Prima Secundae
Lecture 87: Concupiscence, Pleasure, and the Infinite Desire

Transcript
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to concupiscence here. Whether some concupiscences are natural and some not natural, right? To the third one goes forward thus. It seems that of concupiscences, some are what? Some are not natural and some non-natural. For concupiscence pertains to animal desire, right? But natural desire is divided against animal desire, or soulful desire, right? Therefore, no concupiscence is natural, right? Some of these objections depend upon understanding the word, and clearing up a misconception in the word, right? As Aristotle would say in the book on Cistical Refutations, that the most common mistake in thinking is from mixing up the senses of a word. Therefore, no concupiscence is, what, natural, right? Moreover, a material diversity does not make a diversity in species, but only according to number, right? Like these two tables here, right? They're different species, but just differ in their matter, right? Because one's made out of this wood, and the other's made out of that wood, right? Which diversity, according to number, does not fall under, what, art? It's the difference between you and me, it doesn't fall under art, right? But if some concupiscences are natural and some not natural, they do not differ except according to diverse things that are, what, desired, right? Which makes a material difference, and according to number, what, only, huh? Therefore, why not not to divide concupiscences through natural and non-natural, or by natural and non-natural? Moreover, reason is divided against, what? Nature. Nature, huh? As is clear in the second book of the physics, huh? The second book of natural. If, therefore, in men, there is some concupiscence that is not natural, it's necessary that it be rational, but this cannot be, because since concupiscence is a certain passion, it pertains to the sense desiring power, not to the will, which is the desiring power of reason. Therefore, there are, what, not some concupiscences that are non-natural, but against this is what the philosopher, whoever he is, that's Aristotle, right? In the third book of the ethics, right? That's where he takes up the virtue of temperance, huh? And the first book of the rhetoric, huh? He lays down some desires to be natural and some not natural, right? I answer it should be said, Thomas says, as has been said, concupiscence is the, what, desire of a delightful good, pleasant good. But in two ways is something, what, delightful. You see the distinction here. In one way, because it is suitable to the nature of the animal, as food and drink and other things of this sort, and the desire of these things is called natural, yeah. We're saying, and the desire of a pleasure of this sort is called natural, right? Because the desire is something that is suitable to the nature of the animal. So it's a natural desire, right, to eat food, let's say. In another way, something is delectable, pleasant, because it is suitable to the animal according to his, what? His grasping, his knowing, right? Just as when someone grasps something as good and suitable, and consequently he delights in it. And such a desire of the delectable is called not natural, and is more called in Latin, I guess, cupiditas. Now the first natural concupiscences, natural desires, are common both to men and to the other, what, animals, huh? Because to both is something suitable and pleasant to coordinate you. And in these also, all men, what, come together, huh? Whence the philosopher in the third book of the Ethics calls them common and, what, necessary. But the second kind of desires are private to men, right, huh? Of whom it is private to think out something as, what, good and suitable, in addition to that which nature, what, requires, huh? Whence in the first book of the Rhetoric, Aristotle calls the first concupiscence irrational in the sense of being without reason, right? But the second with, what, reason, huh? And because diverse people diversely reason, therefore also, what, in the theory of ethics, proper and, I suppose, additive above the, what, natural, right? I always use the expression in English sometimes, an acquired taste, yeah. Yeah, yeah. As if you need some, what, work of reason there, right? To acquire a taste, right? Could you use some examples of what it means that it's non-natural design? Well, when I read the Austerlis essay, you read the Austerlis essay there, Towards an Evaluation of Music, right? Where he gave reasons for listening to the Baroque and Mozart rather than the Romantic composers, huh? When I started out listening to classical music, you know, it was Beethoven and Tchaikovsky and so on, right? Which is not too bad, but they're not as good as the Baroque, right? And the classical period of Mozart, Haydn, right? And so Austerlis says in the essay, you know, the one thing the Romantic guy won't admit is that the emotion should be subordinated to reason. So you end up with, you know, but anyway, he's instructing me, right, huh? So I'm acquiring now, so I start listening to Mozart and the Baroque and so on, right? And I remember the first time my brother Richard and my brother Marcus, you know, they brought home a magic flute of Mozart, right? Well, I was docile by nature, you know, and I listened intensely, the whole thing, I don't really hear anything, you know? But then all of a sudden, they start to hear this stuff, you know? And then you realize how much is in there, right? And the more you hear it, the more you appreciate it, right? But you need a little bit of reason there, right? To see what Mozart's