Prima Secundae
Lecture 66: Malum, Peccatum, and Culpa: The Hierarchy of Evil and Sin

Transcript
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Nothing stands up for above or below, right? It's straight. This is kind of borrowed from geometry, then, on the straight line. Of course, we speak of that, you know, straight or straight. Because the middle does not go out from the extremes, right? That is to say that the act, from the order of the active, what? Power of source to the end, right? It's lined up with that. Some of you say he's a straight shooter. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. And straight versus body, too. Which speaks wise. Well, that speaks wise, especially in this context, yeah. When, however, from the rightness of such an act someone receives, then he incurs, right? The act is of that sort, right? Incurs the notion of what? Sin. Sin, huh? In those things which are done by the will, the proximate rule is human reason itself. But the supreme rule is the eternal law. When, therefore, the act of man proceeds to the end, according to the order of reason and of the eternal law, then the act is, what? Right. When, however, it is, what? Oblique. It departs from the straightness, right? Then it is said to be a dekatum, right? Skewed. Is manifest, or from the foregoing, that every voluntary act is bad through this, that it recedes from the order of, what? Reason. Reason and of the eternal law. And every good act is in agreement with, what? Reason and eternal law. I was thinking there, I was looking at the treatise on friendship there, and they talk about, in the Latin text, Thomas, concordia, right? And how should you translate concordia? What would be the common meaning of that in English? Concordia. It's a phrase where the harmony will. Yeah. And I looked in the dictionary, it seems that the kind of the most common translation of concordia would be agreement, right? That doesn't seem quite as obvious as concordia does, right? But agreement, right? So you see, every act is good, every good act concordia, huh? It agrees with reason and the, what? Yeah, I think you translate that one. And how should you translate the English? Who's got the English? They translate it by agree, or they translate it by? Which word are... Concordia, concordia, towards the end of this. Towards the end of the body. Yeah, yeah, okay. That's what it seems to be in the translation, you know? Thomas is always talking about the end of the state, there'd be an ordered agreement, huh? You have a disordered agreement, I think it's true. Once it follows that a human act from this, that it is good or bad, it has a notion of what? Rightness or what? Sin, huh? He doesn't use the word wrong, does he, huh? See, they're right or wrong. It would be quite interesting to study the word wrong, but the origin of that word is etymologically, right? To the first paragraph, it should be said that monstera are said to be, what? Peccata. We call it peccata natura, right? You just find that phrase, it kind of strikes you, you know? Because it's a sin of nature, you know? You know, it seems like... We use the word sin, they're a little bit more restricted, right? So, monstera are said to be sins insofar as they are, what? A sin existing in the act of, what? Nature, right, huh? So you've got to take care of that, right? I was reading last night with the students there, we're reading the extrinsic places there, right, huh? In the sixth book there, in definition. And there's some example there, it's the word agnoia, right, huh? And some of you are trying to define agnoia as simply, what, ignorance, right? The lack of knowledge of the subject. But I remember this from the post-analytics here, the word agnoia can mean ignorance or being, what, deceived or mistaken, right? Okay? And so, I don't think that's true in English so much, right? I don't think ignorance means... Does that mean you're mistaken? Or is that one meaning of ignorance? It's more like error, yeah. Well, mistake and error are the same, right? Mistake is the English word and error is the laughing word, right? But we were kind of discussing it a little bit last night, you know, whether you have the same equivocation in English, right? Where ignorance can mean simply, what, not knowing, right? Lack of knowledge. And then can it mean also being, what, mistaken or deceived. To me, the word ignorance in English doesn't seem to bring out the idea of being mistaken, right? If I say you're ignorant of something, I don't mean you're mistaken about it, right? I might, in the context, you know, if you're mistaken about something, I might say, you know, that you're ignorant because that's kind of the source of your mistake, right? But I don't think the word ignorance in English has that sense of being, do you think, or what do you think? I think it would, in terms of, it can be a cause. Yeah, yeah. I mean, ignorance seems to name more just the privation