Prima Secundae
Lecture 52: Command as an Act of Reason and Its Nature in Animals

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Remember, let's take an example of that insect, right, that would squeeze the head of its victim and squeeze the head of its victim enough to, what, paralyze it, but not enough to kill it. And then it would, what, dig a hole, and when it had apparently measured one big enough for its victim, it would drag the victim by the, what, antenna and drop it into the hole and then deposit its eggs upon the victim, right, and then cover up the thing. And so when the young hatched, they had, what, yeah, the head, okay. Now, if he had squeezed the head to kill it, the animal, the victim, would have decayed and therefore not been suitable food for the young, right? Very considerate, right, then? So did he use his, what, pinchers, right, then, to squeeze the head just the right amount and then used his pinchers to, what, drag them by the antenna, right? Well, Fabre, the French entomologist, saw that he always grabbed them by the antenna, right? So one time when he was over there with his hole working in that, he snapped off the antenna. So now the thing is ready for the victim, but it comes back and... And then in frustration, he went back and filled up the hole with the dirt, but didn't have the victim in there at all, right? Now, what does that indicate? No reason. Yeah. If he could figure out the order of squeezing this mouch to paralyze, you know, he could figure out there's some other place to drag the victim by than the, what? Antenna. Antenna, yeah. So that's what Thomas is saying, right, then? If you put in the definition of use, and you could use, I suppose, in a broader sense, you could say the others would use their eyes to see, right, and use their legs to run, right? But if you put in the idea that you are, what, seeing the order of one to the other, right? Well, then they don't, right? It's by natural instinct that he squeezes the head in just this amount, right? Like, he's programmed to do that, right? But he doesn't see the order, right? Because only the order, the squeezing to its effect is much more, what, subtle and hard to do, because even Faber tried, you know, taking that same insect and squeezing the head just the right amount, and he's always killing it instead of, you know? So he lacked that, you know, it's not easy to do that, right? To see the order of the pressure to the effect and so on, right? And that takes much more than to see that, you know, you can pull something else than, you know? So it's like he doesn't see the order of one to the other, really, the insect, huh? If he did, he would see the lesser one, right, rather than the more difficult one, which is a squeezing the head, huh? Yeah, I always think of the example of a monkey who's, you know, got some obstacle in the way of the banana, but he's got a stick, so he uses a stick to bring the banana to it. That's what I always think. That seems to be an example of using a tool or something. It seems to be that way. Yeah, yeah. Well, you know, they've been these psychologists who raised a monkey with their kid, you know, huh? And the monkey's ahead of the kid, right? Doing things until you get into words, right? And then all of a sudden the monkey is left behind, you know, an in-app student, you know? Yeah, yeah. But the kid can see the order of the words to the things. That's what, well, there's many examples. An example of showing a monkey's screen, TV screen, or computer screen with numbers. Yeah. But they're scattered around. Now, I don't, this may, this is supposed to be some kind of hokey thing to it. Because the monkey, if they flash the screen with the numbers and then they just go into boxes, he will press the order, the number, in the order they were, faster than any human can do it. Yeah. He'll remember the order by his imagination and memory and get it right every time. Whereas a human, he'll go, uh, I can't remember any word. Well, they used to have a commercial on television for a particular motor oil showing the chimp, the monkey, they're changing the oil in the car. And suddenly find that, you know, you can't change your own oil, but they should be done with the monkey. But it gives no meaning of grease monkey, right? Yeah. So we'll stop here then. Yeah. