Prima Secundae
Lecture 93: The Causes of Pleasure: Operation, Motion, and Knowledge

Transcript
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Question, rather, 32 here, right? On the cause of pleasure, right? And I was comparing this looking before and after to what he did with love, right? Yeah. You played hooky, remember? Oh. Yeah. It was so well recollected on retreat by the guy who asked class. Yeah. I was noticing the likeness here between the treatise on love and the treatise on what? Pleasure, right? That he considers it kind of in itself and then looks before at its cause and then after its effect. Even though looking at it in itself, it's a looking before and after, right? Even there, but it kind of gives a sudden, what? Completeness to those two ones, love and directatio. And just in terms of the Trinity, I mean in terms of the science of theology, right? Of all these emotions, right, whose names are carried over sometimes to acts of the will, only love and what? The dictatio are found in God. So even considering the earth is order to knowing God here in theology, it's appropriate that love and pleasure have a more, what? Fuller consideration, right? But maybe even for us, those two are very, most fundamental too. Because a lot of people want most of all is pleasure, right? Okay. Then we're not to consider about the causes of pleasure. And about this, eight things are asked. I didn't know that there were eight things asked about it, but I guess there are. First, with operation, is the proper cause of what? Pleasure, right? And Aristotle talks about this in the last book of Nicomachean Ethics, right? That there's a pleasure that follows upon the perfection of what? Operation, right? So when I hear something beautiful and I hear it well, I'm not hard of hearing, then there's going to be pleasure, right, in hearing the music of Mozart, right? Or if I see a beautiful painting and my eyes are not, you know, I can't really see it, right? And then there's going to be a certain, what, pleasure following upon that. If I understand something like appropriation or something, right, and I understand it well, right, then there's going to be a, what, some pleasure, right? So that's a very important thing that Aristotle was talking about there in the 10th book of Nicomachean Ethics, right? So we talk about that in the vision, right, pleasure, right? The Psalms talk about that. Now, second, whether motion is a cause of pleasure, right? I think I mentioned before how Thomas tends to use the word operation for a, what, activity that is perfect, right? Not for, what, this act of what it's able to be insofar as it's able to be. That is motion, right? Motion is, by its very nature, an imperfect, what, act, right? Why operation is used by Thomas, anyway. Aristotle uses entele and a caya. But operation for a perfect act, like seeing or hearing, right? And probably the simplest way to see the distinction a little bit, like I've mentioned before, and Aristotle does in the 9th book there, when you're walking home, which is emotion, right? Have you walked home? And when you have walked home, are you walking home? So, so long as you're walking home, the activity of walking home is incomplete. It's very nature of incomplete. And if you think of it being completed at some time, it doesn't exist anymore. So, okay, but what about seeing or hearing, right? See, when I'm seeing the beautiful painting, have I seen it yet? Yes, see, it's already complete in a way, right? I'm hearing the music of Mozart, have I heard it yet, right? I used to say to the girls there, and I'd be like this example, I said, you know, you're loving somebody, have you loved them yet? I guess, of course, you know. So that seeing or hearing and loving are, what, perfect acts, right? They're operaciones, right? So it's interesting, he has these two, you know, next to each other, right? But motion is, what, more known to us, right? And Thomas often remarks upon how Plato, you know, says that the first mover moves himself, right? But he's not really disagreeing with Aristotle, because he's using motion now in this broader sense to include even understanding and loving, right? And so it's kind of profound. Plato means that God, the understanding and loving himself, you know, moves us, right? And he and Aristotle are saying the same thing, right? And the motion is carried over. It's more known, right? It's interesting, it's carried over to operation. Motion is not carried over to form, though. But the word act is carried over from motion to form. We first name motion and act. I mentioned how, you know, it's in Quebec there, you know, you go to the movies and they still have the newsreels in those days. And what we call a newsreel, they call it les actualités. What's actual, what's going on, you know? Moving, yeah, yeah, you know. So if there's a revolution in some country, that's going to be the news, right? Things are still the same. I mean, there's no news. It was boring, yeah. Yeah, I used to say, no news is good news. I used to hear it from my