of lack, right? And so I'm trying to, you know, understand the text of our style, right? And the Greek word, you know, has those two senses, you know, it has, and I've seen that in the, in the, in the, it's like you, like you say, in the partial politics, as if there's, there's two kinds of ignorance, right? One where you just don't know something, right? And the other where you're, you think, you know, falsely, right? I think it's related. It's related to the root of agnostic. Yeah. But agnostic in English would be, I don't know. Yeah, I don't know. Or is it good off? Yeah, it's used, it's used differently, I think. I mean, if he asks what it's an agnostic, does he think that God does not exist, or does he mean, say, I don't know what exists or not? Most people are also agnostic who think they don't, they don't want, they don't want God to exist. But, yeah. But that's how it's used, popularly. Yes. Chesterton pointed it out about, people say science is, makes people agnostic. And he said, now there's, there's a humdinger. He says, the word science means knowledge, and agnostic means agnostic. So, since when does knowledge mean agnostic? And he plays on that. When I was growing up, I mean, these stories distinguish, you know, between agnostic and atheist, right? Yeah. It seems, sometimes, practically speaking, a lot of people who say they're agnostic actually are atheists. They're interchangeable. Yeah, it seems that they don't, they don't... It's sort of evolved. Agnostic, maybe, they're not so aggressive about it or something like that. You want to know more pantheist theists or something like that. But if it took in the whole definition from the Greek, they would not only not know it, it would be mistaken, too. Or it could be, it could be one and the other. It could be mistaken to know something, but you won't. I told you one time, and I gave a little bit of a true-false part of the exam one time, you know, and I told the students, now, if you want to agree this on Socratic principles, right, so if you leave it blank, you get one point off. If you answer incorrectly, you get two points off. It was difficult, I figured afterwards, that if a guy had left the ball blank, he'd probably get the highest score, you know. But I say, you know, if you answer wrongly, you get two points off, one for not knowing, and one for thinking you know what you don't know, right? You just leave it blank, well then you get one point off for ignorance, but not for the, you know, the thing that Socratic is trying to corrupt you from, thinking that you know what you don't know, right, huh? In epistemology, the only thing worse than ignorance is error. I'm just asking the last name, where is folly, where is foolishness? I was talking, you know, about the words you find in Shakespeare, they're fond, right, huh? And it means foolish, right? And so it's not used just in context of being fond of a girl or something, right, huh? But the original meaning of saying that I'm fond of this girl means that I'm acting foolish over her, right? And, but you find it with, out of context, we speak, you know, somebody's, you know, proposed something that's stupid, you know, you're fond, you know, I think. And so, where is this, right, you see? Well, because people do foolish things when they have, they're attached to the girl or they do foolish things when they're angry at somebody, right, and they, you know, hit somebody or do something that they wish they hadn't done, right, afterwards. Where is that folly then, right? Is it in the emotions or is the folly in the, what? Yeah, yeah. In other words, Aristotle was saying when you give a lack or something of that sort, you've got to say what it's a lack of and what it is, right, huh? Okay? He's talking about an example he's given instead of blindness, right, huh? Blindness is a lack of sight, but in the eye, right, huh? And so, what is, it's a folly or foolishness, I was saying, right, you know? Is it in the anger or in the concubiscence or is it in the reason and the other is just some way may have cause of it, right, huh? It's not the subject of the folly, right? Right? I think I hit him because I'm angry at him, right, you know? And, uh, shoot him or something, even worse, you know? To the second it should be said, the two-fold is the end, right? To it, the last end and the, what? The proximate end, yeah. The near end. In the, what? The katum, huh? The sin of nature, right? There we are, huh? So I don't know how you translate the katum there. You know, usually that's the word they use for sin, right? No, no, you couldn't translate the mistake, but then it's, you get confused with a mistake in judgment. Yeah. It's more generic, it seems a more generic word. Yeah. So in the katum of nature, right, huh? The act, what? Fails from its last end, which is the perfection of the thing, what? Generated, right, huh? It does not, however, fail from every, what? From just any