Prima Secundae
Lecture 54: Command of Reason Over Sensitive and Vegetative Powers

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partaking, right? So the conclusion partakes of the knowledge of the premises, right? And to the third is clear the response from what has been said. He admits in some cases it's not in the power, right? Because you can't help but know the thing. Time for another article? Sure. Now whether the acts of the sense desire can be commanded, right? I remember one time I was giving a talk there at the University of California there, you know, and this guy comes up to me afterwards, right? He said, I'd be frightened to get up and talk in front of that group, you know. Look at talking to me, then a guy jumped out of airplanes and down in the army or something. Why would he be afraid to jump out of an airplane? So sometimes a person is nervous about getting up and speaking or something, you know, and that's why people sometimes, you know, join these clubs where they, you know, should turn the talk tonight, you know, in front of the dinner thing and so on. But can you command yourself not to be afraid, right? Be good. Yeah, yeah. So this is the question, right? Or sometimes if people get angry, they can't seem to control their anger, right? Can they command themselves to be milder? You can get angry about getting angry. I said, I was driving up to Quebec one time, they had a kind of new car or something, and I was going up through Maine, you know, and they had their route to President Kennedy, right? But the route to President Kennedy was no honor to President Kennedy because there's all kinds of potholes. So I was driving fairly, you know, slowly, and this mad Frenchman behind me, you know, didn't like my slow thing, so he speeds up like this, you know, and he picked up the rocks on the thing and bang against the side. Well, I knew there was going to be a nice thing there, you know, but they said, well, I'm a philosopher. What does this make, you know? So, even the Apostle now, no less a person than St. Paul himself, who's by Antoinette Messiah, called the Apostle, right? Romans 7. Not the good that I wish, just do I do, right? But the bad, huh? And the gloss expounds that man wishes not to, what? Lust, you know, concupiscere. And nevertheless, he does, right, huh? Okay. But concupiscere, that's sense desire, is an act of the sensitive desiring power. Therefore, the act of the sensitive desiring power is not subject to our, what, command, huh? Even Paul saw that, right? Moreover, bodily matter obeys God alone, right? As regards its formal transmutation of change, as is shown in the first book. But the act of the appetitive, sensitive desiring power has a certain, what, formal transmutation of the body, namely cold, when you're hot and you're angry, and cold when you're afraid, I guess. Therefore, the act of the sensitive power is not subject to, what, human command, huh? Can't command yourself to be hot or cold, right? No. It stays here. Moreover, the proper mover of the sense desire is something grasped by the senses or the imagination, right? But it's not always in our power that we apprehend something by sense or, what, imagination. Therefore, the act of the sense appetite is not subject to our command, huh? Go ahead and enjoy yourselves tonight. My mother told me to tell you I had a nice time. But again, this is what he said in Gregory, this is the Miesius, they say in the footnotes, not the Miesius, that that obeying reason is divided into two, right? And this is the, what they call in Latin, the conquistable appetite and the irascible one, right? Epithumia and thumas in Greek. And these pertain to the sense appetite. Therefore, the act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of reason, right? It's like asking whether the dog can be commanded by us, right? Not always. Sometimes the dog bites. The male man, you know, the male man used to carry these, you know, it's a squirt thing, you know, to protect themselves from the dog, you know? Because quite a few dogs in those days weren't chained up like they are now with all these laws. But even nowadays, you know, you get these dogs that sometimes mauled children and so on. The other adults. I answer, it should be said that according to this, some act is subject to our command insofar as it is in our what power, right? And therefore, to understanding in what way the act of the sense of the power is subject to the command and the reason is necessary to consider in what way it is in our what power, Now, it should be known that the sense appetite, and this differs from the intellectual appetite of the will, which is called the will, that the sense appetite is the power of a bodily what? Organ. Not over the will, right? Aristotle talks about this being a power in very premium to the animal. But every act of a power using a body organ depends not only on the power of the soul, but also on the disposition of the what? Bodily organ, right? Just as sight from the what? Seeing power and also the what? Quality of the eye to