Prima Secundae
Lecture 64: Interior and Exterior Acts: Goodness and Dependence

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The third thing on the goodness and malice of human acts, right? And I guess you had, what, one question was on, in general, right, the goodness or badness of human acts, and then the question just finished was on the, what, goodness or badness of the interior acts, right, of the will, and now we're going to deal with the, what, exterior acts, right? Then we ought to consider about the goodness and badness as regards the exterior acts. And about this, six things are to be asked, or asked. First, whether goodness and badness is found before in the act of the will or in the exterior act. Second, whether the whole goodness or badness of the exterior act depends upon the goodness of the will. Well, they're all minds, Thomas said, huh? He thinks of everything you think about and even more. That's like, if an infinite number of lines can pass through a point, God knows all points. That's an infinity of infinities. What does Mozart say, you know, there are things in the concertos, he says, only a connoisseur can truly, you know, appreciate, he says. But they're rich in such a way that everybody will like them, he says. And sometimes, you know, my friend Warren Murray, he's more educated in music, you know, technically and so on. He'll talk about some subtlety and all these things. And the first time he did this, you know, he said, do you like the Jupiter symphony? And I said, yeah. You know, he's doing the fourth movement. And I say, well, kind of. And he says, well, at the end he's combining four or five melodies together, right? I said, he is? I said, I can't listen again, you know. So you keep on hearing these things, right? This is the way Thomas is, right? I told you that time they were doing the Charles de Connick and the Senior Dion were in Rome, you know, the Second Vatican Council, they were a parity, you might call, for the Cardinal of Quebec. And the Senior Dion pointed something out, you know, and the physics there to de Connick, you know. De Connick says, how could I have talked about all these years and missed that, you know? But he'd come into class, you know, and he would say, you know, he'd been teaching these since the 1930s, right? You know, I had him in the, you know, 50s, 60s. And he says he still, you know, sees something new every time he goes through these things. It's kind of marvelous, you know? I remember him coming down the hall there before we were doing the fourth book there, the physics there, one course in the place there, you know. Come down, you know, he just kind of, he's kind of a sharp man, De Connick, you know. I mean, I was looking down on him, you know. And I think of him in my eyes and he says, you know, isn't this wonderful, you know, what he was saying, you know. He had more of one than anybody in the class, right? Even though he'd taught it many times, you know, just a marvelous man, De Connick. Yeah, none, too, of course. Well, there is the same goodness and badness of the interior and exterior act. Where it talks about some people not liking this precision, right, huh? And they think it's stingy, right? I think I feel a little more relaxed about these things, you know. More pastoral. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Shakespeare sometimes speaks as if, what, the truth is stingy, right, huh? So you flatter somebody, you're, what, going beyond, right? But if you just say the truth about somebody, you're being stingy, you know. You're stingy at your praise, right? Because you say that more than you. But then there's rhetoric. I know. But Aristotle, there in the 8th book of the Nicomagnetics, he's talking about friendship, you know. And he talks about, does friendship consist more in loving or being loved, right? And before he determines the truth about this, he says, you know, many men, or maybe most men, are more interested in being loved, right, than in loving, right? And then he sees a connection between being loved and honored, right? And that to be loved, in a way, is to be, what, honored, right? Because honor is a testimony to some excellence in you. And being loved is a testimony to some good in you, right, huh? So some don't want to be loved, you know, for the sake of honor, right, huh? And then he says, but which is better, to be loved or to be honored? He says, well, why do you want to be honored, right? He said, people want to be honored either by those who are in power and can do them some good, right? And so they figure if they honor them, they're going to get something out of them, right? Or they want to be honored by those who are virtuous and excellent in something as a kind of confirmation that there's something good in them, right, huh? Okay? But in either case, you want to be honored for something other than being honored. By being loved, you want to be loved for its own sake. So what's per se is better than what's per livelihood, right? Listen, yeah, you know. And then he goes on, you know, to argue that friendship consists more, though, in loving than being loved, right, huh? But he doesn't give the reason at that point. He just gives the example of the woman who gives up her baby to be, what, nursed by another