Prima Secundae
Lecture 73: Moral Character of Passions and the Order of Concupiscible Appetites

Transcript
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Okay, so we're up to Article 4 now. To the fourth one goes forward thus. It seems that no passion of the soul, according to its species, is good or bad morally, right? For good and bad moral, good or bad, is to be noted according to reason. But the passions are in the sense desiring power. And thus that which is according to reason happens to them, right? But nothing that is parachidens pertains to the, what, species of the thing. Therefore, it seems that no passion, according to its own species, is good or what? Bad, huh? Moreover, acts and passions have their species from their object. If, therefore, some passion, according to its species, was good or bad, it would be necessary that passions, whose object is a good, would be good according to their species, as love, desire, and joy. And passion, whose object is bad, would be bad according to its own species, as hate, fear, and sadness. But this is clearly, what, false, huh? Therefore, some passion is not good or bad from its, what, species, huh? Moreover, no species of passion is there which is not found in the other animals. But the moral good is not found except in man. Therefore, no passion of the soul is good or bad from its, what, species. Those are good objections, huh? But again, this is what Augustine says in the ninth book of the Siddhiya, that, what? Pity, I guess you'd say, huh? Misericordia pertains to virtue, right? And Aristotle says in the second book of the Ethics, that veracundia, shame is a passio laudabilis. Of course, you have no sense of shame, right? You have no sense of shame, you have that expression, right? And therefore, some passions are good or bad according to their own, what, species, huh? Well, Thomas says, huh? Answer, it should be said that as has been said about acts, so it seems it should be said about passions. And that the species of act or of passion can be considered in two ways, huh? In one way, according as they're in the genus of, what, nature. And in this way, good or bad, moral good or bad, does not pertain to the species of the act or passion. In another way, according as they pertain to the genus of morals, as they partake of something of the voluntary, and of the judgment of, what, reason. And in this way, good and bad, that are moral, good or bad, can pertain to the species of the passion. According as is taken as the object of the passion, something which of itself is, what, suitable to reason, or is dissonant from reason, right? In harmony or is in class with reason. Just as shame, or kundi, I guess, is shame, which is the fear of the base or the ugly, and invidia, which is sadness about the good of another, right? For thus they pertain to the species of the exterior act, huh? I just happened to be reading a little bit in the biography of Washington, you know, how there was this kind of underlying envy of him in his position there, right? This is kind of an underlying factor, so, yeah. What did they say at the end of, you know, over the death of Brutus, right, there, you know? All the others do what they did out of envy of great Caesar, you know? He didn't do it out of envy, though, he did out of certain for the common good, fear that he's going to become tyrant or something, you know? But most of the men, they're envy, huh? I've ever seen years ago some book by some sociologist about envy in democratic times. Apparently this is a vice that the democratic people are even more, you know? Capital. Capital of envy is Washington, D.C. Yeah, isn't it at the same time you said the thing about envy is only between equals? Well, I don't know. It's principle. I mean, it's kind of principle. It's like the first years, you know, people are... So it's often, like, a peasant doesn't envy the king. Give that example. They had a separate case. Yeah. He wouldn't see the king's goodness somehow reflecting on his own. Yeah, and that's what, I don't know, probably maybe it's his commentary or something about when Christ was in the synagogue, right, and they drove him out and went from off the cliff. And he refers to Aristotle talking about this kind of envy or something. I think it arises from, I'm trying to think of how he puts it, but that they figure that he's no better than we are, so how can he do these things? He's like us. So they can, right, mistake in the reason, they think he's their equal. So he has no right to tell us what to do or whatever. So that was kind of motivated, then, that kind of, their defect of reason. It's like, you know, a woman is more active, maybe envy another woman than envy a man. Okay, yeah. And a man is more to envy another man than envy a woman, right? If other possible, but it's not envy. That was, well, it was Father John Moore, who was here, and he said he had been a diocesan priest, and so he had to sit in all kinds of councils and committees. My nickname for her is Sister Mary Anthrax was there, talking about justice and rights and all that stuff. And he's just, you know, she's going on and on like she always does about this, because she's one of these feminists. And so finally he just chimed in at the end of her rant about something, and he said, Sister, I know just how you feel. I always wanted to be a nun. So the first objection, it should be said, that that ratio proceeds about passions according as they pertain to the species of nature, right, huh? As the sense desire is considered in itself, huh? But according