Prima Secundae
Lecture 63: Conformity of Human Will to Divine Will

Transcript
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Sorrow for your sins, and praying for the Pope, and repugnance to even venial sin, and so on, right? I'm going to go on eating candy, nevertheless, or something. Okay, let's let that rest in the mind and say, well, when I come back, I'll understand that article better some day, right? Good time for the article, I guess, huh? Yes. Okay, whether the goodness of the will depends on the conformity to the divine will. I suspect that's so from the Our Father, right? To the ninth one proceeds thus. It seems that the goodness of the human will does not depend on his conformity to the divine will. For it is impossible for the will of man to be conformed to the divine will, as is clear to what is said in Isaiah chapter 55. Just as the heavens are exalted from the earth above them, so are exalted my ways from your ways, and my thoughts from your thoughts, right? Okay, if therefore to the goodness of the will is required to conformity to the divine will, it is impossible, it would fall as impossible for the will of man to be, what? Good, huh? You don't know God's will, right? It's above your weight. Moreover, just as our will is derived from the divine will, so our knowledge is derived from the divine knowledge. But it's not required for our knowledge that it be conformed to the divine knowledge. For God knows many things which we don't know. Therefore, it's not required that our will be conformed to the what? Moreover, the will is a beginning of action, right? A principle of action. But our action is not able to be, what? Conforms to the divine action, right? Therefore, neither our will to his will, right? But against us is what is said in Matthew 26, huh? Not as I will, but as you will. That's during the Passion, I guess, right? Which is said, right? Because, what? He wishes to be, what? Right, huh? To be directed to God, as Augustine expounds in Inquidium. But the rightness of the will is its goodness. Therefore, the goodness of the will depends on its conformity to the divine will, right? So he's saying here, our Father, thy will be done, right? Why would he pray that if it's not? Okay. I answer, it should be said, as has been said, the goodness of the will depends on the intention of the end. But the last end of the human will is the highest, what? Good. Good, huh? Which is God, huh? This has been said above. It's required, therefore, for the goodness of the human will, that it be ordered to the highest good, which is, what? God, huh? Now, this good, which is God himself, is first and per se, compared to the divine will as its own, what? Object, right? So God wills nothing, except in willing his own, what? Goodness. Now, that which is first in any genus, is the measure and reason of all things which are of that genus. It sounds like the tenth book of wisdom, right? Aristotle. And each thing is right and good insofar as it, what? Reaches its proper, what? Measure. Therefore, in order that the will of man be good, what's required is that it be conformed to the, what? Divine will, right? Now, to the first, my ways are not your ways, and so on, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that the will of man is not able to be conformed to the divine will by, what? Equiparentia, equality, you know? But by, what? Imitation. Imitation, huh? That's a little bit like, you know, when Christ says at the Sermon on the Mount, and therefore, kind of summing up, be perfect even as your heavenly Father is perfect, right? What does that mean? Does it mean equiparentia? You can't be as perfect as God, right? So he doesn't mean that you should be, right? But you should imitate, right, as much as you can, the perfection of God, right, huh? Okay? You know what it means, huh? It doesn't mean to be equal. It doesn't mean equiparentium, but imitation, right? And likewise, the knowledge of man is conformed to the divine science insofar as he knows the, what? Truth, right? So when Aristotle talks about wisdom there, he says that it's, what? Divine knowledge, right, huh? He says, in what way is knowledge divine? He says, well, it's because either it's about God, right, huh? Or it's because it's the knowledge that God alone, or God most of all, would, what? Have, right? Whereas Aristotle has shown already in the premium before he gets to that point that wisdom is about the first cause, right? And the first cause is God, therefore wisdom is about God, right, huh? But then he takes the other thing, just the, what, in the great tradition of Greek philosophy, that the origin of the word philosopher was from, what, Pythagoras, right? And Pythagoras had discovered wonderful things like the Pythagorean theorem, so that his contemporaries called him wise, and he says, well, don't call me wise, because God alone is wise, huh? Well, what's that we call you? Well, don't call me something, call me a lover of wisdom, right, huh? So there's kind of, in the origin of the word philosopher or lover of wisdom, a kind of humility, right? That man is not wise in the way God is wise, right? So Aristotle is in that same tradition. He says that wisdom is divine knowledge, both in the sense that it's about God, right, and also in the sense that it's the knowledge that God himself would have, or God most of all, right, huh? Now, I sometimes, you know, instead of taking the word divine, I say wisdom is the knowledge of God, right? And