grandfather. Okay. Third, whether hope and memory are causes of pleasure, right? Well, you see, hope and memory are for an operation which is not present here, right? But the one, you're remembering it, right? Or you're anticipating it, right, huh? Okay. Interesting way he's got these things worded, right? It's a strange thing. Whether it's sadness. Yes. Oh my goodness, huh? Masochist? What are you talking about here? He's melancholic. I mean, huh? He's melancholic, yeah. We'll make happy others now. Five, whether the actions of others are to us a cause of what? Pleasure, right? If my fellow citizens vote for Romney instead of for this black guy, they cause a pleasure for me, right? Interesting, he has these things. He's a very, very capacious mind, he has, I would say. Willing to benefit another is a cause of what? Pleasure. I often hear people talking about that in even the daily paper, right? They know that you're very, very... Feel good to do something for somebody. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. That's what he does. Now, whether likeness is a cause of pleasure, right? That's strange. Remember, likeness was a cause of what? Love. Of love, you know? See, gee, what's that? Why would he even ask this? He's an amazing guy, this Thomas, you know? You know, just an incredible guy. Incredible. He says so much, you've got to slow down, you know, and enjoy it, you know? Go too fast, you know, and enjoy it, you know? I don't sit down and read a whole Shakespeare play anymore in one evening, you know? I could, but I just, you know, read a few pages and, ah, think about this line or that line, you know? And then, ah, as a philosopher now, where their wonder is a cause of pleasure, right? This makes me think of the... I thought of it this morning when the Lord asked the Pharisees, you know, whose son is the Messiah? And he said, David's son. And he said, well, if he's David's son, how can he call him Lord? And Mark's gospel is the only one that... He says, and everyone heard him gladly. Yeah. They didn't have an answer. They didn't even dare to ask another question, but they were glad. Yeah, yeah, yeah. They just hated it. Yeah. That's sort of what I thought of as an example of that. It's kind of interesting, too, you know, there's sometimes a wonder in the student, you know, when they first hear something, you know, and it's a wonderful thing, you know, and it's kind of revised and refreshes the vessel, you know, and it sees this wonder, you know, in the student area, you know, huh? Light goes on. Yeah, yeah. You've got to break through the bowline stairs. Yeah, yeah. In helping my joke last night, they were talking about the fallacy of equivocation, right, and so on, talking about some other things. And I was talking about how, you know, our knowledge starts with the singulars, but among universals, more universal comes equal to less universal. One of my typical examples is to, you know, if you're going to classify through your experience the plants on that campus, right, vegetation on the campus, and they always stick in, you know, prison company excluded, you know. I can't help it. We're doing this in-size table by students, you know. I don't know what they... It's built in the college professors to be mean. Yeah, yeah. Yeah. To the first end, one goes forward thus, it seems that operation is not the proper and first cause of pleasure, propria and prima, for as the philosopher says in the first book of the rhetoric, to be pleased consists in this that the sense undergoes something, right? For there is required for pleasure some what? Knowledge. So the tree has no pleasure, right? Let alone the stone, right? But just the animals and us, right? But paraprials, right? Before are knowable the objects of operations, then the operations themselves, right? Therefore preparation is not the proper cause of pleasure, right? So is it the music of Mozart that pleases me, or is it my hearing the music of Mozart that pleases me? Is it God that will please me in the epic vision, or is it my seeing him that will please me? Or is it both in some order there, right? The hearing of rock and roll is not going to please me. It's got to be a good object, right? It's interesting, you know, we have this passage of Aristotle in the Dianua, you know, where he says, you know, one knowledge is better than another is knowledge, right? Because it's about a better thing, or because we know the object better, right? And he gives you two criteria, right? But then in the beginning of the parts of animals, he says that the ability of the object is more important than how you know it, right? That it's better to know a better thing imperfectly than to know, yeah. So to know God imperfectly is better than to know the number of chairs in this room perfectly. I can really get the number of chairs in this room down, you know? Don't doubt about it anymore, you know? Divide and conquer, I mean, really, line them up in rows and stuff. I can really get the exact knowledge of that, you know, but it wouldn't give you much