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. God, your enlightenment. Guardian Angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Pray for our presence. Help us to understand all that you have written. Thank you, Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Amen. Okay, we're up to Article 3 there, I guess, of Question 16. Okay, we're still talking about Yusuf, son. To the third one goes forward thus. It seems that Yusuf is able to be also of the last end. For Augustine says in the 10th book about the Trinity, everyone who, what, enjoys, uses, right? But the last end, someone enjoys. Therefore, the last end, therefore someone uses the last end. There's ambiguity there with the word use. Moreover, to use is to take something in the power of the will, as said there. But nothing is more taken by the will than the last end. We're really taken up with it, huh? Therefore, the use can be of the last end. More, Hillary, huh? Says in the second book about the Trinity, that eternity is in the Father, species, or beauty in the image, huh? That is in the Son, and Yus, in the gift, huh? That is in the Holy Spirit. But the Holy Spirit, since he is God, is the last end. Therefore, it can happen to use the, what, last end. Against all this is what Augustine says in the famous book in the 83 questions. That no one rightly uses God, huh? But he enjoys God, huh? But God alone is the last end. Therefore, the last end should not be used, huh? But Thomas says, I answer. It should be said that use, or yuti, as has been said, implies the applying of something to something. So you're applying something to something, so it's something that's not the end, then, right? But what is applied to another has itself in the ratio of what is towards an end, huh? Has the reason of what is towards an end, huh? And therefore, Yus always is of that which is towards the end. On account of which, also those things which are accommodated to the end, or suitable to the end, are called useful. And therefore, usefulness is sometimes called Yusa. But it should be considered that the last end is said in two ways. In one way, simply. And another way, toward someone, huh? For since the end, as has been said above, is said sometimes, the, what, thing itself, sometimes the attaining or the possession of it, right? Just as to the avaricious man, the end could be said to be either, what, the thing, money, right? Or the possession of money, right? Is manifest that, simply speaking, the last end is the thing itself, huh? But not the, what, possession of, for not the possession of money is good, right? Except on account of the good that money itself is. But as regards this one, the attaining of money is the last end, huh? For the avaricious man does not seek or would not seek money, except he might, what, have it, huh? Therefore, simply speaking and properly, a man, what, some man enjoys money, right, huh? Because in it, he places or constitutes his last end, huh? But insofar as he refers it to possession, he is said to, what, use it. So that's the equivocation there, right, huh? Thus made it for thyself, and our hearts are restless until they rest in you, huh? So are you seeking God so that your heart can come to rest? In him, right? Okay. Is God the end, or is it seeing God the end, huh? Loving God, huh? Yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. But in this way of speaking, you say, you use God to know and love. Yeah, yeah. So he says simply, God is the end, right? But in some way you might say, you know, the end is eternal life, and eternal life is to know him in whom he has sent, right? So Christ's acceptance. These are symbiotics for true and glory, right? They last night when they do it. Yeah. Thomas's prayer, do you mean? By the end, by the sight of your glory. Yeah. I'm blessed. Now, to the first, he says, Augustine speaks of use communitaria, right, huh? As opposed to what? Properly, right? According as it implies the order of the end to the, what? Enjoyment itself of the end, huh? Which someone seeks of the, what? End, huh? And to the second, it should be said that the end is taken up in the, what? Power of the will, that the will might, what? Rest in it, right? Whence the rest in the end, which is enjoyment, is said in this way to be a use of the, what? End, huh? But that which is towards the end, huh? Is taken up in the power of the will, not only in, what, order to the use of that which is to the end, but in order to a, what? Another thing, right? Another thing is to, you know, what the will's going to rest, huh? And to the third, huh? The words of Hilary. Thomas seems to quote Hilary after Augustine, right, about the Trinity, huh? Most, the same, son. He had to be a poitier, I guess. When is this feast, is next week? Maybe so. For you. I don't, do we have a lot of our family? We've got human today for us. Yes. There's been a season yesterday. And St. Paul the First Hermit? St. Paul the First Hermit's today, I think. No. You ever hear those things called hermits? Wife used to make them, I kind of know. All cooking? Yeah, yeah, they're kind of good, yeah. They're like ginger, not ginger, wouldn't they? Ginger, like it says, yeah, something like that. To the third, then, it should be said that use is taken in the words of Hilary for rest in the, what? Last end, huh? In that way in which Selman, communitario quenna rather than properly, right? He said to use the end to, what? Obtain it, right? It's kind of a strange way of speaking, but we do speak that way, right? Whence