as the sense desiring power obeys reason, already good and bad reason is not in the passions paratians, but what, per se, right? They partake of it, per se. The second should be said, that passions which tend towards something good, if it be a true good, are good, right? And similarly, those that recede from a true, what, bad, huh? A converso, those passions which are by, what, from the good and to access to the bad are, what, bad, huh? But what's this vice there, they're, um, it kind of didn't be translated good, you know, one of the, I guess, uh, capital sins, so to speak. But they, they, they took it as laziness, right? Yeah. But that was not really what the, what it was exactly. Acidia, it was the Latin word, right, huh? Mm-hmm. But this meant kind of the sadness that, uh, you want to exert yourself to get up and go to church or go to the sacraments or to pray or something like that, right, huh? Or do some spiritual reading, you know, ah. The body is, is what, by its, uh, passions, right? Finding this, um, yeah, yeah, yeah. That was, you know, classified as, like, you know, you know, capital sin, right? I mean, this is a very serious thing, right? Laziness is just, I don't want to go up and walk with grass. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, laziness is not, maybe, maybe this is a good word to use in English, I don't know. But there is, you know, a passion that was. I'm full, you know. Somebody's always pointed out that you could still be very active. Workaholic can be a symptom. Actually, you're trying to distract yourself from the spiritual things until you throw yourself into work. That can be a symptom. Or travel, or entertainment, or... Anything that would be a demand for the spiritual. Third, it should be said that in brood animals, the sensing, sense-desiring power does not obey reason, right? And nevertheless, insofar as they are led by a certain, what? Natural estimative power, right? Which is subject to a superior reason, to wit, the divine, right? There is in them a certain likeness of, what? Moral good, right? As regards the passions of the soul, right? So the dog will protect you from the bad man, or even the bad animal, right? My mom had that experience once. What? Charlie Brown. Charlie Brown. The dog is entertaining there. It was an awful experience for her. It was early, early morning. It was so dark. It was in the wintertime. She used to be able to walk the dog in the early morning. She'd leave the house. The neighborhood's all dark. She's got the dog on this huge, long leash and it's way, way in the bushes. And some guy comes just cruising up the street really slow and she just, she sensed fear right away. And she said, I was just terrified. If he had just taken me by the hand and led me away, I couldn't stop. She was that scared. She knew something was really wicked. And the guy opens the door of his car on the passenger side. And he looks out and he sees her and he looks at the dog and he says, oh, he's a bloodhound. He says, they're real quiet, aren't they? That's what he said. And Charlie never raised an eyebrow at anybody. And when he said that, Charlie did one leap. And the guy slammed the door. Charlie hit the car and he took off. So Charlie sensed the fear too of protecting him. Yeah, yeah. That's interesting. But as you said, he just took one flying leap. And he never raised an eyebrow at anybody. The cats have wake up there. Oh, there's two in the house that's on fire. There's a fire in the house. Kind of unusual things. Oh, so that's, I didn't even smoke a lot more fun. That's right. You want to see. And you're going to say, oh, quiet, quiet. Go to bed. I'm not going to let you in. You're too fat already. Did you read the story of George Washington when you had to hit the troops? They were just getting really frustrated with everything because Congress was never given them anything. Yeah. And so there was almost a risk of a rebellion or whatever. And so anyway, he's trying to, he's trying to have them up and he pulls out this thing. He's trying to read this thing. It was Congress again, trying to promise them or something. He's throwing the glasses out. Yeah. Yeah. And it was like everything. It was just a terrible situation. I'm like, don't even talk to us. And anyway, he says, oh, you have to excuse me. He pulls out his glasses. He says, do you keep telling his story? I can't get exact words, but you know, his eyesight had gone in the service of his country. Yeah. I have to be sorry to read this. Oh, so you have to pardon me. Not only have I spent all the, yeah, like I've spent all my years in service of my country, but even I've lost my eyesight in service of my country. Anyway, it just broke the movie. It just, it just got this sympathy for the whole. It was just really beautiful. It should have been that. Well, nowadays, of course, the soldier don't have to worry about what Congress has to say, but I, because if the president says, go shoot him, go shoot him. What's the name of the author of the biography? Ron Chernow. Chernow. Chernow. I think it's C-H-E-R-N-O-W, something like that. Ron Chernow. Yeah, Ron Chernow. He's written a biography of Morgan, I guess, and a biography of Alexander Hamilton, and he's working on one, I guess he's working on one now, and this is Grant. Oh, so it should be interesting. yeah. He's got an old dog. He's talking about the denominations of money. You would know that. No, I'm missing a week. It's kind of, yeah, it's kind of like Morgan first, it's very much in the monetary thing, and then Hamilton is so that