Prima Secundae
Lecture 65: Interior and Exterior Acts, Events, and Moral Culpability

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Article 4, I guess. Whether the exterior act adds something to the goodness and badness, of goodness and badness, over the act that's interior, right? To the fourth one precedes us. It seems that the exterior act does not add in goodness or badness over the act that's interior. For Christendom says upon Matthew, the will is what is rewarded, I guess, for good, or condemned for what? The bad. But works are the testimonies, the witnesses of the will. Therefore, God does not seek the works for their own sake, that you might know in what way he judges, right? But in account of others, so that all what? That God's trust. But bad and good, more should be estimated according to the judgment of God and according to the judgment of men. Therefore, the exterior act adds nothing to the goodness and badness over the interior act. Moreover, one and the same is the goodness of the interior and exterior act, as has been said. In the previous article, right? This article seems to be contradicted to the previous one, right? You know, they're very, very subtle, huh? But growth or augmentation, growth is by the addition of one to the other. Therefore, the exterior act does not add in goodness or badness over the interior act. It's the same, right? Okay, so Dwayne Berkowitz plus Dwayne Berkowitz is no more than Dwayne Berkowitz, right? So it's the same goodness and badness here. It's adding the same thing to itself, right? Okay, but that's no more. More of the whole goodness of the creature adds nothing over the divine goodness, huh? That's why this thing that struck me is very, very interesting, you know, huh? That God and creatures is not better than God alone, right? Yeah. And I told you the two ways that Thomas tries to lead us by the hand to understand that. He says that the goodness of the creature is not the goodness of God, like a shorter line is to a longer line, which would make the line longer. But because God is infinitely good, it's like a point to a line. Yeah. And he had a point to a line, how much longer is a line? Oh, yeah. So God and creature is, what? No better than God alone, just as a line and a point is no longer than the line. And the other argument is sometimes is that the goodness of the creature is partaking of the goodness of God, right? And as the word partake means, taking a part of, so to speak, right? Well, the whole and one of its parts is no more than the whole. So you and your arm is no more than you alone, right? So it's still hard to understand, right? You know, how good God is, right? It's goodness itself, right? The pile is like the two parts, the small line that they will have. We just have to fall into that way of thinking. Yeah, yeah. So, moreover, the whole goodness of the creature adds nothing over the goodness, the divine goodness, because the whole is derived from the divine goodness. But the goodness of the exterior act, sometimes the whole is derived from the goodness of the, what? Interior act. Sometimes it's the reverse. Therefore, one of them doesn't add in goodness or badness over the other, right? But against this is that every agent intends to achieve the good or to avoid the bad. If, therefore, through the exterior act, nothing was added of goodness or badness, it would be in vain that whoever has a good will or a bad one would make a, what? Good work or desist to a bad work, which is unfitting. It's together the truth, right? As Aristotle says in the ethics, the truth of all things fit, harmonize, huh? Now Thomas says, it's going to distinguish here, I answer it should be said that if we speak of the goodness of the exterior act, that goodness which it has from the willing of the end, then the exterior act adds nothing to what? Goodness. Unless it happens that the will itself, by itself, becomes better in good or worse in what? Evils. Which can happen in three ways, huh? In one way, by number, huh? As when someone wills something to do something for a good end or a bad one, and then what? Not do it. But afterwards, right? He wills and does it. For the act of the will is what? Double. And thus there comes about a two-fold good or a two-fold what? Right end. Evil, yeah. In another way, as regards extension, as in someone wills to do something, right, for a good end or a bad one, and encounters some impediment, that he, what, desists, huh? But another one continues the motion of the will until he perfects, what? The will. Yeah. It manifests that the will of such a one is longer in either good or, what, bad, huh? And according to this, it is worse or better, right? What did Buckley speak about the... Tenacious ill will of his opponents? I thought it was well chosen, the word tenacious, you know, huh? Yeah. I just got a quick, you know, ill will, but tenacious, you know. It's like persevering, right? Yeah. You know, ill will that some of these people had for you. Third, according to what? For there are some exterior acts which, insofar as they are, what, pleasant or painful, right, are apt to, what, intensify the will or to make it more remiss, right? Now, it stands to reason that when the will more intensely tends towards the good or the bad, right, to that extent it is either better or worse, right? If, however, we speak of