Prima Secundae
Lecture 47: Choice, Freedom, and the Will's Determination

Transcript
================================================================================

To the third, one goes forward thus. It seems that choice is not only of those things which are for the end. For the philosopher says in the sixth book of the Ethics that virtue makes for what? Right choice. So Aristotle defines what moral virtue, he puts choice in the definition, right? It's a habit with choice, right? Existing in the middle towards us. It's determined by right reason and so on. So if you have the virtue of what? Temperance, right? You choose to eat and drink. Modely, right? Enough to sustain you, but not to get drunk, etc. So whatever things are apt to be, what come about for the sake of something, right? Are not of virtue, but of another power, right? But that for the sake of which something comes to be is an end. Therefore, choice is of the end. I don't follow the text to go over now. Moreover, second objection. Choice implies the what? Accepting before one thing with respect to another. Placing it before. But just as of those things which are, what? Towards one end. One can take one before another, right? So also of diverse, what? Ends, huh? Therefore, choice can be of the end, just as of those things which are for the end. And I noticed there, when Aristotle's talking there in the metaphysics there, he's comparing the philosopher, the wise man, with the dialectician, right? And with the sophist, right? And he says he differs from the dialectician by his power, right? Because the wise man is certain about things, and the dialectician is only probability, right? The difference in the sophist by his, what? Choice of life, right? He says, yeah, but then they have a different end in mind, you know? So here's a place where Aristotle seems to be saying, you can choose, what? Your end, right? And so when people set out in life, you know, we can do in life, you know, but they choose their end, right? So what do they aim at in life, huh? So I choose to be wealthy, the wealthiest man in the world, or I choose to be the best this or that or something, you know? Yeah, we'll see what Thomas says here. But against this is what the philosopher says in the third book of the ethics, that volintas, right, wills of the end, but choice of those things which are for the end, towards the end, huh? Now, I answer it should be said, that as has been said, choice follows upon a, what? Sententia, huh? Or judgment, right, huh? There were the sentences, Peter Lombard, right? What the sentences were of the church fathers and so on. Which is as the conclusion of a, what? Operative syllogism, right? Syllogism of the operative. Whence that falls under election, which has itself as a conclusion in a syllogism about things to be done. Another famous proportion. But the end and things to be done is like the, what? Principle or premise. And not as conclusion as the philosopher says in the second book of the physics. Whence the end as such, right? Does not fall under, what? Election, huh? Choice, huh? But now, this is the distinction he's going to see here. But just as in speculative TVs, right, nothing prevents that which is the beginning of one demonstration of science, right, to be the conclusion of another demonstration of science, right? Nevertheless, the, what? Very first beginning, the demonstrative beginning, cannot be the conclusion of some, what? Yeah. So that all right angles are equal, right? Or if equals right, equals results are equal, right? These are not, what? Conclusions, right? So also it happens that what is in one doing, an end, is ordered to another as to a, what? End, huh? And in this way, it falls under, what? Yeah. Just as in the operating of the doctor, health has itself as an end, huh? Whence this does not fall under the choice of the doctor, right? Let's go to a lot of doctors. But it supposes this as a beginning, right, huh? But the health of the body is ordered to the good of the soul, right, huh? Whence among the man who has a cure over the salvation of the soul, right, huh? He can come under election to choose what? Hell. Or a secret. As the apostle says, and I am, what? Weak, then I am powerful. But the last end in no way comes under, what? Choice, right? Okay. So just as the same statement can be a premise or a conclusion, right? So the same thing can be, what? An end of some things and a means of others, right? That's not hard to see, right? Insofar as it's an end, it's not the object of, what? Choice, right? It's always as a means to some further end that it can be choice, right? It reminds me of what Thomas says sometimes. He'll say in logic there that what is defined is always a species, right? You say, well, quadrilateral is defined by Euclid, right? And quadrilateral is a genus of square, oblong, and so on. So sometimes, isn't it, a genus is defined? It's a species of higher genus. Yeah, yeah. It's insofar as it's a species of a higher genus that's defined, huh? Not insofar as it's a genus, right? And eventually, you come to a genus, call it categories, that cannot be defined, right, huh? In any way, right? Okay. But even those genus that can be defined, like quadrilateral, they're defined insofar as they are the species of some genus, which is the beginning of its definition, right? So you could say, then, that genera are not defined, just