, huh? And it's neither a body by itself, nor just a soul, right? But both, so also what? Choice, right, huh? Okay. So, notice, when we first see this act called choice in a somewhat, what, confused way, right? I'll get it distinctly. It's either, what? Intellect desiring or intellectual desiring, right? You know? Which kind of indicates that it, what, involves both, right, huh? Okay? And Gregory's saying something like that, huh? So both Gregory and Aristotle are saying that, right, huh? Okay, but now we go on to be a little more distinct, right? But it should be considered that in the acts of the soul, that acts which are, what, essentially of one power, right? Or of one, what, habit, right, huh? They receive sometimes their form, right? And their species from a higher power or habit, according as the lower is ordered by the, what, superior, right? Sometimes they say charity, for example, it's the form of the virtues, right, huh? Okay, and forms the other virtues, right? And believes all things, you know, hopes all things, as St. Paul says. For if some act of fortitude, right, is exercised in account of the love of God, right, the act is, materially speaking, an act of, what, fortitude, right, huh? But formally of, what, charity, yeah. Thomas talks about that when he talks about you monks, right? You know, and he says, well, if you're abstaining from food or something like that, right, is it an act of abstinence or temperance, or is it an act of, what, obedience, right, you see? Well, if you're acting under your vow, well, then it's formally that, right, huh? Even though it's materially an act of, what, temperance or something of this sort, right? Now, it is manifest that reason, in some way, right, comes before the will, because the object of the will is the good as known by, what, reason, right? And it also, what, orders its, what, act, right? So, as Aristotle says, it belongs to the wise man to order things, right? And that's because it's the highest perfection of reason, which is proper to look before and after, as Shakespeare says, right, huh? So, if there's a before and after an order in the act of the will, you'd expect it would come from, what, reason, right? So, as manifested, reason, in a certain way precedes the will and orders its, what, act, huh? In so far as the will tends toward its object by the order of, what, reason, right? In that the grasping power, and that's the, what, knowing power, right? It's apprehensiva. Sometimes they call the first act of reason, what, simple grasping, huh? So, the act of reason is named from, what, the act of the hand, right? And so, you see that term in Thomas and logic, you know, simplex apprehensiva, right? Okay? And that is interesting, huh, because the knowing power, right? Knowing takes place by getting the thing known in the know, right? So, when I grasp something with my hand, it's contained in my hand, right? When I grasp something with my mind or reason, it's in my, what, reason, right? Why love is more in the thing loved, right? Okay? So, there's kind of this, kind of, contrariety there in the way that reason and the will work, right, huh? Reason is trying to get the thing into itself, right, huh? Why the will goes out to the object and rests in the object itself, right? I left my heart in San Francisco, right, huh? Okay? Or Christ says, where your treasure is, there you're, what? Right. Yeah. So, your heart's in heaven, it's not here, right? So, there's kind of a contrast there, right, huh? I used to use a simple example, you know, you can jump into the ocean, but you can't put it in you. And that's the way it is with God, right, huh? You can more, your will is more proportioned to God than your, what? Yeah, yeah. Especially in this life, right, huh? So, charity remains after, what? Death, right, huh? But faith, you know, gives way to it. Vision, right, huh? So, he often, you know, uses kind of a synonym for the knowing power, the vis apprehensiva, right, huh? Okay. For the vis apprehensive, the grasping power, huh? Represents its object to the, what? Desiring power. The petitive, huh? The wanting power. If, therefore, that act by which the will tends towards something that is proposed to it as good is from this, huh? That through reason it is ordered to an end. In a material way, it's an act of the will, right? But formally of, what? Of reason, yeah. In, what? In things of this sort, right? The substance of the act materially has itself to the order which is placed upon it by a superior, what? Power, yeah. And, therefore, choice, substantially, is not an act of reason but of the will, right? In other words, substantial goes from standing under, right, huh? So, the act of the will here stands under reason in the sense that it stands under this order that reason has imposed upon it, huh? But, choice is perfected in a certain motion of the soul towards the good, right? That's going out to the good, right? And that is chosen, right? Whence manifestly, it is an act of the, what? Desiring power, huh? So, I'm desiring the medicine. for the