part of the end. For nature operates by forming something, right, huh? Likewise, in the sin of the will, the katum voluntatis, always there is a defect from the, what? Intended, right? True, yeah. Why? Because no bad voluntary act is able to be ordered to, what? The attitude, right, huh? Which is the, what? Yeah. Although it, what? It does not fail from the sin. Proximate end, right, huh? Which the will intends and achieves, right? Whence also, when the, what? Intention of this end is ordered to the last end, right, huh? In that, in the intention of this, what? In, can be found the notion of, what? Rightness or sin, huh? I was reading Thomas there, and he was talking about divine providence, right? And how he orders everything, right, huh? Then he has a nice little distinction, right, huh? Sometimes something is, what, ordered to another, right, and something else is ordered to it. And if this proximate end is in accord with the last end, right, then it's ordered by God both, what, to something else, and something is ordered to, what, it, okay? And this goes back to what Aristoteles says, that the intermediary ends, right, both something is ordered to them, and they're ordered to something else, right, huh? So, if I've got a, what, a headache, huh? My last end is to get rid of the headache, right? And I say, well, maybe I can get rid of the headache by taking aspirin, right? But I don't have any aspirin. So, now I intend to go to the drugstore, right, huh? Where I can buy the aspirin, right? So, you have a series of ends, right? And something is ordered to this, each of these intermediary ends, but they are in turn ordered to a, what? Yeah, yeah. But now you have something bad. How does God order that, right? He doesn't order other things to it. It's, being bad is not the sort of thing that can be an end, right? And therefore, something else can go to it, right? So, he orders the, what? He orders something else, he says. Sometimes he orders it to the good of the individual, you know. He's going to humble him, you know, by discovering of his defect. Other times, he orders it to his justice, right? Okay? But he doesn't order other things to it. It's kind of a nice distinction that he sees, right, huh? Well, if the practical end is good, it's ordered to the ultimate end, then it's ordered in two ways. It's ordered to something else, and other things are ordered to it. So, logic might be ordered to learning natural philosophy, right? Right. But natural philosophy is ordered to, you know, wisdom, right, huh? And so on, right, huh? And so, something is ordered to it, and it's ordered to something, right? Now, if I've got a mistake or an error, right, or to it, good and the end are almost the same thing, right? So, the bad can't be an end, and therefore, God can't really order things to it. But he can order the bad thing to something else, right? To punishment or to prove it to you. By humbling you, right? We can narrow it down to the third objection. To the third, it should be said that each thing is ordered to an end through its own, what, act, right? And therefore, the notion of sin, which consists in, what, deviating, right? Parting from the order to the end, properly consists in an act. But punishment, huh, regards the person sinning. Does my bad act want to be punished, or does my myth want to be punished? Yeah, it's a nice little thing, huh? Take a little break down here before we go on to the... in my edition here there's a nice little quote here from De Malo you know the disputed questions on evil kind of carries up the words here a bit and Thomas is making the same point he makes in the body of the first article that malum is in plus right instead of more he says I'm going to translate it for you malum communius est malum evil or bad is more common right than peccato right he says in anything whatsoever right whether in a subject or in an act right there is the privation or the lack of form or of order or of a suitable measure right it then has the rationum the ratio of bad right so any lack of what the form or order or measure that you should have right that has a notion of evil right okay but peccato right is said some act act is right so it's an act right that's why it's more particular right karen's lacking the suitable order or form or measure this is those three words not having its suitable or appropriate order or form or measure right whence he says a tibia curva that means that thigh thigh yeah is a mala tibia right a bad thigh right it however cannot be said to be a peccato right okay but ipsa claudicatio but it means you're you're walking can be called a peccato right well it's not a moral peccato okay okay now then he makes this general statement here any disordered act qui libit actus inordinatus potestici can be called a what peccato vel notori either of nature vel artis right vel moris right that's a broad sense of peccato right kind of surprises us right but