Augustine says in the sixth book about the Trinity, that that love, that pleasure, that happiness, your beatitude, is called uses, huh? By him, right, huh? Okay, just one more article to go before I can get out of this. To the fourth one proceeds thus. It seems that use comes before what? Choice, huh? For he says, after choice. In choice, nothing follows except carrying out, execution. But use, since it pertains to the will, precedes what? Execution. Therefore, it precedes also what? Election. I guess it's saying that choice is followed right away by carrying out, right? So then maybe I suppose. But use has to be before, because it's an act of the will. Execution is by some other faculty of us, right? Therefore, the only place for it is before. That's right. Moreover, the absolute is before the what? Relative. Relative, yeah. So Thomas often uses the word absolute, right? In that sense, huh? Like he's divided up the categories, right? He distinguishes quantity and quality from towards something, relation, right? First is something absolute, and the other is towards another, right? Sometimes they'll say, odd saying, you know, to oneself. For absolute, right? That's kind of a funny way of speaking, but. So the absolute is before the relative, huh? Therefore, the less relative is before the more relative. But choice implies two relations, one of that which is chosen towards the end, another of that in preference for which, right, is chosen, right? But use implies only relation to the, what? End. So it's less related than. Who ever thinks of these objections? Should be shot, right? Yeah, I don't know who's smarter than the guy. The objection is the guy that answers the question. Therefore, use is before choice, huh? Moreover, the will uses other powers insofar as it moves them, right? But the will moves also itself. Therefore, it also, what? Uses itself by applying itself to acting, right? But it does this when it consents. Therefore, in consent itself is a use. But consent precedes choice. Parable. Well, it must have been hard to get through these medieval things, huh? They say when Kajitin was defending himself, right, at the thing, you know, he did so well, right? At the end, it was customary for the guy, if he's passed, right, to fight off for a beer, everybody around there, right? But instead, they took him on their shoulders, you know, and carried him off. Created him to the beer, you know? He did so well at the responses, huh? But, you know, if one of these guys would be brought back and talked to one of our modern philosophers, he'd really give him a rough time, I think. But against is what Adamascene says, that the will, after what? Choice makes a, what? Impetus to operation, and afterwards it, what? Therefore, use follows choice. Let's see if he can sort out this mess, huh? I answer it should be said that the will has a two-fold, what? Relation to the willed, right? One, as the willed, is in some way in the one, what? Willing. Look, this is not in itself a transitive act, it's an act that remains in the doer. Through a certain, what? Proportion or order to the thing, what? Willed, huh? Whence those things which are naturally proportioned to some end, we are said to, what? Desire them naturally, right? But in this way, to have the end is to have the end, obviously, imperfectly, right? But everything imperfect tends towards its own, what? Perfection, right? And therefore, both natural desire, as well as voluntary desire, tends that it might have the end itself really, right? Which is to perfectly, what? Have it, right? And this is the second relation of the will to the, what? Willed, huh? But the willed is not only the end, but also that which is towards the end, huh? Now, the last thing that pertains to the first relation of the will, with respect to that which is towards the end, is what? Choice. Choice, for there is complete the proportion of the will that it completely or fully wills that which is towards the end, right? But use already pertains to the second relation of the will, by which it tends to obtaining the very thing willed. Whence it is manifest that use follows election or choice. If, nevertheless, one takes what? Use according as the will uses the, what? Executive power by, what? Moving it. But because the will also in some way moves reason, right? And uses it, right? One can understand use of that which is towards the end according as in the consideration of reason, right? Referring it in the end. And in this way use, what? Receive choice. I'm using the will, or the reason, rather. Okay? Can I let it all absorb down? Okay. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the motion by which the will moves to carrying out something, right, precedes the carrying out of the work, huh? But it follows, what? Choice. And therefore, since use pertains to the foresaid motion of the will, it is a middle between, what? Choice and carrying out, huh? The will is moving to, what? Start the execution, right? That comes after it's already chosen, this means, huh? Not to the second, this absolute and relative stuff, you know? The second, it should be said that that which is, in its very nature, related, right, is after what is what? Absolutely, right? But that to which relations are attributed is not necessary that it be, what? Posterior, right? So that's using the word, what? Is that the distinction? You have the categories, I guess, huh? In the famous chapter on relation, they're in the categories, huh? For some things are relative, a secundum esse, and some secundum dicci, right? So knowledge, for example, is, what? Not fundamentally a relation, it's a quality, right? But there's certainly a relation falling upon it, knowledge of something, right? He's saying something that's relative in that way doesn't have to be, you know, after, right? Because it's something absolute fundamentally, right? It's kind of a surprise during the categories, the order, right? Aristotle, when he enumerates the categories, he gets substance, quantity, quality, towards something or relation, right? But then he takes them up, he gets substance, quantity, and then he takes up relation before quality. Now why does he do that, right? Well, it's because Plato had defined the relative as what is said to be of another or towards another in some way, right? And that would include knowledge, right? And so, until you make that distinction between the two kinds of relative, one whose whole being, as Aristotle says, is to be towards another, right? Double is nothing by itself. How much is double? Is it four or six or ten, right? You know? It's nothing by itself, right? You see? It's only towards another, right? Why knowledge is something, you know, in itself, right? I suppose love is something in itself too, right? Okay? But they would actually speak of love of something, right? So in Latin there, they call it... Distinction between Relativa Secundum Dici, right, which are said to be of another, right, but their fundamental nature is not to be of another, right, like knowledge. And then Relativa Secundum Esse, one who so, Esse, whose very being, very nature, is to be, what, towards another, like, double or half, right? What Thomas is saying in the sense that something quadis per essentium, right, to his very nature, Relatum, right, that's posterior to the, what, absolute, right? But that, to which are attributed relations, right, is not by his very nature relations, like knowledge. It's not necessarily that that be, what, posterior, right? And he says, Immo, Quanta, the more a cause is before, the more it has relation to more effects, but it's still before, right, okay, because that's something that follows, what, upon it, right? That's why when power is defined as a beginning, right, you know, you're kind of defining it by the relation that follows upon it, right? That's a subtle distinction there, right? To the third, it should be said, huh, that choice precedes, what, use, if they refer to the same thing, right? Nothing prevents the use of one thing to precede the choice of another. That's the kind of distinction we've met before, right, okay? And because the acts of the will reflect upon themselves, right, in every act of the will, there can be taken both consent and choice and use, right, then? It should be said that the will consents, right, to choose and consents to consent, and uses itself to consent and to what? Yeah. And always these acts are ordered to that which is before, right, yeah? They are what? Before, right, okay? So what comes first, Tom? The premise or the conclusion? Yeah, but you can use the conclusion of one theorem to, as a premise. So sometimes the conclusion comes before a premise, right? What would you say to that? Yeah, as a conclusion. Yeah, yeah. And as a conclusion, it's after the premises that are used to prove it, right, you know? But you can have a series like this, right? Premises, conclusion, and then this is a premise for another conclusion, you know? But always the premise comes before the conclusion, I think. Like I said, which comes before the genus or the species, huh? We say, well, quadrilateral is the genus of what? Squares, so there the genus comes before the species, right? But the, you know, rectilineal plane figure, right? The species of plane figure comes before the genus. Yeah, but then it's not as a, yeah. We were talking before how Thomas said what's defined is always a what? Species, right? Because something is defined by its genus and its differences, so it's always defined as a species, right? Well, then can a genus be defined? Well, yes, but not as genus, but insofar as it is a species of a higher genus, right? And, of course, you get the highest genus, that can't be, as dirt be speaking, defined, right? It has no, it has no genus, right? Deo gratis. So, I get the amount of depth. Deo