species. Someone could say, well, yeah, well, but the same thing can be, right? Yeah, until you come to the highest genus, which cannot be a species, right? But the genus that is also a species can be defined, but, yeah, yeah. Can a father be generated? Huh? Not his father. Yeah, you see what I mean? Maybe there's some father like Adam or somebody, right? Who's not generated, right? It's created, but not generated, right? It's a premise proved? Proved? Yeah. But is it as a premise in that it's proven? No. But insofar as itself as a conclusion, right? That it's proven, right? It's not hard to see, right? So it's the same kind of distinction he's making here, right? That what is chosen is chosen as a means, not an end, right? So it's having a lot of fun there. I've got one of my grandchild children. Her name is Sophia, right? So I say, I'm a philosopher, so I'm a lover of Sophia. I was kind of playing with the equivocation of this, right? Okay. But anyway, you might say that I chose to be a philosopher, right? But you see, that's my end in life, to be a philosopher, right? You see? No, when I chose to be a philosopher, I thought that this would lead to my happiness, right? See? So I didn't choose to be happy, right, huh? But I didn't think I could be happy by being a politician. Nobody thinks that. And I didn't think I'd be happy by being a businessman, right? I didn't think I'd be happy by being a lawyer or a medical doctor, right? That could be happy. So, but then you could say that then, if this is my end, you know, then I think it's the same of it, right? I went to Laval and so on, right? So, if I chose to be a philosopher, it's, insofar as to be a philosopher is a means to my being, what? Happy, right? What's insofar as it is? It's my end in life to be a philosopher, right? Come on, let's see the little girl. Let's see if you share up all this stuff. It goes on. So, if you look at the entire Egyptians here. Yeah, so the ends of, the proper ends of the virtues are ordered to beatitude as to a, what? Last end. And in this way, there can be choice of them, right? So, Thomas sometimes says that virtue is the road to, what? Happiness, right? Vice is the road to, what? Misery, right, huh? So, if you want to be miserable, you choose to do these vices, right? But you can't choose beatitude, huh? You can't choose, you know? Does a man choose between happiness and misery, right? Probably the existentialist of things. He could, you know, but can he really do that, huh? If the age of sedentions would always choose to be miserable. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Because it'd be more noble. You know, the priest out there in Kansas there was saying, talking about the, a little joke there about the Sadducees, right? And, of course, the Sadducees didn't believe in the, yeah, and so on, yeah. So, that's why they're sad, you see? The priest was from Wisconsin, you know, he's kind of a fan of the Green Bay Packers, you know, but he's always making some allusion, you know, in a humorous way to the Packers, you know, huh? And to the second, right, huh? It should be said, as had above, that the last end is one thing only, right, huh? The attitude or happiness. Whence, wherever there occur many ends, right, among whom there's able to be choice, according as they are ordered to a, what, a further end, right? We're going to have to take a little break now, huh? Hmm? How? Let's look at Article 4 right now. To the fourth one goes forward thus. It seems that choice is not only with respect to human acts. For choice is of those things which are for the end, right? But those things which are for the end are not only acts, right? But also, what? Tools, right? This is said in the second book of physics. Therefore, choices are not only of human acts, huh? And the dummy book was saying, you know, they chose medicine, right? That's not a human act, right? Moreover, action is distinguished from contemplation. But choice also has place in contemplation. In so far as one opinion is what is chosen over another, right? Is that equivocation there? What is that? Therefore, choice is not only of what human acts, huh? I was choosing Homer, right? He's the poet, huh? Moreover, men are chosen for some offices, huh? Either secular offices or ecclesiastical offices. From what? By those who do nothing with reference to them, right? Therefore, choice is not only of what human acts, huh? So when they elect the president, right? There you go. That's how you act. But against all this is what the philosopher says in the third book of the ethics. That no one chooses except those things which he, what, estimates can come about through, what, himself, huh? Let's see what the master says here. I answer it should be said that just as intention is of the end, so choice is of those things which are for the end, huh? But the end is either, what, an action or some thing, right? And when some thing was the end, right, it is necessary that some human action, what, intervene. Either insofar as man does, what, something which is the end, just as the physician makes, what, health, which is, what, his end, he is. Right. Whence to make health is said to be the end of the physician, right? It's interesting, we use the word physician, huh? Right? We use the word physician that comes from nature, right? Yeah. So when a doctor starts getting involved in abortion and other