Prima Secundae
Lecture 61: Erroneous Conscience and the Moral Will

Transcript
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You know, in Thomas, he quotes a kind of little dialectic there of the great Augustine, right? God should be followed, but he's not, but can't be seen, right? Man is seen, but he's not, you know. He shouldn't be followed. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So you've got a real problem there, right? And it's reflected in the thinking of the two great philosophers, great Aristotle. But then you say, well, God solved this by becoming man, right? Then you have a perfect example to follow, right? But an example that you know, right? So that's kind of a thing you take into account. So, I mean, that's true that a sense that perfect is a measure of the imperfect, right? But if the perfect is not known, right? No good measure. Yeah. But you can kind of see, you know, the reason there for the incarnation, right? So you could, so there's this work called The Inmitation of Christ, right? Which, I guess, is a pretty good work, yeah? I mean, you can kind of see that right now. You know, but at the end of the Sermon on the Mount, though, he says, you know, well, then be perfect even as your heavenly father is perfect, right? So there he doesn't seem to be, you know, you're not saying be perfect as I am perfect, right? It's my human nature, you mean? You know, God's father is not incarnate, right? So he's God. And so he says, be perfect even as your heavenly father is perfect, you know? He sees me and says, well, he talked about that later. They weren't ready. Yeah, yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Dios gracias. God, our Enlightenment, Guardian Angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, or to illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more quickly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor, pray for us. And help us to understand how that you are written. Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Amen. So, I guess you're up to Article 5. Is that where we are? Yes. To the fifth one goes forward thus. It seems that a will that, what? Doesn't agree with. Reason, when it's in error, is not, what? Bad, huh? For reason is the rule of the human will, insofar as it is derived from the eternal law. But reason, making a mistake, or occurring, is not derived from the, what? Eternal law. Therefore, reason in error is not the rule of the, what? Human will. Therefore, that is not a bad will that departs from reason in error. It's nice to think about, huh? Moreover, according to Augustine, the precept of a lower power does not obligate us if it is contrary to the precept of a superior power. Just as if the proconsul orders something that the emperor prohibits, right? But reason, erring, sometimes proposes something that is against the precept of the superior, to with God, of whom is the highest power. Therefore, the dictative reason, erring, does not obligate us. Therefore, it is not a, what? Bad will if it departs from reason, what? Erring, discord with. Moreover, every bad will is reduced to some species of particular kind of malice. But reason, this green from reason erring, cannot be reduced to some species of wickedness. For example, reason erring, errs in this, that it says, well, why not to commit fornication, right? The will who does not wish to fornicate cannot be reduced to any, what? Evil, right, eh? Evil, can you use that too? You don't want to do that. Therefore, the will, discording, or being in discord from reason, mistaken, is not, what? Bad, eh? But against this, as has been said in the first part, conscience is nothing other than the application of knowledge to some act. But knowledge is in reason. Reason, therefore, which is discordant from a reason that is in error, is against, what? Conscience. But every such, what? Will is bad. For it is said in Romans 14, everything that is not from, what? Faith is a sin. That is everything that is against conscience. Don't exactly like it said out of there. Therefore, the will and discord from reason erring is, what? Bad, eh? See what Thomas says here now in response, eh? Difficult question here. The answer should be said that since conscience is in some way the dictate of reason, for it is, as we have said, a certain, what? Applying of knowledge to an act, then. It's the same thing to ask whether the will in discord from reason and error is bad as to ask whether conscience that is in mistaken obligates us, right, eh? About which some distinguish three genera of acts, eh? Some which are good in their kind, eh? In their genus. Some that are, what? Indifferent. And some that are bad from their very, what? Genus, yeah. They say, therefore, that if reason or conscience says that something should be done that is good in its own kind, there is not there in the, what? Era. Likewise, it says something should not be done that is bad from its own, what? Genus. For for the same reason, good things are, what? Commanded by which bad things are, what? Prohibited, eh? But if reason or conscience says to something, to someone, that those things which are in themselves bad, a man is held to, what? To do from command or from precept. Or that those things which are in themselves good are, what? Prohibited. It will be a reason or conscience that is in, what? There. And likewise, if reason or conscience says to someone that that which is in itself indifferent as to, what? Raise up a straw. It's easy as every example of this. From the earth. That that is, what? Prohibited. Or a precept. Reason or conscience in this case will be in, what? Era. They say, therefore, that reason or conscience and error about indifferent things whether commanding them or prohibiting them obligates us, right? Also, that will in discord from such a