way too, you know, but there's other interests, and then Washington. So. I remember Tabitha there, our captain, had the kittens there, of course, and we was watching there, you know, tears running down our face, she was watching, to have to give birth to these kittens, you know. But anyway, when the kittens are old enough to drink milk out of a bowl, rather than from their mother, you wouldn't give, you know, six or seven bowls, you'd get one big bowl, right? So you put it down, and then all the little kittens are over, and they stand, you know, and things like that. And Tabitha didn't stand back like that, and like that. And it was after the last cat, the last kitten rather, left the thing, then Tabitha over, and tried some milk or so. She stayed back like that, I really just respected her, you know, her paternal instinct, I mean, she went to her, and had her fill of milk, you know, and then she went over, and had some milk or so. That's what struck me, but that was, that was a, more of a, Rosie always talks about, you know, her Tabitha going there, and taking her soft paw, and rubbing around the cheek, you know. Really? Yeah, yeah, yeah. You got the paw, you know. That kind of touched her, you know. Well, sometimes, I've seen that with dogs, and with cats, it's cats, one of the dogs, if they're very, very content, now our two cats, won't do this, because they're, why? Because they're females, maybe, I don't know, but I remember Andy used to do once in a while, and he's just sitting in your lap, and you put your hand down, or something, and he'll put his, paw on your hand. Yeah, yeah. Like that. He's content, and he just wants you to know it. Yeah, yeah. He's saying, let me tell you something, son. This is going to hurt me, more than it hurts you. Yeah, yeah, yeah. You know, there's a similitude of morality, I suppose, right, yeah? You know, like when the horses, you know, since horses, you know, were kind of brave in battle, right, not the horses, maybe I suppose, with panic or something, yeah? Do you have time to do one more article, or not? Yes. So we're up to question 25 now. Order of passion. to each other, right? Then we're not to consider about the order of the passions to each other, right? And about this thing, four things are asked. First, about the order of the passions of the irascible to the passions of the concubiscible, right? So are they before or after or both? Then about the order of the passions of the concubiscible to each other. And then about the order of the passions of the irascible to each other. And then about the four chief passions, huh? That fourth one is important for my attempt to define comedy, right? Because I started off with the idea that comedy was the contrary of what tragedy, right? So tragedy moved us to pity and what? Fear, right? Then comedy should move us to the opposites of pity and fear. Some kind of what? Joy as opposed to the sadness of pity. And then what? Boldness or audacity. The opposite of fear, right? Well, then when I read this, right? I said, well, maybe these being the two principal forms of fiction, tragedy and comedy, right? Maybe they're concerned with the, what? Chief or principal passions, right? And, of course, those are sadness and fear and joy and hope. So maybe it's more a hope comedy than, what? Boldness, right? And I was reading, you know, mainly for the English comic news, you know, I'm getting support for this, but I looked at a book by, the book comedy is a Terrence, right? And the guy was saying, you know, he's kind of, you know, paraphrasing St. Paul, you know, faith, hope, and charity, the greatest of these is charity, right? But in comedy, the greatest of these is hope. You know, and it's obviously a theological, you know, college. But, I mean, it struck me, right? He's a guy who, you know, is kind of a scholar, you know, and he translated the Terrence and studied his comedies and so on. And it seemed to be, you know, hope, you know? So you get all kinds of witnesses like this, right? The hope is the one. But I was led to it by this discussion of principal passions, right? You know? I mean, we do, you know, jokes sometimes when we're bold or something like that, you know, like, you know, David there with a little sling shot he might make fun of, you know? But hope is more the effect of comedy, you know? Hope and mirth, you know? And joy, you know? Okay, to the first one ought to be said thus. It seems that the passions of the irascible are prior, before. You can kill us with passions, right? Strangely, you must think that, right? Yeah. For the order of passions is according to the order of the objects. But the object of the irascible is the arduous good, right? Which seems to be supreme among other goods, huh? Therefore, the passions of the irascible seem to, what? Come before the passions that we can kill us for, huh? Well, that's a good attempt. Moreover, the mover is before the mood. I'll agree to that. But the irascible is compared to the concubiscible as the mover to the mood. For to this is given to animals. Yeah. That they might take away the impediments by which the concubiscible is prevented from enjoying its, what? Object. But the removins, prohibins, huh? Has the motion of a mover, as is said in the Eighth Book of Physics. That's one of the accidental causes, right? So when you press the pillars out and the roof fell in there, that was removing the prohibits, right? Yeah. Special kind of accidental cause. Yeah. Moreover, joy and sadness are passions that concubiscible. But joy and sadness follow upon passions and