unnatural things, is he a physician anymore? In fact, Father Owen Bennett used to always insist on that for a doctor or a physician. Yeah. Because a doctor is a teacher. He may or may not teach. Yeah. Whence to make health is said to be the, what, end of the medical doctor. Or insofar as a man in some way uses or enjoys the thing, which is the, what, end, as the avaricious man is in this, what, money, right? Or the possession of money, right? And in the same way it should be said about that which is for the end. Because it's necessary that that which is for the end is either a, what, action, right? Or some thing, or some thing, which, what, the intervention of some action, but which it is, what, or uses it, right, huh? And in this way choice is for the end, and in this way choice is always of what, human acts, huh? So in regard to the injection then from the tools, huh? To the fourth, to the first effort should be said that tools are ordered to the end insofar as the man uses them for the end, right? So do I choose the medicine, or do I choose to take the medicine, or do I choose to use it? I choose to take the medicine, right? But it's a human act, I don't need to take the medicine. Sometimes I... Yes, I hesitate. Purgatory goes between. To the second it should be said that in contemplation itself, there is some act of the understanding assenting to this opinion or that, right, huh? But it's the exterior action that is divided against contemplation, right, huh? So he doesn't deny that, huh? Be careful about that, Thomas. Be careful about saying, you know, that you choose, but you want the affirmation or the negation, right, huh? But anyway. Maybe it's an opinion, well, yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah, choose, you know, choose what you want. Yeah, yeah. Like a menu, you know, huh? A philosophical menu, you know. Well, that's where they teach, you know, introductory philosophy in most colleges and universities, right? You give them a menu, right? You know, and this is what, there's stuff, this is what Descartes says, you know, and then you, you know, the student decides what he wants for his meal, you know? We'll choose Descartes on a card. Now, to the third, it should be said that the man who chooses a bishop, right, or the prince of the city, chooses to, what, name him for such a dignity, right, huh? Otherwise, if there were no, what, to establishing, yeah, to the constituting of a bishop or a prince, there would not be any, what, choice, right? And likewise, it should be said, whenever something is, what, chosen before another, right, huh? One joins to its operation of one choosing, right? So if I choose steak over a salmon, huh? It's, I don't want to eat the steak, I don't want to eat that. It's got a good connection involved in there, right? Were there choices on you? things that are possible. To the fifth, one proceeds thus, it seems that choice is not only of possible things. For choice is an act of the will, as has been said. But the will is of what? Impossible things, as Aristotle says in the third book, the ethics. Moreover, choices of those things which are done by us. But in no way does it differ, as far as a choice is concerned, whether one chooses that which is, what, simply, or that which is impossible to the one choosing. But often, those things that we, what, choose, we cannot, what, perfect, right? And thus, they are impossible for us. Therefore, choice is of impossible things, huh? Moreover, nothing does man, what, attempt to do, except by choosing. But the blessed Benedict says, huh? This is, I guess, the one, huh? There's regular, huh? That if the prelate, huh? Commands something impossible. Must be tried. Therefore, choice is of impossible things, huh? There you go. Proof in the pudding, right there. I think it was admitted, huh? Mother Superior says, you know, you're going to teach calculus, then sister's going to... That's it. But against us is what the philosopher says in the third book of the ethics, right? That choice is not of what? Okay. I answer, it should be said, that it has been said, are what? Choices refer always to our, what? Actions. But those things which are done by us, are possible, what, for us? Whence is necessary to say, the choice is not except if things possible. It's so simple, Thomas, huh? The comic used to say, we've got to get back to the simple understanding of Thomas, right? Likewise, the reason for choosing something is from this that it leads to the, what? End, huh? But to that which is impossible, one cannot, what? Achieve the end, huh? A sign of which is that in taking counsel, men arrive at that which is, what? Impossible for them, right, huh? They cease, right, huh? As if not being able to proceed further, right, huh? We're not going to hang a bell on the cat, right? Who's going to do that, right? And this appears also manifestly from the proceeding of reason that proceeds. For thus they have themselves to the end, of which there is choice, to the end, just as a conclusion to the, what? Beginning, or the printed premise. But it is manifest, however, that a, what? Impossible conclusion does not follow from a, what? Impossible. Yeah. Whence is not possible that the end be, what? Unless that which is for the end was, what? Possible. But to that which is impossible, well, no one is, what? Moved, huh? Whence no one tends towards an end, except to