Prima Secundae
Lecture 78: Beauty, Goodness, Knowledge, and Likeness as Causes of Love

Transcript
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Both sides, you know, it just, you know, makes you restful. Those senses, especially regarding beautiful, that most of all make us know, wit, sight, and hearing, serving reason, right, huh? For we speak of things that are visible, that are beautiful, and beautiful, what, sounds, huh? In the sensibles of the other senses, we do not use the name of beauty, for we do not say that, what, tastes or odors, right, huh? So you see, the steak is beautiful. Sometimes. See, even with wine, though, you see, you know, you know, the color of the wine, you might, because that's the eye, right, it's a beautiful color, right? Or, I do my tea in a clear way, because it's beautiful, you know, in the color of the tea, you know. We don't say the taste is beautiful. Tastes beautiful. Nobody says that, right? Tastes good. Good taste, huh? We do not speak of beautiful savors and odors and so on. And thus it is clear that the beautiful adds above the good, right, huh? A certain order to a, what, knowing power, right, huh? Thus that the good is that which simply pleases the appetite, right? That is beautiful, the apprehension of which pleases, right, huh? That's a bit more particular, right? Now, they don't go into it now, but, you know, there's a question sometimes asked, you know. Is the beautiful more the object of love or the object of what? Knowledge, huh? You know, the famous poet there, Spencer, huh, for Shakespeare, you know. He's seen his poems there to earthly beauty and earthly love. And then followed by the poems to heavenly love, right, huh? So we tend to, what, connect beauty with love, right? In those things, right? And in this marvelous English language, right? Lovely is kind of a synonym for what? Beautiful, right? So love is taken from the word, what? Love, right? So in that way, it seems that the beautiful is more the object of what? Love than of what? Knowledge, huh? And I'm not sure, though, that that's true. There are texts, you know, where the beautiful seems to be tied up with what? Knowledge, huh? That's a good little interesting thing to discuss, you know. Do you love God because he's beautiful or do you want to see him because he's beautiful? I told you I had a very beautiful painting on my wall. Do you want to love it or want to see it? I see it, I see it there. The beautiful, his sort of perfection is the object of what? Of knowing, right? One of the definitions of love and of the beautiful is it's a scene. Yeah, yeah. As a reference to the habitat that you see, please, but, you know, the scene there. And I have one of Heisenberg's essays there, you know, the importance of the beautiful there for the discovery of theories, right? You know, and you get to know these guys and they've made great discoveries and they're very much tied up with the beauty of the thing, right? You know, why do you accept somebody who's doing what's so ugly? You know? Yeah, these two, the top says they're beautiful, I think, you know, huh? Do we have time for another? We've got to stop here. Maybe we should stop here. We've got to stop here. We've got to stop here. We've got to stop here. We've got to stop here. We've got to stop here. We've got to stop here. We've got to stop here. Okay. It seems that knowledge is not a cause of love, huh? Because something is, what? Sought, right? This happens from what? Love, right? But some things are sought which are not known, as science is, right? For in them, it's the same thing to have them as to know them, as Guston says, right? And if they are known, they are had, and are not sought. Therefore, knowledge is not a cause of, what? Love, huh? Moreover, it seems to be the same reason that something unknown is loved, and that something is loved more than it is, what? Known. But some things are loved more than they are known, as God, who in this life, can be loved to himself, huh? But not known to himself, huh? Therefore, knowledge is not a, what? Cause of love, huh? So if something can be loved more than it is known, then how can knowledge be the cause of love, right? It would seem that they would be, what? Proportional, right? But then it doesn't so, right? The theologian might not love God as much as the charbon, as they say, yeah. Okay. Okay. Moreover, if knowledge were the cause of love, there could not be found love where there is no knowledge. But in all things there is found love, huh? As Daniel Jesus says in the fourth chapter of the Divine Names. But there's not found knowledge in all things, right? Therefore, knowledge is not a cause of love, huh? Against all this nonsense is what Augustine proves in the Tenth Book of the Trinity, that no one is able to love something, what? Unknown. So when you love wine, if you don't taste it, and you love licorice, if you don't taste it. I think a root beer floats, you know, I was saying last night, they said, if ever there's a marriage made in heaven, right? It's that of fruit beer and vanilla ice cream. They go out to friendlies or something like that. My wife