the goodness of the exterior act, which it has by its matter and its suitable circumstances, thus it is compared to the will as a limit and end. And in this way, it adds to the goodness or badness of the will. Because every inclination or motion is perfected in this that it, what, it's in or it reaches its turn, right? Whence it is not a perfect will unless it be such that given the opportunity it, what, acts, yeah. If, therefore, if, however, the possibility is absent, right, then, the will existing perfect that it might operate if it was able to, right, the defect of perfection, which is from the exterior act is simply something involuntary, right? The involuntary, just as it does not merit pain or reward in operating the good or the bad, so it does not take away anything from the, what? It takes a lot of time. It does not take away something. Oops, this is either total. To none? This is either total. This could be wrong. Yeah. If man involuntarily simply fails from, what, doing something good or bad, right, no? In the lesson. Now, what about the text from, what, Chrysostom? Chrysostom, yeah. To the first, therefore, it should be said that Chrysostom speaks when the will of man is, what, consummated, right? and does not cease from act except on account of, what? In the ability to do it. Yeah. To the second, it should be said, huh? That that argument, that the same goodness of both, right, proceeds from the goodness of the exterior act, which it has from the willing of the end, right? But there's the goodness of the exterior act, which it has from its matter and circumstances. And that's other from the, what, goodness of the will which is from its end, but not other from the goodness of the will which it has from the act willed, but is compared to it as the reason and cause of it, huh? And in this way, he's cleared the solution to the, what, theory, huh? He digested all that? Give me some time. Don't be in confession all there. I figured this out, though. He sits in the confession and they're reading the Prima Secundae there, right? That's not even down to the details, so the Secundae, Secundae. Well, that's what St. Leopold Mandic, the Capuchino, was in Padua. Yeah, he was like a Padre Pio figure, his Dalmatian, about this tall. Yeah. And he had, outside the confession, he was one of the people confessed to him from all over and his little desk he had in his cell and he had the sumo right on his desk. Oh. Oh. Oh. Oh. Oh. Oh. Oh. Oh. Oh. Oh. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Dios gracias. God, our enlightenment, Guardian Angels, strength in the lights of our minds, more than the room of our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Great to hear us. Help us to understand what you have written. I was reading the container of Oreo this morning there. One about the 99 animals, you know, that are okay, you know, and one of them is lost, right? So a good shepherd leaves the 99 in the mountains, right, and goes after the one that's lost. One way the Church Fathers understand that is that the 99 that are left in the mountains, those are the, what, angels, right? And the one that is lost is the human race, right? So, was it that Gregory that was talking about, left in the mountains, right, up in the high cultivation of, you know, seeing God and so on. So they are left in the mountains, you know. And then he'd come down, you know, to take care of us. But it got beautiful all the way. Those things they said. I was looking at a way, so I posed a biography there, Thomas, again, you know, and he insists upon the importance of the catenoria, you know, for Thomas' theological development. He really thinks it's kind of a generic, I mean, a masterpiece, right, that he could select these things that are so relevant to the text, you know, and, you know, select the right ones, you might say, you know, the ones that are really illuminating and so on. It's interesting. Okay, we're up to Article 5 here in Question 20. That's what we're told here by the machine, okay? Yeah, I can't lie. Okay, to the fifth one goes forward thus, huh? It seems that the, what, event following upon, right, adds to the goodness or badness of the, what, act, huh? For effects exist in virtute, right, huh? In the power of their, what, cause, huh? But events follow, acts as effects follow, what, causes. Therefore, they preexist in the power in the acts, right? But each thing, according to its virtue or power, is judged, good or bad. For virtue is what makes its have or good, and is act good, as Aristotle says in the ethics, huh? Therefore, the events add to the goodness or badness of the act. That seems quite definitive. Moreover, the goods, which, what? Hewers. Yeah, our effects follow upon the, what, preaching of the teacher has. This is around the Dominican, you can see them, you can say, oh, yeah, this is a nice objection here, right? Yeah. But these kinds of good redound to the merit of the, what? Teacher. Preacher, yeah. Okay, that's what they call OP, right? Ordo Predicator, right? You had one, yeah. Yeah, what is it? What is it, Jacob? Jacob Restrick. I'm sorry, I don't know. He used to be a chap on it, but it was Springfield, right? Oh, that's Springfield. He's never down. Yeah, Hoffman, New York. So, anyway, these goods be down to the merit of the preacher. It is clear through that which is said in