that which appears that, what? Possible. Yeah. Whence that which is impossible does not fall under election. Now, to the first, therefore, it should be said that Voluntas, huh? Is, what? In between the understanding and the exterior operation, right? For the will proposes to the will its object, right? And the will itself causes the exterior action. Thus, therefore, the beginning of the motion of the will is considered on the side of the, what? Understanding, which grasps something is good in general, right? But the termination or perfection of the act of the will is to be noted according to its order to operation, through which someone tends to the, what? Achievement of the end, of the thing, rather. For the motion of the will is from the soul to the thing, right? By the knowing it's from the thing to the knowing. And therefore, the perfection of the act of the will is to be noted according to what? According to this, that there is, what? Something good to someone for a doing, right? But this is, what? Possible. And therefore, the complete will is not except about the possible, which is good to the one willing. But the incomplete will is of the, what? Possible. Which, according to some, is called, what? Wishing, I guess. Wishing, I guess. Wishing. Wishing. Wishing. Because someone wishes that, right? If it were, what? Possible, right? So a man wishes to marry some woman if it were possible, right? But it's not possible, so does he choose to marry her? No, it's not possible, right, huh? So he won't have him, right? So if he chooses to marry a woman, he won't have him. Or they could wish to, right? But not the choice, huh? Okay. But choice means an act of the will already determined to that which is, what? Yeah. By this person. And therefore, in no way is it except of things that are, what? Possible, right? Now, the second objection here, huh? Too many times you choose things they're unable to perfect, right? To the second should be said that since the object of the will is a good grasp, huh? In this way we're not to judge about the object of the will according as it comes under, what? Grasping, right? And therefore, just as sometimes a will is a something that is grasped as good, nevertheless is not, what? Truly good, right, huh? So sometimes there is choice of what is apprehended as possible to the one, what? Choosing, which nevertheless is not, what? Possible to him, right? So he's always saying, you can choose something impossible because it seems to be possible to your reason, right, huh? I guess people do that sometimes. I'm going to be on the Olympic team this year. It seems possible to me. Now, the thing from a Benedict, right, to the third should be said that this therefore is said because whether something is possible, right, huh, ought not to be what? The subordinate ought not by his own judgment to define, right, huh, okay? But in each thing to what? Stand with the judgment of the superior, right? Or it's not to question why, or it's what to do and die, right? What, can I get in this last article here, shall we? Sure. To the sixth one proceeds thus, it seems that man of necessity chooses. For if the end has itself to things choosable as premises to those things which follow from the premises, right, as is clear in the seventh book of the Ethics, but from principles or premises of necessity are deduced the, what, conclusions. Therefore, from the end of necessity, one is moved to, what, choosing, right? So what do they say? Likeness is a cause of deception, right? They're talking about this in God, right, huh? By knowing himself, he knows other things. By loving himself, he loves other things. Therefore, just as he necessarily knows other things, he necessarily loves others. So that's, you know, seeing some distinction there between the two, huh? Often the mind is deceived because he doesn't see some distinction, huh? Distinction in the life of reason. Moreover, choice follows the judgment of reason about things to be done. But reason of necessity judges about some things on account of the necessity of the, what, premises. Therefore, it seems also the choice of necessity, what, follows, huh? Moreover, two things are wholly equal. Man is not moved more to one than to the other, right, huh? Just as the, what? Starving. Yeah. If he has food equally desirable in diverse places or parts, and according to equal, what, distance, he's not more moved to one than to the other. As Plato says, assigning the reason for the rest of the earth in the middle, as it's said in the second book on the universe, huh? But much more or less is he able to choose what he, what, takes as being, what? Less. Less, huh? When, then what is taken as, what, equal, right? Therefore, if there are proposed two or more, among which one appears more, right, huh? It is impossible to choose, right, one of the others. Therefore, necessity chooses that which appears more, what, eminent. But all the choices of all that which seems in some way to be, what, better, right, huh? Therefore, every choice is a necessity. Well, that's convinced now, huh? You had to choose, huh, to be monks, huh? I had to choose to be a philosopher. Couldn't resist. Couldn't resist, no? Yeah. There was always a copious discussion, and you get a guy who's not really got the mind to be a philosopher, but he's convinced that this is the best thing, you know, and Jeffrey seems to be making