Prima Secundae
Lecture 94: Pleasure: Causes, Memory, Hope, and Sadness

Transcript
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Okay. Interesting. Kind of interesting to compare custom and what? Fashion, right? Because fashion is from the new and custom gets a string from the old, right? So something can be strong and attract us because it's old and also because it's new, right? It's kind of a different thing, right? Kind of interesting. Certainly with immigrants, the Lebanese, they come to this country and they may be here for a couple of generations, but they still want to have the kid be in the hummus and they want to listen to the music and they want to have a hoffle and do the dead key and all that stuff. They want the old customs. It's comforting to them in a country that's, even if they were born and raised here, it's comforting to them to have a connection. Sure, sure. Should we take a little break now or what? Sure. Hope and memory, right, huh? That's a bummer, right? Change and hope, wasn't it? You ran in 2008 there. It was change, but change was worse, as someone said. The third one goes forward thus. It seems that memory and hope are not causes of what? Yeah. For pleasure is about a present good, as Damascene said. Well, he says that too, right? But memory and hope are about an absent good, right? Persons makes the heart go fonder, huh? Or some people say, adhesives makes the heart go wander. For memory is of the past, and hope is of the, what, future, right? Therefore, memory and hope are not causes of what? Pleasure, right? Moreover, the same is not a cause of contraries. But hope is a cause of affliction. For it is said in Proverbs 13, the hope which is deferred afflicks the soul, right? So even the saints there, are they afflicted by their going to see God yet? Sometimes you see parts of the scene as a conversation with God or something, or Christ, and you want to suffer a little more before you go? What do you choose, you know? Or you want to go now? It gives them the choice, you know? I can't understand that, you know, you've seen the painting, the Christ is holding on to her, the golden crown, and the crown of thorns, and she's choosing the thorns, she's grabbing for the hell. Yeah, a marvelous woman. Therefore, hope is not a cause of pleasure. Moreover, just as hope comes together with that, pleasure in this that is about the good, good, so also desire and what? Love. Therefore, we're not to sign hope more than concupiscence, right? Or love, as a cause of pleasure, right? Of course, concupiscence doesn't imply, though, that you what? Hope to eat, you know? It's not possible, you don't think it's possible, right? Because it's good, you might desire steak dinner, but there's no steak going to be there on the table tonight, you know that? You have no hope for that, I think. But again, this is what, let's see, anybody can quote these things here. Hope, spei godentes, right? Was it, Paul VI had an encyclical right there, spei godentes, didn't he? Paul VI, I think he did, yeah. And Chris, what's his name, his encyclical, and Pope II, a little bit of that. Yeah, and in Psalm 76, Memor fui dei e delictatus sum, right? I like that. So it wasn't, I remember this little grandchild, you know, talking about a little kid thing they did every little. So I answered it, it should be said, that pleasure is caused from the presence of a suitable good, right? According as it is sensed, or quali ter kumkwe, in some way whatsoever, right? When it is perceived, right? But something is present to us in two ways. It's interesting, he speaks of the thing present, right? In one way, by knowledge, insofar as the known is in the knower, according to its what? Likeness. In another way, say kundamrama, in the thing itself, insofar as one is really joined to what? Another, huh? In act or in ability, according to some way of being joined. And because greater is the conjunction, say kundamrama, in the thing, than by likeness, which is the conjunction of what? And also greater is the conjunction of the thing in act than in what? Potency. Therefore, most of all is the pleasure which comes about by sense, which requires the presence of the, what? Sensible thing, yeah? But the second grade holds the pleasure of hope, in which not only is something pleasant, the conjunction according to what? Grasping. But also according to the faculty or power of obtaining the good which delights them. Third grade holds the, what? Pleasure of memory, which has only the conjunction of apprehension, right? So he's putting hope ahead of memory, right? Before and after, right? You're going to attain it, because that's all, that's like the old man who only has his memories. Yeah. So he has three things here, right? And one is more than the other, right? That's beautiful. Or that he does say. Present. This guy really looks before and after, this guy, right? No question about it, huh? Jesus said he uses his reason, huh? Hmm? It's present, yeah. Yeah. To the first effort should be said, the first objection is based upon the, it has to be present for pleasure, right? Hope and memory are those things which are, what? Simpliciter absenta, but nevertheless secundum quid sunt, what? Presentia. It's interesting. Either according to apprehension