Prima Secundae
Lecture 84: Distinctions in Being: Per Se and Per Accidens

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Some of it is a fact of experience that the bad is sometimes wonky, right? Especially for others. It's wonky for us, yes. And sometimes it is for ourselves, right? Okay? But it's not as such wonky, right? So that's the distinction of the Parashan and the Parashan and the Parashan and the Parashan and the Parashan and the Parashan and the Parashan and the Parashan and the Parashan and the Parashan and the Parashan and the Parashan and the Parashan and the Parashan and the Parashan and the Parashan and the Parashan and the Parashan and the Parashan and the Parashan and the Parashan. And sometimes you can sometimes speak of that per se, you know, as such, right? You know, speaking of it. Then this whole thing will break down, right? So you can't get anywhere in philosophy, you know. In the very beginning, people would be denying this, right? If they don't see that distinction. And say it to you, right? He's going to touch upon that in the next article, right? We'll see this. But notice, as I say, Aristotle, he talks about that distinction of that kind of mistake, right? He says, to seize even the wise, right? I won't tell them it's really hard to see. Yeah, yeah. But if you go down through the history, you know, even Greek philosophy, you see that people don't sometimes see that, right? I'll give you an example there from Sartre that were there today, right? But then the one from Heraclitus, you only heard the Greeks. One opposite becomes the other, right? So, you always ask the question, does something want its own destruction? Well, the sick want it to be healthy. And then, well, you want something that's going to destroy yourself, right? You don't want to be sick, right? You know? But that's prejudice, right, huh? The sickness doesn't wish the hell, but the body, right, huh? So Aristotle, he distinguishes between the body and the sickness, huh? Because if health, or to be healthy is something good, right, huh? Then the body is in some way good, too, because it's capable of being healthy, right? But sickness doesn't seem to be in any way good, right? Not in itself, nor is it capable of the good, right? But it's destroyed by it, right, huh? That's a beautiful thing there, you know, where when he's talking against Plato, right, huh? And Plato, you see, kind of confuses the what matter with non-being, right? So matter turns out to be kind of what non-being, right, huh? And again, the Platons, you know, they speak of accident as being non-being. But it's not nothing. You know, they're confused, right? But there, you can say that accidents are not being simply, but in some way, right? So when I come, when I was, you know, generated by my parents, I came to be, right? Wayne Perkins came to be. But when I studied Euclid, I didn't come to be. I had to qualify it. But in some way, I came to be, right? I came to be geometry, right? When I walked into this room, I came to be in this room, right? When I leave this room, I will cease to be, not simply, I hope not. But in some way, I will cease to be, right? I will cease to be in this room, right? You expect it to be limited. Until the fall, right? Until the fall, that's right. He leaves today, not going to be. Unless I'm unexpected surprise. Yeah, yeah. So Plato's making the mistake of what? The person approaching him. And he identifies matter with non-being, right? You know, Aristotle, or not Aristotle, Thomas says, you know, Augustine, of course, didn't know Aristotle very much, right? He's kind of a Platonist, right? And he tries to follow the pattern as far as he can with the faint wallow, right? But sometimes he, you know, speaks a little bit like a Platonist, you know, where he speaks of the matter. If I could say it's a something that is a nothing, or a nothing that is something, that's what I would say, you know? You know, but it's a little bit speaking almost like, you know, Plato, right, huh? But if you say, you know... He speaks that way to sin, too. Yeah, but that's more reason to say sin is... Yeah, privation. But matter is not privation, right? And Aristotle argues, you see, that if, you know, that matter desires form, right? Because it's perfected by it, right? But the lack of form doesn't desire the form, because it's going to be what? You desire its own destruction, right? Nothing wants what's bad for itself, right? It's going to be eliminated, right? Okay? Then you take examples, you know, do the healthy want, the sick want to be healthy, right? Well, the body wants to be healthy, but the sickness doesn't want health. That's going to eliminate it, right? So you want to distinguish between what is desiring health as such, and what happens to what desires health as such, but is itself not as such desiring, right? So, I mean, that's all in the first book of natural hearing, the so-called physics, right? The series in the first book of the ethics, right? So this is the very beginning, and it's so fundamental, these distinctions, right? Of the pair, you know, there's no book about them, but the book of the, this is Grafitations, right? Kind of makes you concentrate on these kinds of distinctions, because there's a very common and difficult-to-avoid kind of mistake that corresponds to each