Philippians 4. My brothers, right, most dear and desired, my joy and my crown, right? Okay. It's like when they say in the Psalms, see, your children's children, right? It doesn't mean just, you know, be grandfathers. Grandfathers, but, you know, when you teach somebody, then they teach somebody else, and you preach, and then somebody else. Okay. Therefore, the events following add to the goodness or badness of the act, huh? Moreover, punishment is not added, except when the guilt, what? Increasing, huh? As is said in Deuteronomy 25, for the measure of the sin, there will be the measure of, what? Scourges. Scourges, yes. But from the event following is added to the pain, huh? Or punishment, rather. For, it said, Exodus 21, huh? That if the, what? The act is born from the day before the end. And then it's, what, denuded of the horns? I don't know. And, uh... In the third objection, if the ox was... This horse was... Was what? Yeah. Goring. Goring. Goring, yeah. And his dominion was, what? Contested, right? And his lord, yeah. Yeah. And was not, what, locked up, I guess, right? And killed a man or woman. Yeah. Then he's going to be killed with stones, I guess, right? And they'll kill his lord, too. Yeah. And he kills the lord, right? Pretty bad, right? Yeah. Pit bulls there. Yeah, yeah. Give this law for them, yeah. But he would not be killed if the cattle had not, what? Killed the man, right, huh? Mm-hmm. Even not, what? Closed up. Yeah. Therefore, the sick event adds to the goodness or badness of the act, huh? Okay, if you're punished for that. Further, the fourth argument now, is someone, what? Engenders the cause of death by striking or giving a, what? Sentence, huh? And death does not follow. No irregularity is, what? Contracted. But it is if death follows. Therefore, the event following adds to the goodness or badness of the act, huh? So you see these things in the paper there, you know. Well, the person you've assaulted him dies in even more trouble than you are, right? For having assaulted him, right? But against us is if the event following does not make the act bad, which was good, nor good, which was bad, right? As if someone gives, what, alms to the poor one, which he abuses for, what, sinning. And nothing is left or lost to the one who, what, alms, right? And likewise, if someone patiently bears the injury done unto him, the one who did it is not on account of this excused, right? Therefore, the event following does not add to the goodness or badness of the act, huh? So the guy who chopped off the head there. St. Dennis. Who's the one that rose from the dead? Who chopped his head off? He walked around telling everybody. That French one in Paris. Was it St. Dennis? Was it St. Dennis? Well, Thomas is kind of not going to simply dismiss those arguments and that aside, right? I answer it should be said that the event or result following is either for, what, known, pre-cogitatis, or not, right? If it is known before, it is manifested, it adds to either the goodness or the, what, badness of the act, right? That means he's feasible. For when someone thinking that from what he does, from his work, many bad things can, what, follow, right, huh? Nor on account of this does he, what, stop. From this it appears that his will is even more disordered, right? But now, if the event following is not foreknown, right, huh? Well, then Thomas says he never has to distinguish here, right, huh? Because if it follows per se, as such and such an act, and for the most part, right, according to this, in this case, the event following adds to the goodness or the badness of the, what, act, huh? For that is manifestly a better act, which from its own kind, right, many goods are apt to, what, follow, right, huh? And that is... Worse, peioram, right, from which are apt to follow, what, many things, right? So divorce, right, a lot of bad things fall from that, right? But if it is prachidens, right, by chance, right, and utin pochiori was, right, then the event following does not add to the goodness or the badness of the act. For a judgment is not given about something according to that which is, what, prachidens, but only according to that which is, what, per se, right? So this distinction between the per se and the prachidens is a very important, what, distinction? So, in part of the first objection that he's agreeing with it, if it's taken in a per se sense, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that the, what, power of a cause is judged according to the effect per se, right? Not, however, according to the effect, what, prachidens, right? That makes sense, huh? So you're out of the firing range, ricochets off and kills again. Yeah. I see you down the drugstore to get some medicine and you get shot in there when the place is being held up, right? Yeah. Yeah. Well, did this make my synagogue down there worse? Yeah. That's prachidens, right? I was still held responsible at that time when I went to, the winter day there at the assumption there when the school was closed. Got hit by a car coming back and he got all the way down in his driveway, right? Oh, yeah. So, where was his old Ford car, you know, so. I never looked up if I had a radio and I could listen to it before. The second should be said that the good which here is due, right, that follows from the preaching of the doctor, are effects, what? Per