only, or according to, what? Apprehension and the faculty of obtaining them, right? At least estimated to be so. I don't have any hope of obtaining the Heisman Trophy, even though, I think, in pure potency, yeah, I have the ability to get the Heisman Trophy. I'll keep crying. Now, what about the same thing being a cause of what? Contraries, right? Well, it seems not, huh? So, you know, when I teach the great philosopher Empedicius there, right, huh? He's talking about how earth, air, fire, and water, they come together, and then they are, what? Separated, right, huh? But then he looks for, what? Contrary causes, right, huh? And he comes up with love and hate. Contrary causes, right? I know a guy who's got a tattoo, you know, L-O-V-E on his hand, H-A-T-E on his hand. That's it. That's all right, right there, the tattoos. You know, Aristotle talks about the four kinds of causes on the, he has three kind of, I call them corollaries that follow upon the distinction of the four kinds of causes. And the first corollary is there can be many causes as such, per se, right, of the same thing, right? So both Michelangelo and, what, Marbo are causes of the Pietas, but not in the same way, right? And then the second corollary, which I find the most interesting, is the two things can be causes of each other, but in what? Different ways. Different ways, right? And, like, the maker, right, could be the cause of something. And the yin can be the, you know, okay. So is making dinner the cause of dinner, or is dinner the cause of making dinner? Making dinner is the cause in the sense of the efficient cause, right? But dinner is the cause of the making the dinner, in the sense of the end of purpose, right? It's learning the cause of knowing, or knowing the cause of learning. I used to say this to this day. Is reproduction the cause of the baby, or is the baby the cause of reproduction? If you're reproducing the right reason, then the baby is the cause of reproduction in one way, and the reproduction is the cause of the baby in another way, yeah. Then the third corollary, though, is the same thing could be a cause of, what? Contraries by its presence and absence, like the captain of the ship, right? Whose negligence is the cause of the... He's held responsible for the destruction of the ship, but by his tenderness, he's the cause of its safety, right? Here he's saying, you apply to the second here, nothing. I think prevents the same thing, secundum diversa, right, to be a cause of what? Controys. Thus, therefore, hope insofar as it has a present, what? Guessing of the future good, right? Estimating of its possibility. It causes what? Pleasure, right? But insofar as it lacks its presence, it causes what? Afflection, yeah. So the sailor out there that's separated from his wife and family, right? He hopes to come to be joined to them again, right? That causes him to sit in what? Pleasure, right? But then in the absence, right? So you see, kind of back and forth, right? Get that meat and food on the table. Cause affliction, right? Yeah. Now, to the third, right? This is one about, shouldn't other things be more assigned, right? Like love and innocence. To the third, it should be said also, that also love and concupiscence cause what? Pleasure, right, huh? For everything loved is pleasant to the one, what? Loving it, right? So if I didn't love wisdom, I wouldn't be, what? Pleased with getting some wisdom, right? If I didn't love wine, I wouldn't be pleased with getting some wine, right, huh? I won't be pleased with getting salmon, if I didn't have no love. In that love is a certain union, or what? Conformity of the nature of the lover to the what? Loved, huh? Likewise, everything, what? Desired. Is pleasant to the one desiring it, since desire is especially a desire for what? Pleasure, right? But nevertheless, hope, insofar as it implies a certain certitude, right, of the real presence of the good delighting, which will have it, right? More is, notice the word there, majus, it doesn't deny that the others are causes, right? But it is more laid down as a cause of pleasure than those, right? And likewise, more than a memory, which is of that which is passed on, huh? I forget the exact words there in Shakespeare, in the sonnets there, you know, but the feasts that have gone by, and no longer, you know, sadness there, because they're gone, that's it, you know? But your younger days are gone, right? Yeah, that's right, yeah. Yeah. One of the few things I remember, we had a beer stein, a big old beer stein on the bookshelf, Shundes de Yugen, si Kampning Mer. And a picture of a young man sitting under a tree with a young woman. Yeah. Youth is beautiful, she comes no more. Shoo, and it's gone, it's gone. Shoo, and it's gone. Now, this crazy article 4, right, where the sadness is a cause of what? Pleasure. Well, maybe in tragedy, I guess, huh? To the fourth one goes forward this, it seems that sadness is not a cause of pleasure, right? For a contrary is not the cause of a contrary. But sadness is contrary to what? Pleasure. It's like saying pain is a cause of pleasure. It's ridiculous. Absolutely ridiculous, right? Therefore, it's not a cause of pleasure, I'm convinced. Moreover, contrary are the effects of contraries, right? So if hot and cold