might get a nice, you know, Sunday now, but I get a root beer float. So, you and Father Abbott have a very similar experience. Father Abbott? He likes, yeah. I don't know if he likes a root beer float, but he likes to have ice float. Whenever there's a guy like Amos, he'll always get it. I know it's a sort of opposite. Now, I answer, Thomas says, that as has been said, the good is the cause of love in the way in which the object, right, is the cause of love. But the good is not an object of the desiring power, except insofar as it is what grasped. And therefore, love requires some grasping of the good that is love. And on account of this, the philosopher says in the ninth book of the Ethics, that bodily vision is the beginning of what? It's very clear there in Roman and Juliet, right? And similarly, the contemplation of spiritual beauty, right, or goodness, is the beginning of spiritual what? Love, huh? Thus, therefore, knowledge is a cause of love for the same reason by which the good is, right? It's on the side of the object, that he's saying, right? He's opposed to this likeness, which cannot be loved unless it is, what, known, huh? So this, in a sense, is a continuation of the previous article. It's the good as known that is, what, the object of love, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that the one who seeks knowledge is not entirely, what, ignorant of it, right? But according to something, he foreknows it, either in general or in some effect of it, right? Or through this that he hears it, what, praised, as Augustine says in the tenth book of the Trinity. Thus, he's able to, what, in this way to know it is not to have it, but to know it perfectly is to have it, right? So if I learn that medicine is the art to cure the body of disease, oh, I'd like to have some of that, right, huh? Okay. Or a logical help may to avoid mistakes, oh, okay, I'd like to have that now. It's charting in there. Yeah. Now, the second one is a beautiful thing here for the understanding of the spiritual life, huh? The second should be said that something is required for the perfection of knowledge that is not required for the perfection of, what, love. For knowledge pertains to reason to whom it belongs to distinguish, right? We said the distinction is, what, before, seeing the before and after, right? So if reason looks before and after, it must seek distinction, right? So it belongs to reason to distinguish among those things which are, what, joints, the kundum rim, right, huh? And to put together in some way those things which are diverse by comparing one to the other, right? And therefore, for the perfection of knowledge, it's required that man knows step by step whatever is in the thing, right? Just as the parts and the virtues and the properties. But love is in the desiring power which regards the thing as it is in itself. Whence, for the perfection of love, it suffices that the thing be grasped in itself, that the thing insofar as in itself is grasped, is loved, huh? And on account of this, therefore, it happens that something is more loved than is known because it can be perfectly loved even if it is not perfectly known, huh? So I don't have to take something apart to love it, huh? So you could like this salad dressing without, what, distinguishing the ingredients, right, huh? In a lot of wines, they made, you know, different grapes, right? Sometimes they tell you the percentage of this and the percentage of that, you know? But you can enjoy the wine without, but without distinguishing the grapes it's made from, right? But you don't really know it fully then, right? Love it a lot. Or Warren's system, you know. When I'm raving about the Jupiter or something, you know what it is at the end? And I said, well, kind of. Well, he combines five melodies together. And I said, he does? But Heisenberg talks about that because Heisenberg was a great musician, right? He was a great pianist and so on. And, you know, he wrote about Heisenberg there. He played Mozart's sonatas, so... His stock just went up. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. They talked about, you know, the difference between enjoying music and analyzing it, you know? The physicist, he may analyze the music sometime, but he's not really enjoying the music, right? So he kind of loved the whole thing. He's got to take it apart to really know it, huh? And there's, there's, I don't know, Warren gets it somewhere in the computer or somewhere, but, you know, they really take apart Mozart's piece for you. Wow, the subtlety, all they're doing, you know. I didn't realize all that sort of stuff, you know? But Mozart said, you know, someone's music could only be fully appreciated by a connoisseur, but it's written in such a way that everybody would like it. But, in fact, you're reading something in verse, you know, maybe you know what the actual verse, what the meter is, but... Just as most of all clears the sciences, which some love on account of the various summary knowledge, which they have of it, right? That they know rhetoric to be the science of which man is able to persuade, and this they love in rhetoric, right? So