which it is either aided or impeded. Whence the act of the sense appetite, not only depends upon the desiring power, but also on the disposition of the what? Body, right? But that which is on the side of the power of the soul follows apprehension, some grasping. But the apprehension of the imagination, since it is particular, is ruled by the apprehension of reason, which is universal, just as the particular act of power by universal act of power. And therefore, on this side, the act of the sensitive appetite is subject to the command of what? Reason. But the quality and disposition of the body is not subject to the command of the reason. And therefore, on this side, it is impeded some, but that sometimes the emotion of the sense desire is not wholly subject to the command of what? reason. I've asked me why they jump in the books, right? Benedict, yeah? Oh, Francis of Benedict, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Because the body was not... Problem. Yeah, the body was not being subject to the will of reason, right? So they kind of changed the decision of the body and they jumped into the needle and the thing, yeah. I don't know if it... Is there any example of them jumping in the fire? I don't know. Jump, yeah. Do some other thing. It happens sometimes, right? That the motion of the sensitive, what? Power? Or desired power is, what, subito and suddenly, I guess, Conchitata aroused at the, what, grasping or apprehension of the imagination or the, what? Sense. And then that motion is outside the command of reason, right? Although it would be able to be impeded by reason if it were, what, foreseen, right? Once the philosopher says in the first book of the politics that reason or... Seize the harassment of Kibzapal, not by despotic principality, which is of a lord to his servant, but of a political or royal principati, really, which is to what? Yeah, not totally subject to the what? Yeah, yeah. There's also something like that about the father and the son, too, right? Should the father rule the son as a free man, right? Because a free man is not entirely subject, right? And he has something to say about this thing, right? That's kind of the reason why they have the fine arts, why good music, right, is very important. Aristotle talks about music at the end of the politics, right? It's very important the kind of music you allow the kids to listen to, right? I remember my cousin Don was in the Navy there, you know, and they still had a big base down there in Newport, was it? And this is when rock and roll was coming in, you know? They'd be rioting and throwing these collapsible chairs in. That's a pretty mean thing, you know, to hit one of those chairs flying. But they go, wow, there's music, right? Right, you know, and so there's a certain kind of music, the music of the 18th century, like Astrid points out in an essay towards the evaluation of music, right? The music of the Baroque period and Mozart, you know, they represent the emotions in a stage that is, you know, what, harming with reason, right? And that's myself, you know, if you've been studying something like that and, you know, something rock and roll, something comes in, you're just kind of contrary to your state of mind, right? But if you're tired, you know, philosophizing or reading theology and so on, put a little bit of Mozart on or something like that, you know, it harmonizes, right? Because they're representing emotions in a reasonable state, right? And then your own emotions move in, what, harmony with that, right, if you listen to that kind of music. The Sirk used to say to me, you know, you know, you can't control your emotions, but I listen to this kind of music, right? You know, this other stuff is really, really perverse. Here, at least, he doesn't touch on why it is that some of these emotions are not something. Well, I mean, he's saying that they can be moved suddenly, right, by the senses, right, without, what, reason for seeing it, right? Right, but I'm thinking in terms of what, in, without the fall, would not even the first motion be subject to reason. Yeah, yeah, yeah, that's true, yeah, that's true. So this is, I know Francis, he talks about the fall earlier in the first female parties, but. But the, but the, it's not necessary to go in here, I suppose, but Francis de Sales often does it by way of counsel, because people are often confused why they have certain emotions. You say, well, it's not in your power to control it. It's not in your power to stop that from occurring. A fair example is that, I guess the guy was waiting in line, you know, and the guy was serving some people up front, and he's very patient with a lot of people in their complaints, and so on. And this guy got up there, you know, and he thought he'd come with the guy, and he's patient, right, and then the guy blew up. It's kind of funny, you know, the way that, it's not like that, you know, thing, you know, if somebody's getting a little bit hot to him, and he's saying, oh, keep calm, and then they, that's like an insult, right? And then they're