the irascible. For the philosophy says in the Fourth Book of Physics, that punishment, huh? It quiets the impetus of, what? Anger. Didn't look like a part of it, though, right? Yeah. Didn't quiet the impetus. Maybe you were making, what? Pleasure in place of sadness, right? Therefore, the passions of the concubiscible are after the passions of the irascible, right? Well, maybe they're both before and after, but we'll see what he says. But again, it says, the passions of the concubiscible regard the good absolutely. The passions of the irascible regard the good, what? Qualified or contracted, or particular, the arduous, right? Since, therefore, the good simply is before the good contracting, it seems that the passions of the concubiscible are before the passions of the irascible. I actually should be said that the passions of the concubiscible are to more things, right, than the passions of the, what? Irascible. For in the passions of the concubiscible is found something pertaining to motion, to wit, what? Desire. And something pertaining to rest, to wit, joy and sadness, huh? But in the passions of the irascible, there is not found anything pertaining to, what? Rest, huh? But only pertaining to motion. It's an interesting observation by Thomason. The reason for this is because in that which is now at rest, right, it does not have the notion of something difficult or arduous, which is the object of irascible. At least it would be the good thing at rest, right? Now, rest, since it is the end of motion, is before in being intended, right, but after in being carried out. If, therefore, we compare the passions of the irascible to the passions of the concubiscible, which signify rest in the good, manifestly the passions of the irascible precede an order of execution, passions of this sort, of the concubiscible, just as hope precedes, what? Joy. Joy. Whence it also, what? Causes it, according to that of the apostle, spay gaudentes, right, huh? Though maybe St. Paul is talking about the spay that is an act of the will, not right? But the passionate and concubiscible, implying rest in the bad, to wit, sadness, right, is a middle between two passions of the, what? For it follows, what? Fear, right, huh? For when there occurs something bad that is feared, it causes, what? Sad. Sadness, huh? But it goes before the motion of, what? Anger, right? Because from the preceding sadness, someone rises up in revenge, right? In victim, huh? And this pertains to the motion of, what? Anger. And because to, what? Payback, is it? Mm-hmm. Like, yeah. Is apprehended as good, when the erratus has, what? Achieved this. He rejoices, right? And thus it is manifest that every passion of the irascible ends in a passion of the, what? Concubiscible pertaining to rest, to wit, either joy or, what? Sadness, huh? But if one compares the passions of the irascible to the passions of the concubiscible that imply motion, thus manifested the passions of the concubiscible are, what? Private. In that the passions of the irascible add something over the passions of the concubiscible. Just as the object of the irascible adds something over the concubiscible. the object of the concubiscible, namely, some are arduous or difficult in getting the good or avoiding the bad, right? For hope adds above desire a certain konata, a certain attempt, right? And a certain elevation of the soul, right? To what? Achieving a difficult good, right? And likewise, fear adds over flight or abomination, a certain depression of the soul on account of the difficulty of avoiding the bad, right? Thus, therefore, the passions of the irascible are a middle between the passions of the concubiscible, which imply motion towards the good or towards the bad, right? Away from the bad. And among the passions of the concubiscible, which imply rest in the good or in the bad. Thus, it is clear that the passions of the irascible have a beginning from the passions of the concubiscible and that they end up in the passions. So Thomas seems to be saying they're both before and after, right? He looks before and after this guy, Thomas, huh? He uses his reason, in other words. Now he says, that first argument, huh, that the irascible is dealing with something supreme among good things, right? That first argument precedes as if the object, as if the notion of the object of the concubiscible was something opposed to the arduous, right? As is of the ratio of the object of the irascible that would be difficult. But because the object of the concubiscible is the good absolutely, it is naturally before the object of the irascible as the common is before the, what, private, particular. Now what about this, a moven's prohibence? Well, that's not a moven's per se, but a moven's, what, precedence, huh? But now we are speaking in the order of the passions per se. And moreover, the irascible removes the, what, perfect rest for the concubiscible and subject. Whence for this it does not follow, except that the passions of the irascible precede the passions of the concubiscible pertaining to rest, right? You can see, if you didn't want something good, right, you wouldn't make the effort when you realize it's a difficult good, right? Okay? So I want to be elected, you know, and I get out there and I realize it's a little difficult. Well, I got to have hope of getting elected, right? I got to make the effort now, you know, and run around to caucuses and so on. And that arises because I want him to be elected in the first place, right? It just happened to be some difficulty in the way of my getting elected. You can see these guys need the, what, they get angry too sometimes, right? And you have fear of losing elections in Germany. The third argument is answered by seeing what way the before and after, right? Okay, so we can bring this session to an alternate. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Deo Gracias. God, our Enlightenment, Guardian Angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, or to illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more great. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Pray for us. And help us to understand what you have written. Father, Son, and of the Holy Spirit. Amen. Amen. So, who's smarter, Aristotle or Thomas? Who's more enlightened? One thing you can say, I think, is that Thomas is the one man who really could understand Aristotle, and therefore proportion him to us. I picked up the Albert the Great's commentary on the physics of Aristotle, right? In the very beginning, he was talking about what the subject of natural philosophy is. And he's saying it's a corpus, corpus mobilee, right? Okay. Well, of course, Thomas, in the very beginning of the commentary on the physics, right? He says the subject is ens mobilee, right? It's not corpus mobilee. And he says, because no science proves its own subject, right? So, later on, like in book six, Aristotle shows that ens mobilee is going to be a corpus, right? So, that's like a property there, but rather than a subject, right? So, you can see, you know, he doesn't mention that it's Albert, you know, and who else besides Albert, you know? But it's, you know, little mistakes like that, don't you, right? And, of course, he's correcting Averroes, right? Because Aristotle explains the order of determination, the order of consideration in actual philosophy there. And Averroes is taking it to refer to the order of demonstration, right? Well, it's the second book, as Aristotle talks about it, right? And it doesn't make sense in the text, or the way Averroes explains it. It doesn't put it under one intention, you know, and so on. So, he's correcting both Albert unnamed, and Averroes named there, right, you know? To realize that Thomas is the only guy who can really, what? Yeah, when I read the Greek commentators, you know, they kind of paraphrase Aristotle, but they have a difficulty in paraphrasing him, let alone, you know, unfolding the meaning of the text, huh? Yeah, that's the beautiful way Thomas proceeds, you know? So, you know, I need to open question who's got a greater mind, Aristotle than Thomas. But suddenly Thomas had the mind that could what? It was capable of understanding Aristotle and applying it to our minds, right? In that sense, you'd learn more from Thomas, you know, knowing Latin than just knowing Greek, if you had to learn just one language, right? Because if you had written, just know Greek, you'd have to read Aristotle in Greek, and you couldn't read Thomas, you wouldn't understand Aristotle that well, you know? And last night, we were doing the books, the seventh book there on places, right? Seventh book of the book of places there. And, you know, Aristotle was saying, you know, for the most part, you know, property is always a simple okay, right? So it's a combination of things, right? So it's not one word, huh? I remember guys attacking the porphy, you know, like he was mixing up the four problems in the book of places with the five predicables, right? But the five predicables are all names, right? Right, right? Property, for the most part, Aristotle's saying is really speech, it's not a name. And therefore, it's the only definition, it's always speech, yeah. It's never just a name, huh? And, but we don't have, oh, I got to celebrate this commentary on the book of places, huh? I was thinking last night about this beautiful thing there, that we talked about before, about truth does not require that the way we know be the way things are. Well, God knows composed things, things put together, in a simple way, right? Because he knows all things by knowing himself, and he's completely simple, right? While we're the reverse, we know simple things in a composed way, right? But neither God is false, nor are we false in knowing things in the way we know things not being the way things are. That's what you say about things, it has to be with them, right? Okay, so I was thinking about that, and, you know, what's the most fundamental things you can say about God, huh? You know? Half of you know that he exists, right, huh? Well, you have these two ways of speaking of God. You can say God is the pure act, huh? And Thomas often calls them to the first act, okay? And of course, these are composed, right? Act and what? Pure. Pure and act and first, right? But pure is a being of reason, it's a negation. Because pure there means what? It doesn't have any ability to be moved, or to be formed, or to be been acted in any way. There's no passive ability there, right? So you're getting this composed knowledge of God's simplicity, right? With his actuality. And then the other one, first act, right? Well, that's a relation, right? And he's, first, he's before all the rest, right? All the creatures. But the relation of God to creatures is only a relation of reason, huh? It's a real relation on our side, but this side's not. So you have the two kinds of, what, beings of reason, negation and the relation that can be, some of these are just beings of reason. And so you're knowing these two ways, right, huh? And I got thinking about these two ways of speaking about God. Because I remember years