but now said ration coupe guilt right does not a sin does not have the ration of a coupe except from the fact that it is what voluntary right okay so if you go down from malum bad to what peccato to kupa right you're getting something more what particular right okay so here we kupa is is well it's peccatum right but peccatum is bad but not the verse right so he says the ration of a coupe a peccatum doesn't have except from the fact that it is voluntary for to no one is imputed out cupum to guilt some disordered act except that it's in his what power right okay and thus it is clear that peccatum est in plus that same expression you know quam cupa just as malum is in plus quam peccatum right okay but that's the last thing he says here because this is more like we say licet secundum communum usem loquende although according to the common what custom of speaking right apud theologas apud theologians pro eodem sumanter particularly the same peccatum et cupa that's that's our use of the word too right so it already crept in right but still you know in the text there Thomas says that that's that's the original meaning of the word right peccatum meant any what disordered or unmeasured or what unformed act right whether it be of nature or of art or of morals yeah because when we were reading the book of places last night there you were talking about these hamitema you know which would be a sin right so you had that same use in Greek right and it's a sin now of art right but you're magic right yeah somebody makes it he just blunders and executes work yeah that's a peccata but he doesn't know he with only so many modern artists yeah but we're accustomed to use it there communum usum luquini right that we're speaking right so we're taking the goddamino you already crept in the custom that we have it's well established now it just seems strange to speak of a yeah yeah but now what is the name for a disordered act or a lack an act that is lacking the order or measure or they should have or they should have or they could just say a mistake or blunders yeah you know like Holmes says there you know in the Norfolk builder you know that one story and at the end there he's kind of you know having you know how they talk about the case sometimes at the end and how he'd almost fooled him you know but then he'd gone too far right so he said he lacked the supreme gift of the artist knowing when to stop and that's why they praise you know you know Titian you know you know when to stop Mozart you know they often say this you know they say the great artist knows when to stop and that's really something but since they were talking about what would be a peccacum then right they didn't know when to stop right they know the right man yeah so I think that's kind of a good little quote that they had here in the Marietta edition I don't know if you had in your editions I was thinking this other little quote he has from the sentences is kind of interesting in terms of this you know lighting up right he says the rectum right is said to be that whose middle does not go out from the extremes right that reminds me of geometry right for he says an act is considered as between two dual two things as it were extrema right to it the principium agens the agent acting and the phenom intentum right well it almost looks back to the original meaning of beginning which is you know where a point is to be beginning of a line and another point to be the end of the line and so you kind of and when Euclid you know or they describe now you kind of say what a straight line is right well a straight line is one where you line up the two points nothing you know gets out of the straight line right I think to use this thing here kuyus medium non egzan ab extremis right so that's kind of waiting to see when you kind of line up you know with the imagination I think one of the one of the translations we had you said something like all the points lie evenly yeah yeah it's kind of interesting that you're going back to the first meaning of beginning and end right Aristotle gives you know the meaning of end and sense of purpose right it's the third meaning of end there you know there's the meanings there in the fifth book and the first meaning would be you know the end of the line right the end of the table so it's kind of beautiful to see the way the mind is carried over from one to the other so I make myself clear it's carried over right I'm trying to explain this thing about the if you compare the human reason to say the center of a circle right is it to all statements right like the center of the circle is to all points in the circumference of the circle no no you say the center of the circle is equidistant right from all points in the circumference of the circle right so is that the way our reason is in regard to statements that they're all equidistant from the mind some statements are closer to the mind than others right and so the mind has