one of these, what, kinds of distinctions, right? Hirstel says the distinction from mixing up the senses of a word is the most common mistake being made, right? That's the thing he says about the first kind of mistake that he gives in words, right? And then the first one outside the person of Brachetans, there he says that even the wise are deceived, right? Brachetans is a very strong way of saying it, right? But all these, when they're important, you're good to know, right? This distinction is, you know, the time you're talking about the, what, the Trinity and so on, you know? Oh, that's awesome. I didn't see that, you know? But you start out seeing it in simpler examples, right? And I try to explain Sartre's to us a little bit, I take the example of, you know, is it ignorance? And I can only teach the ignorant, I can't teach those who already know, right? Was I going to say something like that, right? About, come take care of not those who are healthy, you know, but those who are sick, you know? So, I can only teach the ignorant, right? Nobody else can be taught. And therefore, you're, you're, you're able to learn because you're ignorant, right? Right? See? But really, ignorance is not what gives you the ability to learn, right? See? See? That's what Sartre's doing with the will, right? That the ability to choose, he says, before you choose, if you really choose, right, your will must be undetermined, right? So, you know, if they gave me a menu there, and the steak, and shrimp, and salmon, yeah. If I'm really, you know, if I can really choose which meal I want, right, then before I choose, right, is my will determined to have steak or something? See? So, it's like saying, just, I can only, you can only teach the ignorant, right? Well, you can only choose if your will is, what, indetermined, right? That indetermination is a kind of non-being, right? So, it's, this non-being in man, Sartre's a great discovery, this non-being in man is what gives him free, makes him free, right, you know? Being in nothingness, you know, in the book, right? And what was the part of the latter? But he's making the mistake of what the Parisian and the Pratchettians is saying, the mistake that even Plato made with the matter there, right? You see? And so, go down the street. You know, you get, you get, you get, you get, you get, you get, you get, you get, you You get to, what's his name, Lord Bishop Barclay, right, you know? And he's saying, I can't know anything without it being what? Known by me, right? Can't sense anything without it being sensed by me, right? But what is sensed by me is in my sense, therefore all I know is what's in me, right? Makes sense, doesn't it? See, same distinction, right? See, when I learned the theorem of Euclid, right, it's known by me, right? When you learned one, it's known by you, right? So what's known by me isn't known by you, and what's known by you isn't known by me. So we're not knowing the same thing, right? But when I know the definition, let's say, of square, I can't know the definition of square without being known by me, right? But is known by me part of the definition of square? Even when I know it right, you know? I kind of take a step beyond Aristotle and say, you know, that it seems to me that the fallacy of the accident, right, especially, right, sees us when the accidental is always there, right, and it's necessarily there, right, you see? So, you know, a square could be green, right? But squares are not always green, right? So no one would think that green is per se to square, right? But no one ever learns who's not ignorant. Ignorance is always there when you learn, you see? And there's always this, what, indetermination in the will before you, what, choose, right, huh? So, you know, Hegel comes along, you know, speaks of the tremendous power of the negative, right, huh? You know? And, well, the negative, you know, always comes before, right? What always comes before might seem to be, what, per se, right, huh? And to give rise to what comes after, right, huh? There's always trouble in town after I arrive, right? There it is. You know, and the way Schlockholm, you know, has got to figure out that this is not just an ordinary crime, you know, there's a mastermind, this is the evil Professor Moriarty, right? But, again, it's because this always happens, right, huh? It's because there's never really a, you know, masterpiece crime, you know, until Moriarty has arrived in the city. You begin to think he's per se, right? But maybe, you know, what always comes before is not always, what, per se, or is such a cause, right? It's kind of marvelous, but it's distinctions to see them. Take a little break now? Sure. Sin that one cannot have and hate truth, right? For good and being and true are, what, convertible, right? You know what convertible means, huh? A and B are convertible if every A is B and every B is what? A, right? But one cannot have and hate goodness, right? Therefore, neither truth, right? That would seem to follow. Moreover, all men naturally desire to know. As is said in the beginning of the metaphysics. But science does not accept the things that are true. Therefore, truth is naturally desired and loved, huh? But what is naturally in something always is in it, huh? No one, therefore, can have and hate truth, right? Moreover, the