knowledge of God could mean the knowledge whose object is God, right, or the knowledge that God has, right? And in both senses, wisdom is the knowledge of God, right? But when Aristotle says that wisdom is the knowledge that God alone has, or God most of all, right, he's not saying that we can be wise in the way God is, huh? But we can, what, imitate to some extent, right, remotely, huh? I have the same way of speaking there in Shakespeare's definition of what? Reason, right? Shakespeare's definition of reason is a knowledge of reason in both senses, huh? It's a knowledge about what reason is, and it's a knowledge which reason has about itself, right? So it's a knowledge of reason in both senses. Well, likewise, theology is a knowledge of God in both senses of the phrase, knowledge of God, right? I like those double meanings, right? We're not connected that way, huh? You can say in the three books about the soul, it's a knowledge of the soul, right, in both ways. It's a knowledge about the soul, and it's a knowledge which the soul has about itself, right? Where it knows itself through its powers, and its powers through its acts, and its acts through its, what, objects, right, huh? Though most souls don't get to the point of knowing it's about themselves. Unless you learn the three books about the soul, then you'll be a knowledge of the soul, and both of those senses, right? That's how it presents that, huh? So he says, and likewise, the knowledge of man is conformed to the divine knowledge insofar as he knows, what? Truth, right? So in the second book of wisdom, Aristotle says that wisdom is, what? Most of all, the knowledge of truth, right? And he gives a very good reason for that. He says that the cause is more true than the, what? Effect. And that goes back to this great principle, which is, and it kind of works more so. But I expand the principle, I say, when the same belongs to two things, but to one of them because of the other, it belongs more to the, what? Cause, right? So sweet is said of sugar and coffee, but of the coffee because of the sugar, which is sweeter. And if wet is said of the dishcloth and water, but of the dishcloth because of the water, which is wetter. And so if true is said of the cause and the effect, but the effect is true because of the cause, which is more true. Yeah. And therefore the first cause is most true, right? So if Aristotle heard Christ saying, I am the way, the truth, and the life, right? And as man, he's the way, and as God, he's the truth itself, right? So that makes sense. That's what I would say, right? That would be a motive of what? Of credibility for Aristotle, just like I am who am, is a motto of credibility for Hilaire Poitier, right? And he comes to the Greek philosopher, and he reads in Exodus, I guess, that God says, I am who am. And he says, well, that makes sense, right? Here's a religion that makes sense, you know, more so than Homer and his, his God was distracted by his wife, you know, from the governance of the universe. You know, the great Heraclitus, you know, he talks about the Greek gods, you know, and he's talking about how they pray to the statue and so on, right? It's as if a man should, you know, talk to his house or something, you know? So they can see that's what's wrong with us, right? Because the Greek religion is a religion based on the imagination, right? It's what you can imagine, huh? So we imagine the gods to be somewhat like us with our faults. So Heraclitus says, you know, Homer represents the gods as committing adultery and stealing and so on, all these things, right? Things which are shameful, you know, among men, you know, how could these be, you know, true gods, right? So he's very good, but he does, right? You don't have those irrational things in Christian religion, right? He says this solves the, okay, and the action of man to the divine action in so far as it is what? So what, to the agent? And this through imitation and not through, what? Equality, yeah? Equi comes from equal. And this solves in the second objection and the, what? The theory, right, huh? Because they're both talking about the fact you can't equal, right? So, you know, they take that, I think this is the meter bars in Paris, right? Everything else is made equal to the meter bar, the standards, the meter bar, you know? Then you get acuparencia, right? You know, you get it right, you know, down to the, you know? But you can't get that kind of conformity to God's, what, will or his knowledge or his, what, action, right? But you're supposed to do so by, what, imitation, right? As St. Paul said, be imitators of me as I am of Christ, right? So we imitate Paul insofar as he imitates Christ, then we get to our preaching. So we'll see you next time. So we'll see you next time. So we'll see you next time. So we'll see you next time. So we'll see you next time. So we'll see you next time. So we'll see you next time. So we'll see you next time. So we'll see you next time. So we'll see you next time. So we'll see you next time. We'll see you next time. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Dios gracias. God, our Enlightenment, Guardian Angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Amen. And help us to understand all that you have written. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. So we're up to Article 10, I guess, in Question 19. So, to the tenth one proceeds thus. It seems that the will of man ought not always to be conformed to the divine will in the thing willed. For we are not able to will what we don't know. But the good grasped is the object of the will. But what God wills, we are what? Therefore, the human will is not able to be conformed to the divine will in the what? I happen to be reading in St. Kirtu last night, you know, about how you're supposed to pray for someone who's sick, right? Are you supposed to pray for them that they be healed or that the will of God be done, whether it be to heal them or to let them suffer? What is it, St. John the Cross said to his friends? Pray that I have my purgatory on earth. You did. That's pretty brave, pretty brave to pray for, right? Yeah, exactly. Prayer is better to have your purgatory on earth than the next world, so. We should all pray for that, I don't know. But you've got to hesitate to say that, you know? Bugs? On your back, yes. Oh, okay. It won't bite you. Okay. Beelzebub there or something? Moreover, God wishes to what? Damn someone whom he foreknows to die in mortal sin, huh? Okay, Christ is kind of, you know, he talks about Judas there, right? But if he had not been born, right? If, therefore, man is held to conform his will to the divine will, the thing willed, it would foul that man would be held to will his own, what? Damnation. Which is inconvenient. Not fitting, yeah? Moreover, no one is held to will something that is against, what? Piety, yeah? But if man wills that which God wills, this wouldn't sometimes be against piety, right? As when God wills that someone's father die, right? If the son willed that his father would die, this would be against, what? Piety. Piety. And therefore, man is not held to conform his will to the divine will in the thing willed, huh? Well, that's pretty convincing, right? I'm convinced now of this, and I'll have to change my mind, I guess, shortly, but that's a good, good objections. They're easy to see, right? But they are objections. But against this is because upon that of Psalm 32, 1, that praise bespits thee, what? Right. Rectified, eh? Right. He has a rectified heart who wills what God wills, huh? But every one is held to what? Right. Yeah. Therefore, each one is held to will what God wills, right? Moreover, the form of the will is from its object, just as the form of any object, any act is its, what? Object. If therefore man is held to conform his will to the, what? Divine will, it follows that he must, he's held to conform it to, what? Anything willed, huh? Moreover, the pugnance of wills consists in this, that men will diverse things. But whoever has a will that's in opposition, repugnant to the divine will, has a bad will. Therefore, whoever does not conform his will to the divine will in what he wills, has a bad will. Well, now I'm, what? Perplexed, huh? Okay? It's funny, we look at the example there in the book on places there of Aristotle last night. And he's talking about those who define, what? Doubt as the equality of contrary arguments. And Aristotle was saying, well, is that what doubt is, or is that the cause of doubt? Yeah. No? See? So the equality of contrary arguments is not what doubt is, but it's what produces doubt, right? So you really haven't defined, this is the book, six of the place, book of places, which is about definition, right, huh? And this is not to define, right, huh? Or another definition there of pain there, there's pulling a part of, of what? Parts that are, what, naturally about, you know? He says, well, is that what pain is? Or is that the cause of pain, right, huh? You know, so, there's another one more subtle there about the sleep being the adunamia, the lack of power of the senses, right? Well, which is cause and which is effect? Is being asleep the reason why I don't hear what you're saying or see what you're doing? Or is my inability to see or hear at that time? Laying in bed that night sometimes, if I could, if I could manage not to think about something, you know, maybe I'd go, see me, yeah. I had this adunamia of thinking, you know? Well, let's see what the Master says, huh? I answer, it should be said, that as is clear from the things forth said, the will is carried toward its object, right, according as that object is proposed by reason. Now, it happens that something can be considered by reason in diverse ways. Thus, that for one reason, something is considered to be good, right? And, by another reason, it is what? Not good, right? My Lord's there in the Garden of Gethsemane, right, huh? It'd be good to have a legion, right, of angels to dry these gnats off, right? But, maybe for some other reason it would not be good, huh? To have a legion of angels sent down. And, therefore, the will of someone, if he wills that to be, according as it has a reason to be good, is good. And, the will of another, if he wills that same thing not to be, according as it has some reason of being bad, his will could also be what? Good. Good, yeah. Just as the judge has a good will when he wills the death of the, what, thief, huh? Because it is, what, a chest, huh? So, what a punishment for stealing, right? But, the will of another, as of the wife, let's say, or of the son, right? Who wishes him not to be killed, right, huh? Insofar as by nature... Yeah, is also what? Good, right? They both have a good will, right? I don't want my daddy to die. Maybe why he uses his feet instead of murder? Well, he'll start to do justice in those days, I guess. Is that proportional to the crime? Well, that's how you might wonder. Okay, sin solver, the