pleasure, I don't think. But even in perfect knowledge, of course, Aristotle makes a beautiful comparison there, you know, as a glimpse of someone we love is what? More than a leisurely view of the boss of the job or something, you know, or someone you see all the time, right, you know? But don't love, right, huh? Okay. Or, you know, grandparents might have a picture of their grandchild, right, you know? More than, you know, something you can see every day, you know, in the grocery store, you know? And, okay. Second objection here. Moreover, pleasure, most of all, consists in the end being what? Achieved, I guess. For this is what is especially what? Desired, huh? But not always is the operation itself the end, but sometimes the thing what? Done, right? Therefore, the operation is not the proper and first cause of pleasure, right, huh? So with Michelangelo, right, was it the making of the pietas or when the pietas was now made, ah, there it is, you know? Moreover, idleness and rest are said by their, are said to the seizing of operation, right, huh? Okay. Kind of relax. But these are, what? Delightful, as is said in the first book of the rhetoric, right? Therefore, operation is not the proper cause of what? Pleasure, right, huh? So what do you think of that, huh? But then you're piped and smiled for a little bit. Okay. But against this is what the philosopher says, huh? In both the seventh and in the tenth book of the ethics, huh? That pleasure is an operation that's connatural and not impeded, right, huh? Now I answer it should be said, that it has been said above, that for pleasure two things are, what? Required. To it, the obtaining of a suitable, what? Good. And the knowledge of this, what? Attaining. Attaining, right, huh? So if I'm wealthy in my sleep, my stock has gone up in some remarkable way, but I don't know it, no delight, right, huh? Got a brilliant idea, but I don't know it's brilliant. It solves the difficulty. But both of these consist in some operation, right? For actual knowledge is a certain operation. What would be the English word for operation, see? It's kind of a Latinized word, huh? A Latin import, huh? I call it transliteration. Yeah. There's always a joke about that, right? The wife might say, no, it's not doing anything. There's a thinking there, right? I mean, I like the word English for doing, right, huh? You can have practical context sometimes, too, you know? But you make this distinction in English between doing and what? Making, huh? It's an example that way of names becoming equivocal by reason, huh? You could divide doing into making and what? Doing. And making gets a new name because there's a product apart from doing, right? And then the operation that doesn't have a product keeps the name, what? Doing, right, huh? But the operation that doesn't have a product is actually a more perfect doing, right? The doing that doesn't have a product. So I'm kind of inclined to like the word doing, you know? I think you have to explain it a little bit, right? Because your wife might think you're not doing something. I think about the guy, you know, one of my philosophers, you know, he's sitting in the room there reading books and he looks up and he thinks I'm always just a rage, you know? And then his wife thinks, well, he's not doing anything now. If he's reading, you know, he's doing something. But, you know, if he pauses and looks up like that, he must be just, you know, dating or something. Coming up with his small talk or something, you know? That's so funny, I think, you know? You know, we don't understand what a foster is. But this is probably the most important part when reading a book, where you stop and say, you know, you think of that, that's something, you know? You kind of go over it, you know? Sometimes I read tablets and I just stop and try to remember what I just read, you know, and think about it. That's kind of when it really sinks in, you know? That's what I told you. That's really doing something, you know? That's what my mother did to me last year when I was reading something. And she was sitting next to me in a chair. Yeah. And she was really deaf, so, and I was reading something and I looked up and I was trying to reason it out and I guess my lips were moving and I didn't realize. Yeah, yeah. And she said, who are you talking to? Who are you talking to? I said, oh, I'm just trying to reason out what I'm reading. Oh, what are you reading, you know? And likewise, the suitable good be obtained by some, what, operation. And one's own operation is a certain good that is, what, convenience or suitable, right? Fitting, you know? Once it's necessary that every, what, pleasure follows upon some, what, operation. So you're going to get pleasure sleeping, I guess, huh? Let's see if we get that. What about the first one? It says, the objects, aren't it? The objects, the causes of pleasure, right? To the first therefore it should be said that the objects of operations are not, what, delightful or pleasing. To the first thing. To the first thing. To the first