to use those statements that are closer to it, to know those statements that are, what, further away, right? And the Pythagorean Theorem is Proposition 47 there in Book 1, right? And most of these ones that come before that are just there to get there, right? So there are statements that are, you know, progressively closer to reason as you go back, right? Yeah, yeah. So you could say that in the center of the circle, if that represents reason, it would be to, what, points on the line, on the radiance, right? Where some point is closer or further away from reason, right? Why these crazy people that Dick talks about there, you know, that everything's, you know, equals where you know. I mean, it's kind of, you know, carrying off the, what does the talk will say, you know, that the democratic mind is more interested in equality than freedom? You know, freedom sounds more noble, you know, and it's brought out in the way of revolutions. But they're really more concerned with equality, right? And they'll take equality in place of freedom if that's the way they can get their equality, right? That's why they've got public schools now. Yeah, yeah, yeah. You see, you might say, you know, all things are equally, you know. I mean, they're all equidistant from the market. They're all equal. Those statements are privileged, you know, huh? You know? I mean, that's terrible, you know, some statements should be used to determine the truth about other statements, right? Period. That you should judge, yeah, yeah, yeah. That's like one man, you know, judging other men, right? Or something like that, right? That's not. And you can't have one statement. All statements are equal, right? That's crazy, huh? You can go back to the old axiom, huh, that the through itself is before the through another, right? And you can't even think through another, there's nothing through itself. So there's got to be some statements that are known through themselves, right? And not through other statements. The modern mind, now, you know, the agnostic mind, what I call it, right? Everything's relative, right? The mind says, well, no statements that are known. Nothing's known. One thing we know is, nothing's known really about cholesterol. What this cardiac expert was saying, you know, what we're doing is actually creating the problem for them. That's why it's a number of people dying of heart attack is going up, right? So that what we're doing is not really the problem. The problem is inflammation of the food rather than the cholesterol. So I don't know. Who knows? When you read about bloodletting, you know, and how much blood they took out of George Washington, you know. You realize the medical arts are not altogether. Okay, so article two here. The second one precedes us. It seems that a human act from this, that it is either good or bad, right? Does not have the, what? Ratio. Blame. Blame. Of being praiseworthy or. Blame. Blame. Yeah. Blame. I know it's the quote here in Latin. The katum inum contingent. Itzim in visque aguntura natura. Sin, right? The katum. Happens also in those things which are done by nature. As is said in the second book of physics. But nevertheless, those things which are, what? Naturalia. Are not, what? Praiseworthy or, what? But you should praise a woman for being beautiful. Depends on which word she did. I don't know how much such a spence to use. Then you should blame the. The one who's ugly, you know. They think, you know, that these women who are regarded as, what, witches, right, huh? And put it with their looks, you know. They determine that they must be. Which is there in the early history of our country here. Therefore, a human act from the fact that it is, what? Malus, right? Bad or a sin. Does not have the notion of, what? Or the aspect of guilt, right? Definition of guilt. And consequently, neither from this that it is good does it have the notion of, what? It's kind of arguing from the cut of the nature, right? You can go out there and praise a tree for going straight and the other tree going crooked there, you know. Castigate it. Moreover, just as there happens sin in moral acts, right? The cut in moral acts. So also in the acts of art, right? That's what, you've seen that text from the De Mauro, right? You know, the one where he put those, what? In the one sentence where he had them, he said, quilibit, hein? Inum actus in orinatis. Any disordered act. Potestici peccatum. It can be called a peccatum. Vel nature, vel artis, vel moris, right? Either of nature or of art or of morals. Okay, so this work has some problems here. So also, therefore, in the acts of art, right? This is not comparison to art rather than to nature. Because, as it's said in the second book of the physics, peccatum, the sins, the grammarian, right, hein? Not recti scubens, hein? And the medicus, the doctor, not giving... The right potion. Yeah, so. Some of those potions are kind of expensive, too, you know? They're