se. Per se, right, huh? Whence they were down to the award of the preacher, huh? Especially when they are, what? Intended beforehand, right? So remember that now. You get there to give your sermon there and then. So you go up high, you know. Yeah, yeah. Pride go up and forth. To the third, it should be said that that event for which that, what? Aim is inflicted, commanded, it, what? Per se, follows in such a cause, right, huh? And likewise, it is laid down as something that should be foreknown, right? And therefore, it is rented to, what? Punishment, right? What happens is I drive my car too fast and I hit somebody. It's not necessarily, it's dangerous, but it doesn't always, you know, always hit somebody. No, no. But it's, it's not wide. It's a place where I can't see, you know. You do the street for everyone, so. I used to, you know, come from St. Paul there. But you had two rows of houses like this, right? And you had a kind of alley in between them. And the delirium, people like milk and so on, they used to go down that alley and they could hit too many kids. So they stopped doing that, right? Yeah. And so on, right? But obviously, if you're going fast down that alley, that would be, that would be, I would think, adding to the, the badness of your act, right? The judge had come down more severely upon you. Oh, we didn't read the fourth objection, is it? We didn't read the fourth reply. It says, that argument proceeds if the, what? The guilt, huh? It does not have our foul, the guilt, but the thing, what? Done in account of some defect of the sacrament, huh? The irregularity is, you know, the impediment to the sacrament. Yeah. Because is it, certainly the sacrament of order, so I don't know. Yeah, this is also an impediment for marriage. Marriage. Yeah. Now, whether the same exterior act can be good and bad, I don't know. That sounds highly suspicious, huh? And to the sixth, one goes forward thus. It seems that one act is able to be good and bad, right? For one, a motion is one that is continuous, as is said in the fifth book of natural hearing and physics. But one continuous motion can be good and bad. If, for example, someone continually going towards the church first intends the name glory, right? Afterwards, he intends to serve God, right? So walking to church, which is one act, right? The one continuous act is both good and what? Therefore, one act can be good and bad, huh? That's the objection, right? Moreover, according to the philosopher in the third book of physics, acting upon and undergoing are one act, right? So my kicking you and you're being kicked is the same thing, Aristotle's saying, right? But undergoing can be good, as an example of that of Christ, right? And the acting upon bad is that of the Jews, right? Therefore, one act can be both good and what? Bad, right? So you're taking good spirits, you're being kicked, but it's bad for me to be kicking you, right? With you in humility and so on. Then preparation for your sins, you accept with good. Preparation for your sins. Good. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Except you're being kicked, right? So one of the same things, then, right? It's both good and bad, right? Moreover, since the servant or slave is a, what? Tool of the Lord, huh? The action of the servant is an action of the Lord, right? Just as the action of a tool is the action of the, what? Artist, right? But it can happen that the action of the servant proceeds from the good will of the Lord, and thus it is good, right? And from the bad will of the servant, and thus it is, what? Bad. Therefore, the same act can be, what? Good and bad, huh? Against all this, contraries are not able to be in the same. But good and bad are contraries, huh? Therefore, one act cannot be both, what? Good and bad, huh? Now, what distinction is Thomas going to see here, right? He's always thinking out some distinction, this guy, huh? I answer it should be said that nothing prevents something to be one as it is in one, what? Genus, huh? And to be multiple according, as is referred, to another genus, huh? Just as the surface, continuous surface, can be one when it's considered in the genus of, what? Quantity, right? But it can be multiple when it's referred to the genus of color if part of it is, what? White and part black, huh? Oh, yeah. Cutting board. Cutting board. And according to this, nothing prevents some act to be one as it is referred to the genus of, what? Nature. Nature, huh? Which nevertheless is not one once referred to the genus of morals, huh? Just as the verse has been said, right? Now, walking, ambulatio, continuous, is one act in the genus of, what? Nature, huh? But it can happen that there are many according to the genus of, what? Yeah. If the will of the one walking is changed, right? Because that is the beginning source of moral acts, right? Could you guys consider that we're out walking today, huh? That you might have one natural act, but morally speaking, you might have had, what, two or three, who knows, you know? You might have changed your mind and your will in the course of that walking, right? Right? If, therefore, one takes one act in so far, now as it's in the genus of morals, right, it is impossible that it be, what, good and bad by the goodness and badness that is moral, right? If, however, it is one by the unity of nature and not by