woman because she can't. And therefore, she's, what, loving the good of the child, but she won't be loved in return because the child won't know his mother. So he takes a woman as being, you know, more, better than a man in terms of love, right? What's this all about, you know? Actually, I kind of really admire that prayer of St. Francis, you know. One of the things he prays for is that he more seeked to love than to be loved, right? And I used to say to the students, I mean, if this saint had to pray for this, what about the rest of us slobs, you know? You know, we probably want more to be loved than to love, right? That's why we flatter people, right? Because then, you know, they think we'd love them, you know? And a beautiful thing in Julius Caesar there, you know, where they get into kind of a squabble there, Cassius and Brutus, you know, Cassius, and a friend of that, you know, he's criticizing my faults, you know, and so on. And he said, well, flatter we're not, but a friend would, you know? And Brutus has a beautiful understanding there, Shakespeare. Examples in Shakespeare are so clear, you know, if people knew them, you know, I mean, you could teach ethics from the plays of Shakespeare with those examples, huh? Thomas, in some places, you know, he quotes Terence, you know, who's a good example of all things, huh? So, whether, quarto, whether the exterior act adds something to the goodness or badness above what the interior act has, right? If I want to commit adultery and then I go out and actually commit it, is that adding something bad to my wanting to commit adultery or is that, if I want to rob you, and then go out and rob you, that's going to add some badness to it. Well, I suppose, in a court of law, you can be punished for a conspiracy, even if you didn't do it. What do you punish more if you do it? Well, fifth, whether the events fouling, I suppose the act, right, adds something to the goodness or badness as regards to the exterior act. And sixth, whether the same exterior act can be good and, what, bad, and in dangerous territory there, right? Okay. To the first, then, one proceeds thus. It seems that good and bad, before, consist in the, what, exterior act than in the act of the, what, will, huh? Yeah, look at the commandments there, huh? The first one for us about the bad there is, thou shalt not commit murder, I guess, huh? The fifth commandment there. So, you know what? That's the exterior act, isn't it? Murder. Then the next one is, thou shalt not steal. These are all the exterior acts, right? And then later on it gets to the other ones. It just kind of stands out, you know, you think of the things you're, you know, do's and don'ts, as people say, that's what ethics is about. They think do's and don'ts. Rules. Yeah, yeah. Don't be all the rules. But where I simply say do's and don'ts, right? The do's and don'ts seem to be the exterior acts, right? People think about those things. So, for the will has its goodness from the object, as has been said, right? But the exterior act is the object of the, what? The interior act of the will, right? For one is said to will theft, right? Or one is said to will to give alms, okay? Therefore, good and bad are before an exterior act than the act of the will. So the object of the will is before the act of the will, right? The object of the will here seems to be the exterior act, right? So if the theft is a bad exterior act and the giving of alms is a good one, right? Then the interior act of the will is good or bad according to what you're willing, right? According to its object. Moreover, good before belongs to the, what? End, huh? Because those things which are towards the end or for the end have the notion of good from their order to the end. But the act of the will is not able to be the end as has been said above. Therefore, the act of some other power, but the act of some other power can be the, what? End, huh? The first thing you will is the end and the first thing you will is not the act of the will itself. Therefore, before good consists in the act of some other power than in the act of the, what? Will. Moreover, the act of the will formally has itself to the exterior act, as has been said. But that which is, what, formal, is after the form comes to the matter. Therefore, before is good and bad in the exterior act but in the act of the will. So are you all convinced? You should be. But Stuart at this point is convinced, right? No. But against this is what Augustine says in all books, the book of the retractions, right? I've often said, you know, that Augustine in the book of the retractions has given a lesson to all of us, you know? All these philosophers should be forced to write a book of retractions. Some of these guys are constantly changing their minds, you know? So they've written many books of retractions. Yeah, yeah. But anyway, in that book, Augustine says that the will is that by which one sins and, what? Lives rightly, you know? Therefore, the good and bad moral are before found in the, what? Will, huh? See what the Master says now. The answer should be said, that some exterior acts can be called good or bad in two ways. What distinction is this? In one way, by their, what? Genus, huh? By their kind, huh? And according to the circumstances