gratis. Deo gratis. Deo gratis. Deo gratis. Deo gratis. Deo gratis. Deo gratis. Deo gratis. So now we're up to question 18, right? And this is the division now we had between the acts of the will itself, right? Which we've been taking up to this point, huh? The acts of the will with regard to the end and with regard to the, what? The means, right? What is towards the end. But now it's going to talk about the acts commanded, as it were, by the will, huh? Then we're not to consider about the acts commanded by the, what? That will, huh? That you get the word emperor, I guess, huh? He's the one who commands, huh? You better obey, too. And about this, nine things are asked, huh? First, whether to command is an act of the will or of reason, huh? Okay, so that's one of those things that seems to be kind of ambiguous, you know? Second, whether to command belongs to, what? Good animals, huh? She should make fun of the guy obeying the dog, right? Okay, I'll obey. I won't go stiff close, you know. He's on a chain or something, you know. I'm not going to get him into his territory, huh? Third, about the order of command to use. Oh, heck, see, that's going to come a little bit more. I'm not completely free of that monster. It just kind of sticks to you, bring it all over. For, whether command and the act commanded are one act or diverse things, huh? Now, whether the act of the will itself is commanded, huh? Commanded to love God, I don't know. Where are you, where are you? Yeah, St. John, is there reading St. John there? Yeah, and John says, but it's an old commandment, too. So, whether the act of reason is commanded, right? Whether the act of the sense desire, that is, emotions, right? I command you to be angry. I command you to be afraid. I command you to be sad. I command you to love me, and so on. Okay, so, we're going to find out about command, huh? To the first, one goes forward thus, huh? It seems that to command is not an act of reason, but of the, what? Will. For to command is to move something, right? But Avicenna says that fourfold is the, what? Mover. The one perfecting the thing, the one disposing it to be perfected, the one commanding, right? And the one, what? Giving counsel. They're all moving you in some way, right? But to the will it pertains to move all the other powers of the soul, as has been said above, huh? And therefore, to command is the act of the, what? Will. Mover, just as to be commanded pertains to that which is subject, so to command pertains, or seems to pertain to that which is most, what? Free, huh? So the free man commands the slave, right? But the root of liberty is most of all in the will. I'm free to think that two is half of five. You know. There is a style of speak sometimes, you know, of the being coerced by the truth, you know? Moreover, act follows at once upon command, right? But to the act of reason does not at once follow action, huh? For not the one who judges something to be done at once does that, huh? Not now yet, as Augustus does, right? He's not the only one. I was waiting for someone to ask me, you know, what's your New Year resolution, right? And I say, to say it with your spirit. Well, if the priest were to say it in Latin, everybody would think differently. Therefore, the command is not an act of reason, not because nothing follows, but of the will. But again, this is what some Gregory says, right? And also the philosopher, that the desiring power, right, obeys what? Reason. Reason. Therefore, it belongs to reason to what? Command, huh? Hmm. That's why I mentioned command woman, right? Because reason commands. Now, what is Thomas' answer? The answer, it should be said, that to command is an act of reason, but it presupposes nevertheless an act of what? The will, right? Now, to the evidence of all of this, huh? It should be considered that because the act of the will and the reason are able to be what? Yeah. It can be, what? Causing each other, right? Yeah. Insofar as reason, the reason's about willing, right? And the will wills to what? Reason, yeah. It happens that the act of the what will is what? Preceded by the act of reason and the what? Reverse, huh? And because the power of the act before remains in the act following, it happens sometimes that what, that there is some what? Act of the will, and what is an act of the will, according as it remains in what? Power. It is power. In it, something of the what? Act of the green line. Yeah, yeah. I didn't have to turn that very good. But it happens sometimes that there is some act of the will, according as there remains in power in it, something of the act of reason. As has been said about use and about what? Choice. Choice, huh? Okay? So I mean like the will chooses between these because reason has seen some reason why this is better than that, let's say, right? And a converse, though, there is some other act of reason, according as there remains in power in it, something