Augustine was persuaded. Teacher rhetoric, wasn't he? And similarly ought to be said about the love of God, huh? So you can love somebody more than you know them, right? This is true about God, then, right? Now this love that's in all things, this natural love is caused by some knowledge, but not the knowledge of the natural things themselves existing in them, but in the one who, what? Established nature. Yeah. So God knows that the plant needs a bottle of water, huh? Knows that broccoli is a big feeder, right? We need broccoli that way, huh? Made it that way. Yeah. Okay, we should stop here right now. We should stop here right now. We should stop here right now. We should stop here right now. We should stop here right now. We should stop here right now. In the name of the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas, Deocratius. God, our Enlightenment, Guardian Angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly, St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Pray for us. Help us to understand all that you have written. In the name of the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, Amen. So now we get to the third article, right? The likeness is a cause of love. These four objections are really beautifully designed to help you understand this and not be done astray like it would be easy to be done. To the third, then, one goes forward thus. It seems that likeness is not the cause of love, because the same is not the cause of contraries. But likeness is the cause of hate. For it's said in Proverbs 13, that among the proud always there are fights. And the philosopher says in the Eighth Book of the Ethics that the... The what? The potters. Yeah, potters, you know, who are rivaled, fighting with each other. Therefore, likeness is not the cause of what? Love, huh? Okay. I mean, you know, one comes and he sees what the other guy did, you know, last year, and he's like, complains about it. Never should do it that way. Yeah. When I clerked you about in the sentence. I used to say to Warren Murray, you know, when my mother was a widow, right, and her sister was a widow, they were both widows, they were both, you know, maintaining home by themselves, right? Why don't they just, you know, move in together and have one house, right? And Warren said, you know, women can't do things the same way, you know, you're sisters. And trying to, you know, proportionate to me, he said, you know, two professors couldn't teach the... Yeah. Every one time, Warren and I sat down and said, you know, how are we going to teach, you know, philosophy and science right now? We've got kind of a schedule, and we went back to our respective places and to teach a course and did it kind of different, you know, from what we had. I don't think you guys really teach the course the same way, right? And, you know, they agree, you know, on things, they just don't do it the same way. Moreover, Augustine says in the fourth book of the Confessions that someone loves another what he would not want to what? Be. Just as man loves the, what, the actor, I guess, huh? Would not want to be the actor. But this would not happen if likeness were the proper cause of love. For thus a man would love another what himself had or wished to have, right? And therefore likeness is not the cause of love. These are well chosen, these objections. I think you think about the objections as they kind of single out for special consideration this aspect of the truth, right? And most people can't, you know, see the whole thing at once because they have to see it bit by bit, and that's what it does. You know, it's really very proportional to the student. The moderns never write this way, right? Moreover, each man loves that which he lacks, huh? Or what he needs, right? Even if he doesn't have that, right? Just as a sick man loves health, and a poor man loves wealth, right? But insofar as he needs and lacks these things, he has an unlikeness to them, huh? Therefore, not an unlikeness, but also unlikeness is a cause of what? Love, huh? Moreover, the philosopher says in the second book of the rhetoric that we love those who are what? Yeah, beneficial in money and in salvation, and likewise those who observe friendship concerning those who have died, right, huh? Everybody likes that, huh? It's that thing. But all are not such, right? So you must be liking someone who's not like you, right? Therefore, a similitude is not the cause of love, right? I might be a coward, but I kind of like the brave man, right? Why do I like him if I'm a coward, right? Or he's generous with his money, right? I'm a scrooge, so I like this guy in terms of his money, right? If I'm a melancholic fellow, I like this guy. He's always joking, right? How can a melancholic man make the jokester, huh? The gensis is what is said in the book of Ecclesiasticus, huh? That every animal loves what is like itself, right? Well, we're going to have to see some distinctions. So Thomas answers that likeness, properly speaking, is the cause of what? Love. But it should be considered that a likeness between things can be of two kinds, right? In one way, from