getting worse, you know. But some people are, you know, more quickly, you know, moved to anger than others, and sometimes, you know, they, it subsides more quickly, too, you know, but I, myself, I'm slowly moved to anger, but I think, you know, once it gets going, you know, I'm all about to destroy you, you know, and stuff. Other people, you know, it kind of blows over quickly, you know, and they sell smiles, you know, like the day. I was, my, my dad was like, when one time, we kept interrupting when I was talking, you know, trying to interject something, and we kept cutting him off. Like 10 times, it happened. Finally, he got, where's the man? I got something to say! And he said, okay, what? I forgot. And then he, then he said, he got over his anger, and then he said, and it was fine. I was watching one of the football games there, I was a pro, I think he was, and the two guys really kept going, they, they were out there. And, you know, catching on. They threw him both out of the game, you know, the guy, once they, once they start, you know, slugging, you know, you're out of the game, that's it. And you don't bother with eating. Yeah. Well, hockey, I think, is geared to this. But there's more liberality in hockey as far as bumping into people. So, I mean, people come to see that, you know, so. Yeah, yeah. Hockey's ordered in there. Yeah. Doesn't it? They said that's what hockey is. It's an Indian word that means ouch or something. But it's kind of funny, you know, the Patriots, you know, watching the last two games, because the enemies started scoring first. They won it last Sunday. They were playing the Buffalo Bills, right? And the first quarter, you know, they kicked off, you know, to the Buffalo Bills to start the game. And they brought back them and scored a touchdown, right? And then they came back and scored another touchdown. And they came back and scored another touchdown. So by the end of the first quarter, it was 21 to nothing. I think the Buffalo Bills said, what's going to happen, you know? Rosie gets nervous. She can hardly watch. But I'd seen, you know, the week before, the same thing had happened, you know. And they were, like, way, way behind, you know. Of course, they finally ended up the game, and the final score was 49 to 21. So they kept on, you know. So they're concerned about the defense, you know, the Patriots. So it's going to happen to them when they get to the playoffs, you know, for the thing, you know. But it's kind of funny to see it's just twice in a row, you know. I haven't fought all the games in these last two games. The other games were, you know, ahead by a good deal, you see. I think it was the game before, they got something. It was almost halftime, you know, before they scored. I think, you know, field goal 28 to 3 or something like that. And they came back and won 48 to 3, you know. Wow. They just sit and say, they don't score something before the halftime. They're going to lose this game, you know. Really, yeah. You know, they just think they're going to. But maybe the guy gives them a little talk there. I mean. That's not for sure. Yeah. There's how we start getting cut in half. Now, what about St. Paul? I can defend the poor man here. The first, therefore, it should be said that this, that a man does not, wishes not to what? Desire of sense desire. And nevertheless, does have sense desire, right? This happens from the disposition of the what? Body. The which is impeded that the sense desire, lest it wholly follow the command of what? Reason, right? Whence the apostle there says, I see another law in my members, right? Repugnant to the law of my, what? Mind. Who's going to free me from this body, as he says, right? And this happens on account of the sudden motion of concubiscence, as has been said, right? Or it could be a one of anger, too, right? It's on the fear of Hector on the field there with Achilles, right? All of a sudden he starts to run, you know? It's just terrible. The second should be said that the quality, the bodily quality, has itself in two ways to the act of the sense desire, right? In one way, as going before, right? Preceding. Insofar as someone is in some way disposed according to the body, to this or that, what? Passion, right? In another way, as what? Fouling, huh? Just as when from what? Anger, right? Someone heats up, huh? In color, shit. Okay. Now, the quality preceding is not subject to the command of what? Reason, right? Because it is either from nature or from some preceding what? Motion, huh? Which is not able at once to, what? Come to rest, huh? But the quality of fouling, fouling, so you can command the reason, huh? Because... It follows the locomotion of the heart, which is moved in diverse ways according to the diverse acts of the sense of what? Appetite, I don't know, your heart expands or contracts or things. Of course, you know, they talk about the white fear and the red fear. The red fear being shame, right? And Thomas explains, you know, the blood comes out in your face and you get red, right? Because the evil here