Prima Secundae
Lecture 98: Pleasure: Its Goodness, Nature, and Moral Significance

Transcript
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If I take pleasure in doing good, that's even better. But if I want to torture you, that's bad. When I enjoy doing it, I'm even worse than I was than I wanted to do it, right? Yeah? Of course, sometimes a person might want to hit somebody, but then they don't really enjoy hitting them, you know, and they feel kind of sorry that they don't, you know? Or they, they, sometimes you want to say something nasty to somebody, and then you don't say it, but other times you actually say it, then you wish you hadn't done it, right? Yeah, I was seeing an interview with a brutally tortured and murdered somebody, and he, I mean, the man was, he's either possessed by a devil, or he's just out of his mind, but he was kind of recounting what he did, and you could see the pleasure he was taking just in remembering it. It's just totally, totally diabolical, just to watch the scene. It's just horrible. Yeah, if I was the guy behind the camera, I'd get another room or something, you know? Now, the first objection here, of course, is somewhat like the one we saw before in the previous article, right? To the first theory of what should be said, as has been said above, that the pleasures which are about the very active reason itself do not impede reason, right? Nor do they corrupt, what, foresight, right? But extraneous pleasures, right, can do this, of which are the bodily pleasures, right? Which impede the use of reason, huh? As had been said above, both through the, what, contrary to the appetite, which rests in that, which is repugnant to, what, reason. And from this, pleasure has that it is to be something morally, what, bad, huh? Or according to the, what, bounding reason. That was another reason he gave, right? The third reason he gave, I think. As in the conjugal, what, union, the pleasure, right? That although in that which is what's suitable to reason, nevertheless, it impedes the, what, use of reason on account of the bodily change joined with it, right? But from this, there does not follow, what, moral badness. Just neither is sleep, which bounds, or binds up use of reason, huh? Ties it up, right? It's more, I'm rolling back right now, but daddy's allowed to sleep. He's not allowed to sleep. I mean, he's not allowed to sleep. How many times are they going to confess that? Every day. I just have a hard time sleeping now, you know, in age, you know, and nothing, I sleep too well. I feel so guilty, yeah. It's amazing, you know, you see the little, little grandchildren, there's things, though, just completely out of it, you know. Just, how that happens. Abandon, you know, to sleep. No, what's that on? Father Abandon says when one of his brothers, his new kids, he took them up to show up in the room, there's a whole bunch of them. And he turns on the light, and Father Abandon says, oh, they're not going to wake up. They don't, they don't want to get enough. Nothing wakes them up when they're sleeping. And he's sitting on the floor and he's on. Some of us. Still like that. They're lucky. We see, nevertheless, that this, what, binding of reason, right, from the pleasure in the conjugal acts, although it does not have, what, moral badness, right, because it is not a mortal sin, nor even a venial sin, right, nevertheless, it arises from a certain moral, what, evil, to wit from the sin of the first, what, parent, huh? For this would not be so in the state of innocence, as clear from those things which are said in the prima pars, right? So towards the end of the prima pars, there's a discussion of what the status was or the condition was of Adam and Eve before the fall. So when they covered themselves after the fall, right, that's because their emotions are no longer subject to reason, right? I had to do this in the newspaper and figure evidence for, you know, you know, signish probability, Terry Thomas would say, you know, he talks about some kind of shit. You know, you can, you know, this thing's gone wrong with the human race, I mean. The way you're going to shoot and kill each other, you know, and so on, and all these other horrible things you're doing. There's something wrong. That's what somebody was saying, this isn't the last year or something, but there's more murders in a weekend in Chicago than a whole month in Iraq. But maybe so you just stay over there. Wait, that's all the time where I put it in Chicago. Now what about the temperate man, right? The temperate man does not flee all pleasures, right? But those are excessive, right? And they are not suitable to, what, reason, right? So you can listen to the music of Mozart, right? Thank God. That's what Oscar was saying in the essay there, towards an evaluation of music, right? The music of Mozart and the music of the Baroque, right? As distinguishing the music of the Romantic period, right? It represents the, what, emotions, removes the emotions in a state in harmony with, what, reason, right? And, you know, the emotions are something to reason there, right? But that's the one thing the Romantic is. Romanticists will not allow the emotions to be something to reason, right? Well, Tchaikovsky, you know, Tchaikovsky went out into the middle of the river there, you know, to draw himself, you know, couldn't quite get the courage to draw himself, you know. That's romantic, right? Yeah. But he used to listen to Mozart, right? Because, you know, it would relieve him from the excess of his own passions, right? And there's some interesting little, you know, between him and some lady, you know, saying, you know, well, how come you like to listen to Mozart, you know? Well, because he kind of saved him from himself, right, huh? Get these terrible emotions, huh? And, you know, he wrote the Mozartiani, you know, to honor