this, that both have the same thing and act, just as two having whiteness are said to be what? Similar or alike. In another way, from this, that one has in ability and in some inclination, that which the other has in what? Act, huh? Just as if we say that the heavy body existing outside its place has a likeness with the heavy body existing in its place. Or also, quoting as ability, has some likeness to the act itself, huh? For in the ability itself, in some way, is the act, huh? I was reading a little thing there by, who was it? By Coleridge, you know, but he's talking about, in the early works of Shakespeare, why can you see, you know, he's going to be really a great poet. And he's talking about the, you know, Phineas and Adonis, those early narrative poems. And he's talking about how melodious the rhyme is and the meter and the poetry, you know? And he kind of quotes that phrase of Shakespeare, you know, beware the man that hath no music in his soul. It's especially a poet, right? A poet has got to be kind of, you know, musical, melodious things, right? And so, you can see that he has something in, what, potency and inclination. And that's what you have when you have an older man, say, in some art or science, right? And he sees this younger man with some, what? Some ability. Some ability, yeah, some inclination these ways, right? The first time Heisenberg met Niels Bohr, Bohr was the greatest physicist in the world at that time, he and Einstein, and Bohr was known as a man who, you know, understood the atom better than anybody else in the world, right? And he came to Germany, you know, giving a tour of lectures on the atom. And they call it the Bohr Festival, you know, with the Germans. And, well, I remember he was just kind of a young student then, you know, huh? But he attended one of Bohr's lectures, and he posed a question, right, huh? And Bohr gave him an answer, you know, but he'd come and look at him like that, you know? And then after the session, he came over to Heisenberg, and he said, let's go for a walk, he says. And he went for a long walk, you know, a couple hours like that, and Heisenberg said, you know, influence all his future thinking about the atom, right, you know? But what did Bohr see in him, you know? Some kind of a, what, ability there? By the question he asked, and some inclination towards these things, right? And he wanted to encourage him, right, huh? Or a musician might see this in a young pianist, you know, right, a young violinist or something, you know? There's some ability there, right? They can, you know, just be encouraged, you know, huh? Because he's going to be, he's going to succeed me in some way, maybe a few years. And he says, the first way of likeness causes the love of friendship, right? Or, you can call that, like I do sometimes, the love of wishing well, right? The love of benevolence. For from this, that some two are alike, as having the same form, they are in some way one in that, what? Form. Just as two men. are one in the species of humanity, and two things that are white in whiteness. And therefore the affections of one tends towards the other, just as something one to himself. This is another self, huh? He's just like me, right? I like you because you like me. And he wishes good to him just as he wishes good to himself. So this is the love of friendship, right? But the second way of likeness, that of ability, right? Towards what? Act, right? Causes the love of concupiscence, the love of what? Wanting, right? Or the friendship of the useful, or the what? Delightful, right? Because the other person has an act, something that you are able to have, huh? That you have an ability or potency. And that ability or potency can be, what? Actualized by the contact of the one who has the thing in what? Act. For to each thing existing in ability, as such, there is a desire for its own, what? Act, huh? And in the achievement of that, it delights, if it be sensing and knowing. Now, it has been said above, that in the love of concupiscence, so the love of wanting, as much as you would say in English, the one loving properly loves himself. Since he wishes that good for himself, you might say, that he wants. Now, more does one love himself than another. Because he is one in substance with himself, right? But to another, he is one in the likeness of some form, right? But he's not the same in America. Only in God, right? Imagine the intensity there. Because they have one nature in number, right? While you and I have one nature in species, huh? So, and therefore, if from this, that he is like someone in the partaking of some form, he is impeded from the, what? The good that he loves. The other is made, what? Odeous to him, huh? Hateful, huh? Object of hate. But not insofar as he is like. Not per se, right? But insofar as he is impeding his own, what? Good, huh? So, you know, if you like this particular piece of music by Mozart, I'm going to start to like you, see? And you're liking that piece of music by Mozart. It doesn't impede me from, what? Like you, right? But if you and I like the same girl, so much so that I want to, we both want to pursue