the foolish choice of necessity, right? But against this is that choice is the act of a rational power which has itself to, what, opposites, according to the philosopher, right? I answer it should be said that man does not of necessity choose, right? And this because what is, what, possible, because what is possible to not be, right, huh? is not necessary to, what, be, huh? That what is possible to, what, not choose or to choose, the one can take, right, the reason for this from a two-fold power of man, huh? For man is able to will and not will, to act and not act, right? He is able also to will this or that and to do, what, this or that, huh? The reason for this can be taken from the power itself of reason. For whatever reason is able to apprehend as good, in this or towards this, the will is able to, what, intend, huh? The reason is able to apprehend as good, not only this which is to will or to do, but also to not will and to, what, not do, right? And again, in all particular goods, one can consider a reason of some good, right, or the defect of some good, which has the notion of the, what, bad. And according to this, one is able to, what, apprehend each of these goods as choosable or, what? Immuneable. Yeah. Okay. I actually do that example of the fallacy of what's simply and not simply, right, huh? Because there's nothing so good in this world that doing it prevents you from doing something else that is good. So in some way, you can consider anything as bad, right, huh? Shows you the freedom there, right, huh? Okay. Only the perfect good, which is beatitude, right, huh? Which reason cannot grasp under the notion of evil or of any, what, defect, huh? And therefore, of necessity, man wills, what, beatitude, nor can he will not to be blessed or to be, what, miserable, right, huh? Wretched. I want to be wretched. What a house. Choice of her, since it is not about the end, but about those things which are towards the end, huh, is not of a perfect good, which is beatitude, but of other, what, particular goods. And therefore, man does not necessity, but he freely, what, chooses them. Now, to the first, it should be said that not always from premises or beginnings of necessity the conclusion proceeds, right, huh? But then only when the beginnings are not able to be true if the conclusion is not, what, true. And likewise is, what, not necessary that always from the end there be in man necessity in choosing those things which are for the end. Because not everything that is for the end is such that without it, the end cannot be, what, had, right? Or, if it is such, not always, yeah, yeah. So I can't be happy without reading Homer tonight? Okay, let's get that way, huh? I'm sorry, happiness if I don't read Homer tonight? Throw another book in there? You could make a case for it. I try to limit myself to one book a day, you know? I guess enough of a treat, you know, one day. Okay, it's going out to the grandchildren I said. Now, how many of these sermons have been one a day of Bernard Clairvaux? How many can I get, so I don't know how many I could get, you know? I got through them, you know, but I could have got a couple more, you know? Okay. The second it should be said, huh? That the judgment of reason, huh? About things to be done is about things that are, what? Contingent, which are able to come about by us, huh? But in conclusions, huh? In those things in which conclusions do not, what? Of necessity, from principles necessary by an absolute necessity, but by what? Necessary only by condition. As if he runs, he, what? He moves, huh? He expresses himself there, right, huh? Conacting with things that have absolute necessity, right? He moves, huh? He moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves, he moves To the third, it should be said that nothing prevents if two equal things are proposed according to one consideration that about one of them there be considered some other condition through which it is what? Eminent, right? And the will is more moved in one than in the other. So how do you, you know, choose between two equal things? That's correct. Yeah, some of it makes you see one exceeding the other, right? I go to buy a book in the bookstores and like that, I can already see all the pictures are there and it's not, you know, broken here, you know, like that, you know, you've got to do these things. But the two books are exactly equal, huh? You don't see any difference in them, right? Are you able to find the books that are really exactly? No, no, I think you look carefully, you know? There's something about it, you've got to find it. Yes, sir. But what's the book exactly equal? Like when you go to the grocery store, you know, packages are exactly equal, I mean, you know. So you're not even a choice, really. Do you think sometimes, you know, they put the fresh ones in the back? Yeah, exactly. So, I'll go back, there you go. Yeah, exactly. Everybody does that with the milk. Everybody does that with the milk. But then, true or falsie, you're judging it's a period, right? You know, it's fresher, you know? You think it might be fresher, you know? It's a good store, it's a bad store. I mean, they would just keep on putting the new ones in the front and you get the stuff rotting in the back. Sir's officer's a smart guy, right, you know? But he gets all the old packages. It's just... It's a bad father. It's just... Oh.