will follows the what? Grasp the reason or the understanding. According as the gratio of the good apprehended was what? More common, right? According to this, the will is born in the good or common. Now he's talking about the common good there, huh? Seems to be a little bit, right? More universal good. Justice is clear in the example proposed. For the judge has care of the common good, which is what? Justice, right? And therefore he wills the killing of the thief, huh? Which has the aspect of good by its relation to the common, what? Status, huh? But the wife of the thief considers, has to consider the private good of the, what? Family. Family. And according to this, she wishes the, what? Husband. Fief. Fief not to be, what? Killed. Killed, right? Okay. So sometimes, you know, taking an example, we're in the time of war, right, huh? Government might want to draft the services of some father, right? Because he's good for the, what? Yeah. And the mother, I mean the mother, the wife, children, it's not good for the father to be moved from the family, right? So they wish that he would not, right? So they both have a good will, right? But the good will, but the one is for a greater common good. The good of the nation is better than the good of the family, right? Maybe so, yeah. She'd have to submit to that, right? The mother that's kind of a question is, is the wife's will really good if she wants her husband to stay? Well, he hasn't got that for you. He's just saying both these objects are good. They both have a good reason for willing the opposite things, right? Now, the good of the whole universe is that which is grasped by God, right? Who is both the maker of the universe and the, what? Governor of it. Whence whatever he wills, he wills under the reason of the common, what? Good. Good. Which is his own, what? Goodness. Which is the good of the whole, what? Universe. It's even Aristotle known. But the grasping of the creature by his own nature, right, is of some particular good proportioned to his own, what? Nature. Now, it happens that some thing is good by some particular reason that is not good by the universal reason or the reverse, as has been said. And therefore, it happens that some will is good, willing something according to a particular reason considered, right? Which nevertheless, God does not will according to a universal reason, and the reverse can take place, right? And hence it is also that there can be diverse wills of diverse men, right, about opposites being good, right? Insofar as under diverse particular reasons, they wish this to be or not to be, right? Now, it is not a, what? Right will, as you were saying, Father Robert there. It is not a right will of some man, willing some particular good, unless he refers that to the, what? Common good, as in a, what? In. Because also the natural desire of any part is ordered to the common good of the whole, right, huh? Another example Thomas always gives is that of the, what? Hand, without thinking. It was like that, to protect the head, right? Because the head is more important for the will-being of the body, right? Than even the hand, right? So the hand, in a sense, sacrifices itself, right? To protect the head, right? Whence, in order that someone, by a right will, will some particular good, is necessary that that particular good be willed, what? Materially, but the common good, the common good, the divine common good, be willed, what? Formally, right? So the human will is held to conform to the divine will in what is willed formally, is held then to will the divine good and the common good, right? Formally, but not materially, for the reason, now, what? Said, huh? In my text, it's got a passage from the De Veritate, right, huh? In the object of the will, it says two things should be considered. One is, as it were, material, to wit, the very thing will, right? Another, as it were, formal, is the reason for willing, which is the end, huh? Just as in the object of sight, color, is, as it were, material, light, formal, because through it, color is rendered visible in act, huh? And thus, on the side of the object, a two-fold conformity can be found, huh? One on the side of the thing willed, as when a man wills something that God wills, and this is, as it were, according to the material cause, huh? For the object is, as it were, the matter, the act, once it is minima among the others, right? The other is on the part of the reason for willing, or on the part of the will, as when someone wills on account of this, when someone wills on account of this something, on account of, God, that's getting strange, though, it's interesting. Okay, and this conformity is according to the final cause, huh? It's kind of the distinction he's making in the text, huh? But nevertheless, as regards both, in some way the human will is conformed to the divine will, because according as is conformed to the divine will, in common by reason of what? It's conformed to it in the, what? Last end. According, however, as it is not conformed to it in the willed materially, is conformed to it according to the, what? Efficient cause. Why? Because this proper inclination, following upon nature, right? Or this particular, what? Grasping analogy, right? Of this thing. It has this from God as from a, what? Yeah. Whence it is a custom to be said that it is conformed as regards this, that the will of man is what? Because he wishes this that God wishes him to wish. So suppose my God intends for my