of the act of the, what? The will, right? That makes sense, right? Okay. But he says to command is essentially an act of reason, right? Because the one commanding orders that one to whom he commands to doing something, right? By intimating this or denunciando, how do you translate that? Denouncing it. Telling it the way it is. But thus to order by way of a certain what? Intimation is a reason. That goes back to reason is the ability to look before. for an actor, right? So insofar as commanding is ordering something, right? It's essentially an act of what? Reason, yeah. But reason is able to, what? Intimate or to announce something. How do you translate it in C.R.A. in the English translation? Intimating or declaring. Declaring, okay. Okay. I don't think it's denounced, that's not exactly the proper translation here. If you notice, warn, foretell, declare intent. Declare, okay. In one way absolutely, which intimation is expressed by a word of an indicative mode, as if someone says to someone, this is what? Done by you, right? Sometimes reason intimates something to someone by moving it to what? To this, huh? Okay. And such intimation is expressed by a word of the imperative mode, huh? Well, named, huh? The imperative mode. As one says to someone, do this, right, huh? Okay. Now the first mover in the powers of the soul to the exercise of some act is the will, right? It's the mover. Since therefore the second mover does not move except in the power of the first mover, right? It follows that this very thing that the reason moves by commanding is from the power of the what? Once it remains that to command is an act of reason, but an act of reason that presupposes an act of the what? Will, right, huh? In whose power, right, reason moves through command to the exercise of an act, huh? That make sense, huh? To the first therefore it should be said that the command is not to move in just any way, but with a certain what? Intimation, I suppose that's informing, right? Yeah. Which involves this use of what? Ordering, right? That's proper to reason, right? Which is of reason, right? To the second it should be said that the root of liberty is the will as the subject of the liberty, right? But as a cause, it is what? Reason. That's why they have that word in Latin, the Librium Arbitrium, right, huh? It implies that there is what? Yeah. And that reason has a kind of universality in its ability to judge, right? Because it knows good in general, right, huh? Okay. So there's nothing in this life that can't be considered by reason as good or what? Bad, right, huh? Because anything you might do is going to prevent you from doing something else, which might be good. And therefore in some way it can be considered, at least you couldn't have quit as bad, right? And even murdering somebody who annoys you, you know, can be considered in some way good, right? Get rid of annoyance in your life, huh? So you're free of it. Yeah, yeah. So he says, the root of liberty is the will as a subject, but as a cause, it is reason, right? From this, the will can move freely to what? Yeah. Because reason is able to have diverse conceptions of the good, right? Have you talked to somebody about things, you can see this, right? And therefore philosophers define Librium Arbitrium, right? It's kind of, Arbitrium means judgment, right? Which is free judgment from what? Reason, right? As if reason is the cause of what? Liberty, right? And that's why the other animals don't have really liberty, right? Not free judgment anyway. The third objection, it should be said, that argument concludes that command is not an act of reason, absolutely, but with a certain motion, huh? That is moved by the will, right? Now, what about the animals here, right? Baiting the dog, right? Yeah. The cat, you know, decides how you're going to live with the cat, right? Baiting the cat, I'm sure, then you baiting the dog. The dog is a lot more forgiving. The second one proceeds thus. It seems that the command belongs to brute, what? Animals, huh? Because, according to Avicenna, the power commanding motion is, what? The repetitive one, right? And the power carrying out the motion is in the muscles and in the, what? Nerves. Nerves, huh? But both power is in, what? Brute animals, right? Therefore, command is found in the brute animals, right? Well, it's not simply an act of the appetite, is it? Yeah. Involves bison, right? So, I mean, if the command is an act of reason, how can it be in the beast, right? Moreover, it is of the notion of a servant or slave that he be, what? Commanding, right? But the body is compared to the soul as a servant to his, what? Lord or master, right? As the philosopher says in the first book of the politics. Therefore, to the body that is commanded by the soul, right? Even in brutes, right? Which are composed from soul and body, right? The soul commands the body, right? Moreover, through command, a man makes