are contrary, they're going to have contrary effects on the butter, right? One softens the butter and the other hardens the butter, right? But delightful things remembered are a cause of what? Pleasure. But sad things remembered are a cause of what? Pain. Not of pleasure, no. It's convincing. Who could deny this? Moreover, just as sadness is to what? Pleasure, so hate is to what? Love. Love. But hate is not a cause of love, right, huh? My hatred of Sam is not a cause of my getting pleasure. The more diverse. The love is its absence. The more diverse. Therefore, sadness is not a cause of what? Pleasure. But against this was what is said in Psalm 41. I can go back and check that. For my, what, tears were for me, what, bread, I guess? Day and night. Day and night, huh? Hmm. To bread over, the, what, refreshment of pleasure is understood, right? Therefore, tears which arise from sadness can be, what, contentful. I don't know what this comes. It sounds like romantic or something. He needs to see a shrink. The answer should be said that sadness, in two ways, can be considered, huh? In one way, according as it is an act. I'm actually sad, I guess, huh? Another way, according as it is in, what, memory. I thought you were going to say one is and one is not, but now he says, and in both ways, sadness can be a cause of, oh my goodness, what this guy's up to. Sadness, existing in act, is a cause of pleasure, insofar as it makes memory of something, what? Loved, whose absence, what? Loved, whose absence of someone is sad. Sad. Nevertheless, about its, what? Grasping alone, one is, what? The right, please. Yeah. What is, what is, say, in Roman Juliet? Parting is such sweet sorrow? Mm-hmm. Pretty good at Shakespeare, right? Mm-hmm. And such, it's, I suppose it's too sad. He said, pardoning is a sign that you love each other, right? Mm-hmm. That's pleasant to remember, to know that, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. But Rose and I always joke, you know, when I was going off on some trip, I think it was some conference or something like that, and the boy said, bye, Dad, you don't even know. And really, she tried to hold back the tears, you know, and try to keep from breaking down, you know, and so on. And I said goodbye to her, you know, and then she left. And then, Rosie says, that's a hard act to follow, she says. You know, you see that, you know. And I always think, I shouldn't kick on the airplane, you know, what happened if something happened to me, you know, for that poor little girl, you know. But she'd say, obviously, I love you, you know. Yeah. So, that's when my sister, I was serving a man with my brother. I never saw my dad's, my dad's, so emotional. His face was all red, his eyes were getting real watery. He was so serious, he was trying to contain himself. I mean, you're so proud, marching down with my sister, but I could see it was just about to break down, break down. So, he says, the sadness existing in act, right, is a cause of the pleasure, I'm reading it over again, insofar as it makes memory of the thing loved, right, about who's absent, one is what? Sad. Sad, yeah. It's interesting, huh? I suppose when a friend or someone has died, you know, you can be a certain pleasure in remembering that person, right? It makes sense of the memory of the person, I suppose, is sadness. It's one of the sons of Shakespeare, where he's saying, you know, don't be poor or something over me after I'm gone, you know, that's the life, we'll look into you and mock you, you know, for the, you know, kind of interesting, huh? Memory of sadness, right? Now, this is something, or I have to cause, especially, is a cause of pleasure on account of the subsequent evasion, right, huh? So, I suppose you're thinking of the fact that you, you know, how miserable you were at that time, and I'm glad to be free of this thing, right, huh? I was very upset that girl wouldn't go out or something, you know. No, no. That's how I met my wife to be, or something, yeah. Whence, according as a man grasps or knows himself to have, what, evaded or escaped from some, what, sad or painful things, right, huh? There comes to him a, what, yeah. According to Augustine says in the 22nd book of the City of God, huh? That safety often, huh? We remember, what, joyful, letty, right? We remember pistil, sad things, right, huh? And healthy of sadness, of pains, without pain, right? And then further we are rejoiced and grateful, and the Eighth Book Confession is that the more there was danger in the battle, the more there is joy in the triumph. That's what St. Bonaventure says, that the saints in heaven think about hell because they think about what they deserve, and God's mercy is spared from them. So it increases their joy. Yeah. Who says that? St. Bonaventure. Yeah, that's interesting. Okay. Just remember that next time somebody says it's inappropriate to talk about hell, well, they talk about it in heaven. So, can a contrary be a cause of contrary? The first, therefore, it should be said that the contrary sometimes, Parachi does, right? That's a very important distinction, right? Is a cause of the contrary, just as the cold sometimes, what? Heats. Heats, as it says in the book of the physics. I used to always see how, you know, you bring down