doing. I suppose it's something comparable with Shakespeare. Yeah. Because it's difficult to read for us. Yeah. But it's only after you think about it and learn about it that you read more about it, even scripture for that matter. Yeah. And part of the, you know, the obscurity of Shakespeare comes from the fact that words have somewhat changed their use and so on. And so, but that's not really Shakespeare's fault that it would be a difficulty, right? This is what our friend, Nimi Taup, points out about the difference between the Bible and the Koran. Because so many Muslims, they praise the Koran because it's a great work of literature. Yeah, yeah. The Bible is not that good in literature. And he says, yes, but you have to read it spiritually. And then they'll appreciate more. What's there? As opposed to the, which is nice sounding words of the Koran, but what it's saying and not that reason. Well, then Augustine said, you know, he found the Bible unworthy to be compared to Cicero at first, you know, and St. Jerome had the same sort of thing. And our Lord is supposed to appear to St. Jerome and say, are you a Christian or a Ciceronian? Then later on, he became, you know, and I just don't, could scripture us. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Not too much, no. So the desire for music would be a... I just, it's kind of strange that you call it a not... I didn't say unmet, but it's not not met. Yeah, we've got to, maybe get to the reply to objections, we'll see some of the subtleties, right, in this, right? He says, that same thing that is desired by a natural desire, right, can be desired by a, what, soulful desire, right, when it is, what? Apprehended in the grasp. Yeah. And according to this, of food and, what, drink and things of this sort, which are desired naturally, right, huh? There can be a, what, a natural, what, concubiscence. What is that going to be? Back to objection there, right? Objection is based upon, what, the natural appetite being divided against the animal, right? Right, huh? Problem about the broccoli being a big feeder. That'd be a natural desire, right, but not an animal desire, right? But in the animals, it can be, what, apprehended in the food, right? Now, to the second objection that this is only material difference, like two tables there of the same kind. To the second, it should be said that the diversity of natural desires from ones that are not natural is not material only, right, huh? But also, in a certain way, formal, insofar as it proceeds from a diversity of the, what, active object, right? I remember how we're going back to the more general question about the desiring power. And Thomas and Aristotle ask, is it a power which acts upon its object, or is it a power where the object acts upon it? Well, in the case of the power of digesting my food, eating my food, my body is acting upon the food, right? And my teeth are biting up the food, and there's juices in there that start to break the food down, and so on, and more juices further down, I guess, and so on. And so the digestive power is a power that acts upon its object, right? Well, in the case of the senses, are you people acting upon the sounds that I'm making, or is the sound I'm acting upon tormenting your ears? It's a lot, right? If I yelled, it would act more upon your ears, right? The same way if that painting over there, are my eyes acting upon that painting, or is the painting acting upon my eyes? Well, the same with the emotions, right? The object of the emotion moves the emotion, right? So the guy with the gun moves me to fear, right? And the food to desire and so on, right? So that's why he speaks of the objectivity, right? The active object, right? It's not an object that is undergoing, but that is acting upon us, right? And therefore these emotions are called by Thomas Passio. That's the only thing. But the object of the appetitive power is the good, what? Apprehension. Whence to the diversity of the grasping retains the diversity of the active power, right? Whence insofar as something is apprehended as suitable by a, what? Absolute apprehension, right? What does absolute mean there in that context? Absolute is usually in Thomas opposed to what? Relative, relative, right, huh? Okay? But he means that the desire arises without a comparison, right, huh? Okay? From which are caused natural desires, which the philosopher in the rhetoric calls, what? Irrational, huh? You have to be careful about the word irrational, without reason, right, huh? Okay? And insofar as something is grasped with deliberation, now that's an act of reason, from which are caused desires that are not natural, which on account of this and the rhetoric are called and said to be with reason, right? So your love of Shakespeare is with reason. Yeah. Some deliberation there, right? Though we love to hear your voice, yet well we know that music has far more reason. It's a quote of Shakespeare against me. With reason, with reason. My ear distinguishes. Okay, now what about the third ejection here? Reason against, fight against nature, right, huh? How can emotion be rational, right? The third, it should be said, because in man not only is, what, universal reason, which pertains to the understanding part, but also, what, particular reason, huh? Which pertains to the sensitive part, as has been said in the first book. Well, that goes back to the treatise on the soul, right, huh? And according to this, also the concupiscence, which is with reason, is able to pertain to the sensitive appetite, right? And moreover, the sensitive appetite is able also to be moved by the universal reason, using the imagination as the middle