impetus, kind of funny the way of speaking here, to a work, right? But impetus to some work, right? Is found in the brute animals, huh? As Damascene himself says. Therefore, in brute animals is found, what? Command, huh? But against all this, it's what we saw before in the first article, that imperium, command, is an act of reason, right? But in brutes, there is not reason. Therefore, neither is there, what? Command, huh? Answer, it should be said, that to command is nothing other than to order something, to what? Doing something. With a certain intimativa. How do they tend to say intimativa? Intimit. A certain motion of inclination. Indicating what the thing should be, right? But to order is an act of reason itself, right? So, good is to know Shakespeare's definition, right, of reason? Whence it is impossible that in brute animals, in whom there is no, what? Reason. That there be in some way, what? Command, huh? Okay, so the body of the article and the sin contrail are almost the same, aren't they really, huh? The arguments aren't really the same, huh? It's that the body is no more explicit, that's all. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the desiring power is said to command the motion, insofar as it moves reason-commanding, right? But this is only in men. In brute animals, the desiring power is not, properly speaking, commanding, right, huh? Unless, what? Command is taken in a broad sense for the, what? Mover, right? When I get up in the morning, I command my body to get up, right? Time to get up there and start reading Thomas there and so on, saying your prayers. But in brute animals, I'll command themselves to get up, right? Now, what about the soul moving the body, right? Commanding the body. To second, it should be said that in brute animals, the body, to be sure, has whence it obeys, right? But the soul doesn't have whence it commands, because it does not have whence it orders, right? Because that's proper to, what, reason. And therefore, there is not there the notion of command and commanded, but only of mover and moved, huh? So the dog moves himself to get up. He doesn't command himself to get up, right? Now, to the third. To the third, it should be said that in another way is found the impetus to the doing of something in the brute animals and other in men, huh? For in men, men make this impetus to some work through the ordering of reason, right? Whence they have in themselves, whence the impetus has in them, right? The notion of a, what? The impetus of men. Yeah. But in broods, there comes about impetus to work through the instinct of, what? Nature, right? I'm watching the birds there in the trees there today, and she says, I'm watching the squirrels, you know, by saying, I guess some birds stay around here in the winter, right? Oh, yeah. Yeah, no one's, you know, flies south, you know? Yeah, we saw yesterday in Boston. I was in Boston, somewhere else, and there's a little park there, and a whole flock of geese flew right in there, huh? I said, oh, are you flying south in the winter? I said, no, they stay here. Are you a nation? Yeah. You know, they're around here, they're here, you're around. But, like, robins stay here, don't they? Robins do. Yeah, they seem like robbers across the street, aren't they? Robins, and chicken, chickadees, and nut hatches, and crows, and wrinkly crows, starlings, and rats with wings. Some of you wish I did. You know, I said crows on south, and you said, I'm bad. Crows. Crows are nice. Crows are nice. Ravens and crows. Ravens, by the way, I'd say, I don't know. But in the brutes' animals, there comes about an impetus to some work through the instinct of, what? Nature. Nature, because their desire, at once, when the, what, convenient or suitable thing is apprehended, or something unsuitable, right, they're naturally moved to pursuit, or what? Flight. Flight, huh? I guess that would explain them there, to the right. Yeah. Once they are ordered by another to acting, right, huh? But they do not order themselves to their action. And therefore, in them, there's impetus, but not command. That's what Bob discovered. Mm-hmm. It's amazing how the John Marie told us about the birds, that sometimes when they migrate, they attract, you know, individual birds and various flocks. And sometimes, from year to year, they not only stop in the same locations, they stop in the same tree, they stop in the same branch. Every single year. They're like, wow, over a thousand miles. Over a thousand miles, at every stop, is exactly what it was last year. That's good. Exactly. I see it in this one bush on the side of the house there, you know, the cardinal, you know, more than once, you know, and I wonder whether they come to that bush for some reason. I don't know what. Yeah. This little tub back, they turn back over there and they... Every year they nest out there. No, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no, no. Thank you.