the unity of morals, it can be both, what? Good and bad. Yeah. So the walking, right, huh? So one act, naturally speaking, right, can be both good and bad because it's not one act morally speaking. The distinction that he sees, huh? To the first, therefore, it should be said that that motion, that continuous motion which proceeds from a diverse intention, although it is one by the unity of nature, is nevertheless not one by the, what? Moral. Moral, yeah. It's funny, huh, because the word moris comes from mas, it means what? Custom, you know? But it's taken on a different sense than just custom, right? Wouldn't it sound right to translate this and say, you know, in the genus of the customary? You know, but in a sense, the things you talk about in ethics, a lot of them are by, what? By custom, right? You speak of moral virtue, right? Or let's say moral quality there. Whether it be a virtue or a vice, it's produced by, what? You get it at, right? And therefore, it's a, it's custom, right? It's always been a little puzzled to say that word, you know. I should translate it, huh? But here, I mean, I translate it, you know, morally speaking, you know, but naturally speaking. To second should be said, huh? Acting upon and undergoing pertain to the genus of moral insofar as they have the notion of, what? Being voluntary, right? And therefore, according as they are, what? Voluntary by a diverse will. According to this, they're too morally, right? And from one part, it can be good and the other one bad, right? So my kicking you is, what? Bad in terms of my will, right? But you're taking this as something you deserve from your past sins, right? You deserve to be kicked and so on. And it's a good act, right? You're being kicked. So being kicked can be good and kicking can be bad, yeah? Right? That's what he's saying. That's all I was thinking about in the past. Well, we got redemption on it, so who's blamed? He always answers that at the same time as the Father knows it. But we're responsible because we did what was in our power to do something bad. We did whatever was in us to do something bad. So an interesting thing in the theory book of the physics theory, you know, about acting upon and undergoing. And that's where Thomas gets into the whole discussion of the categories in some way, these different categories. So it's called acting upon insofar as it's from the agent, right? And it's called undergoing insofar as it's in the... Undergoer. Yeah, yeah. From another agent. You can stamp the wax or something like that, right? Is it... Reading at St. Gertrude she's talking about. Yeah. That's what... That often corresponds... I was thinking about these different expressions we have of being made in the image of God or to the image of God. That compares with the wax and the stamp that expresses it when the image to corresponds to the exemplar. When made in might refer more to something... I'm reading Gertrude at Nightgad where she asks our Lord to know to protect the nuns in the congregation, right? He called the angels down, and he lived just around the whole place, you know. It's kind of interesting to keep the demons away, you know, from any figment that's sitting in the office of the nuns. It's kind of beautiful, beautiful kind of imagery. It's kind of nice thing to read just for you, you know, to fall off the sleep reading those things. It's kind of nice. Somebody, I think, one of the priests in the Order of Father Robert was in before, and they, I don't remember the details of the story, I don't know whether it was in Mexico or Central or South America, somewhere there was a convent of nuns, and some soldiers were around and were going to attack and abuse the nuns, and they prayed, prayed to the angels, and the soldiers came, and then they left, and somebody asked them later, why did you leave? They said, well, we saw all those soldiers up on the roof, and they were all loaded with weapons, so we said, no, we're not going to attack. I'm going to get in trouble with those. Third, it should be said that the act of the servant, of the slave, insofar as it, what, goes forth from the will of the servant, is not the act of the, what, lord, right, morally speaking, right? But only insofar as it proceeds from the command of the, what, lord, right? Once it does not make it bad, by the bad will of the servant, right, does that therefore make it something, what, it itself bad, right, is the act. Now we come to question 21. Now we come to question 21. Now we come to question 21. Now we come to question 21. Now we come to question 21. Now we come to question 22. Now we come to question 22. Now we come to question 22. Then we have to consider about those things which follow upon human acts by reason of their goodness or what? This is a reckoning now, I guess, coming up. Reckoning. All right, yeah. And about this, four things are asked. First, whether a human act, insofar as it is either good or bad, has the, what? Character. Character, yeah. It's always a question of how to translate racionum, right? Times are so free in the use of that word, huh? Sometimes I think I'm going to force the word reason in there somewhere, you know? I know, as somebody told us, Father Peter told us years ago, in Italian, ragiogenere or something like that was rooted in racio, is the name for an account. He has to give an account of