term, right? Mm-hmm. So I often think, you know, people, you know, if they really heard Mozart, they would, what? Yeah, yeah. And it takes a while, you know, to hear these things, I think, before you start to really hear them, you know? That always makes me wonder about how often, when he would say, have a performance of his work, or when he was alive or dead, before recordings were available, would they just play for a whole week or two weeks at a place, and then so people could hear it again and again? Well, I noticed when they performed the first time, the 22nd Piano Concerto of Mozart, right? And the audience demanded that the second movement be played again. Play it twice, right? They didn't have any records in those days. Yeah, because someone might hear a piece of Mozart once in his life. Yeah, yeah. It's pretty amazing that they could distinguish it that well. We have to hear it again and again and again and again. Partly because I have no information so readily accessible, you don't have to develop the power of memory as much, maybe, as they could make that answer. But it's amazing how much they could discern in one hearing or something. Mozart just sits down and improvise in the piano after the concert, you know, and they seem to enjoy it even more, you know, you can see that kind of brilliancy rising spontaneously from the man's. I noticed a lot of times, you know, if I go from reading this text or something like this to Mozart, you know, there's kind of a natural transition, right? It's still in the domain of reason somehow there and why some more popular forms of music would be irritating, you know, and jarring, right, as being unreasonable, to say the least. I told you the story of Father Boudet there, you know, he's in a restaurant and he's buying up this crazy stuff. So he sends up some money, you know, for them to stop. Of course, they stopped playing. Of course, they were sufficiently insulted that they didn't stop playing. I don't know that guy. He'd do a lot of things. I didn't know him to say. He was a friend of the symphony orchestra conductor there, you know, and back there. I could have sent him another bit of money to learn how to play the music. He'd sold a dance. He'd wait to come back to the place. Well, now, do we have time here for the Article 4? Or do we have to... Yeah, take a chance. To the fourth one goes forward thus. It seems that concupiscence is not, what, infinite, huh? For the object of concupiscence is the good, which has a notion of a, what, end, right? So Aristotle always points out the connection between the end and the good, huh? The means is good in maybe a secondary sense, but primarily it's the end that is good. Well, finis and infinis are... But the man who lays down the infinite excludes the end, right? If everything was desired for the sake of something else, right, then there'd be no end, really, that's all it says. Therefore, concupiscence cannot be infinite, huh? Warwork in concupiscence is of a suitable or a fitting good, right? Since it proceeds from love, right? Which is conformity of the heart with its object. But the infinite, since it is disproportioned, cannot be, what, fitting. How could an infinite pair of pants fit me, you know? Or an infinite pair of shoes? Infinitely big or infinitely small would not fit my foot, right? Therefore, concupiscence cannot be infinite. These are marvelous objections. You must have a lot of fun doing this. Warwork, you can't go across the infinite, right? And thus, in them, it's not possible to arrive at the end, at the last. But to the one desiring, there comes about, what? Pleasure to the fact that he attains the end, huh? Therefore, if concupiscence were infinite, it would follow that never would there be delight, huh? So man is always trying to make more money, right? And he's going to always be dissatisfied, right? Because there's always more money to be made. That's what Sam Walton said at the end of his life. Somebody interviewed him and said, So you've made a gazillion of dollars. What do you want now? I want to make more. Okay. But against this is what the philosopher says in the first book of the politics, huh? That infinitum, huh? Concupiscence, desiring, right? Existing. Men desire, what? Infinite things. You give an example of the man there, right? I answer it should be said, that it has been said, twofold, right? It's concupiscence, right? One natural and the other, what? Non-natural. Now, the natural desire cannot be infinite in act, huh? For it is of that which nature, what? Requires, huh? But nature always tends into something, what? Finite and certainite. Whence never does man desire infinite food or infinite drink. Even the kid doesn't want infinite candy, right? To the point where he's had enough. Well, it depends on the kid. But just as in nature it happens that there is the infinite in potency rather than in act, right? Through succession, right, huh? One day after another, right? One bottle after another, right? So, desire of this sort can be infinite in what? Succession, right, huh? In this, huh? As one having obtained food, right? Again, what? Desireless food, right? Or whatever else that nature requires, right? Because these bodily things could, when they come, do not remain, what? Forever, right? But they fail. Whence the Lord himself said to this American woman, I guess, huh? Who drinks from this water. Always that. That's one of the most vivid scenes where Christ, you know, comes to my life, you know, it just seems so... And the other one where, what's his name up in the tree there, you know? It's a game. He'd say, yeah, yeah. Come on down, can I eat your house today, you know? He's