philosopher says in the second book of the rhetoric that men love those who are not, what? Thained, I guess. Yeah, they don't pretend to be other than they are, right? It's kind of a thing. But not accept an account of what? True. True. Therefore, man naturally loves truth, right? So kind of like some of the people that they don't try to be somebody they're not, right? So we want the true, the true man, right? Or the true mister. So and so. So and so. Yeah, saying the truth to you, huh? Yeah, I hear the truth. The answer should be said that good and true and being are the same secundum rem, right? No difference in a thing. But they differ in ratione, right? So, you know, Aristotle pointed out, of course, first, huh? But you had that same distinction when you talk about the attributes of God, right? So they are, what? The same secundum rem, right? But they differ, what? In ratione in their definition, right? So that distinction was not invented by the theologians, right? But they saw that that distinction was necessary to see, right? I'm talking about that. But good has the, what, definition of desirable, right? But being and truth don't have that definition, right? Because the good is what all want. That's what Aristotle says. That's a reference down there to the first book of the ethics, right? And therefore, the good, under the definition of good, cannot be had in hate, right? Neither in the universal nor in the, what, particular, right? But now being and true in universal, in general, are not able to be had in hate, right? Because dissonance is the cause of, what, hate? And agreement the cause of love. But being and true are common to, what, all things. But in particular, nothing prevents some being and some true to be had in hate, right? Insofar as it has the aspect of something contrary and repugnant to something, right? For contrariety and repugnance are not opposed to the notion of what? Being and true as they are opposed to the notion of what? Good, huh? It's kind of a subtle thing, right? Now he goes into some more in particular, how this takes place. It happens that some particular truth, in three ways, can be repugnant to or contrary to the good that is, what? Loved. Loved, huh? In one way, according as truth is, as a cause and as a beginning, huh? Originally, in things themselves. And thus, man sometimes hates some truth, which he wishes not to be true, that is true, right, huh? Okay? So you have in Shakespeare, you know, where they're talking about, your son has been killed, you know, and the bringer of good, I mean, this message is not going to be, you remember nicely, you know? So I don't hate to hear that my son has been killed, right? That's the truth, right? It's a hateful truth. Another way, according as truth, is in the knowledge of the man himself, huh? Which impedes him from the pursuit of the, what? Loved. Just as if some wish not to know the truth of faith, that they might freely sin, huh? How do I tell us with this going around? Yeah, yeah. From whose person is saying, Job 21, we do not wish the knowledge of your ways, huh? That's what St. O'Post calls willful inadvertence. In a third way, one has, what, hate for the particular truth, as it were, insofar as it is in the mind of, what, another. When someone wishes to remain hidden in his sin, right, huh? He hates, huh, that the truth about his sin be, what, no one, right? And according to this, Augustine says in the 10th book, Confessions, that men love the truth that shines, I guess. They hate it when it corrects them, right? And to this is, what, clear the response to the truth, right, huh? Because it goes back to the fact that good and one and two, although they are convertible, they are not, what, same ratione in definition. To the second it should be said, huh? It is true that to know the truth as such is, what, lovable, on account of which Augustine says that they love it as, what, enlightening, right? But paratchitans, huh, some of the same distinction. I mean, paratchitans, the knowledge of the truth can be, what, hateful, right? Not insofar as it is the truth, right? So that's the way he says that, right? But insofar as it impedes one from something, what? Desired. Desired, huh? Yeah, yeah. Can't marry my cousin, right? We're too nice-looking girl, but can't marry my cousin. To the third it should be said, from this proceeds that the fictitious people, right, are not loved, huh? That man loves, what, as such, right? Yeah. Which men did, what, who are not fictive manifest, right? I don't know the truth about these things, right, huh? All these biographies have been written about men, huh? So now she's saying that men, homo amatsi kundum se, that's per se, right, huh? To know the truth, right, huh? But in the second objection there, it said paratchitans, huh? The cognitio veritatis potis se, o dividis, right, huh? What does that mean? It means not as truth as it hateful, right, huh? But because it means I can't do this, something like that, right? Okay, to the sixth one precedes us. It seems that hate cannot be of salvation. in general, right? For hate is a passion of the sensitive, desiring power, which is moved from what? A sensible grasping. But the sense cannot grasp the universal, therefore hate is not able to be a something in the universal. Moreover, hate is caused from some