father to die now, right? And what should I be willing? My father died? Or should I be willing that he recover, right? Well, there's a natural inclination to will that your father will recover, right? So you're in some way conformed to God as the efficient cause because he gave you this nature whereby you are what? Yeah, where you're inclined to the good of your father, right? You should still be conformed to God's will no matter what takes place, right? In this disease, huh? There's also another way of conformity according to the reason of a, what? Formal cause, huh? To wit that man wills something from charity just as God wills, right? And this conformity also is reduced to the formal conformity that is to be noted from the order to the last end, which is the proper object of charity, huh? You have to will the same thing? Yeah, God wills, huh? Yeah. But here and now, this, right? You're willing that your father recover? That's not what God's willing? What about Martha and Mary there, right? You're willing that their brother did not die, huh? If he had been there, he would not have died, they thought. Christ willed that he died so he could impress the apostles. As well as the others there, right, huh? That's one way of saying it. Yeah, yeah. And that's two, right? When the Pharisees wanted him to, how did he kill Christ, did he kill the others? So that's, yeah, they gave him the others. Fascination by association, if there ever was one. Okay, now what about this first objection? I'll just clarify things a bit. First objection says, we're not able to will what we don't know. But what God wills, we don't know for the most part, right? So, to the first therefore it should be said, that the divine thing, what is willed by the divine, according to a common what? Reason, what it is, we're able to know, right? For we know that God, whatever he wills, right? He wills it under the reason that it's good. And therefore, whoever wills something, under whatever reason of good, right, has a will conformed to divine will, as regards the reason for the will. We know, in other words, that God wills something because it is good, right? And therefore we try to will what we think is good, right? And that way we're conformed in a general way to God's will, right? Although not in particular, right? Said in particular, right? But in the particular, we don't know what God wills, right? And therefore, as regards this, we are not held to conform our will to what? Divine will. So when the parent's little baby there or child there becomes, what, ill and danger of dying, right? And if God wills that child to die, right, should the parents be considered bad in putting the child to live? Now, if they knew that God willing the child to die, that would be different, right? But if they don't know that God wills a child to die, they don't know that. Then they would not be willing, what? According to their natural inclination, right? To be conformed to God who gave them that, right? And they accept it, yeah. It's like King David. He fasted and he wept and he prayed while the child was sick. When he died, he was a fan of the name of the Lord. Now, in the state of glory, however, right? All will see in what? Yeah. In the singular individual things that they will, right? Order these things to that which God, what? Wills about each of them. And therefore, not only formally, but materially, in all things, they will conform their will to God. So what do we see on the Our Father there? On earth. Yeah. But can his will be done on earth as fully as it is in heaven? Because I mean that will in particular, but God works in particular, right? The way that Augustine divides the seven petitions, right, huh? The first three petitions are about what is not fully given in this life, right? But only in the next life, right? So God will not be fully hallowed, right? Praised in this life. And his kingdom will not fully come in this life, right? And then what? His kingdom won't be fully done. Yeah. And the last four are the ones that can be fulfilled in this life, right, huh? So, you know, of course, when I grew up saying to our Father, it was always, you know, if the priest was saying to our Father, he would lead the first three petitions, right? And then the last four petitions, the congregation ends, right, huh? Well, it kind of fits in with Augustine's division, right, huh? Because we'd probably divide, you know, the seven into the four concerned of the good and the three of the bad, right? So you'd put the first four against the last three. But Augustine puts the first three against the last four. It shows not as perversed as, but the subtlety of his mind, right, huh? You know? And the summa Thomas divides him into three, right? The first two for the end and the second two for the means to the end. And the chief means doing his will, the crutch, you know, to help you do his will. And then the last three, you know, to remove all the impediments to the end, huh? So an interesting thing in the Church Fathers are in the Katina area. How do you understand the seventh petition? Deliver us in the middle, yeah. Is it sometimes the evil one? Oh, yeah. Oh, in that sense, yeah. That's one way of understanding it, yeah. Maybe it kind of fits the Greek, you know. But one of the Church Fathers says that the, we pray, and he is not into temptation, right? So we don't, in the previous one, right? So we don't come into the power of the temptation, right? We know we're coming by