ago when I was studying the treatise on the substance of God during the Summa Theologiae, right? I was always struck by the fact that you can use pure act as kind of a middle term to show almost all, you know, right away, of the attributes, right? So God is unchanging, right? Because change involves potency, so pure act can change. It explains what, why he's all together as simple, because simple means not composed, our way of thinking. And as Thomas says, in everything composed, either one part is to the other as act to ability, or at least all the parts are to the whole as ability to act. So you can't have composition without some potency, some ability to be actualized. And so God is, what, all together as simple. And then once you know from the ninth book of wisdom that act is perfection, a thing, right? Well, then you can see that God is going to be all together perfect. And he's going to be infinite. As I say, there's actual, it's not going to be limited by any potency, right? But then I said, now, you know, it's got to look before and after, right? Is there an order in our knowing between these two, pure act and first act? Pure act first? Well, that's a warrant on the phone today, see? But I said, how do we arrive at God being pure act? What's in the third part of the ninth book of wisdom? Where Aristotle shows that act is simply before ability, right? He says, you know, in some way, ability is for act, and the thing that goes from ability to act is an ability before it's an act, right? But it goes from ability to act because it's something already an act. So, speaking simply, act is before what? Ability. And therefore, the first act, is that, you know, it's got some ability? Well, then, no, there'd be something before it. It wouldn't be the first act. So, if it's the first act, it must be, what, a pure act. So, I would say that you could syllogize and say, God is the first act. The first act is a pure act. Therefore, God is a pure act, right? So, beautiful, huh? Beautiful things to give. It's kind of funny. One of the students, I'm teaching him logic now, right? He says, what's your favorite part of philosophy? He said, you know, is it logic or something? You know, so I would say, when I was in college, the course I enjoyed the most was the course that was called Natural Theology, right? And what Kasurik did was to do the articles of the Summa before the Trinity, right? The ones where you can, by natural reason, see things so you could kind of justify and call it natural theology, right? And make it a philosophy course rather than a theology course. But that was the most interesting course, you know, once you get a little taste of God, you know, what I saw, how tasty he is, you know? Taste and see how sweet is the Lord, huh? He knows himself outside of this. So you're not logic, you know? That's almost as stupid to say, you know, my favorite science is grammar. I mean, grammar is a... Get us some grammar, you know? You know, you got to know what the noun of verb is and so on and that. But, I mean, somebody's favorite, you know, subject is grammar, you know? There's something wrong with the guy, you know? But you see this thing about logic, right? That's one thing I make an article I have about logic, you know? You know, that the thing is... Logic is a tool, right? You know? Thomas says that logic is put with looking philosophy as its tool but not as a chief part of it, right? So. Now this is extremely interesting here. Look how Thomas is looking before and after, right? Because the first article was what? Whether the passion is irascible or before those in Achillespa or the reverse, right? And Thomas had a, what, nuanced answer, right? Because simply you could say some passions that didn't give us will always come first, right? But some passions of the irascible can come before you achieve the good or... When I was asking whether love is the first of the passions of the concubiscible and he's going to be asking whether hope is first among the passions of the irascible. So he's still, you know, looking before and after, right? And that's why pure act, right, as a result of looking before and after with the help of the third part of the Ninth Book of Wisdom. The first part of the Ninth Book of Wisdom is mainly about ability, right? The second part is mainly about act. It's more universal than the first part. And the third part is a comparison of the two, especially in terms of their order, right? In terms of knowledge and defining and causality and so on. Now, to the second one goes forward thus, It seems that love is not the first of the passions of the concubiscible. For the concubiscible power is named from what? Concupisence, huh? Which is the same passion with what? Desire, right? Another name, huh? Notice how Thomas calls this part of the soul the appetitive power, right? Or they use the word appetit, the word appetite, right? Which is a desire, right? You know? I know when they say that, the rest of them say, bon appetit, that annoys me. But as if, you know, it really means have good desire, you know, huh? You should say, you know, may you enjoy your meal, you know? You should do that. Yeah, so the Lebanese use an expression that, sort of a wish, expressing it, may this meal be for twice the health that you have. Something like that. It's a plural for health. That's what they're wishing for the meal. Not just a good appetite. I want more than an appetite for a meal. I want the food. So, so, so, appetitus, the power in general is named from desire, right? Okay. But now the concubisable