so desirous to see him, you know. It seems to me, it seems so real to see him, you know? That's what then maybe Elizabeth Taylor said that she had one husband, she desired another one. Yeah. But concubiscence that is not natural is, what? Entirely. Infinite, huh? For it follows, what? Reason. Reason, huh? But it, what? If it's reason to proceed, what? Infinitum, huh? Whence the one who desires wealth is able to desire them, not to some certain term, right? But simplicity here, to be, what? Rich. Quantum cum que potest. Power much is able. Yeah, yeah. That's like a guy you're quoting, right? Mm-hmm. Same one. Yeah. Now there's another reason able to be assigned, according to the philosopher in the first book of the politics, huh? Wherefore, some desire is finite and some, what? Infinite. For always, the desire of the end is, what? Infinite, huh? In the sense that the end is, what? To itself, yeah. As health, right? Whence more health is more, what? Desired, and thus an infinitum, right? Just as if white by itself, what? Disperses. What is more white will more, what? Disperse, right? So how much do you want to be pleased? How much do I want to enjoy the music of Mozart? I want to enjoy it more and more. The plays of Shakespeare. But the desire of that which is for the end is not infinite, but according to that measure, it is desired in which it is suitable to the, what? End. Whence those who lay down their end to be in wealth, that's their goal in life, see? They have the desire of wealth in infinitum. But those who desire wealth on account of the necessity of life desire wealth, what? Limited. They're sufficient for the, what? Necessity of life, huh? There's a philosopher who says there, right? And the same is of the ratio of concubiscence. I mean, other things, right? Is that kind of related to what he said about hatred before? I don't just hate this deep, I hate all things. Not that's much an end, though, with hatred. I don't want to give it to the Jews, I guess, though. But a few of them, there's any limit to his iniquity. Now, the first objection there from the connection between the good and the end, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that everything that is desired is taken as something, what? Limited, huh? Either because it is, what? Limited or finite, secundum ram, huh? Insofar as it is once, what? Desired act. Or because it is finite, according to it, it falls under, what? Apprehension. It is not able to be apprehended under the, what, ratio of the infinite. Because the infinite is that of whose quantity one takes, there is always something outside of it to take. Now to the second it should be said that reason is in some way of an infinite, what, power, insofar as it is able to consider something, ad infinitum, as it appears in the addition of numbers and what, lines. Remember the kids were little, can you count to a hundred, Daddy? I said, yeah. Wow. After a while you know, Daddy, can you count to a thousand? Yeah. Wow. Can you count to a hundred? Once the infinite in some way taken is proportioned to what? Reason. Reason. For the universal, which reason apprehends, is in some way infinite, huh? So if I know what a number is, in some way I know an infinity of things, right? And when I say, you know, no odd number is even, I'm talking about an infinity of things, right? There's two of it. Yeah, yeah. I'm pretty impressed with that one, right? Insofar as in potency, it contains an infinity of singulars, right? It's a set of infinity of things. That's why I was explaining Shakespeare's definition of reason, right? And one sense of larger discourse is what? The discourse about the large, right? And one sense of about the large is about the, what? Universal. Well, if the universal in some way covers an infinity of things, that's really a large discourse you're making there, huh? That's what you do with it, take a year. Like a large discourse. The third, it should be said, in order that someone be pleased, huh? It is not required that he, what? Pursue all things that he desires. But in each thing desired that he follows, he takes, what? Delight. He does get to each bonbon, each bottle, wherever it is, right, huh? He enjoys it, right? So I have to have the pleasure of talking to my pleasure next time, huh? That looks pretty good. Delight. Delight. Delight. Delight. Delight. The Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, amen. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order, illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor, pray for us. And help us to understand all that you have written. Father, Son, and the Holy Spirit, amen. So now we're up to pleasure, right, huh? Pleasant topic, huh? Then we're not to consider about delectazione, huh? Pleasure. And tristitia, sadness, right, huh? Now, about pleasure, four things ought to be, what, considered. I didn't know that there were four things to be considered, but we'll see what those are. First, about pleasure itself, by itself, right? Secondly, about the causes of pleasure, right? Third, about its, what, effects. Now, up to this point, does this remind you of something else? Yeah, yeah. It's a very beautiful way of, huh? What is love, and what are the causes of love, and what are the effects of love, right? This is beautiful. And then fourth, though, about the goodness and badness of it, huh? Can pleasure be bad? Desire for its own sake, how can it be bad, you know? So, okay. But notice, if you look at Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, you know, he talks about pleasure when he talks about temperance, of course, in the third book. But he talks about pleasure again when he talks