dissonance, which is repugnant to what? Commonness, huh? But community is of the notion of the universal, something common to me. Therefore hate cannot be of something in general, universal. Moreover, the object of hate is the bad, but the bad is in things and not in the mind, as the philosopher says in the sixth book of wisdom, the sixth book after the books of natural philosophy. Since, therefore, the universal is only in the mind, which separates the universal from the particular, it seems that hate cannot be of something, what? Universal. But against this is what the philosopher says in the second book of the rhetoric, where he takes up the emotions and how you can arouse these emotions and help yourself in the courtroom or something or call these emotions that are, that anger is always among what? Singulars, huh? But hate is towards what? January, right? For we hate the thief and each man who what? Slanders. Slanders, yeah, slanders. We hate these terrorists, right? In general, right? Hate. Thomas sees a distinction here. I answer it should be said that one can speak of the universal in two ways, right? In one way, as it stands under the intention of universality. In another way, about the nature to which such an intention is, what? Attributed. For other is a consideration of man, the universal man, right? Like the species or genus, where it might be. Another of man insofar as he is, what? Man, right? If, therefore, the universal is taken in the first way, then no power of the sensitive part, neither the, what, grasping power, nor the desiring power, can be, what, carried towards the universal. You know, it's singular, right? As the great poetia says, the thing is singular when sensed. Universal when understood. So the man you see is individual man, right? Well, you understand what a man is. You've got something universal. Because universal is through the abstraction from the individual, what? Matter. So your flesh and bones are not in the definition of man, nor is mine. Otherwise, every man would be me. You might keep it in general, right? And in the individual matter, every sense of power is, what, rooted, right? So the matter out of which my eye is made is not the matter out of which your eye is made, right? But some sense power, both the, what, grasping one and the desiring one, can be, what? Carried into something universally. Just as we say that the object of sight is color in general, it's called in Jesus. Not because sight knows color, universal color, but because, what, the color that comes or is knowable by the sense does not belong to color insofar as it is, what? This color. This color, but insofar as it's, what? Color simply. Okay? I can see any color, right? Thus, therefore, the hate even of the, what, sense part can regard something, what? Universally. Because from the common nature of something, because from its common nature, something is adverse to an animal, and not only from this that is particular, as the fox, I guess, to the sheep. The wolf, right? A wolf, yeah, okay. Yeah, a wolf, yeah, you're right. As the wolf to the, what? Sheep. Sheep. Once you can say that the, generally, yeah. But anger is always caused from something particular, because from some act of the one injuring you, right? But acts are of, what, particulars. And an account of this, the philosopher says, that anger, I guess it's in the, right, right? That anger is always towards something singular, right? But hate can be towards something in general, right? So I hate salmon in general. I'm not angry with men in general, right? This man. That's going to come up. I'm missing through over it, but they're like, like Tim and the Raffer's there in Shakespeare's great play there. You read Tim of Athens, and you go and read Socrates there, you know, and the Phaedo there where he compares the hate of arguments to the misanthrope. Beautiful. Beautiful. Because you have this analogy there that, it's more known, of course, to us, that the misanthrope has got something wrong with it, right? And the hate of arguments. But the man, because of misanthrope, because he doesn't distinguish between those men you can trust completely, who are very few, and those men you can trust, but up to a point, and those men you can't trust at all, right? And the same thing in arguments. He says there are a few arguments you can trust completely, and these were later on called by the father of logic demonstration, not the dexies, right? Most arguments are in the middle there. You can trust them up to a point. So a dialectical argument or a rhetorical argument, you can trust up to some extent, right? The dialectical argument more than the rhetorical one, right? And then the sophistical refutations about them, which you can't trust at all, right? And so, Socrates is saying, you know, you've got to be naive if you think that you can trust every man, you know? And I used to always say to the girls, you know, there are very few men you can trust completely. You can probably trust yourself completely with John Paul II, but most men you can't. Very few men you can trust yourself completely with. Most men you can trust up to a point. Some men more, some men less. There are some men you can't trust at all. So if you should trust some men, you shouldn't trust at all. Or you trust a man more than you should, right, huh? Should