thing. except insofar as they are joined, what, to us. Either by knowledge alone, in some cases, as when we delight in the consideration or begin to of some things, right? Or in some other way, together, see more, right? With, what, knowledge, huh? Just as one delights in this, that he knows himself to have some good, as, for example, wealth, or honor, right? Or something of this sort, huh? So if you know you're loved, right? It's good to be loved, huh? There's still that comparison there. You know, it says to be loved is a way to be honored, right? But to be loved is really better than to be honored. Which are not delightful except insofar as they are grasped or known as something had, right? Whence the philosopher, as the philosopher says in the second book of the politics, it has great pleasure to think something to be, what? One's own, right? Which proceeds from the natural love of one to himself, huh? To naturally love yourself, huh? So I have this nice edition of Shakespeare. Hmm. You'd be very happy, right? Delightful. You know, it's my, my copy of Shakespeare, right? There's no grandchildren, right? Do you know? Yeah. To have, right, of this sort is nothing other than to use these things or be able to, what? Use them, right, huh? Like this bookcase with the nice books in them. What should I look at tonight, you know? And this is through some operation, right? Take it down and read it. Once it is clear that oldness, gee, see, Thomas, very strong. That every pleasure is reduced into some operation as in a, what? Cause. Wow. What a mind this guy is. Now, as you said, there's seven articles. That's the question. But this will be more clear, right? The fundamental truth, right? But the way he's ordered these, right? Not only is he looking before, but he looks at the causes, but that he orders this article before all the rest, right? Did you think of that as a place to begin? Mm-hmm. Because he's got a little help from Aristotle, you know? Mm-hmm. And he didn't do it all by himself. I was talking to his students last night about the eight senses of end, right? What's kind of remarkable is that in the text that Thomas is saying, this is in the fourth book of the physics, right? And Aristotle distinguishes the eight chief or central or core senses of end. He's got eight of them, right? But he doesn't put them in order. And Thomas said, well, now, let's put them in order in the way that Aristotle puts the senses of the words in order in the fifth book of wisdom, right? So he's learned from what Aristotle does. And then he orders them from one to eight. Beautiful the way he orders them. That's absolutely beautiful. And it's, I mean, things that lead you to understand, right? I was kind of struck by, I was thinking about the senses of thinking out the other day again. And there's one sense of thinking out corresponding to the second sense again. One corresponding to the third. One to the fourth, right? One to the fifth. And one to the sixth. And one to the seventh, right? But the ones corresponding to the second, the third, the fourth, and the, what, fifth, pertain to the logic of the first act. The one corresponding to the sixth sense corresponds to the second act. And the one corresponding to the seventh sense to the third act. So how it illuminates, right? Logic, right? You know, when I was first teaching logic there, we used to have a logic course required, or everybody used to do the first course required in philosophy. Logic course, and I got to thinking about this phrase, thinking out, you know, I thought it was so good, you know. And I was thinking out, the senses of thinking out, through the senses of in, right? So I told you, I went to Mancini Dian and said, what do you think of this word, thinking out? And he thought it was very good. And then he told me, but you can't say this in French, you know, because French is just a defective language, you can't go into English. You know? Oh, there you go. I told you that a million times ago, both Mancini Dian and Father Boulay, you know, whose native language was French, you know, said that English was superior to French for both philosophy and for poetry. I mean, if Brooker said, he said, well, Brooker said, well, French, what the hell is this? It's pretty, you know, worth. Here are people whose native language is French, right? And they can see the superiority of English, huh? I told you what the, the, the, the phyologist up there of all said, that the English language is the greatest invention of the human mind. Oh, really? Yeah. Oh, yeah. I remember the German, the Austrian priest telling him, because he stumbled over the pronunciation of English. Uh-huh. So he didn't like English because of that. And he said, English is a dumpling language, which he meant, you pronounce the word like you have a dumpling in your mouth. That's how you pronounce it. That's how you pronounce it. Because he was trying to say the word euthanasia. Yeah. Because he was reading it. He had me sit next to him while he was reading this discourse of poetry. Yeah. And he says, of