reason and error is bad and a sin. But reason or conscience erring by commanding those things which are per se bad or prohibiting those things which are per se good and necessary for salvation does not obligate. whence in such cases the will in discord from reason or conscience and error is not bad. But this is unreasonably said. This is irrational, Thomas says. For in indifferent things the will in discord from reason or conscience and error is bad in some way on account of the object from which the goodness or badness of the will depends. Not, however, on account of the object in its what? Nature. But according as or accidents it is grasped by reason as bad for doing or what? Avoiding. and because the object of the will is that which is proposed by reason as has been said in the previous article. From this that something is proposed by reason as bad the will when it is what? Carried into that object takes on the notion of what? Yeah, as opposed to reason right? Which the will should follow. Now this happens not only in indifferent things but also in things that are per se good or per se bad. For not only that which is indifferent can take on the notion of being or the aspect of being good or bad gratidins but also that which is good can be taken as what? Having the aspect of bad or that which is bad the what? Proxial good on account of the way that reason grasped it. For example, to abstain from fornication is a certain good. Nevertheless, in this good, the reason is not what? Carried except according as it is what? Proposed by reason. If the therefore is proposed as bad by a reason and error then the will is carried towards it under the aspect of what bad whence the will will be bad because it will something what yeah not that it is bad per se but that it is bad what gratid ends on account of the way that reason has grasped it and likewise to believe in christ is per se good and necessary for salvation but the will is not carried into this except according as it is proposed by what reason whence if is proposed by reason as something bad the will is carried towards it as something bad not because it is bad in itself but because it is bad gratid ends from the what grasping of reason and therefore the philosopher says in the seventh book of the ethics that per se speaking per se the incontinent man is the one who does not what follow right reason gratid ends however he's incontinent who does not follow also what false reason whence it should be said simplicity that every will and disagreement by from reason whether reason is what correct or an error is always what yeah so is that shocking or scandalize you you're saying it's per se that it's bad but it is bad because you're not what following reason right just like danisha says right the bad for man is to be not an important reason so he says to the reply now to the first objection to the first therefore it should be said that the judgment of reason and error although it is not derived from god right nevertheless reason in air proposes its judgment as true and consequently proposes it as being derived from god from whom is all what truth and then it is the what prior to the objection of augustine he says to the second it should be said because it's saying you can't what shouldn't follow the command of the lord when it's in what opposition without the higher but you have to know that this is all right okay to the second therefore it should be said that the word of augustine has place when it is known that the lower power command something against the precept of the higher power right but if one falsely right believe that the precept of the pro-consul was in fact the command of the what emperor right in in condemning the precept of the pro-consul one would condemn the what the emperor yeah likewise if someone uh knows that human reason uh knows that human reason dictates something against the precept of god he would not be what held to a following reason right he knows now that reason is in opposition to god right but then reason would not be entirely in error right but when reason in error proposes something as the precept of god then it is the what same thing to condemn the what dictator reason and the precept of god right of course you may be in the position there of what you should know this against the law of god right and that would change things again right who could know yeah but certainly he should should have known it right he had not informed himself right now okay i didn't know it was against god's law to murder somebody but you should have known that right huh you know but if you could say that reason was the position of not what yeah yeah what he thinks is what god wants some terrorist right now you gotta wait for the article six here to you know grab some of your lurking doubts about this teaching here okay now to the third it should be said that reason when it grasps something as bad always grasp it under some what reason for being bad right if it is contrary to the divine precept or because it's a scandal on account of something else and then to such a species of badness is we do such a bad will right huh well thomas falls up with article six now right huh and this is is cited to six one proceeds thus it seems that the will in agreement with reason error erring is what good that's what you might think that he's saying in the previous article right huh he's saying no and the previous article is saying the reason what going against huh i mean excuse me the will going against reason and error right it's bad right now he's asking reason agreeing right reason agreeing right excuse me who the will going along with right a uh reason error right is that good right i think that's that follows of what he said before right well let's wait and see what the master says huh i hope you're not hearing