sake of, what, health, right? I can say desire to take the medicine every day, you know. A little box, all these things laying down. So this is an act of my will, to desire to take the medicine, right? But I'm designed to take the medicine because my reason has, what, seen the order of medicine to health, or the reason of the doctor has seen the order of this medicine to my, what, health, right? So it's materially, substantially an act of my, what, will, desire to take medicine, but it's formally, right? It's an act of my will under the order which reason has, what, given that, right? So it's reason that sees the order of medicine to health, right? And therefore the will depends upon reason, right? To desire health for, what, to desire medicine for health, yeah. Now if the medicine tasted good, that might be a different thing, I just, you know. I mean, as a kid, I had some, a little medicine for something, and it was kind of a cinnamon flavor, like the one, those little red cinnamon things, you know. It tasted pretty good. And one day, I took it, and I sucked it for a while, you know, too long. Sucked right through the, thinking, oh, what a hot day! It's a dangerous way to get little kids around the house, right? You have medicine that tastes like candy, you know, huh? But my medicine doesn't taste good, you know, so the method I take now, it's not cinnamon-coated, anything like that, so it's only by reason that I want to take that medicine, right? Okay. To the first, therefore, it should be said that choice does imply a, what, bringing together, right, huh? A certain one that is preceding it, right? Not that it is essentially, or as he said in the thing, substantially, right? Here he's using it to what? Essentially is kind of a synonym for substantially, right? Not that it is essentially the, what, bringing together, right, the ordering, huh? How do they translate the Colossio there? Just kind of give you kind of, some of you have an English text there, how do they translate Colossio? I thought at the end of the reply to the first, something about like gathering, putting together, or something. Comparison. Some of it tells you it's comparison, right? Comparison. Bring alongside. The extra guy to bring alongside, you know, Lattus and Colossio, bring alongside, you know, which is called comparison, right? Yeah. I see that in Albert the Great sometimes, you know, speak of, and Thomas too, that means it is coletivus and discursivus, right? It's like, oh, I think of the soldierism, you know, where you bring together the two premises, and then you discourse to the conclusion, right? You run to the conclusion. Discourse comes from running. To the second should be said that the conclusion also of the soldierism, which comes about in things to be done, pertains to reason, right, huh? And is called a, what? Sententia, right? Or judicium, which the choice, what? Follows, huh? And on account of this, the conclusion seems to pertain to choice, right? As a word to something that follows upon it, right? To the third, this phrase now, ignorancia, what? Electionis, huh? Ignorance of choice. To the third should be said that ignorance is said to be of choice, not that the, what, choice itself is knowledge, but because one is ignorant of what should be chosen. Okay? That's a perfect phrase. Now, what about our bestly, beastly friends, huh? Okay? Grandchildren were getting on top of the cows there and riding them. Oh! Of course, my son's, you know, his daughter's, he had lessons to riding horses, and also, there's nothing to get on top of the cow. I don't know how the cows liked it, but. The young ones are trying to imitate the older ones getting on top of the cows. So they don't, cows don't work out there, I think. How many cows did they have? Oh, I don't know how many now. It's, it keeps on changing now, because some are being born, so on. We had some steak, too, from the cows, you know. So, it's a great, great, we're discussing good, this farming life is a, you know, good, honest life, you know. It goes on in some of the sections of the economy. The second one proceeds thus, it seems that choice belongs to the, what? Brute animals, huh? For choice is a desire of those things, of some things on account of an end, as is said in the third book of the Ethics. But the, what? Brute animals desire something on account of an end. For the act is the sake of an end, and from, what? Desire. Therefore, in brute animals, there is, what? Choice, huh? What do they compare, right? Or is it by nature that this is, you know? Moreover, the very name of choice signifies that something is taken, what? Before others, right? But the brute animals take something before, what? Others, right, huh? Just as manifestly, the, what? Sheep, I guess it is? Eats one, what? Ur, right, huh? And uses another one, right? And therefore, in brute animals, there is, what? Yeah. I remember in the book about cats, how do you get a cat a pill, you know? And there, you put the pill inside a little meatball, right? And you have a nice little meatball, you