is outside, right? Other people are thinking this, you know, so your blood rush is out here, you know, to drive away the disgrace in other people's eyes, right? But if you're feared for death, then your blood contracts, you know, to your vital organs, you know, to protect you, you know, because your life is being threatened. You turn cold, you know, these jibbering people there in Homer, you know. You're about to be slain by the invincible warriors. Now, to the third, it should be said that because for the grasping of the sense, right, is required some, what, sensible thing exterior. It is not in our power to apprehend something by the sense unless the sensible thing itself is, what, present, huh? And his presence is not always in our, what, power, right, huh? Then a man is able to use his sense when he, what, unless there be an impediment on the side of the organ, right? But the apprehension of the imagination is subject to the ordering of reason according to the, what, mode of power or weakness of the imaginative power. Now, that man is not able to imagine what reason considers happens either from this that they are, what, not imaginable, like you're trying to imagine what your soul is going to be like when it is your body, right, huh? You can't imagine what it's going to be like, huh? Or an account of the weakness of the imaginative power, which is from some indisposition of the organ, right, huh? You go into solid geometry from plain geometry, huh? Oh, imagination isn't up to the task. Okay, we better stop now, I guess, huh? Mm-hmm. and the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Dios, gracias. God, our enlightenment. Guardian Angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, board and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Amen. Help us to understand what you have written. Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit. And I was reading through that thing, by the way, and the second part of the sentence is, I found those three things I say in the prayer for the angels, right there in one little text, you know. I think it's found in other places, too, but it's the three of them right together, you know, in one of the reply to objections. The other thing about holiness and teaching, I remember when we started studying theology many years ago, Father Peter asked us, to be a good theologian, do you have to be holy? And we're all scratching our heads. And he says, well, if the best theologians are the doctors of the Church, namely a doctor of the Church, it doesn't care if I'm going to sing first. Because that's kind of the order, you see it. Their authority as teachers is, basically begins with their holiness of life. Okay, so up there. Article 8 here in question 17. To the 8th, one goes forward thus. It seems that the act of the vegetable soul, plant soul, the acts of such a soul, I suppose it's a plural, are subject to the command of reason, right? Well, he says the sensitive powers are more noble than the powers of the plant soul. But the powers of the sense soul are subject to the command of reason, right? Therefore, much more, those inferior powers, right, of the plant soul. Moreover, man is said to be a little world, because thus the soul is in the body as God in the, what, world. But God is thus in the world that all things which are in the world obey his command. Therefore, all things which are in man obey the command of, what, reason, even the powers of the plant soul, right? Who but think about can add a cubit to his height, huh? Yeah, a girl in front of high shoes, high heel shoes, but she can't. Some of these girls, you know, they're kind of a little short, they'd wear those crazy shoes, you know, and say, they're really a danger to drive with, you know, and, yeah. Yeah. But still, I'm really, strictly speaking, adding a cubit to your height. It's a good attempt. And praise and what? Blame. Blame, I guess. It's a tuperium, a tuperium. It does not happen except in those acts which are subject to the command of reason. But in the acts of the nourishing and generating power, there can be, what, praise and blame and virtue and vice, as is clear in, I guess, huh? Luxury and the opposite virtues, huh? And therefore, acts of these powers are subject to the command of reason, huh? But against this is what Gregory, some Gregory, huh? Says that that which is not, what? Is the nutritive and the janitor power, right? So Thomas says, I answer, it should be said, that at the acts which proceed from, what? Some are from, and in some, what? Some proceed from natural desire, some from animal desire, right? Sense desire. Desire or intellectual desire. For every agent, in some way, desires the end, right? So sometimes the man in the nursery may say, you know, this plant likes a lot of what? Sun. It wants a lot of, you know? And when I used to be planting broccoli, you'd say it's a big feeder, huh? It wants a lot of what? It wants a lot of what? So for every agent, in some way, desires the what? The end. But the natural desire does not follow upon any, what? Grasping