considered in them, right? Just as to give alms, observing the appropriate, suitable, or own circumstances, right? It's said to be good, right? In another way, something is said to be good or bad from its order to and in. And that's to give alms on account of inane glory is said to be, what? Bad, right? So to teach is what? In the first sense. First sense. But it could be bad in the second sense if it's an account of inane glory that one teaches, right? And there's a lot of that going on in the world. Now, sense, however, that the end is the, what? Will's own object, right? It is manifest that the aspect of good or bad, which in exterior act as from its order to the end is found before in the act of the, what? Will. And from this, it is derived to the, what? Exterior act. So if I teach you to make you know more, to make you more like God who knows everything, that's good, right? If I teach you to gain inane glory, that's bad, right, huh? That's in there, is in the will more than the, you know. Now, the goodness or badness which the exterior act has by itself, on account of a, what? Suitable matter and suitable circumstances, right? Is not derived from the will, but more from, what? Reason, huh? Whence if the goodness of the exterior act is considered according as it is in the ordering and grasping of reason, it is before the, what? Of the will. But if it be considered according as it in the carrying out of the work, it follows the goodness of the will, which is its, what? That's an interesting distinction she's making there, right? Now, what about the first objection? It says the will has its goodness from its object and the object is the exterior act. Well, to the first, it should be said that the exterior act is the object of the will. How? Now, insofar as it's proposed to the will by reason, right? As a certain good grasped and ordered by reason. And in this way, it is before the good act of the will. Then it's more in reason than in the exterior act itself, right? Insofar as it consists in the carrying out of the work, it is an effect of the will and it follows the, what? Will, huh? So the will there is before, right? Now, second objection here. To the second, it should be said that the end is before in what? But after in execution, right? It's a famous principle, right? It seems to be what government's whole response. It's in there, yeah. To the third, it should be said that the form, according to as is received in matter, is after in the way of what? What? Generation than the matter. Although it is prior nature in being more perfect, right? But according as it is in the agent cause, it is in all ways, what? Before, right? But the will is compared to the exterior act as an efficient cause. Whence the goodness of the act of the will is the form of the exterior act as existing in its, what? Agent cause, huh? Come on, it's about to adjust there, right now? He's a lot to think about Thomas there, right? Got a little break here now. Thank you. Thank you. Up to Article 2 now, I guess. To the second one goes forward thus. It seems that the whole goodness and badness of the exterior act depends on the, what, will. For it is said in Matthew Chapter 7 that a good tree is not able to produce bad fruits. A bad tree is able to produce good fruits. But through the tree, however, is understood the will. And through the fruit, the work of the, according to the gloss. They say in my footnote, this is a gloss from Augustine, but anyway. Therefore, there cannot be, it cannot be possible that the interior will be good and the exterior act be, what, bad or the reverse. Moreover, Augustine says in the Book of Retractions, that one does not sin except by the will. If, therefore, there is not a sin in the will, there would not be a sin in the exterior act. And thus, the whole goodness and badness of the exterior act depends upon the will. Moreover, the good and bad, about which now we speak, are differences of the moral act. But differences, per se, divide the genus, I'm not paratidus, according to the philosopher in the seventh book of wisdom there. Since, therefore, the act is moral from the fact that it is, what, voluntary. And there he knows the word moralist doesn't mean good, huh? Okay. It seems that good and bad are taken in the act only from the, what, side of the will. But against, this is what Augustine says in the book Against Lies, huh? Against a lie. That some things are, there are some things which, by no good end, right, or good will, are able to come about well, right? Some people in the United States, right, that's crazy theologians nowadays. So Thomas says, the answer should be said, but as has been said, in the exterior act, one can consider a two-fold goodness or badness. One is by the suitable matter and circumstances, another by its order to the end. And that which is, by its order to the end, the whole depends upon the, what, will. But that which is from a suitable matter or circumstances depends upon reason. And from this, the goodness of the will depends, according as it is carried towards that act. Now, it should be considered, as it has been said above, that in order that something be bad, it suffices one singular defect. Quick quote there from Dionysius, remember? Unum ex integra causa. And that the baddest