toss it with a cat. You toss it with the pill, and the cat takes it. Very hard, otherwise, to give the cat a pill, right? You might have one all the time and give the cat a pill. My son, they came up, he brought a cat that had been hanging around their house down there, you know. In Texas, they brought it up to the farm because my daughter had to get something to get the mice that they're trying to get into the feed, you know. And so the cat didn't know what's going on. It seems to be something down now to the new life of the farm. But I guess, you know, you get these animals that come in, you know, to try to get at the chickens, you know, and they will actually, you know, tear at the screens and so on, you know. So I guess there's a thing to give, these things that they'll go eat and fight and set up and they'll be dead. But you know, watch out the kids, you know, potent things, you know. Okay. So the animals desire something for the sake of an end, right? And they prefer, right? One thing to another, right? They've got some class, those, you know. And when I catch, look, he used to have pork, you know. Somebody said pork, you know. And Christ's steak, you know, and that sort of stuff. Moreover, as I said in the Sixth Book of the Ethics, to prudence belongs or pertains that someone well choose those things which are for the end. But prudence belongs to the brute animals whence it is said in the beginning of the metaphysics that they are prudent without, what, learning, whichever ones do not, what, huh? Not able to hear, right? As the, what? The what? Bees, yeah. Apes, yeah. So you've got the word apiaries in it, you know. And this also has manifested sense, huh? For there appears marvelous sagacities, right? In the works of animals. As of the bees and the, what, spiders, huh? As of the bees and the bees and the bees and the bees and the bees and the bees and the bees and the bees and the bees and the bees and the bees and the bees and the bees and the bees and the bees and the bees and the bees and the bees and the bees and the bees and the bees and the bees and the bees and the bees and the bees and the bees and the bees and the bees and the bees and the bees. And even the dogs, right? For the dog in following the, what? The deer, I guess, huh? If it, what? Comes to a, what? Yeah, trivial, huh? Three ways. By, what? Smell. It explores within the first or the second way, right? Once it finds it is not, it securely goes, what? Into the third way, right, huh? Not exploring. But it says we're using a, what? Solgismo divisivo, right? Okay? They used to call it in class an either-or solgism, right? Either went this road or this road this way, well. It's like, yeah. You know how they go with, you know, the police use these dogs, right? And it goes right away and you follow them, right? So I guess what you do is you get that hot pepper there and you split it there and you get the dog off and stuff. Okay. Okay. As if using a divisive, divisive solgism, huh? By which it includes that the stag has gone through that way, right? From the fact that it did not go through the other two ones, right? Since there are no more. Therefore, it seems that choice belongs to the brute animals, huh? But against all this is what that Gregory, whoever he is. You can see the footnote here. You see, the misios, huh? The natura homini. He says that boys and, what, irrational animals voluntarily do something, right? But not, however, choosing, right, huh? So the little baby doesn't choose to cry, does he? So at a certain point, they kind of, you know, realize this is kind of a tool, you know, to get attention, you know. And then they start to choose to cry, right, huh? I saw the only grandchildren, the older one, correct, and the younger one, you know, that the younger one was, you know, she was doing that, you know, to get attention or to get the thing that she wanted, right? And then she was choosing to cry, right? Since there was an increase in the, you know, reason, right? Actually, it should be said, huh? That since choice is the, what, taking of one with respect to another, right, is necessary that choice be, what, with respect to many things which are able to be, what, chosen, right? And therefore, in those things which are entirely determined to one, choice has no, what, place, huh? Now, there's this difference between sense, desire, and will, as is clear from the four said things, that sense, desire is determined to something, what, one particular thing, by the order of, what, nature, huh? But the will is, what, by the order of nature determined to something, one common, which is a good, but it has itself, what, indeterminately with respect to, what, yeah? So when the person goes to the restaurant and they give a menu, right, you might be determined by nature to eat something, right? But now he's got to make a, what, choice among these things, huh? And therefore, it's proper to the will, what, to choose, but not for the sense, desire to choose, right? Which is the only kind of, what, choice that is found in the, what, food