of it. Just as the animal and intellectual desire do follow upon some kind of, what? Knowledge, huh? But reason commands through the, by way of, what? A grasping power. It is a grasping power. And therefore acts which proceed from intellectual desire or animal desire are able to be, what? Commanded by reason. Not, however, acts that proceed from natural desire. And of this sort are acts of the, what? Planned soul. When some Gregory, right? Says that that is called, what? Natural, which is the generative power and the nourishing power, right? On account of this, the acts of the nourishing soul are not subject to the, what? Command of, what? Reason, huh? Digest this food. Yes, or don't, I guess. Okay, now what about the first objection there? That the more noble are subject, but they're not the less ones. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the more some act is, what? Immaterial, the more noble it is and the more subject it is to the command of reason. Whence from the very fact that the powers of the plants, though, do not obey reason, it appears that these powers are the, what? Lower. It's interesting, huh? The more an act is immaterial, the more noble it is and the more it is subject to the command of reason. So, which is more immaterial? Sensing or imagining? Yeah. And it's more of what? Yeah, yeah. I can't, you know, hear the music of Mozart now except for my imagination, maybe. But I can't hear it with my ear, right? The object's got to be there, right? I can't see Lady Wisdom, you know? I don't even have a picture of Lady Wisdom with me. Okay? And, but I can imagine these things, right? I can imagine things, huh? So, the fact that they are more immaterial and more noble, the acts of the sensitive soul, right? That's why they're more subject to reason than those of the plant soul. Okay? Now, minor world, huh? To the second it should be said that likeness can be noticed in some respect, huh? Because just as God moves the world, so the soul moves the body, right? That's the likeness there. But not in regards to all things. For the soul did not create the body from what? Yeah. As God created the world, right? So you're exaggerating the likeness there, right? Likeness is a slippery thing, as Plato says, huh? Cause of deception. Seeing the likeness of things, but not their what? Difference, yeah. That's why I said to Monsignor Dian one time, you know, that maybe that's why our style gives the tool of difference before the tool of likeness, huh? Because to see the likeness of things without seeing their difference could lead you to being deceived, huh? So because God created the world, then it's totally subject to his command, right? So you can create your body, you can't make your body, some girls aren't so beautiful, you know, they can't make it beautiful, really, they can try with art, I suppose, but they don't have that same control of your body, right? If you could create your body, you could make it as beautiful as you wanted it. They make themselves pretty by deception. Because now they go ahead and have themselves be adjusted, you know? Yeah, yeah, yeah. It seems you have a title from the radio, you know, for getting you. Teeth fixed so you can improve your smile, you know, and the guy said, my smile is much better now than it was before. The next day I have the antidepressant medicine. To the third, it should be said that virtue and vice, praise and blame are not owed to the acts of the nourishing or generative power, which are digestion and the formation of the human body, right, but to the acts of the sensitive part ordered to the acts of generation or nourishment, as in desiring the pleasure of food and sexual matters, and in using according as they ought to or not according as they ought to, right? So I guess I've got control of my hands, right? I didn't even talk about this article, right? I didn't put it in my mouth or stuff. It's funny how people, you know, they say, you know, they're reading or something, you know, and they don't even know that they're, are people reading popcorn at the movie theater, you know, you wonder whether it's a natural act or a chosen act. And now the last article in this question. To the ninth one goes forward thus, it seems that the members of the body, your arms and legs, do not obey reason as regards their acts. It's funny you should even ask this, right? I was looking at the first book of my master there, Euclid, and the 20th theorem, you know, the Epicureans, I guess, they made fun of it, the 20th theorem is, in any triangle, any two sides together are more than the third side, right? And he says, well, even an ass knows this, right? If you lay out the food here and the ass over here, he's not going to go like that to his food. He's going to go straight in line, right? And so, but anyway, how would you prove that, right? You know? I threw it out in front of my, just as fast as I used to see if they recall, you know. It seemed like, well, yeah, but how do you prove that, you know? It's marvelous to the way Euclid does it, an incredible way