it, right? But if we do, we're really in a bad state, right? And then the last one, you know, I never thought of that. I used to think of it in terms of other evils and sin or something, you know. As a child, I did always think of it that way, right, huh? That you have two ones about sin there, and then you have one about other evils, you know. But now, deliver us in evil. Now, I succumb to the temptation, now I'm really in. I'm drowning, I'm quicksand, I'm going down. So now, how come it pulled me out of the quicksand, you know, or something, you know. That's kind of interesting, you know. It's just the, you know, you can say about what Shakespeare says, the brevity of the soul of it, right? The brevity of that Our Father, you know, and how profound a prayer it is. So now, I'm going to use that. So now, I'm going to use that. Like Augustine and Thomas Falling, Augustine say, you know, you can't pray, the only thing you can rightly pray for is in the Our Father, right? Now other prayers are just kind of, what, they're repeating or saying 70 different words, you know? It's basically, you know, he said it all in that prayer, right? So that way our will will be more conformed to the divine will, right? Even for the, what, the saints, right? The will in heaven is even more conformed to the divine will because it was in this life, right? Because in this life it was not always conformed to the divine will in regard to the particular thing that God was willing, right? But in there it will be, right? Now what about the second objection here about God willing somebody to be damned? Well, you've got to be careful about saying that, right? The second, it should be said that God does not will the damnation of someone under the notion of, what, damnation. Nor the death of someone insofar as it is, what, death, right? Because he wills all men to be saved. That's the antecedent will, as the antecedent says. But he wills this under the ratio of, what, justice. Whence it suffices about such things that a man wills the, what, justice of God and that, what, the order of nature be observed, huh? And this is the way he answers the, what, third objection, right, huh? That he wills, what, father, right? But notice, now Thomas, unusually, he, what, he's going to answer the arguments on the other side, huh? That's strange, huh? That's real, too. Now, to the first, that is objected to the contrary. It should be said that God more wills, that what? He more wills what God wills, who conforms his will to the divine will as regards the reason for the thing being willed, right? Then the one who conforms it as regards the very thing, what? Willed, huh? Now, what's the reason for saying that, right? Because the will, chiefly, is born to the, what? End. Yeah. It's not easy to say that word, fair to, right? It means carried to, right? Born. Born, yeah, born to the end. Then to that which is towards the end, right? So you're more held to will the end, right? Than what is for the end, right? You might not know. Like the previous one about the will of justice of God. Yeah, yeah. When St. Paul is praying for this, you know, stimulus in his body, whatever that is exactly, and he thinks it's going to be helpful to him in his preaching or whatever it is, right? And God says, no, it's better for you to have this, right? Because it keeps him getting puffed up, right? And because of the revelation, so he, you know, so humility, the humility of him, it's necessary that he have this, what? Annoyance, to say the least, whatever it is, right? You know? Paul accepts that, right? He's been praying for it, right? See? Was he bad praying for that? Didn't know in particular, though, that this was, this is here for his humility, right? Some things that happened in life that are good for your humility. You know, you didn't know at the time, but you say afterwards, as good as embarrassment of art was, took place for me, huh? It's good for my humility. They saw what a scoundrel I really was. If I kept on succeeding and deceiving them all as to my, you know, it would be bad for my humility, right? Paroles, huh? Paroles. I guess he comes from, gets his name from words. I've heard of words in French, paroles. Yeah. And he's, he's fairly exposed, you know. He's a jailer. Yeah. Yeah. But there's room for even me, you know, at the end, he says, I was going back to London. I don't see which one is it now. I can't think which one it is now. It'll come to you. Okay. Ask me again. It'll break down. I don't know if I have it on you. Yeah. At the second one. That the species and form of an act is more to be what? According to the ratio of the object than according to what is material of the object, right? It's kind of the same point. To the third, it should be said that there is not a repugnance of wills when some will diverse things, but not by the same reason, right? But if under one reason there was something, what, willed by one that the other did not will, this would induce a repugnance of, what, wills, huh? Which, nevertheless, is not in the thing proposed, huh? So, yeah. That was a close call there. I thought we'd better be in trouble there, huh? I have to know what I don't know. Because God requires you to know what you don't know. And maybe if someone had lived longer, he would have been exposed to temptations that he would have succumbed to, right? Mm-hmm. And it was better for him to go then, right? Whom the gods love dies young, as it says in the Greek proverb. So, now we get to.