your house and you're in the wintertime, you're going to be cold. So the fire is the cause of what? Being cold, right? The Parachidans, right? Not the fire as such. Fire as such is going to warm you, right? And likewise, sadness, Parachidans, is a cause of pleasure, insofar as through it, there is a knowing of something, what? Pleasant, right? So I think that's the meaning of, you know, parting is a sweet sorrow, right? Because through that sadness that you have in parting from the person you love, you both perceive that you love each other, and that's what? Pleasant, right? I mean, it's a kind of mixed thing, nevertheless, right? But I mean, it's not unalloyed joy, right? There's a certain joy in recognizing that sadness brings you to realize that you love each other, right? To second should be said, that sad things remembered, insofar as they are sad and contrary to pleasures, do not cause pleasures, right? But insofar as man is freed from them, right, huh? And likewise, memory of delightful things that one, what? From this that they are lost, can cause sadness, right? You're very, very, very young. So these young people enjoy themselves, I can't enjoy myself in that. way anymore, huh? To the theory it should be said that hate also, Karachidans, can be a cause of what? Love, huh? Insofar as some love each other, insofar as they come together in hatred of one and the same thing, huh? Anybody here hate salmon? I feel close to you. When you have somebody, like a Red Sox fan, he hates the Yankees, but maybe he hates the Phillies too, but a Phillies fan hates the Yankees too, so the Phillies and the Red Sox fans are together, hate the Yankees. Yeah, it's a sticker, you know, I'm for the Red Sox, anybody who's fighting the Yankees, I forget what they say. My first bit more, I'm really younger, I think, sophomores in high school, you know, and walking down the thing there, you know, and I was, you know, my anti-Roosevelt thing, you know, and he said, I don't think too highly of Roosevelt either. So, I don't think I hated him, but he just had a little picture of him. That was the beginning. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Somebody can't stand Obama, you know, I felt drawn to him, you know. He's got sense. I'll keep talking to another one here, maybe. Whether the actions of others are to us a cause of pleasure. To the fifth, it should, one proceeds thus, it seems that the actions of others are not, for us, a cause of what? Pleasure, huh? I guess in heaven they're supposed to rejoice in the good deeds of the saints who meet up there, right, huh? We don't have much deeds that they can rejoice in, but we can rejoice in, we don't feel envious of their good deeds that they did and their martyrdom or something, you know, huh? Well, the cause of pleasure, the first objection says, the cause of pleasure is what? One's own good adjoined, right? But the operations or the doings of others are not adjoined to us, right? And therefore, they are not, for us, a cause of pleasure, right? Maybe you can find something that's adjoined to us, but we'll... Moreover, operation is the, what? Yeah. And so it's own good, huh? Yeah. If, therefore, the operations of others are, for us, a cause of pleasure, for a like reason, then all the other goods of others would be, for us, a cause of pleasure, which is clearly, what? False, huh? So it would make me pleased that you won the lottery? If you're generous, yeah. If you're disinterested. Moreover, operation is delightful in so far as it proceeds from a habit inborn in us, right? Or one must take that one takes pleasure in the deed, right, huh? So if you don't take delight in eating and drinking moderately, you will not be acquiring the virtue of moderation, huh? And then, of course, you always ask, what about courage, right? You know, does he take delight in these dangerous things? Well, not really, but anyway, there's an exception there. But the operations of others do not proceed from habits which are in us, but sometimes from habits which are in the ones operating. Therefore, the operations of others are not delightful delightful to us, but only to the ones doing them, yeah. But again, this is what is said in the Canonica, Johannes, is that the, this is one of his? I think it's the second one. I have rejoiced what greatly, huh? Because I have found my sons walking in the truth. That's beautiful. So he's rejoicing over what others are doing, right? Of course, parents rejoice, you know, when they find their sons or daughters walking in the truth, right, huh? And people in the parish, you know, they've had sons or daughters who have gone off, you know, from the faith or, you know, they, you know, they, but those who have, you know, their children still going to church and they rejoice. My answer should be said, that has been said, two things are required for pleasure, right? One is the achieving of one's own good and the knowledge of the, what? One's own good having been attained, huh? In three ways, therefore, the doing of another is able to be a cause of pleasure, right? In one way, insofar as through the doing of another, we achieve some good, right? And according to this, the doings of another, which produce some good for us, right, huh? Are pleasant for us, right? Because