is named from concubisence, which is the sense desire, right? Okay. But then he gives this code from Aristotle that denominatio, right, the naming comes from the more, what? Potent, right? Okay. As it's said in the second book about the soul, right? So I call episteme, what? Reasoned out knowledge. But reasoning out is not the only kind of thinking out, but it's the ultimate one, right, huh? So he named the whole thing from the last thing, okay? And therefore concubisence must be more potent than, what? Love. And if love is, how do you name it from love? Moreover, love implies a certain union, right, huh? This unitiva, as our friend Dionysius says, huh? It's the name of this power that unites, concretiva, right? As Dionysius says in the fourth chapter of Divine Names, he's talking about that. But concubisence, or desire, is emotion towards union with the thing desired, right? Therefore, it's before love, right? Just as you pursue union before you have union, right? Moreover, the cause is before the effect, huh? But pleasure is sometimes the cause of love, right? So why eating that food? Because you enjoy that food, right? For some, desire or love on account of pleasure, right, huh? As is said in the Eighth Book of the Ethics, huh? It's one of the kinds of, that's the first book on friendship there, right? That's one kind of friendship, right? Therefore, pleasure is before love, just as the cause is before the effect, huh? There's more truth in this third objection than the first two. We'll see that in the time. Therefore, not first, among the passions of people's power is love, right? To follow the Latin word order there. But now against all this is what a very famous man there, Augustine of Hippo, said in a very famous book, the 14th book of the City of God, that all passions are caused from love. For love, right? Seeking, I suppose, on the hands. Seeking to have what is loved is cupiditas, right? It's desire, right? But having it, enjoying it, it is what? Joy, right, huh? Okay. So it's like saying that, what? Desire is love pursuing what is loved, right? Because you don't have it. And joy is... Love having. Yeah, is love having what it loves, huh? Love, therefore, is the first of the passions of the, what? In Kibiswa, right? Well, Thomas begins here, by distinguishing between the passions concerned with the good and those with the bad, right? And we have to look among those concerned with the good to see what is first. The answer should be said that the object of the concubiscible are the good and the, what? Bad, huh? Now, there's that gospel this morning, I don't know what your gospel was, but I learned some fish in front of the apostles, that's what it says, right? It didn't say salmon, I just said fish. Well, salmon's the kind of fish. I hate to have to prove that I have my body resurrected by eating salmon, you know. Yeah, because there's not going to be any suffering after the resurrection. It couldn't have been. Yeah. Now, naturally, the good is before the, what? Bad, huh? In that bad is a lack of the good, huh? This is what Aristotle teaches us in the ninth book of wisdom. That's a great book, that ninth book. I used to always do that when I taught metaphysics, you know. You can't teach all the books, you know. The ninth book is always the one that was, you know. And you can kind of see the way you give all the way to God, the pure act, right? You know, it's just beautiful. See things about that first act. It's really something. You know, Teacher Kassarik said, compared to Aristotle, he says, I've got the mind of an Angkor. Give us hope. Give us hope, Teacher. Give us hope. Once all passion, whose object is the good, are naturally before the passions, whose object is, what? The bad, huh? Each one to its opposites, right, huh? For because one seeks the good, therefore one, what? Refutes the opposite evil, right, huh? Now, the good has the, what, definition of an end, huh? The good and the end, as Aristotle pointed out, right? Basically the same thing. Though we speak in a secondary way of the means of being good, right? But primarily the good and the end have the same. Now, what is before in intention is after in, what? In obtaining. The good and the end have the same thing. So Aristotle is pointing this out. Thomas is just repeating Aristotle right now. Poor Albert, the ape of Aristotle, right? He didn't say that a long time. Therefore one can observe the order of the passions of Incubisable, either according to intention or according to what? Now, according to achieving, that is before which first comes to be in that thing which tends towards the end. But it manifests that everything that tends towards some end, first has a certain, what, aptness for, or a certain proportion to that end. For nothing tends towards an end that doesn't in some way fit that thing, right? It's not proportioned to it. Then secondly, one moves towards the end, right? And third, one rests in the end after the, what? Yeah. Okay. So I like the music of Mozart and I move towards the CD of Mozart's music. And then I rest as I hear the beautiful music of Mozart, right? Now that aptitude or proportion of the, now here, Petitus means the name of the, what? Power, right? But the aptitude or proportion of the desiring power, right? It's named again for desire, to the good is love, right? Which is nothing other than a, what? Complacence with the good, pleasing with the good. But the emotion to the good is called desire or concupiscentia, right? Cuvicentia is a little more, besides the sense of desire, right? But the