making me actually worse. But one does not hold the artist guilty because he does not, what? Don't be bad. Yeah. Because to the industry of the artist, it pertains that he's able to, what? Both make a good work and a, what? Bad when he wishes, huh? You know, Mozart's musical joker's call? Kershaw 5, 26, something like that. Not 5, 26, but around there, but. It's supposed to show, you know, how not to write music, right? It's got some, you know, obvious, you know, mistakes anybody recognize, you know? But then there are more subtle things, you know, he's putting out. What's wrong with contemporary composers, right? So is that a sin of Mozart, huh? The musical joke, I guess. He's telling me I don't buy the musical joke. I've heard it, but it's kidding. It's one thing, I don't get my collection, I haven't used to put all of Mozart. I never got out to buy the musical joke, right? It's actually kind of a nice piece, but. It shows you how much I know about music. One time, my brother Brock was playing, he said, what do you think of that twist? Oh, it's really kind of nice. That's the musical joke. So I think it gets a good value, I just had to have to buy the darn thing. I gave somebody a solid wine. What do you think of that one? Very good. My father-in-law used to be Italian. My father-in-law, sometimes he comes home with some bottle and his friends had made, you know, it was like drinking vinegar. I mean, it really, it was, you couldn't really enjoy it. It's a wine. Maybe, you know, I'll go get a salad or something. That's what Father Robert's brother, Brother Basil, Father Basil, somebody, they made some wine out in Brazil, they tried to make some wine. And he tasted it and he said, what do you think? He said, well, if you let us a little bit longer, you'll make it great vinegar. Therefore, it seems also to do a moral act, right? From the fact that it is bad, does not have the notion of something, but I mean, but Richard had a book there. 101 plots used and abused. So they'll think for would-be artists, you know. It's interesting when you see some of these, I think they noticed that Shakespeare, you know, get these additions, it gives you all the background. A lot of times it took, you know, a story or plot from somewhere else in European literature. But he still sometimes, you know, changes the plot, but makes it better, you know. So the guy had, you know. tried to write the story we didn't write it well, you know. Sin. There was a British general that captured this city that sinned in India or something, and he went back to his higher-ups. He said, Hey Kali, I have sinned. You always talk nowadays about how there's kind of a loss of the sense of sin, right? We should revive this project. He used the word sin. Oh, yeah. He deduced the particular sin that we're concerned about. Archbishop of Manila was cardinal sin. Yeah, oh, yeah. When he came to his house, he always said, Welcome to the house of sin. Morbid Dionysius says in the fourth chapter about the divine names that the bad is, what, weak and impotent. But in weakness or impotence either takes away or at least what diminishes the guilt, right? Therefore, human act is not, what, culpable, guilty, I guess, huh? For the fact that it is, what, bad, huh? But against all this is what the philosopher says on himself, Aristotel, and that praiseworthy are the, what? Works of virtue. Good shoot. And the tuperabilia, right? Worthy of the tuperation of blame, right? Or culpable, the contrary works, huh? You've heard Aristotel was supposed to set up a stone in honor of Plato, you know? If he died, you know. The first man to show by both word and deed that the virtuous life is a happy life. It's quite a compliment, right? The man who did it by both, right? Showed by argument and by the life he lived, right? The virtuous life is a happy life. You've got to admire these, you know, pagans, you know, sometimes, you know, what they could do. So, but good acts are, what? Acts of virtue. He quotes what you mean by virtue there. For the virtue is what makes its haver good and his work good, right? So we've been speaking of the virtue of a knife, right? Sharpeness is the virtue of a knife, right? Makes it a good knife because it's sharp, right? And makes its own act which is cutting good, right? Good cut. Good cut of steak. Well, no. Oh, sorry. They had his barbershops that say great cuts, you know, great cuts, you know, and I thought, you know, butcher, but no, talk to me. Okay, what changes? A good cut of salmon. That's lead. Once the opposite acts are what? Bad, right? Therefore, a human act for the fact that it is good or bad has the notion to something praiseworthy or a couple of words, Thomas says. I answer, it should be said, Thomas says, that malum is in plus, right? It's in more than what? Sin. Than pecatum, yeah, sin. And so also, pecatum is in more than what? Kupatum. I saw that in the text for the de malum, right? The number of