to well undergo from another is pleasant, right, huh? So when you win the lotto and you give me a piece of the pie, I'm happy you win the lotto. Another way, according to the doings of another, are rendered, what? For us, or make possible for us, I suppose, some knowledge or, what? Estimate of one's own good. An account of this, men delight in this that they are praised or honored by another, right, huh? Estimate of the things that are less, they're more selfish, shall we say. Less noble. Yeah. Because through this, they get a certain estimate that in themselves, there is some, what? Good, right, huh? Dr. Monsignor Dian agreed with me that I was delighted, right, huh? He disagrees with me, but I'm sad. And because this estimate is more strongly generated for the testimony of the good and the wise, therefore, in the praises of these, and in the honors, men more delight. That's what Aristotle talks about, right? So if Tom Dick or Harry thinks it's done something, you know, it's done, but Monsignor Dian thinks it's good. Then it's good, you know? If the Pope honored you, it's more pleasant than if the Obama honors you. Yeah. I quote Heisenberg and other people in class sometimes, from time to time, you know? So the rumor got around the book and says a PhD in physics, or he's about to get one. Well, as far from a PhD in physics, it could be, you know? No, I'm afraid of that. They have all these ideas, you know, about you, you know, certain things that you don't have. And because the flatterer is an apparent, what, praiser, right, huh? On account of this also, you know, flatteries are to some delightful, right? Flatteries get you everything, as the woman says. And because love is of some good, and wonder is of something, what, great, right, huh? Therefore, to be loved by others, and to be had in admiration, huh, is delightful, right, huh? Insofar as through this, there comes to be for man an estimate of his own, what, goodness or magnitude, huh? We saw that in the inauguration of Obama there, you know, we had all these people there. And, you know, they were showing some of these things on TV, nodding on these little things about them. And, you know, it just had to be crazy, you know, these women down there, and so I just, you know. And I remember seeing it, it's stuck in my memory, because my father was dying in the other room. And I go into this room to get some refreshments, like in the hospital there. And I walk in and I see, they just show his car going down the street at, you know, like, one mile an hour. I mean, they're just screaming and falling over each other, and he's just, you can't even see him. He's in the car, it's all bulletproof glass. And everybody was just going bonkers, it was unbelievable. Wow. But now the third way, right? Insofar as the doings of others, if they are good, are what? Estimated as one's own good, right, huh? On account of the strength of love, which one makes one estimate a friend to be the same as oneself. Another self, right? Or a second self, as Shakespeare says. Yes, so. Right. And an account of hate, which makes one estimate the good of another to be, what? Contrary of oneself. Yeah. The bad doing of the enemy is, what? Let them all, right? Once it is said in 1 Corinthians 13, the charity does not rejoice over iniquity, but it rejoices with the truth. The good of your enemy is bad for you. If Obama is being elected, yeah. Bad for you. Yeah. So there's bad performance in the debate there, which kind of turned things around. Some of the polls are putting Romney in. He's a little joy. Yay! To the first, therefore, it should be said that the doing of another can be joined to me either through its effect, if he's giving me something good, right? As in the first way, or through grasping, as I, what? He praises me, right? Or he admires me, right? In the second way. Or through the affection whereby he's another self, huh? I remember that from my Greek book, huh? Philoses de nos autos. Your friend is another self, huh? And I said, Greek book used to have little quotes, you know, signs of the Bible, you know? The archaic, you know, logos, you know, trace of one. Because he reads the same thing, you know? The whole phyllis, estenous autos, right? Friend is another self. Greek proverb. That stuck in my mind. To the second, it should be said that that argument proceeds as regards the, what? Third way. Third way, right, huh? Not always regards the first two, huh? It's the good of the other. If you take him as being another self, you rejoice in it. It's good, right? The third, it should be said that the doings of another, although they do not proceed from habits which are in me, they nevertheless cause in me something, what? Delightful, right? Because either they make, what? In me, some estimate or grasping of my own habit, right? Or they proceed from the habit of the one who is one with me, who, what? Who love, huh? I guess we gotta knock off now, huh? Partying is such a sweet sorrow. Ahem. Partying is such a sweet sorrow. Partying is such a sweet sorrow. Partying is such a sweet sorrow. Partying is such a sweet sorrow. Partying is such a sweet sorrow. Partying is such a sweet sorrow. Partying is such a sweet sorrow. Partying is such a sweet sorrow. Partying is such a sweet sorrow.