her, right? Well, then we can get each other's way, right, huh? Okay. But if there's a girl that we're not going to pursue, like some movie actress, you know, I really like that one, you know, and you do too. Well, that's why we get together, right, huh? Because you're enjoying her acting and so on. Her on the screen in no way impedes my enjoying it, right? In fact, you know, you can talk about it and enjoy it more, right? But if we're pursuing the same one, right, huh? The same way if you and I are two, what, PhDs, but there's only one opening, or two doctors and there's only one opening in the big, you know, important hospital, right? Then we can, what? Yeah. But that's not insofar as you are likely, right, because you're getting in the way of what I want, right? In account of this, and he's quoting that thing from Aristotle, the potters are rival and opposition to each other, right? Because they impede each other in their own gain or their own profit, right, huh? And between those who are proud, there are always, what, struggles and so on, because they impede each other in their own excellence, which they, what, desire, right? So two men both want to be president of the United States or something, right? So, again, there's a distinction between the, what, there's a saying, the prodigency, right? And that first one is the way, he doesn't even repeat the thing, he just explained the first objection there, right, huh? Between pride, proud, there are struggles between the potters, right, huh? Now, what about the second objection, though? I'm a little different thing, huh? The second should be said that in this also, that someone loves another, what he does not love, what? And so, there is found a likeness in proportionality tata, right? Now, he's got to use that word because he's departed from the use of the word there in Euclid, right? Euclid, two to three is a ratio. Three to four is a ratio. Four to six is a ratio. But you come back, and you say, well, four is to six, yes, two is to three. And that's called a, what, proportion, right? But Thomas has already adopted the more recent use of the word proportion to mean a ratio. So, two to three is called a proportion rather than a ratio. Well, then when you say four is to six, it's two is to three. That likeness of proportion is what you call it. Well, you've got a clumsy way of the use of proportionality, right, huh? Okay. Well, we'll let Thomas take a pass on that. But I think it would be better to, in terms of language, to follow my master there in Euclid, right? And proportions, we see first in math, and they'd be much more clear. But what can you do with people, you know? Slaves. Words become... Yeah, the slaves are accustomed. Yeah. It was funny because I was reading the golden chain there on Mark there, and they used the word perpetrate, right? The acting word, huh? And we were talking about the word a little bit last night there. But in English, the word perpetrate, F-A-D-E-U, you're doing something bad, huh? Yeah, yeah, yeah. Well, it doesn't mean that at all. The commentary is just something. It doesn't mean that in Latin, the word, right? But for some reason, the word has come to have that what? Yeah, yeah, yeah. It's like, you know, it's correct that when you're translating, you know, Paris Tau's definition of tragedy, you know, because he begins by saying it's an imitation of an action that is, you know, serious, complete, you know, some magnitude. Well, imitation means, you know, kind of, you know, a copy, you know, huh? An inferior copy. Yeah, and imitation in the commercial civilization we live in means a cheap legacy, you know? Paris Tau says a poet can represent men as they are, or as they should be, or as they are thought to be, right? I mean, you know, they get all these varieties, huh? So, it doesn't mean inferior, right? So, a lot of times, instead of saying an imitation, they say it's a likeness, right? But you don't have that thing, so. Words sometimes suffer, they decline, right, huh? Or the other word, the word conspiracy, huh? Conspiracy, I think, is kind of a sinister connotation, right? And, but it doesn't mean that. It means we're really together, right? You know, closeness, you know? But, conspiracy, you know, this is a bad thing, you know? You're going to assassinate somebody. Yeah, to perpetrate somebody. Yes, you're conspiring to perpetrate something. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Just as one has himself to that in which he loves, right? So, the other has himself in the Apogee lines. As if a good, what, singer loves a? Good writer. Writer. There's a, what, likeness or proportion there according as each has what belongs to him according to his art, huh? I used to use the example there. I said, a truly masculine man, right, wants a woman to be truly, what? Feminine. Feminine, yeah. He doesn't want to be masculine. And she doesn't want him to be effeminate, right? You see? But, obviously, well, masculine and feminine are not the same, right? They're different, huh? But, for a man to be masculine is like for a woman to be, what? Feminine. Feminine, yeah. So, there's a likeness there of what? Proportion, right? Yeah. You know, Washington Irving, you know, talks about how there's this friendship between poets and painters and so on and on. Sometimes there seem to be very, what, true friendships, right? Nothing falls from them. And, again, because there's a likeness of what? Yeah, a likeness ratio is there. like abortion, and they don't come into conflict, you see, you know, why Dickens, say, and Thackeray, you know, were competing, you know, to write the best novel, right, and one to write the novel, and everybody's just talking about it, the other guy tried to, you know, write a better novel, and I guess they were in some kind of conflict almost all their life, and just towards the end of their life there, they passed each other on the steps going somewhere, you know, and one of them turned around and stood in his hand, you know, and the other guy took his hand, you know, and you say, you know, this is because one is competing with the other, right, so between the poet and the painter, though, or something like that, right, or even the painter and musician, maybe, right, you know, he is to his art as I am to my art, right, so you respect him, right, and you respect the cook, right, he does what his thing well, right, and yet they're close enough to be, have a likeness as the basis of friendship, but don't come to competition, right, but the competition is what, crotch it ends, right, and that beautiful girl we both love, if she dies young, you know, we're both dropping tears over her grave, maybe you wouldn't really be in competition anymore, right, you know, and we console each other, right, in our sorrow, that we, put you in the monastery, and that would be the end of it, is that what happened to you guys, it wasn't happily ever, it wasn't happily ever, it wasn't happily ever, it was only one of them, it was only one of them, it was only one of them, it was only one of them, it was only one of them, it was only one of them, it was only one of them, it was only one of them, it was only one of them, it was only one of them, passing these things are, and so on, help them with this. And what about the third thing, you see, the one who loves what he lacks, right, or needs, rather, has a likeness to that which he loves, but the likeness that we spoke of, the second kind of potency to what act, so as to, you know, talking there in the first book of the physics there, right, and Aristotle makes the point there, does something come from its opposite as such, and does the sick man want to be healthy, well, if the sick man becomes healthy, he'll cease to be the sick man, right, so he'll destroy him, right, so is it the sick man, insofar as he's sick, that wants to be healthy, or is it the body that he has, that's capable of health, right, that wants to be what, yeah, because health is a, what, perfection of the body, and the good of the body, but it's not a perfection of sickness, it's an elimination of sickness, right, so does the sick as such, seek its own elimination, no, it's not the sick as such that wants to help you, and I say, do the ignorant want to know, not as ignorant, no, but the ability to know wants to know, right, and the ability to know has a certain affinity, a little more distant, right, to knowing, right, so it's still likeness there being the cause of love, right, that's the second kind of likeness, so notice in the second and the third objection, you have two kinds of likeness, right, the second one, it's a likeness in act, but it's proportional, right, and the third is the same thing, but it's likeness in ability to act, and the answer to that is the fourth objection, why do we like the generous person, right, huh, why do you like the cheerful person if you're kind of a sex, see, well, according to the same likeness in ability to act, the one who is not liberal loves the one who is liberal or generous, right, insofar as he expects from him something that he wants, right, and the same reason, the one persevering in what, friendship to the one who, what, does not persevere, right, for to both there seems to be somewhat friendship on account of what usefulness, then he gives another way of solving this, right, or it should be said that although all men, what, do not all, all men do not have these virtues according to a complete habit, right, nevertheless they have certain seed-like things of reason by which the one who doesn't have virtue loves the one who is virtuous, has conformed to his natural reason, right, you know, not conformed to his present cowardice or whatever it may be, right. Yeah, it's like that, I mean, sometimes you see a real sense of kind of righteous indignation among prisoners when they see someone else treated unjustly, men who have acted unjustly and convicted of it, but they find out, like I remember Father Benedict Grosheau gave it on the tape when he was arrested for praying the rosary outside an abortion plan, and the prisoners were, in a sense, they were really mad, like, what does this country come to it, I mean, they were really mad that he was arrested for praying the rosary outside an abortion plan, they were all