he does it. I remember his reply, or somebody's reply, his objection about the ass knowing that. Well, the ass knows it, but he doesn't know the reason why. Yeah, that's what he says, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. And they are asses who don't know this. It's a simple little theorem, and I said, how marvelous, huh? I was giving you this example of how, you know, we guess before we know, right? And, but in geometry, people are not apt, for the most part, anyway, to guess something other than what the theorem is, right? No one would guess that one side could be equal to the other, too, right? So even before they see the proof, right? They're going to guess rightly, huh? Well, in natural philosophy, or in ethics, or politics, men will tend to guess opposite things, right? So it seems, he says, that the ninth one goes forward thus. Yes, it seems that the members of the body do not obey reason as it guards their sacks, for it tends to reason that the members of the body are more distant from reason than the, what? Powers of the plant's soul. But the powers of the plant's soul do not, what? Obey reason, as has been said. Ergo, much less the members of the body, right, huh? Yeah, in further way, huh? Moreover, the heart is the beginning of the motion of the animal, but the motion of the heart is not subject to the command of reason. For some Gregory says that the, what? Pulsing thing, right? Is not persuasable, persuadable by reason, huh? Therefore, the motion of the bodily parts is not subject to the command of what? Yeah. You read in Aristotle, I guess, and Thomas, you know that the, that they think the heart cannot be, what? Sick, right? And therefore, that the body's naturally recovering powers from sickness are started by the heart, right, huh? I don't know if that's altogether true, but. They didn't know about cholesterol. That's why I passed surgery. Moreover, Augustine says in the 14th Book of the City of God, that the motions of the general club members are sometimes, what? True. Yeah. Nothing, what? Knowing, I guess. Or choosing, does that have to do with desiring, no? How do you think it's important? It's not present, right? Just knowing. Yeah, I think your desire is present. Without asking, you could say asking, I have to do with asking. And sometimes it is, what, absent or distant? And when in the soul concupiscence is fervent, the body is, what? Frigid, right? Okay. Therefore, the emotion of the members does not obey, what? Reason. Against all this is what Augustine says in the 8th Book of the Confections. The soul commands that the hand, what? Move? And so much is the facility that hardly, what? From service is a discernment command. Yeah, the command is distinct from the carrying it out. That's the pianist there playing, right? And so on. Okay. I answer, it should be said, Thomas says, that the members of the body are organs or tools, right? Of the powers of the, what? Soul, right? And the word organ there in Greek means, what? Tool, right? Okay. It's always saying, you know, if you call these parts of the body tools, how can you deny that they are for a purpose, right? Because what's more for a purpose than a tool? So when you call it a tool, it isn't for the sake of something, right? Whence, in that way, the powers of the soul have themselves, to this that they obey reason, in this way that they have themselves also as, what? Body. Because, therefore, the sense powers are subject to the command of reason, not, however, the, what? Natural powers. So all motions of the members, which are moved by the sense powers, are then subject to the command of what? Reason, right? But the motion of members that follow the natural powers are not subject to the, what? Command of what? Reason, huh? Not to the first, huh? Where it says, what about them being further away? To the first, therefore, it should be said that the members do not move themselves, but are moved by the powers of the soul, of which some are closer to reason than the, what? Powers of the plant's soul, right? So that's how it takes up in the Dianima there, right? It's in the third, what, book. After he's talked about, what? Sensing and reason and, what? Desire, the emotion, and so on. Then he talks about the ability to move the, what, powers of the body, right? Because they're followed upon that, right? So it's in the third book. Why he begins, you know, his discussion of powers in the second book, where he talks about the plant powers first, right? The power to digest and to grow and to reproduce, and then he talks about the sense powers there, right? But then after he talks about the understanding, then he starts to talk about desire and the powers to move the body. Now, to the second it should be said, that in those things which pertain to the understanding and the will, first is found that which is by nature, which the others are derived, huh? So nature is what is first in anything, huh? So what is according to nature is going to be before other things, right? As from a knowledge of beginnings, naturally known.