animals, right? And in account of this, choice does not belong to the, what, food animals, huh? He says, you know, apply to the first objection. The first effort should be said that not every desire of something in account of an end is called, what, choice. But when there's a certain, what, discrimination, ah, discretion, yeah, of one from the, what, other, huh? Interesting is the word discreet, discretionary, or in the categories of that word come in, come up, discreet. Yeah, yeah, continuous and discreet quantity, yeah, discretionary, which has no place, he says, except where the desire can be, what, carried towards, what, many, right? To a second it should be said, huh, that the brood animal takes one before another because his, what, desire is naturally determined to, what, to it, huh? Whence, at once, when through the senses, or through the imagination, there's representing something to it, huh? To which it is naturally, it's, to which naturally it's inclined, it's appetite, huh? Without choice, it is moved towards that, huh? Just as without choice, fire is moved upwards and not, what, downwards, huh? So he's saying when something is proposed to him that is in accord with his natural, what, inclination, he goes for it, right? That choice? I suppose there could be individual differences, huh? We had these two cats at the house there, you know, Tabitha and Moppet, and after breakfast, you know, Tabitha went right to the front door and wanted to go out. Down the, a couple of blocks, there was an empty lot there with honey, I guess, or something. She'd do that every morning, you know. And Moppet would go and jump in the windowsill there, you know, the nice board there in front of the window, you know, and watch them go by, a little more domesticated. But they did it every morning, the two of them, you know. You know, I must say something, you know, I don't know why. But I don't think it was that choice, you know, should I go hunting, nor should I sit in the window and watch the road go by. One is contemplative and the other is acting. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I remember the cat we had back home when I was a kid, and they had kind of, you know, a little carpet, a little place in the kitchen there where you could, there was a table there and you'd sit there. And the cat would get up in that thing and go look out the window, right? And then a couple of dogs in the backyard having a fight, and she got so excited, you know. So there are some individual differences, right, these animals, right? But is it a matter of choice, huh? My wife, my wife doesn't like licorice. I like licorice. My wife doesn't like licorice, you know. My daughter likes licorice, but my wife doesn't, I don't know. Why do you get on with this? And then Sam, you know, like, I can't stand, I feel, rave about this, you know. And of course people, you know, people are confessing, you know, sometime, you know, that, you know, they really enjoy their Friday meal, even though it wasn't meat. They really like that stuff. Like when you know, you know, pennies, you know, they have this stuff. It's a real pennies for me to eat this stuff. I mean, there might be individual differences like that, I suppose, in the animals, huh? I don't know. Some animals might be more attracted to one food than another, I don't know. But do they choose, huh? Do you choose to like licorice, or do you choose to like salmon? You know, partly, you know, with nationalities, you know, they have their favorite foods, as they say, right? And that's probably custom rather than nature, right? But it's probably something, too. So, you know, I don't know. about nature. I mean, one of my grandchildren can't eat peanuts, right? They're allergic to nuts, you know. And I know my son, one of my sons is allergic to hazelnuts and that sort of stuff, you know. And we discover this sometimes, you know, and we get a reaction from it, huh? And so, but that's something natural, right? There's not a choice to choose to not like hazelnuts or something like that, right? So, it could be something in us, you know, or by you. You just never liked licorice, you never liked salmon or anything. You were in the, maybe the 60s or 70s, a plate company came out with a plastic plate. Yeah. And they thought they were going to make lots of money. Yeah. But all of a sudden complaints started coming in that food tasted terrible on these plates, but not everybody who had a plate thought that way. It turned out that there was a component in the plastic that some people can taste and others can't. Wow. And didn't have a quality course in college, and the professor had this, looks like, this compact audit. And so each of us tried it to see if we could taste it or not. And it's a kind of ancient chemical thing. Yeah. Yeah. No, the difference between, you know, nations and their food is probably custom rather than nature, but custom is called a second nature, right? Mm-hmm. Maybe it's in bread after generations, you know. Yeah. After generations. Same from Minnesota, you