about continents and so on in the seventh book. But he even comes back in the tenth book when he's going to talk about what, finally, what happiness is, right? And he's got to clap about pleasure, kind of put that somewhat to the side, and then happiness really consists, huh? So it's a very important topic. So, about the first, eight things are asked, huh? I didn't know that either, the eight things are asked about this, huh? This guy seems, you know, interesting kind of. He's just making it up and it goes wrong. A sign of how little we thought about these things, right? We did not ask these eight things. First, with your pleasure, is a passio, right? Now, you could translate passio as passion in English, although science has connotations you don't want to necessarily limit it to. But you can say emotion, right? Or sometimes even one meaning of the word feeling, right, huh? But passio is the one they use there, huh? And that's with edge of the word emotion, right? Because passio means undergoing. Now, it's kind of a surprise. Whether it is in what time? This touches upon the disagreement there between the two greatest philosophers, Plato and Aristotle. Third, whether it differs from joy. Now, you speak of what? Pleasure and joy and pain and sadness, right? Joy and sadness are a little more spiritual, it seems, right? And pleasure and pain are more, what, bodily things, right, huh? So we speak of pleasure and pain, especially with regard to the sense of touch, huh? But joy and sadness are a little more, what, spiritual, yeah. So is envy a kind of pain or is it more a kind of sadness? Yeah, yeah. And is pity more a kind of pain or a kind of sadness over the misfortune of another? And melancholy, right, huh? It's a kind of, what, sadness, right? It's a little more spiritual cause, right? Yeah, we want to, we want to be eternally happy. We don't necessarily want to have eternal pleasure. Yeah. What does it say? There's more joy in heaven over one sinner, he depends, right? Yeah. Yeah, it doesn't say more pleasure. It doesn't say more. Another round of beer. In the prayer after communion, it is in tongues, it's in gaudium, right? Fourth, whether it's found in the intellectual desiring power, right, whether it's found in the will, right? Fifth, are the comparisons of the pleasures of the higher appetite and the pleasure of the lower one. Six, are the comparison of sense pleasures to each other. Seven, whether there's some pleasure that's not natural. And eight, whether one pleasure can be contrary to another pleasure. So I can go from philosophy to Mozart, but not to some other pleasures. So, whether a delictatio is a passio, right? To the first end, one goes forward thus. It seems that pleasure is not a, what, passion, emotion. For Damascene, in the second book, eh? Maybe it's called the second book, it's the famous book of Damascene, right, eh? The orthodox faith, right, eh? It's always been quoted, eh? He distinguishes, what, operation from, what, passion. Saying that operation is a motion, which is according to, what, nature. Passion, however, is a motion against nature. This is kind of an unusual use of these words. But pleasure is an operation, as the philosopher says in the seventh and tenth book of the ethics, right? Rather than it's a motion in time, right? Therefore, pleasure is not a passion, huh? Now I really am mixed up, aren't you? Yeah, especially when you compare two different authors who might be using the words there. Yeah, yeah. Moreover, pati est moveri, huh? To undergo, right? To suffer is to be moved, right, huh? So in the third book of the physics of natural hearing, Aristotle takes up what motion is, right? And he takes up acting upon and undergoing, huh? Axio and passio in Latin. Poion and pasque in there, right? The two categories. That's when Thomas has a little nice digression there where he explains the ten categories, huh? And divides them better than Albert the Great does. I was kind of preparing them, you know, for talking about the book of the Stigrifitations thing. He said, what is the human condition as far as error is concerned? And what does Aristotle, you know, think about this human condition, right? And Thomas, you know, and what passage book? Of course, he's not aware of it, but it's in the commentary in the third book on the soul, right? And Aristotle's talking about the early Greeks, and he says, they gave this as a cause of knowledge, right? But they gave an explanation of why there's deception and error. And that seems to be more property animals than to know, right? And he said, we see that people from themselves are, what, deceived and so on. And they need a teacher to get them out of their errors and so on. And as a teacher, you realize how easily the students, you know, make mistakes and so on. And how long it takes to sometimes see through some of these mistakes or errors. And he says, and we spend more time, pluri tempore, right, in error, than in the knowledge of truth, huh? Only after a long, difficult. So it's a pretty, pretty sad situation for... You know, one time I was taking sabbatical there, and I was working on error, you know, and so on. And I couldn't help but remember this guy who had gone and got a medical degree, but didn't get into psychiatry, right? You know, and of course, to him it seemed like everybody's just about ready to crack up, you know? You know, we're about that far away from that, you know, all around. Well, I was going to, you know, we're that far away from our next mistake, you know. It's so hard to avoid that, huh? So pate, to undergo, is to be moved, right? It's like we get the word emotion, right, from being moved. But...