Mozart, you know. He takes Mozart's melodies and kind of plays with them, you know. It's kind of interesting to hear him do this. But he realizes something terribly wrong, you know, even in Russia at the time, you know. Mozart had his temperate, you know, music, you know. Mozart never goes to any excess, you know. That voice and beast pursue pleasures, right? Does not show them to be universally, what, bad. Okay? Because in them there's a natural appetite from God, huh? Who moves them to that, which is what? Third. Yeah. And what about this objection here from the art here? To the third, it should be said that not, that art is not of every good, but of what? So art is the right reason about making. Making means there's a product there, something outside of us. But prudence and virtue are about the operations and the passions which are in us now, rather than in the wood or in some exterior matter, huh? So they pertain more to prudence and virtue than to art. And nevertheless, some art is, what? To which the, what? Pumentaria. Was that the, uh, something I think had? Yeah, it's going to do with food, I think, huh? Mm-hmm. Yeah. As is said in the seventh book of the ethics, huh? I was talking about, uh, cosmetics or not, huh? Mm-hmm. Pigmenta might be more cosmetics, huh? Maybe. But prumentaria is more of the food, right, huh? So the cook is trying to make the food taste good, right, you know, taste to please the person who eats it, right? And the, I always tell the girls, cosmetics comes to the big word cosmos, you know, which means, yeah, from the universe, right? I mean, the word cosmos was given to the universe because it's a beautiful order of all, right, you know? That's right. Cosmetics, it's a beautiful order of all, you know. So, since God didn't have to make it, you know, to please, to please himself or to please us, then in that sense, that's normal, it's not something necessary. What time is following Aristotle to say that the, the best thing after God, much after God, but the best thing after God is the order of the universe, and the entity says, extraordinary. So, can you go break your knife before I go on? Sure, yeah. goes forward thus. It seems that all pleasure is good. Ah, now this is what I like to hear, yeah. You're going to be disappointed later on. For as has been said in the first, good is divided into three, right? It's the visionary style of guess. To the, what? The honest, the honorable, right? The useful, and the, what? Pleasant, right? But everything honorable is, what? Good, huh? And likewise, everything useful is good, huh? And therefore, also every pleasure is good, huh? Good enough. Yeah, that's enough, huh? I want to hear this. Moreover, that is per se good, huh? Good in itself, huh? Through itself, huh? Good as such. That is not sought on account of something other, right? As it's said in the first of ethics, second end. But pleasure is not sought for the sake of something else. For it's ridiculous, huh? Laughable. It seems to ask from somebody, why does he want to be pleased, right? Therefore, pleasure is a per se good, right? But what is per se said of something is universally said of it, huh? Therefore, every pleasure is good, huh? So, you see, it belongs to a triangle as such to have its interior angles equal to two right angles. So, every triangle is going to have it because it belongs to it per se, right? But it doesn't belong to the triangle per se to be green. So, although some triangle might happen to be green, right? You don't, you know, conclude from that that all triangles will be green, right? Because it doesn't belong to the triangle per se, right? And so, you know, when you take up the nature of science or reasoned out knowledge there, you talk about premises that are per se and conclusions that are per se, right? And only those can be known necessarily, right? Whether a triangle is green or not, it is a matter of more sensation than a reason, right? There's no connection between the nature of what a triangle is in green, right? At least this right angle. But there's a connection between what a triangle is and that it has interior angles to right angles. Or there's a connection necessarily between two and a half of four, right? So, the plot thickens, huh? Moreover, that which is desired by all seems to be a per se good. For the good is what all want. Everyone wants pleasure, right? But all want some pleasure, right? Even boys and bees. Therefore, pleasure is... As such good. As such good, huh? Sometimes you translate it as the same, right? Therefore, every pleasure is good, huh? If we stop here, this is what St. Alphons would call willful inadvertence. Don't finish the question. But against this is what is said about some in Proverbs chapter 2. Who rejoice when they do bad, right? And exult in the worst things, huh? Pretty strong thing. My answer should be said that just as some of the Stoics, right? It gives a reference in my book down here to where Gustin talks about the Stoics, right? They lay down that all pleasures are bad, right? So the Epicureans laid down the pleasure as such to be good, right? And consequently, all pleasures to be good, right? They'd be saying that the pleasure of torturing somebody as pleasure is good, right? Because all pleasure is such as good. But notice here you get these first two articles, right? One is taking the position of the, what? Or excuse me, the Stoics. Stoics, where all pleasure is bad, and now that all pleasure is good, you know? Well, Aristotle is in between those two extremes, right? But this is a common thing that is said is the nature of those being mistaken, right? Those urge to go to what? Extremes, huh? Okay? The truth lies somewhere in the middle, right? Okay? Thomas often comes down when he talks about, say, the Trinity, right, huh? Or even about incarnation. Because there are those who