course, it's a perfect German, derived from the quote, euthanasia. And I said, euthanasia. And he said, what? Good boy. Euthanasia. Euthanasia. Our assistant pastor, he's from Poland, you know, and it's, he has a little problem pronouncing sometimes English words, you know, and it's a little hard to, what he's saying, you know, but it's a little kind of a. Okay, now, second objection, right? Even in those in which, what? The operations are not the ends, right? But the things operative. The things operative, the things done, right? Or made, huh? Are delightful insofar as they are had or made, right? You know, which again refers to some use or operation. Look what I've made. Wow. Now, what about this thing about rest, you know? To the third, it should be said that operations are delightful insofar as they are proportioned to and connatural to the one doing them, right? Now, since human power or strength is, what, finite, right? According to some measure, operation is, what, proportioned to it, huh? Whence if it exceeds that measure, already it is no longer, what, proportioned to it. Nor, what? Right. Delightful. But more laborious and weary. Weary, yeah. According to this, hate. Or idleness. I don't know, excuse me, I want to say hate. Odeo, I think. Yeah, yeah. And according to this, idleness and ludic play, right? And other things which pertain to, what? Rest. Are delightful. Insofar as they take away the sadness, which is from, what? Labor, yeah. So professors tell jokes in class sometimes, right? It's kind of to leave them for that. Yeah, I'll tell you what this guy was saying, you know. He looks down upon the students as he's lecturing, you know. Their expression on their face is like, why are you doing this to me? I'm kind of strange, you know, huh? You know, to think about these things, huh? It's interesting how the Shakespeare's plays are called plays, right? That's the word in English. It's kind of an understanding of what their purpose is. And we speak of play music. Yeah. Many languages. Thomas has one of the, I think it's the Tehep Dramatikos, where he has a little quote from the scripture, you know? Run into your house and play there with your thoughts. The scripture says, and Thomas says, why do you speak of this as play? Well, play is to some extent for its own sake, right? And it's pleasant, and that's what, you know, these thoughts are, right? But it uses the word play, right? Doesn't it say it in the creation too there? Wisdom. In Proverbs. Whichever book it is, yeah. Proverbs, yeah. He's playing it for you, right? Mm-hmm. Yeah. He just flies to a wanton voice. We to the gods. They kill us for their sport. That's what happened. Now, what about this thing called motion, though, which is an imperfect act, right? I thought another example of that kind of imperfect act is cooking. Mm-hmm. When you're cooking the roast, has it been cooked? No. But when is it cooked? You better take it off or get it too much. You're going to throw it, yeah. That's probably when you try to, you know, you've got a piece of steak or something left over, you know, and you've got to heat it up a little bit, but then there's no way to do it without ruining it, really. To the second, then, one proceeds thus. It seems that motion is not a cause of pleasure. Oh, he's going to say it is a cause of pleasure, huh? Okay? Because, as has been said, a good in the now, right, obtained, I guess, is the cause of pleasure, right? Whence the philosopher in the Seventh Book of the Ethics says that pleasure is not to be compared to generation, but to the doing of a thing already, what, existing, right? I didn't say, oh, yeah, it's okay, no, huh? But that which is moved towards something does not yet, what, have that, huh? But in a way is on the road, is on the road, or in the road, a way of the generation with respect to it. According as, in all motion, there is involved generation and corruption, as is said in the Eighth Book of the Physics, right? Therefore, motion is not the cause of pleasure, right? Given the right of the good. Moreover, motion especially induces labor and, what, assitude, right? I was reading the Gospel of St. John today, Christ was, he was tired, he sat down by the well there in Samaria, right? Had a conversation with the woman there. He was tired from his motion, right, of walking, Christ himself. So, but operations from this, if they are laborious, and what? Wearying. Weary, yeah. Retiring, yeah. Are not delightful, but are more effective, right? Therefore, motion is not a cause of, what? So, how did I enjoy playing games when I was a kid? Playing baseball, playing football, you know? Learning around. Wear yourself out. Learning around, catching the ball. Enjoy doing that. Shakespeare has a beautiful metaphor there, you know. It's a night's dream, you know, he speaks of the dead and drowsy fire. The beautiful kind of fire, drowsy, you know. Oh, the fire is kind of slowing down and drowsy. Beautiful metaphor, isn't it? Drowsy fire. It burns slower. Yeah, yeah, kind of. Moreover, motion implies a