you say, you know, that all men are bad and do with them, you know? Like, you know, different character there and great expectations. Or should you say, you know, that you should have, you know, have little smarts about men, right, huh? Then he says the same thing about the heat of arguments, right, huh? He trusts an argument that shouldn't be trusted, or he trusts an argument more than he should. And then he says, well, you can't trust any argument, you know? He says, well, maybe you should say you don't, you don't, you should blame yourself for not knowing the difference between these three kinds of arguments, right? And that's when Socrates says we need a techni, peri logos, huh? An art about arguments, right? And it's amazing that the so-called father of logic, the Carter Stahl, right, has those three, you know, the way Thomas divides them, right? With the prior and posterior analytics there, which you can trust completely, physical reputation above them, which you can't trust at all, and then the topics and the rhetoric there, you know, about the arguments you can trust up to a point, further than one than the other, but not completely, right? You know? So blame yourself, you know, for what? Not possessing the art about arguments, right? Not understanding arguments. Don't blame it and say, oh, arguments are worthless, you know? It's got a beautiful comparison, right? We see Timmon of Athens, I don't know if you know the play, but Timmon of Athens, and he's extremely generous, right? He's always inviting people to dinner, you know, and he gives you a little gift when you come, all these things, and his own servants can see that these people are not really his friends. Friends, right? And then when Timon falls into some financial straits, you know, because of his generosity, what's no problem with all these friends, you know? So he sends to you, and sends to you, and you have some excuse, you know? Oh, I just, you had come earlier, you know? They have some excuse. And then he, you know, he turns against all mankind, and becomes the great misanthrope, huh? Kind of strange play, you know, but I don't know. And then too much of a stage, you know, lifting. But he's mentioned at Timon of Athens, I guess, and one of the, Plutarch, you know, somewhere, you know, Shakespeare's marvelous thing. But the hate which is in the understanding part, right? Since it falls upon the grass, the universal grass and understanding, can be in both ways, which is what? Universal, right? You have a potential in the salinity. So if you know what a terrorist is, right? You can hate them all, right? Or an abortionist or something like that. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the sense does not grasp the universal insofar as it is universal, right, huh? But it does grasp something to which universality happens through what? Abstraction, right, huh? To the second, it should be said that that which is common to all things cannot be the reason for hate, right? But nevertheless, nothing prevents something to be common to many, which nevertheless is what? A dissonance with others, and thus hateful to them, like a dissonance with Sam. Yeah. It's kind of funny. I was reading a review of a book there, a national review, right? You know, some guy who, I guess he taught it in Cal, but he now teaches in England, you know. He's using kind of a thing about novelists, you know, down through the centuries, right? He's always telling some anecdotes about the people, right? And so it's kind of funny, you know. I guess it's amusing to read, but I don't know how good it is, you know, literary criticism through such a thing. But anyway, I'd probably say, you know, in purpose, he didn't like salmon. Don't go down, you know. Don't go down. Don't go down. 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Don't go down. Don't go down. Don't go down. Don't go down. Don't go down. Don't go down. Don't go down. Don't go down. Don't go down. Don't go down. Don't go down. Don't go down. Don't go down. Don't go down. Don't go down. Don't go down. Don't go down. Don't go down. Don't go down. Don't go down. Don't go down. Don't go down. Don't go down. Don't go down. Don't go down. Don't go down. Like sweet and sour pork and so on. It's interesting now. It's the same knowledge of opposites. So Thomas talks about hope. He's going to talk about despair too. He talks about love and then he talks about hate. So here's the connection that love is giving rise to all the emotions, right? But, I mean, notice the next question, 30, is what? But, which we'll be seeing in the fall, I guess, right? But notice that's very much an effect of love, isn't it, right? If I love steak, I want some steak, right? If I love the girl, I want the girl. If I love the music of Mozart, I want the music of Mozart, right? But he puts hate before desire. Desire, even though some might say it wasn't desire even closer in terms of cause and effect, right? But is wanting the opposite of loving. Or liking, you can use a weaker word, right? I like wine, so I want some wine, right? I like candy, I want some candy, right? I like wisdom, I want some wisdom, you see? That seems in some ways, in terms of cause and effect, to be closer, doesn't it? To love and hate, right? But yet, he goes from love to hate, and then to what? Wanting, right? Or