say that as you have three persons, you have three, what? Natures, huh? Three gods, right? Or some would say that as you have one nature there, you have one person, really. It's just different names and the same person. And those are two, what? Extremes, right? In the same way with, but just the reverse, huh? With the sun, right? Incarnation. Because there's two natures, there's two persons there, right? Or because there's one person, there's monophysites, right? There's one nature there, right, huh? So these are two, but the virtue, I mean the truth rather, lies in the middle between these two, right, huh? So there's three persons, but one nature, or two natures and one person, right? But notice, huh, the extremes can't really explain each other, right? If there's really only one person and one nature in God, then why would anybody think there are three persons and three natures? If there really were three persons, three natures, then why would anybody think there's one person, one nature, right? But if there's three persons and one nature, you'd say, well, I can see then why some people think there's three natures that seem to fit with there being three persons. And, but, if there's really only one nature, you'd say somebody might think there's only one person there, right? See? Because there's some part of the truth, right? But if one of these extreme positions is true, then the opposite extreme is entirely false and there's no reason for you to think that at all, right? See? So, if there's somebody who thinks to whom this is probable, right, then there must be in the probable some part of the truth, right? But if one of these extreme positions was the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, then the opposite extreme position would be what? Wholly what? Yeah, have no basis at all, right? So, if every pleasure is in fact bad, why should anybody think that all pleasures are good, right? You know? And if all pleasures are good, why should anybody think that all pleasures are bad, yeah? There's no, you know? There's no commonality. There'd be no part of the truth in the opposite position, right? But if some pleasures are good and some are bad, whatever the reason for this being, right, then you can see how somebody might, you know, think that they're all good or they're all bad because he at least has hit a part of the truth, right? There's some truth in what he said, right? But if one of those positions are correct, then the other position is what? Not probable, it's no part of the truth, you know? There's no reason anybody would have to think that. But some people here are dedicated to those positions. That's very interesting. Some of the Stoics, right, laid down that all pleasures to be bad. So, the Epicureans laid pleasure according to itself or as such to be good, right? And consequently, that all pleasures are what? Good, huh? Who seem to have been deceived from this, right? That they do not distinguish between that which is what? Good simply and that which is good as regards this one, huh? Okay? This, talking about the fallacy of simply and in some of them quit, perhaps. For that is simply good, which is as such good, right, huh? But it can happen that that which is not as such good to be good for this man, right? In two ways, huh? In one way, because it is suitable to him according to the disposition in which he now is, which nevertheless is not a natural disposition, right? Just as to the leper is good sometimes to eat something, what? Yeah, I don't know where you got this idea, this example, but anyway. Which is not, what? Simply suitable to the complexion of man, right? Okay. I mean, you know, when they give this treatment people who got cancer, right? You know? That's the reason it does a job on your body, those treatments. But you see, it's good for him, right? But it's not because of his bad condition with the cancer. It might slow the growth of the cancer or, you know, people who are being, you know, treated this way, you know, they're shrinking the stuff, I guess, I don't know. But, you know, they're exhausted. from the thing, and, you know, they, they, you know, they're not nicely done to go, right? Okay. But you might say it's good for them, right, to have this treatment, huh? They can, they, another way, because that which is not, what? Suitable. Suitable is estimated, not the best word to be used, because that word estimated kind of changes its meaning, right? But I think estimate has got the idea of something that's not all together, what? Certain. Certain, yeah. I think gases. Yeah, you estimate how fast he was going. You estimate how, how much this, how much this weighs, you know, or something, right? Ways, yeah. No? Mm-hmm. Yeah, but esteem, not so much the word, estimate, it's got something of the idea of what it means, but it's not exactly, yeah. Yeah. And because pleasure is the rest of the, what? Desiring power in the good. If that is good simply, in which the appetite is resting, right, huh? It will be, what? Right. It will be pleasure simply, and simply, what? Good. Good, huh? If, however, it is not good simply, but as regards, what? This one, then it is neither pleasure, what? Simply, nor to this one, nor is it simpliciter good, but either a good in some way, secundum quid, or just an apparent good, okay? So the apparent good corresponds to the, what is estimator of convenience, right? Mm-hmm. And the bohens secundum quid, which is according to your bad, what? Yeah, yeah, I got cancer, so it's good for me to get these. Therapy. Chemotherapy, which is, yeah, yeah, yeah. In some way, in some way it's good for me, right? It's good for me to go that way, you know, in some sense, yeah, but not simply, you know? Okay? So the apparent, apparent as boner there might not be good at all, then, huh? These people, they follow these bands, you know, around