certain innovation, huh? Which is opposed to, what? Custom, right? But those things which are customary are pleasant for us, huh? As the philosopher says in the first book of the rhetoric, huh? So, different nations of people have different, what? Foods that they delight in, and other people don't maybe delight in them so much, right? Not at all. Therefore, motion is not a cause of, what? In the book here on Fennish, and of course they have a lot of fish there, you know. I mean, I wouldn't like that to be a citizen of Venice, after all. But notice, custom is like a second nature, huh? So, just like we spoke of pleasure as being what is natural to you, right? Well, pleasure, right? I mean, custom is like a second nature, so it makes something pleasant, right? This motion is something new. But again, this is what Augustine says in the Eighth Book of the Confessions, huh? What is this, huh? God, Lord my God, right? When you are what? Eternal, right? To yourself, right? And you are what? Joy, right, huh? And things about yourself, about yourself, they always what? Rejoice. Rejoice, huh? But this, what? Part of things, that is what? Alternating between defect and progress, right? Right, Lord, yeah. Offenses and what? Conciliations. Rejoices, huh? Hmm. Okay? That's about us, I guess. Yeah, yeah. People kind of panic and they're going to be just looking at God and, you know, kind of... That was my friend. Yeah, it's in Scripture there, you know, you get like a pillar in the church, you know, and you're not glad anymore. That's it, you know? Sounds really boring. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Can we do anything else? Yeah, yeah, yeah. We get tired of that? Let's see. That's where the first... The first couple of million years. Yeah. Okay, all right. But what happened to that? Yeah, and I used to say to people, you know, what in the old days, it made more sense than now, but, you know, what's the most red thing in the world today? Well, it's the newspaper, right? The new newspaper, the paper that has new things in it, right? Who wants the old things, right? That's motion. From which one takes that men rejoice and are delighted in certain alternations, right, huh? Okay. Variety is a spice of life. I don't know. We said spice of monastery. And that motion seems to be a cause of pleasure, right, huh? Okay. What's the great master going to say here, huh? The answer should be said that for pleasure, three things are required, which two of which are is the, what, conjunction or joining of the delectable to oneself, I guess. And the third is the knowledge of this, what, conjunction, right? Okay. And according to these three things, motion is, what, rendered pleasant, as the philosopher says, both in the seventh book of the Nicomachean Ethics and in the first book of the, what, rhetoric, huh? For on our side, who delight, right, or have pleasure, change becomes, what, pleasant to us on account of this, that our nature is, what, changeable, right? On account of this, what is suitable to us now will not be suitable to us afterwards, right? Just as to warm oneself at the fire is suitable to man in the winter, but not in the, what? Summer. Summer, huh? On the side of the, what, good delighting that is joined to us, transmutation or change also comes about, what, as delightful? Because the continual action of some agent, what, increases the effect of it, right, huh? Just as when some is longer, what, poaching the fire, he is more heated and dried out. But the natural, what, condition consists in a certain, what, measure. What, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what And therefore, when the continual presence of something, what? Delightful, exceeds the measure of the natural, what? Disposition. There is a removal of its, what? Delightful, right then? So you eat too much of something, you don't enjoy anymore, right? It tastes good at all. On the side of the knowledge itself, because man desires to know something that is a whole and, what? Perfect. Interesting, you know, those two words are right, because Aristotle, in the third book of the physics, you know, saying whole and perfect seem to mean almost the same, right? And there's some proximity of those two, huh? Since therefore some things aren't able to be grasped, what? Totosimo. So, one delights in these, what, change, right? That one, what? Yeah. And that's the whole sense. That's a very piece of music, right? You know, to stop the one note, you know, the thing is... Or a play. Yeah, yeah, it's cocked there in the thing, you know, right? The old, you can't even talk that way anymore. It doesn't make sense to kids, the records. Yeah, yeah, but even the CD there, sometimes it gets a little thing that gets stuck in it, you know? I don't want to say, well, it's kind of annoying. I can say it over and over again, right? Clean, clean. Yeah. Once Augustine says in the fourth book of the Confessions, you do not wish, what? The syllable to stand, right? But to pass. But to pass, that others might come, that you might hear the, what? The