know, and so we're used to what? Lake food, you know? So, I mean, to me the best thing in fish is a walleye pike, you know? Oh, yeah. And rather than this ocean things, you know? And by somebody who grows up in the coast over here in the ocean, it's going to be attached to that, you know, but that's custom it seems to me, you know? You know? Except when it comes to seven inches. Something, something. Yeah. Something about that. Unpardonable, you know. Yeah. So he says, the brute animal, it takes one before another because his desire or appetite is naturally determined to it, right? Whence at once, this is the second objection now. Whence at once, when through the sense of the imagination is represented to it, something to which it is naturally, to which his appetite is naturally inclined. Without choice, he is moved to that alone, right, huh? And just as without choice, fire is moved upwards and not down, right? Now, the third objection, huh? That again, the third objection. It's a longer one, right? Whereas Stahl seems to attribute to the emphasis of prudence, right? That's kind of metaphorically said, huh? To the third should be said, that is, it's said in the third book of the physics, motion is the act of the mobile from the, what? Mover. And therefore, the power of the mover appears in the motion of the, what? Mobile, right? So the football thrown by the great player, right, huh? You see the power of the mover, right? The quarterback, right? In the motion of the football, right? And in account of this, in all things which are moved by reason, there appears the order of the reason of the, what? Mover, right? Even though they themselves do not have, what? Reason. Reason, huh? For thus the, what? Arrow tends directly towards the target, right? The signal. From the motion of the, what? Archer, yeah. As if they themselves had, what? A reason, what? Directing them, right? I mentioned that how Aristotle in the second book of the physics there, he says that so much does action for an end appear in the bees and the ants and so on, that people wonder whether they have a reason or not, right? No. He's not assuming that they do have a reason, right? But he says so much does action for an end appear in it. Reason seems to be involved, right? Then do they have reason, right? Or if they don't, then they better be moved by something that has reason. And therefore, in the motions of, what? Is that a word for clock? Oralugiorum? Mm-hmm. Huh? Oralugiorum. That's the plural there. It's quite a word for a clock, huh? Yeah. We did it with the horological. You're in English sometimes, huh? Not the class, but actually chronological, right? Right. So, just as all artificial things are compared to human art, so also all natural things are compared to the, what? Divine art, right? And therefore, the order appears in those things which are moved, what? By nature. Just as in those things which are moved by reason, as is said in the second book of natural hearing, huh? Physics. And from this, it happens that in the works of the brood animals, there appear certain, what? Wise things, right? Sagina. Yeah. Insofar as they have a natural inclination to some, what? Most ordered, ordinatissimosa, processes. As it were ordered by a, what? Highest art, right? Divine art, huh? And on account of this also, some animals are called, what? Prudent or sagacious, huh? Not that there is in them some reason or choice. Yes. Which appears from this that all which are one nature operate in the same way, right? Unlike men, right? So they speak, the bees all make their eyes in the same way, right? But, you know, walk around and see a different way. You'll make houses and so on, right? Mm-hmm. So Aristotle, or Deconic used to talk about how kind of second definition of nature, right? Something of the divine art in things. So they say if the art of building a ship could be put into the woods so it'd build itself into a ship. Mm-hmm. It has something like nature, right? Mm-hmm. You can see what, you know, we're trying to do that with our computers and so on, right? Put something of our art into the thing, you know, so. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. I told you about, was it the, Charlie Rose there, you know, was interviewing one of these computer guys and he was talking about, you know, he was actually telling them when the computer's going to excel the human mind. Yeah. And Charlie's, you know, you're buying all this stuff up, you know. I think the deadline is passing up. I mean, it was increasingly like this, exponentially, you know, so eventually it's going to, you know, the head of the universe, you know. It's over, you know. We'll be obeying them, you know. But there you can see, it's more like nature though, right? You're putting more of your art in there, right? Maybe not quite as much as this guy thought, but there is something of the human art there in these machines, right? Intelligence and the artists. Oh. Now, where the choice is only of those things which are for the end, or also sometimes of the end itself.