many defect. And in order that it be simply good, it is not to suffice one individual good, but is required the integrity of goodness. If, therefore, the will is good, both from its own object and from the end, as a consequence, the exterior act will be good. But it does not suffice, and this is the key point now, that the exterior act, in order that the exterior act be good, that the goodness of the will, which is from the intention of the end. But if the will is bad, whether from the intention of the end, or from the, what, the act will, as a consequence, the exterior act is, what, bad. And therefore, it corrects that understanding of that text from Matthew there, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that the good will, insofar as it is signified to the good, what, tree, should be taken according as it has goodness from the act will and from the end, what, intended, right? And in the second one, to the second, it should be said that not only does someone sin by the will, will, when he wills a bad end, but also when he wills a bad way. So what about my friend Robin Hood? Well, he got elected. He won. If I steal to give alms, or steal. Tough, this is tough. It means for breakfast. So in the text of Augustine, I'm not saying that one sins only by the will, right? If, therefore, there is not a sin in the will, there's not a sin in the exterior act, right? But there can be sin in the will, not only from the wrong end, but from the, what, wrong act being willed, yeah. And the third objection is taking voluntary and, what, too narrow a sense, right? It's just for the act of the will itself, right? But something that's called voluntary, not only the interior act of the will, but also the exterior acts. That's why we're taking up the exterior acts. In so far as they proceed from the will and reason. And, therefore, concerning both acts, there can be a difference of good and bad, huh? I'm not a confessor. I think St. Alfonso says if a priest is worried about hearing confessions, especially his newly renamed, because he's, who can do this? Who can be responsible for anything that walks in the door, you know? Yeah. And he says, well, as long as he's not been negative, as long as he's not guilty of neglecting his duty to inform him about, he'll have the grace to pray for the grace. And if his spirit says, do it, then he'll have the grace to do it, because nobody can do that. Nobody can do it. But as long as he doesn't neglect it, he doesn't have to worry about his prayer. Okay, now. The Article 3 here. The third one goes forward thus. It seems it is not the same the goodness and badness of the interior act of the will and of the what? The exterior and the interior. Yeah, interior act of the will and exterior. Oh, I'm sorry, I was looking at the title, which is exactly the other way. For the act of the what? Oh, excuse me, the beginning of the interior. The beginning of the source of the interior act. Is the power of the soul, the interior power that is either grasping, knowing, right? Or desiring, right? So Thomas used that term apprehensive, right? Grasping the mind, huh? Because the knowing power, what? Yeah, contains the object in itself, huh? I was giving this to us last night there, my nice sophism, right, huh? And I said, a square is a, what, equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral. And an equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral is the definition of square. So both statements are true, right? Got a syllogism there. Conclusion is, therefore, a square is a definition of square. Now, what's wrong with that? Or how do you know, you know, let's take a simple question there first. How do you know it's false to say that a square is a definition of square? Well, that's probably the problem of why this thing arises. But, you know, one of the students act very good, huh? He said, the definition is not four-sided. So how can the definition of square be a square if it's not four-sided, right? And yet, is there some truth in the argument, right? That it is the definition of square, in some sense, right, the nature of the square, right? Is the nature of the square in some way contained in the definition of square? It is, right? Yeah. And so it's not, so I'm saying, what kind of mistake is being made here, right, huh? Is the mistake of simply and not simply, right? Because the conclusion is, you know, the square is simply, you don't question the definition of square. But in some imperfect way, it is, right? And that's because this act is named from the grasping of the hand, right? The first act of the mind is grasping what something is. And when I grasp something, it's contained in my, what, hand. And so when the mind grasps something, it's contained in the mind, huh? Yeah. So it's beautiful the way Thomas uses that word there, huh, to kind of name the knowing power, right, huh? The grasping power and the wanting power, you know? See? Well, in the case of the will, the object, the will's act is more in the object than the object in it, right? For your treasure, as our Lord said, you know, that your heart shall be, huh? Okay, so if they have these treasures in heaven, then your heart will be in heaven, right? And they get no treasure down here. You know, you're giving it all away or