something. So it's kind of the same notion here. It's the account for this. So whether it should be accounted praiseworthy or... Something like that. Yeah. Okay. It has, first of all, rectitude or what? Sin, right? Then whether it has, what? The notion of something praiseworthy or that one shouldn't be guilty of. Whether it has the notion of merit or demerit, right? Hmm. And whether it has the, what? Aspect of merit or demerit before God, huh? It's funny. There's two articles in this, right? Yeah, because if you do a good act, you're still going to hell. Okay. Now, what is that? Well, saying... No, it could be good acting. I mean, the Masons do all kinds of charity work for little children. I need to make some Christmas gifts. Some of the communists in China. Weissamp was saying that Thomas, you know, was going to teach the beginnings of Dominican beginners there in the Roman province with the sentences of Peter Lombard, right? He realizes it's too difficult a thing, you know, to obscure a thing for them to... And that's when he started to write the... The Sumo Theologiae, you know, for... Oh, really? Yeah. So they could have something, you know. Hmm. To the first, then, one goes forward thus. It seems that a human act, insofar as it is good or bad, does not have the aspect of, what? Rightness or of sin, right? For sins are, what? Monsters. Monsters in nature, right? As is said in the second book of the physics. But monsters are not, what? Acts. Acts, but they are things generated outside the order of nature, huh? But those things which are by art and reason imitate those things which are by, what? Nature. And therefore, acts, an act from the fact that it is, what? Disordered and bad, does not have the, what? Yeah. What does it mean? That it's going to be restricted to monsters in nature? Yeah, I don't know. Is it, is it saying, just like, um, some of the born handicapped, you wouldn't say, that's a sin? Yeah. Yeah. Something monstrous, though. Or sometimes a woman gets versed to it, it's like a stillborn, it's not even developed as a child, it's just missing all kinds of parts. Further, peccatum sin, right, huh? As is said in the second book of physics, happens both in nature and in art, huh? One does not arrive at the end intended by nature or art, huh? But the goodness or badness of a human act most of all consists in the intention of the end, and it's carrying out. Therefore, it seems that the badness of the act does not bring in, it says sin, huh? Because you didn't achieve your end, right? That's what you have to say, right? There's a word after sin there in the book on the places, right? And the definition is not what it should be. Moreover, if the badness of the act induces the notion of sin, it would follow that wherever there is something bad, there would be sin, right, huh? That this is false. For punishment, although it has the aspect of something bad, it nevertheless does not have the definition of what? Sin, right? Therefore, not from this that some act is bad does it have the aspect of being a sinner. But against all this, the goodness of a human act, as has been shown above, chiefly depends upon the, what? Eternal law. And consequently, its badness consists in this, that it doesn't fit together, right? It disgords, it's clashing with the eternal law. But this makes for the, what? Definition of sin. For Augustine says, it's kind of the definition of Augustine, right? In the 22nd book against Faust, huh? That the cartoon is either something said or done or desired against the, what? Eternal law. Therefore, human act from this that it is bad, and that therefore against, what? Eternal law. That's a notion of the son, right? That's like from Augustine, huh? Well, now Thomas is going to see some distinctions here. The answer, it should be said, Thomas says, that malum, which means, what? Bad. Inclus, it's in more. It's said of more, right? And then peccatum, right? So every peccatum is, what? Malum. But not every malum is peccatum, right? Just as good is in more, then, what? Rectum, huh? Which means that the rectum is, what? Good. More. But not everything good is rectum, right? Mm-hmm. Okay? How do you translate rectum? Right, yeah? Again, like in the new, uh, Chen translation change there in the Mass, there, you know? And they start the, uh... Prevents. Yeah. They say... Right and just. Yeah, but we, we apply, you know? Mm-hmm. Yeah, thank God, right? It's right and just, right? Rectum and... Used to list. Okay. For any, what? Privation. Privation or lack of the good in something, right? Constitutes the, what? Notion of bad, right? Right, huh? But peccatum properly consists in an act which is done on account of some end, right, huh? But an end that does not have a, what? Due order. Order to that end, huh? For the suitable order to some end is measured according to some, what? Rule. Rule. Which rule in those things which are by nature, are done by nature, is, what? Nature, which is inclined to such an end. When, therefore, the act proceeds from the natural, what? Power, according to the natural inclination it has to some end, then there is observed rightness, right? In the act, huh? Because the middle does not go out from the extremes because that's the definition of a, you know, straight line, you know, where if you look down the straight line and line up the two end points, right?