rest in the good is joy, which is a little more spiritual in meaning, or dilettatio, right? Pleasure. And according to this order, love comes before desire, and desire comes before what? Pleasure. Pleasure, right? But according to the order of intention, it is what? A verse, huh? For the pleasure intended causes desire for it and a love of it, right? For pleasure is an enjoyment, you might say, of the good, which in some way is the end just as the good itself, huh? Aristotle, you know, talks about that especially in the 10th book, right? You know, the 10th book is about what, Aristotle's last word of what happiness is, right? But he also talks in the first part of book 10 about pleasure, because that seems to be for its own sake, right? And then showing that happiness consists in this operation of knowing God, right? And if this perfects the mind, then it's going to be pleasant for the mind, right? So pleasure accompanies the end, right? Aristotle has a nice comparison there. He says that pleasure is to the end like beauty is to youth. It's not the essence of youth, but kind of accompanies it, right, huh? Okay? Get old and I've got Rick on you. And so on. Okay. So what am I? I'm a philosopher, right? I'm a man, that's true, yeah. That's more fun than that. Well, why is the philosopher named from love, right? Rather than desire for wisdom, which is what? Called wonder, right? Because it has anything to do with what he's saying here, you know? It's different. This is not a love maybe that's in the passions, right? Not emotion. The love of wisdom, right? It's a love that's in the will, right? But doesn't that love of wisdom, in some sense, give rise to the desire for wisdom, huh? And then it delights you now when you get a little bit of wisdom, right? Yeah. And the love of wisdom can be there whether you're desiring it or whether you're possessing it and enjoying it, right, huh? The love of wisdom underlies us, right? Well, it's probably you name me, right? Rather than from the one pleased with wisdom. Or the one seeking wisdom, right, huh? You know, even, right? And the one loving wisdom, right? That's a fundamental thing, right? There are these things. That's what Bishop Theodore, when he wrote about the monks of Syria, including St. Merin, and Simon's Dialogue and all the others, he always referred to them. I don't know if he referred to them as philosophers, but he referred to their life as philosophy. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. When the Gospel or the Psalms say, taste and see how sweet is the Lord, right, huh? Okay. Well, there you're kind of being moved by the delight that you have in God, right? Mm-hmm. And St. Bernard Clairvaux talks about the stages of love, you know. The first case, you don't love God at all, right? But you love your own earthly things. And then you have difficulty in these earthly things, because sometimes they'll deny you, or sometimes, you know. And then you turn to God for what? Help, right? Okay. And I remember when I was a kid there, you know, the neighbors across there, and the father had got cancer, you know. Mm-hmm. All of a sudden, you're at daily mass, that family, you know. Mm-hmm. So, you know, so you're kind of seeking God, you know, to relieve you from whatever you're stressed and don't have, whatever it is. And then as you get to know God, then you start to take what? The light in the Lord, and now it's not, this is apart from this, right? Okay. And then finally, you're loving yourself for and in God, right? Mm-hmm. And he says, this is hardly realized in this life, you know. But so you're not realized perfectly until the next life, right? But, you know, in a more human example of friendship, you know, you might turn to somebody, for help because you need that person, you know. And then you're not really loving the person for their own sake, right? But as you get to know that person, right, then you find them attractive, you know. Mm-hmm. And now you start to like them for their own sake and not simply as a way of helping you, right? Mm-hmm. Now, how does Thomas answer the first objection? Why is the concubisal appetite named from concubiscence or desire? And you might consider the same thing about depressive power in general. Why is it named from desire, right? Mm-hmm. I think Thomas could be a little bit better in his answer than he will, but we'll see what he says here. We'll wait for the new, improved addition. The first, therefore, it should be said that in this way something is named according as it becomes, what, known to us, huh? For vocal sounds are the signs of things understood according to the philosopher, right? So you remember how I used to talk about the 12th chapter of the Categories, where a style distinguishes the senses of what? Before, right? And before in time is the first sense, right? Then before in being, like one is before two. And then before in our analogy of reason, right? And then finding before in goodness or desirability. I used to always ask the students, now it gives these four senses in a certain order, right? One, two, three, four. In what sense of these four does one sense come before another one, right? It's like the twist tie and the tongue they tie, you know? In what sense of before does one sense of before come before another sense of before? Yeah, in the third sense, right, huh? Because we name things as we, what? Know them, right, huh? Okay. Now we, with plurimum, right, for the most part, know the cause through the, what? Effect, right? But the effect, right? Effect of love, win, what? Yes.