something, right? And so, a beautiful way of describing these two powers, right? It goes back to what Aristotle points out to many places, but when he first started in logic, he used to call the first act simplex apprehensio, right? It's like simple grasping, right? So that's a perfection of the mind to grasp something, you know? But is that a perfection of the will to be grasping? Sounds almost like avarice or something, right? A defect of the will, huh? But anyway, but the act of what? The principle or source, you might say, of the exterior act, is the power carrying out the motion, right? Okay. But where there are diverse principles of action, there, there are diverse what? Acts. Acts. But the acts are the subject of goodness or what? Badness. And they cannot be, what? The same accidents in diverse subjects, right? The same in America, right? So if there's whiteness in your face, it can't be the whiteness that's in my face. It can't be the same whiteness, huh? The same in kind cannot be the same in America. Therefore, there cannot be the same goodness of the interior and the exterior act, huh? This is tough stuff to say. Moreover, and this is the famous definition of Aristotle in the second book, Book of the Ethics, virtue is what makes its haver good and renders its, what, act good, huh? So when you introduce the idea of virtue, I always quote this little plaque that Warren has. Yeah. Has on the, much virtue in herbs, little in men. So the herb has what makes it to be a good herb, and its act, to season the food, it seasons it good, right? But Warren comes down to my house, you know, and he says, this herb is always thawed out, so I've got to do what? It's lost its virtue, right? And of course, our Lord gives you an example when he compares it. You are the salt of the earth, right? If it loses its, what, virtue, you might say, huh? You know, you thawed out and trampled under, right? Yeah, yeah. So that's the same way you guys, you know. So you've got to make virtue kind of, you know, more accessible to people, right, to see what it is. So I always take the example of the knife, right? The virtue of the knife is what? Yeah. Cutting well is not the virtue of the knife, right? But it's a quality of the knife that enables it to cut well, right? What's the vice of the knife? Those, you'll see that, right? And then when you want to have what is the virtue of man, what is that? It's a little harder to know. It's going to be sharp, too. The one with dull man. So, moreover, virtue is what makes its haver good and renders his work good, huh? But other is the, what, intellectual virtue in the power, what, commanding. And other, the moral virtue in the power of what command did, huh? As is clear in the first book of the Ethics, right? So that's at the end of the first book of Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle distinguishes between the virtues of reason itself, right? And the virtues of, what, the will and the emotions, the moral virtues. Therefore, other is the goodness of the interior act, which is of the, what, commanding power. Yeah. And other is the goodness of the exterior act, which is the act of the power commanded, huh? Moreover, cause and effect are not able to be the, what, same. For nothing is a cause of itself, huh? That's a, what, axiom, yeah. But the goodness of the interior act is a cause of the goodness of the exterior act, or the reverse, as has been said. Therefore, there cannot be the same goodness of both, huh? I keep on getting convinced of the false against this guy, huh? Very, very, very dangerous. It's dangerous. On the index. On the index. It's like Bellarmine's book, The Controversies. I don't know if it's put on the index, but he's loudly objected to it. Oh, my God. He's giving the Protestants all these better arguments than they get themselves. And then he pointed out, yeah, but I answered that. No, that's the problem. But against this is what has been shown above, right? That the act of the will has itself, to the exterior act, as something, what, form, is form-domatic. But from the form of material, there comes about one thing, yeah? Therefore, there is one goodness of the interior act and the exterior act. Okay, well, let's have some enlightening, Thomas. I beg you to enlighten us, huh? I beg you to enlighten us, huh? The superior angel. And so Dion, David was comparing, you know, this order, you know, where you've got Aristotle and then Thomas proportioning it to us. To the angels, you know, it's not as fixed as the angels, but there's something like that, you know. You try to read a book of Aristotle that Thomas has not commented on. It's pretty hard to proportion Aristotle to yourself. So he says, I answer it should be said, that it has been said above, the interior act of the will and the exterior act, insofar as they are considered in the genus of what? Our one what? Act. But it can happen sometimes that the act which is one in what? Subject. Has many reasons of its goodness or what? Badness. And sometimes only one. And thus, therefore, it should be said, that sometimes there is the same goodness or badness of the interior and the exterior act, sometimes, what? Other and other. For just as has already been said, the foresaid two goodnesses or badness, to wit of the