curious, and they weren't very just men, they were in prison. You know, people talk sometimes about racism, you know, but certain, what, people don't like other people, you know, it's a class, right, huh? Well, I suppose if likeness is a cause of love, then the cause of hatred is what? Unknowingly. Yeah, yeah. For some reason, those, you know, little things kind of stand out more than the essential things that we might be alike in, right? Yeah, yeah. And Chesterton has an essay on that where he says, he justifies, he says there's a good reason for things like ethnic jokes. Mm-hmm. He says there's a perfectly justified. He says there's the same reason why we laugh when a man sits on his hat. Why do you laugh when a man sits on his hat? I mean, it's a small, it's a ridiculous thing. But a man is so embarrassed by sitting on his own hat. And he says that's kind of the same thing with ethnic jokes. The shape of somebody's eyes or the color of his skin or his hair or his voice or whatever it is, his size or shape. He says those are things that really make no difference in his value as a man. Mm-hmm. But they occupy so much of our attention. It's that disproportion between his real value, his real good, and these small things that occupy so much of our attention. So that's why racial jokes and ethnic jokes are all justified. He says, as long as you don't mean to say that someone's not equal to you or not as good as you. If you're just trying to show out this disproportion between what occupies so much of our attention and his relative insignificance, that's the justification of those things. So, I use the example of a man sitting on his hat. Everybody laughs. The poor man is humiliated himself by sitting on his own hat. Mm-hmm. Have you known someone who uses garlic a lot, you know? You know? They kind of disagree with me when they were around, you know? They're the next. Keeps the flies away anyway. Now, which seems to be a stronger cause of love? Are the good or likeness? Because those are kind of the two fundamental causes of love or liking, huh? Sometimes it does seem to be stronger, right, huh? I guess it would be a likeness. Maybe the likeness is the likeness of some good thing. I don't know. I remember Monsignor talking about, you know, a person being attached to the personality of the teacher, right, huh? So, you like him as a man, but maybe some other teacher knows more, right, huh? So, the good that you, that is knowledge, right? Mm-hmm. This one man has more, right? But he's less like you, maybe. Mm-hmm. He might be in things outside of us. Mm-hmm. That's right. But in terms of this, you know, the way you find these, you know, Shiites and Sunni fighting, but other races, the Kurds and the Turks and the Kurds and the other people there in Iraq and so on, you know, there's paper again today. Mm-hmm. And, you know, the things hit in the Balkans, you know. Mm-hmm. And now we had these. So, in terms of, are you hating someone because they're bad or because they're unlike you? Mm-hmm. Seems to be, you know, stronger because they're unlike you, right? That's more a cause of hate. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. than cause of love, likeness, or good, right? But they are kind of distinct causes in some way, right? God is very unlike God. Yeah, yeah. That's what all that was. I mean, notice, when you talk about the love of God, insofar as, I mean, one reason why you love God, obviously, is because he's good, right? He's good in itself, right? But as you acquire, say, some grace or some virtues, and become a low-way, more like God, right? Then, or even simply because you're in the image of the likeness of God, if you realize it, right? Then that's a reason to love God, right? So there's kind of distinctness there, right? The goodness of God is a reason to love him, and then because you are in some way like him, more or less, right? Starting with the being in his image, then going into the likeness you have through grace, virtues, and so on, right? Thomas was talking about the reasons for the Summa Concientiles, right? Or for this study here. And how wonderful it is, right? But one reason is to become like God, right? And that theology, in a kind of distant way, imitates God, who knows all things by knowing himself, right? So in theology, we consider God fundamentally, and other things, insofar as God is the beginning of them or the end of them, right? So in a sense, we're imitating God's way of knowing in a very distant way, right? And so becoming like him, right, huh? So, um, or if you have charity, you know, there are virtues, right, huh? Or if you become like God, huh? Well, God is very just, so if you're very just, you know, that's another reason to like him, you know, besides the fact that he's so good, right? But if you love him because he's good, he's probably more because, is it like this of act to act or ability to act? Yeah. So although he's given three causes of love, he could put the, what, knowledge, you know, kind of subordinate that, right? So it's the good as known, right? And like this is the cause of love, right? Now we come to the last article.