confession and you're trying to figure out this thing did you think it was bad to be the curia of ours in here right to uh how to hear these things i saw the place there where the curia of ours great confessions yeah yeah and you know there was a different place for men and women right the men were just like there's a chair there's a little a little piece of wood you like that you know it's not really yeah yeah boxed in you know right for the ladies there's there's a little you know go into the box and so yeah like we used to do you know but uh the men just kind of come off the side sit down next to them yeah picked up one of those little things there but it's more on the faith you know rather than on the confession you know people would come from all over europe you know to put his uh confession they had to build new railroad tracks right trains to take people in there to uh ours he would start at one in the morning or something well padre pio did a long time in that confession too he spent a long time in the confession of padre pio i remember father baumgartner there at the uh saint paul seminary he's a pretty good philosopher you know something i would teach at the church didn't know the answer he called father baumgartner on the phone and so he said in order to see father baumgartner you know and so and uh i remember father baumgartner they're talking to his friend and father du Lac you know Oh, I got to hear the nuns' confessions this weekend. I guess a lot of these nuns are kind of scrupulous, you know. They drive me crazy in the confection. I don't know if you've had an experience. And this is the way they talk, oh, it's your turn, you know. I did it last week. Yeah, yeah. So to the sixth one precedes us. It seems that the will in agreement with reason and error is good, huh? For just as the will in discord with reason tends to that which reason judges to be what? Bad, right? So also the will in agreement with reason tends towards that which reason judges to be good. But the will in discord for reason, even erring, is bad, right? Therefore the will in agreement with reason, even erring, is good, huh? That's what you would think, right? Yeah. Why isn't that so? Moreover, the will in agreement with the precept of God and the eternal law always is good. But the eternal law and the precept of God is proposed to us through the grasping of reason, even that of reason and what? And error. Therefore the will in agreement with reason and error is good, huh? Moreover, the will being in discord for reason and erring is what? Bad, huh? If therefore the will agreeing with reason and error is also bad, it seems that every will of one having a reason and error is bad. Either way, you're caught. If you object to it, you know, that's bad, you said in the previous article, right? And now, if you go along with it, you don't say that's, you say that's bad too, then you closed all doors here for me, right? My gosh. And thus, such a man is, what? Perplexed, huh? Baffled, right? You might say. And of necessity, he sins, right? Which is unfitting, right? In that position, huh? And therefore the will in accord with reason and error must be good, right? So you're all convinced now, huh? I won't let you out of the room until you see what the master says. But against this, and he takes his example. The will of those killing the apostles was what? Bad. But nevertheless, it agreed with reason, what? In error of them, right? According to that, John chapter 16, verse 2. There comes an hour, there will come an hour, that everyone who kills you will think that he renders, what? Service to God, right? Sequoia, huh? Therefore the will in accord with reason and error can be in fact, what? Bad, right? So what about St. Paul, you know? Before he's converted, right? Is he doing something bad or not? The act of ignorance, he says, right? Is he altogether excusing himself? Saying, I didn't do anything bad? I don't think he says that, huh? No. There's some reason for it to have mercy on him, right? So he says, I answer it should be said that just as the foregoing question is the same as with that question by which it is asked, whether an erroneous, mistaken conscience binds, right? What did he get, huh? So also, this question could be said to be the same with that by which it is sought or asked, whether an erroneous conscience, what? Excuses one, right? What is the erroneous conscience of the great St. Paul there before he was St. Paul? He said, did that excuse what he's doing, right? Well, Thomas says, this question depends on that which has been said above about ignorance, huh? Now, what is that? What is said above that ignorance, sometimes, huh? Causes the involuntary. Sometimes it does not cause the involuntary, huh? And because good and bad, moral good or bad, consists in an act, insofar as it's voluntary, it is manifest that that ignorance, which causes something to be involuntary, takes away the notion of what? Good or bad, moral good or bad. Not, however, that ignorance, which does not cause the involuntary, right? Now, it's been said above that the ignorance, which is in some way willed, right? Whether it be willed directly, right? Or indirectly, does not cause the, what? Involuntary, right? Now, sometimes when you're talking about morality there, and the young people don't hear it, they say, well, you don't want to hear this, do you? Like, if it's on the spot, right, huh? Because they say, no, I don't want to hear it. Then they're kind of saying that they're, what? Choosing to be ignorant, right? Of what the Church teaches about these matters, right? I don't want to hear it. And I call ignorance directly voluntary, in which an act of the will is, what? Responsible for it, right? Indirectly, on account of, what? Negligence, right? In this, that someone does not wish to know