interior and exterior act, are ordered to each other, right? But it can happen in those things which are ordered to another, that something is good from this only, from this only, that it is what? Order to another. Just as a bitter potion, from this alone is good, that it is ordered to what? Health, right? Protected health. Whence there is not another goodness of what? Health and the potion, but one and the, what? Same. Sometimes, though, that which is ordered to another has in itself some ratio of good, even apart from its order to another good. Just as a medicine, saparosa, savory medicine, has the aspect of a delightful good. Apart from this, that it is, what? Sanitiva. So I remember when they gave me this little medicine, when I was a kid there, and they had kind of cinnamon on the outside, you know, hmm, this tastes pretty good, you know. And one time I sucked it too long, and I went, oh, oh, oh, oh, oh. And I got the Pogshio Amara, you know. And I never sucked them again. I learned my lesson. Thus, therefore, it should be said that when the exterior act is, what, good or bad, only from its order to the end, then altogether there is the same goodness and badness of the act of the will, which per se regards the end, and of the exterior act, which regards the end by means of the act of the will. So, when, however, the exterior act has goodness or badness by itself, to it, according to its matter, right, or its circumstances, right, then the goodness of the exterior act is one, and the goodness of the will, which is from the end, is other. Thus, nevertheless, that the goodness of the end from the will be down, flows over to, the exterior act, right, and the goodness of the matter and the circumstances redounds upon the act of the will, as has been said, huh? Now, the first objection, huh, it's saying that you have different powers, right, and different acts, huh? We say that argument proves that the exterior act and the interior act are diverse in the genus of, what, nature, right? But, nevertheless, from these thus diverse is constituted something one in the genus of, what? Yeah. So, that's a subtle distinction there, huh? Now, to the second objection here, huh? To the second, it should be said that as is said in the sixth book of the ethics, the moral virtues are ordered to the, what, acts of the virtues, which are as their ends, huh? But prudence, or foresight, which is in reason, is what? To those, is ordered to those things which are for the end, right? The means, huh? In account of this, they require, what, diverse virtues, huh? But right reason about the, what, end of the virtues does not have another goodness than the goodness of the virtue, according as the goodness of reason itself is partaken in each, what, virtue, huh? To the third, it should be said, huh? The third objection is, what, the cause and effect can't be the same, right? When something is derived from one thing to another as from a, what? Yeah. Then, it's other what is in each, right? Other than America, right? So my father and the son are not the same, right? But they're one, let's say, difficult agent, right? Same nature. Just as when the hot heats. Other in number is the heat of the heater and of the heated, right? Although they're the same in species or kind, huh? But when something is derived from one to another by analogy or proportion, then there's only one in number, huh? Just as from the healthy, which is in the body of the animal, is derived healthy to what? Medicine. Medicine and urine, huh? Because medicine is what is productive, that very same medicine, right? And urine is where you have a sign of that very same health, right? So there's not a different health involved in healthy being said of your urine and healthy being said of your, what? Medicine, right? But it's the same health you're talking about when you say the body is healthy, right? So not other is the health of medicine and of urine than the health of the animal, right? Which the medicine makes and the urine signifies, right? This example, this is what he's showing out. Metaphysics is one science, right? He uses that example. Yeah, yeah. He was the son of a medical doctor, you know, Aristopoulos. He was the court physician there for Philip, at least, you know. Because Aristopoulos became known to the throne there. He became the teacher of Alexander the Great, right? And in this way, from the goodness of the will is derived the goodness of the exterior act, the equation according to, what? The order of one to the other, right? This is awfully subtle stuff, isn't it? Competition, right? Let me know if it's... It's your machine there? Oh, yeah. That was the work that had out there or something. Yeah, no, it's the phone machine. We have a problem with Bernardo. Can you come back tomorrow? Oh, no. I got home. He's Mexican, right? Yeah. So I got a cheat ticket that's Air Canada. When he's got to stop over in Toronto, they won't let him do that. He doesn't have a visa to go to Canada. Yeah. So that's $400 down the drain. Oh, you can't get a refund on that? Oh, gee. No, that's not comfortable. So he's going to have to come back Tuesday if I can... I don't know. I'll figure it out. I'll have to route to a different airport or something. Yeah. The convenience of the modern world.