these examples there, you know, like when Aristotle talks about beginning, cause, element, right? And Thomas explains that in the fifth book of wisdom or even the use of those three words in the beginning of physics, right? He always says, well, principium, or beginning, is more general than cause, and cause is more general than what? Element. Element, right? So every element is a cause, but not vice versa. And every cause is a beginning, but not every beginning is a cause, right? And where Aristotle will say, you know, that next touch continuous, right? You know? Next is more general, is more particular, and continuous is, yeah, yeah. So the, that is said to be next when there's nothing in between of the same kind, right? But there can be a distance, like the next house, right? The next student, right? Okay? The next chair, right? But there's some air or space between them, right? But if two things are touching, right, then it's not only next, but they're now, they're what? Their extremities are together, right? But then the continuous, they're not only together, but they're what? Now one, right? So the number of examples we have these, you know, more universal, much universal, right? I think you can do that with the three words to distinction, division, and what? Definition. Because the definition is in a way a division, but not every division is a definition. And a division is a distinction, but not every distinction is a division. That's why, you know, you talk about the distinction of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit, right? Thomas will always say you can't speak of this as a division, you know, but there's a distinction between the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit. So distinction is more, what, general, so distinction, division. And here you give another example, right? You have, in Latin, there are malum, decatum, culpa, right? Yeah. So you have that, you sistocuende, probably, I mean, basically, he's kind of, you know, laying it out, yeah? So there's a lot of nice examples of this sort of thing. Now from this, some act is said to be, what, culpable or laudable that it is, what, imputed to the agent, like he's responsible for it, right? For nothing, there is nothing other than, what, to praise or to, um, lay, yeah, than to impute to someone the very badness or goodness of his act, right? Okay? But then an act is imputed to the agent when it is in his, what, power, right, huh? So that he has dominion over his act, right? But this is the case in all voluntary acts, right? That I'm the lord of my act, right? Because through the will man has dominion over his act, right? Okay? Whence it remains that the, what, good or the bad in only the acts that are voluntary, right, constitutes the notion of praise or what? Guilt, right? In which the same thing is malum, pecatum, et koppa, right? Okay? Yeah, so sea is, is an element of cat, the word cat, and it's the cause of the word cat, and it's the beginning of the word cat. So likewise, huh? A voluntary act can be what? Yeah, sin, and koppa, pecatum, and malum, right? You get those three words down now, malum, pecatum, et koppa. How do they translate those anyway in the English text? Because he must have run into the brawl. How do you translate pecatum, right? yeah. It says action, evil, and sin. Evil, sin, and guilt. Evil, sin, and guilt. Yeah, so he used the word sin, yeah, yeah. So that's, I think I'd be aware of that, huh? The first, therefore, it should be said that natural acts are not in the power of a natural agent, since nature is determined to one. Like Shakespeare says, nature not being able to be more than one. You see, understood that, And, and therefore, although in natural acts there is a pecatum, right? There's nevertheless that they're what? You see, kupa, in a sense. Kupa, kupa, maximum kupa. What do they call that, my fault in the translation? My fault. My grievous fault. Yeah. What do they do with that? That's the word fault. Now, to the second it should be said, this is the one now person to what? Pekata in art, right? To the second it should be said that reason has itself otherwise in artificial matters and in what? Moral. For in artificial things, reason is ordered to a what? Particular end, which is something thought out by what? Reason. In morals, however, it is ordered to the common end of the whole of what? Human life. Now, the particular end is ordered to the what? Common end, right? Since, therefore, sin is by deviation from the order to the end, in the act of art, there can be a what? Two-fold sin, right? In one way, by deviation from the what? Print intended by the artist, right? And this peccatum is proper to the art, right? As if the artist, intending to make a good what? Work, makes a bad one, right? Or, intending to make something bad, he makes something what? Good. Good, right? In another way, you know, what's the famous distinction there about the man who