is it because of the same knowledge of what? Opposites, right? What's the same is closer than what's near? Yeah. What's closer to knowing, learning or ignorance? Well, learning is closer, right? Because you're ignorant, and then you start to learn, you get a little knowledge. But in terms of being an opposite, right? Ignorance is more the opposite of knowledge, right? Learning is not to be the opposite of knowing, right? It's interesting, the order, right? You know, Thomas is, it's, I'm always struck by the order, the Summa there, you know. You know, you get the secunde, secunde, you're reading the secunde, secunde there. But he takes up the theological virtues first, right? And then he takes up the cardinal virtues, but he takes up prudence first, right? Then justice, and then fortitude or courage, and then temperance, right? Now, you compare him to his master, Aristotle, right? Aristotle takes up courage and temperance first in book three of the Nicomachean Ethics, right? And then he takes up justice in book five. And then he takes up prudence in book six, right? So it's almost the reverse order, right? And you say, well, now, are these two great minds in dissonance, huh? Are they? And we experience what's more known to us. We just depend on which is which, then. What are you saying? Which is which, well. You see, Thomas, when he's saying, why does Aristotle consider the moral virtues before the virtues of reason, right? In the Nicomachean Ethics, right? And he says, well, he gives two reasons. One is that the moral virtues are more known to us than the virtues of reason, right? And the other reason, kind of practical reason, is that by the moral virtues, we are disposed for the virtues of reason, right? Okay? But now, why does he take up courage and temperance before the moral virtue called justice, right? I suppose because the, what, virtues concerning the emotions are more known to us, right? They're closer to the senses and so on, right? And, of course, courage is the virtue that seems to almost name all virtues because it comes from, well, the lack of it can see more clearly, vir, you know, courage is the virtue of the man, right? The vir, right? So virtue, right? This is courage, right? And, you know, the fact that we have a Congressional or a Medal of Honor for courage, right? I don't be a Medal of Honor for eating temperately if I do it, so. Or even, you know, paying my debts and so on, you know? They won't give me a Medal of Honor for those things, right? So this is more clearly, you know, virtue, right? So it's more known, right? And, but now, why does Thomas do them in the reverse order in the summa, right? Theologiae, right? Or he takes up, why does he take up the angels, right? Before the human soul, right? And the prima paris, right? Well, obviously, we know the soul before we know the, what? Immaterial substances, separate substances, as I call them, right? In philosophies, you study the soul and the natural philosophy, and it's not to wisdom that you study the angels, right? The long God, right? So why is the order so different here, you see? Well, is the order in theology the order from what is more known to us to what is less known to us? No, no. We're imitating God's way of knowing, which is by knowing himself, he knows all other things, right? So the first thing we study, in a sense, in theology, is God himself, right? And the angels are more like God, right? Than weak creatures, right? And now you get to the virtues, right? Well, God has something like prudence, right? Divine providence, right? God has, what, justice, right? But does God have courage, strictly speaking? Or temperance, right? The moderate is eating and drinking. No, you see? So those are, what, less like God, right? So you probably wouldn't say courage of God, except maybe metaphorically, right? White temperance wouldn't even be said metaphorically, right? Because, you know, but justice is properly found in God. And, you know, so you can see the order is theological, right? And that's why he takes up the theological virtues, whose object is God himself, right? Before he takes up the virtues that are more human, so you say, right? You know, less divine, right? So you can see a beautiful order that Thomas has, right? I mean, he's not going against Aristotle, because... And in the second book of the Summa Congentilas, right? You know, Thomas has got to talk about God in himself, right? In the first book. And then the second book, he's going to talk about God as the creator, and these things, and so on. But then he points out how the order in theology here is just the reverse, right? Because in theology, you begin with God, and then go to the creatures, and in philosophy, the order is just the reverse, you know? So you have to appreciate that marvelous order, right? And here you're closer to what we're doing, the reason we get in philosophy, right? Here, the reason why hate comes right after love, it seems to me, is because it's the opposite of love, right? And the same knowledge of opposites, right? Okay. And so, I guess even in theology, when you take up the virtues there, right? In that different order, right? But you're going to talk about what the vice opposed to them, right? Same time. So you talk about despair when you talk about, what? Hope, right? And you talk about...