whole. Oh, and this always, and this always, all things in which something one is constituted, right? And that are not, what? All together. Yeah. They more delight, all of them, than one by itself. Or this, than that by itself, right? Singular. If they are, what? They sense together. Yeah. One can sense all of them, right? If, therefore, there is something whose nature is, what, unchangeable, and there cannot come about in it in excess of the natural, what? Yeah. The continuation of the act of the book. And whose, what? Whole. Whole is, what, delightful to all at once. Upon, right? Transmutation or change will not be delightful to it, right? What's he telling you about there? God. Yeah, yeah. And it's supposed to be division, too, right? Mm-hmm. And the more some pleasures exceed to this, the more they're able to be, what? Continued. Yeah. Interesting, huh? Maybe insofar as we're created to God's image, if we have a better understanding of our soul, I guess this will be, we'll take more pleasure in those things that change less and less far. Yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But I guess, to some way, I'm always thinking in terms of knowledge of yourself, know thyself, and that's what I'm thinking in terms of this, this is a way to go up from your knowledge. But there are some things that can't be enjoyed, can't be enjoyed all at once, right? I go from the appetizer to the main course, the dessert, right, you know? Or just in the opera, you know, one area after the other, right? Mm-hmm. So you're going to want to just hear this, the same aria over and over again, or the next area, and I'm kind of a changeable person because of my body, right? Mm-hmm. I want to see more, is the definition of eternity, yeah? What about the first objection that says, motion is like a coming to be, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that that which is moved, although it does not yet have perfectly that to which it is moved, right, it begins, nevertheless, to have something of that towards which it is, what, moved, yeah? And according to this, motion itself has something of, what, pleasure, right? But it falls short of, what, the perfection of pleasure, for the more perfect pleasures are in things that, what, not the perishable things, lest you perish with them, so says Augustine. Motion also is rendered delightful or pleasant, insofar as through it something, what, becomes suitable that before was not suitable, right? Or it ceases to be, right? As has been said above, huh? In the body of the article, huh? What about it inducing labor and lassitude, huh? Feebleness with this. The second should be said that motion brings in labor and, what, weariness, according as it transcends the natural, what? Yeah. Thus, motion is not delightful, but according as it, what? The contrary things. The thing, but according as it removes things that are contrary to the natural, what? Mm-hmm. Disposition, right? Contrares of the natural disposition, aren't there? Yeah. So, insofar as it induces labor and weakness, it's not pleasant, right? But insofar as he moves, the contrary, so. The physician, I know, he doesn't get a lot of physical activity. A physician. A physician. Because, among other things, we had another one here this weekend, and he was complaining about how much time he has to spend doing data work on the computer at the end of the day. He's exhausted from patients. Yeah. He's got to sit down on the computer for hours to map out all this stuff. So, another physician, I know, he says he relaxes by going to work in the garden. He can work out the things that are contrary to his natural disposition. He can get rid of those things. Yeah. Relax his muscles, and then he can rest. Yeah. So, for him, to work in the garden is actually a form of relaxation. He's getting stressed out. So, I've heard people have, some people have some kind of scruple about that. Well, what if I work six days a week on Sunday? I relax by working in the garden. But some people say, oh, you shouldn't do labor on Sunday. Well, he says, well, you're relaxing. Because the job is so stressful. Yeah. Yeah. Well, that's the problem. I think people don't understand. Now, to the theory, it should be said that that which is accustomed is rendered delightful, right, insofar as it is made, what, natural, right? Yeah. That's why in Aristotle, when Thomas is talking about the existence of God is obvious, right, huh? And it seems obvious because of custom, right, huh? Because they're accustomed to call upon him from childhood and so on. And Aristotle talks about that. I think it's customary, just take it without, as if it were per se known, right? Yeah. Yeah. Custom is a dangerous thing in the life of the mind in that respect, huh? But motion is delightful, not in that you receive some custom, but more according as to it is imputed, the what? Correct. Yeah. Which could happen from the... Meaning? Yeah. Some operation. Some operation. And thus, from the same cause of the naturality, both custom and motion are what? Delightful, right, huh?