what? Who's better, the man who knowingly does something bad or unknowingly? Well, it's the point of view of art, right? The man who knowingly makes something bad, like the musical joke of Mozart, you would say he more possesses the art, right? When I taught logic, I knowingly would make a what? Yeah, yeah, the students would think it's good, right? You know? Right? But, you know, I know how to make an art that looks good, right? That isn't good, right? You know? And, you know, I told you, I tell the students, there's a whole more in the part, and so on. I say, well, man is an animal, but is he just an animal? He's an animal that has reason. So, man's animal nature is only a part of what man is, and they all agree to that, right? And they say, but animal includes besides man, dog, cat, horse, elephant, and so on. So, sometimes the part includes more than the whole. Yeah, yeah. It's a, you know. But they can't distinguish the two different senses of whole, and two different senses of the part, and I'm, what? Mixing up here, right? So, I know how to make, yeah. And you're good at making bad arguments. Yeah. So, but if I, so if I knowingly make a bad argument, my command of logic is good, right? Why, if I unknowingly, right, make a bad argument, then my nuts are good addition, right? You see? But now, morally speaking, it might be a different case, right? If I knowingly deceive my students, right, then I'm a bad guy. But if I unknowingly, I think I was, one of those dialogue, I played over there, early dialogue, where Socrates gets kind of mixed up there, because it seems that what you do annoyingly is better, what you do annoyingly, you know, and you realize there's something wrong with this argument. So, so in the act of art, then, it can happen in two ways for there to be a peccatum or sin, right? In one way, by deviation from the particular end intended by the artist. And this sin will be proper to what? Art. As if the artist intending to make a good work makes a bad one, or intending to make something bad makes something what? Good. Good, right? In another way, by deviation from the common end of human life. And in this way, he is said to what? Sin. Sin. If he intends to make a what? Bad work. And does so to whom, another one is what? Deceived, huh? But this sin is not proper to the artist insofar as he's an artist, but insofar as he's a man, huh? Whence from the first sin, he is what? Guilty, right? Insofar as he's an artist. But from the second, the man is what? Guilty. Insofar as he's a man, right? But in morals, where there is to be noted the order of reason to the common end of human life, always sin and the bad is to be noted by deviation from the order of reason to the common end of what? Human life. And therefore, one is held guilty from such a sin, man is held guilty, insofar, right? So he's a man, right? Insofar as it's what? Moral. Whence the philosopher said, this is the common thing, right? The famous thing. That in art, the one willingly sinning is more what? Yeah. So Mozart willingly writes this. Yeah. You know, you can see that Mozart knows how to write music from the fact that he does not write bad music, right? You see? But in the case of prudence, this is what? Yeah. Just in the moral riches, right? So the one willingly sitting is their words, right? A skit. This was some clowns, literally clowns on a toilet show when I was a kid, and they did this skit that they were, he was going to fix this table, the table, the legs weren't even, so you're going to cut this, and the whole idea was, you know, they keep cutting, and it's going to be no legs left. One time he cut it, it was even. And he said, no, that can't be right, so he did it. He was saying, the art wasn't, he didn't intend that. Yeah. It was a good thing. Yeah. So I'm more of a grill master if I know that I cooked the steak too much, right? I think it even is somebody that I cooked this. We're going to steak for heaven. Yeah, but a piece of charcoal. I see, my professor, I'm a graduate there, he liked his steak, you know, well done, right? So he's up in Quebec, I guess it was, and he sent the steak out to the door, you know, he says, quick enough, and so. He sent it back about two or three times, and he's like, I just, I'll put it on the way. He said, I'll put it to you. So, you know, he's not going to force his face, chef, to cook the steak, the way it should be cooked. You know, you want to moon the steak, I'll moon it for you. Kind of funny though, that's what Aristotle's talking about here, You can't criticize him as a cook, you might criticize him as a man. That's what he's doing. The third should be said, that that infirmity, which is in what? Bad, voluntary things, that's subject to what? Human power, right? And therefore, neither does it take away, nor does it diminish, the right. Now, the next two articles are going to do with merit and de-merit. Is it time for another one or not? I don't know.