that, that he is held to, what? To know, right? So there's a lot of people out there like that, I think, in the Church today, right, huh? And they don't want to, what? To know what the Church teaches about these things, right? Sometimes, too, they don't get a sermon on it either, though, huh? A lot of blame to go around, right, huh? If there are reasons, if therefore, Thomas says, reason or conscience errors by a voluntary error, right, huh? Either directly, or an account of, what? Neglect, huh? Because it is a mistake about that which someone is held to, what? No, huh? Then such an error of reason or conscience does not excuse, huh? But that the will agreeing with a reason or a conscience, thus error, right, the voluntary error, right, is what? Bad, huh? If, however, it is an error which causes the, what? Involuntary, right? Coming from ignorance of some circumstance without any, what? Negligence, right? Like you can't know, what? All the circumstances of your acts, you never do, right? That's why there's incertitude in these things, right? Then such an error of reason or of conscience excuses, right? So that the will, in agreement, with erring reason is not what? Bad, right? For example, if reason and error says that man is held to what? Approach the wife of another, right? The will and agreement with reason so erring is bad, right? In that this error comes from ignorance of the what? Law of God, right? Which one is held to what? To know, right? If our reason errors in this, that it believes some woman in submission to be his own what? Wife, and she asks him for the death of marriage, which is to know him, right? Then his will is excused that it not be what? Bad, huh? Because this error is from ignorance of circumstances, which excuses, right? And clauses the what? Involuntary. Kind of a hard case to imagine, right? Although, you know, there's been cases, you know, we have twin girls, right? And they change dates, right? And so the guy doesn't know, he thinks he found the same girl, but he's not, right? But presumably, by the time they're married, he would be able to tell his wife, huh? Well, there's a story, so about the veiled women. Yeah. Oh, yeah. Leia and Rachel. Don't think they're married. No, it's very, very, very specific. To the first therefore it should be said, as Dionysius says in the fourth chapter of the Divine Names, that good is caused from a, what? Integral cause, huh? But bad from, what? Singular defects, huh? And therefore, in order that something be said to be bad, in which, what? The will is carried, it suffices, whether it is in its very nature bad, right? Or that it be apprehended as bad, right? But, in order that it might be good, it requires this integrity, right? That in both ways it be, what? Good, right? Yeah. It's got to be a good act, and you've got to know that it's good, right? To the second it should be said, huh? That the eternal law is not able to be an error, but human reason is able to be an error. And therefore the will, in agreement with human reason, is not always right, nor is it always in agreement with, what? Eternal law, huh? How the famous thing here, prior to a tertiary in there. To the third it should be said, that just as in, what? Syllogisms, right? One inconveniente dato, right? One unfitting thing being given, is necessary for other things to, what? Follow, right? So if I say that a horse is four-footed, that's true, right? And then I say man is a horse, then it follows that man is what? Four-footed, right? So from uno inconveniente dato, right? The same for another to follow, right? So also in moral matters, huh? One unsuitable thing laid down, a necessity, others what? Follow, huh? Thus supposing that someone seeks, what? Empty glory. Whether on account of empty glory he does what he's held to do, or whether he, what? Doesn't do it, right? In either case he, what? Sins, huh? But nevertheless he is not, what? Perplexed, baffled, right, huh? No way out. Because he can, what? Dismiss his bad intention of seeking, what? Yeah, yeah. So if I want to, you know, get praised for my charitable giving, right? I stalled my horn. Well, whether I give or don't give, I'm going to be, what? Yeah. But that can give up intention of seeking, being glory, right? And likewise, supposing the error of reason or of conscience, which proceeds from, what? Indignance that does not excuse. It is necessary that there follows something bad in the will. But nevertheless, a man is not perplexed, he's not baffled. Well, the doors aren't closed to him, right? Because he can, what? Receive from his error, since ignorance is, in fact, comparable and, what? Voluntary, right? You tell these girls, these young girls, you know, they go in to have their abortion, you know, that just, you know, a blob of tissue or something, you know? I don't know how they can be so ignorant, but, you know? So, you know, saying against stupidity, the very gods themselves could tend to invade. So, you didn't know how difficult it was to be good, huh? So, someone asks you, should you ever act against your conscience? You say, what if your conscience now is an error, right? It's an error due to ignorance that is voluntary, right? Acting or against it? See, you wonder about these people in the pews there, you know, that they've never been told that this or that is wrong, you know? You've been told it's your decision to make, you know? Principles that are wrong, it's not your decision to make, in the absolute sense. The objective, it almost seems too subjective. I'm surprised he doesn't really make that distinction between what I guess he did earlier. It's text from Dionysius, he uses it a lot, right? The bad takes place in what? To any defect, right? And the good requires what? Everything to be right. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.