the country, some of them do, you know, hear about them, you know, in grief, you know? Crazy, you know? Crazy, man. Time or something. I told you when I was working in the package store there, I'd see these guys come in, you know, Grateful Dead. Well, of course, I don't keep up with these things, so I didn't know there was the name of a band that was called Grateful Dead. I just saw people, you know, peering in the, coming in with this Grateful Dead, and I used to think to myself, see, what a sick thing to walk around with, you know? Like, I'd be grateful if I was dead or something. Look, I was sick. Yeah. Put me out of my misery, you know? Yeah. You know, saying, and then they, then I found there's a, there's a band called Grateful Dead, and I'm glad if I heard that or ran across that, and, and these guys who liked that band are rejoiced with the name Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads, yeah. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Deadheads. Whether some pleasure is optimum, to the third one proceeds thus. It seems that no pleasure is the best, right? For no generation is the best thing, right? For generation cannot be the last end. But pleasure follows upon generation. That was some of the ideas you had in Plato, remember? For from this that something is constituted in its own nature, it what is pleased. You're turning to your natural state, this pleasure. And therefore, no pleasure can be, what? Best, yeah. Of course, Thomas is going to say that not all pleasures are tied up with generation, right? But they're tied up with, what? Some with operations, which are these perfect acts, right? Understanding and hearing the music of Mozart, right, are perfect acts, right? Not like emotion or generation. So you'll find Shakespeare talking about a character returning to his natural state, right? He has another psalmist to himself, right? So it's a pleasure in that time. Maybe I'm mistaken, but I know there's something like that that's in St. Anthony's life of St. Anthony. It's common among some of the Eastern Fathers when they refer to the redemption. They don't speak of it so much as redemption, as restoring nature what it's meant to be. Yeah. So we're getting back to our natural state. Yeah. What I can understand is this is above all to the known self be true, right? So when you realize you haven't been true to yourself, you haven't been true to regret, you know, and pain, and considering the fact that I haven't been true to myself, you know? And then you want to get back and be true to yourself, right? And then it's a pleasure, right? But Thomas says it's not always in this kind of generation returning to yourself that you have pleasure, right? You have pleasure in these operations that are not a becoming, but more like being, right? So understanding and sensing are more like being than becoming, you know? You didn't know what I was saying? More like becoming, you know? Yeah. Becoming satisfied, huh? More with that which is best, by nothing added, can come about, what? Better. It can become better, huh? But pleasure added to something, right? But pleasure, something added, becomes better, right? For better is pleasure with virtue than without, what? Virtue, right? Therefore, pleasure is not, what? Optimum, huh? More with that which is best is universally good. It's like we speak about God, right? Universally perfect, huh? Just as existing good to itself, right? For what is per se is before more potent than that which is per action. So that's a very important before and after to see, right? Per se is before the per archidens, and the per se is before the per oligod, right? To another. But pleasure is not universally good, as has been said. And therefore, pleasure is not the best thing. But against this, beatitude is the best thing, huh? That's the perfect good of the rational creature, beatitude, huh? The Greek word is makarios, huh? Now, what is that looking at? I was looking up in the dictionary, I mean, in the gospel there, and where it came up about, there was a quote, Tom said, from the scripture there about beatitude. I forget where it was now. But I said what the Greek word was, you know, something in the Greek text, and there was makarios, you know, which Aristotle uses some time. It's the word that's used in the Beatitudes, and I think it's the beginning of Psalm 1, the Greek word named Makarios on air, blessed, blessed be on air. It seems to be translated by Beatitudes, you know. Makarios is beatus, right? And in English we say, I suppose, the blessed, right, huh? See, Aristotle uses the word eudamonia there, you know. In the poetics he uses the word, you know, eutukia, huh? Which is like our word happiness, right, because I'm happy. But in the ethics he uses the word, what, eudamonia, you've got a good demon, huh? And they differently understand that word, right? It can refer to, you know, the help of a superior being, right, huh? Or sometimes, you know, the soul. But they call it daimon, right? You've got a good soul. But Beatitude especially signifies this. But Beatitude, against this, is that Beatitude is the best thing, right? Since it is the end of human life, huh? Well, the end is always better than what is for the sake of the end, right? So Beatitude must be the best if it's the end of human life. But Beatitude is not without, what? Pleasure. For it is said in Psalm 15, huh? He will fill you, right, with joy, with his own, what, face, you know, seeing him face to face. Pleasures at your right hand, you know, I suppose that's, we'll squint feed him forever, right? We'll squint feed him. The answer should be said that Plato did not lay down that all pleasures are bad, as the Stoics, right? Nor all to be good, as the, what, Epicureans, huh? But some to be good, and some to be bad. Well, I'm glad Plato said that. But nevertheless, that none is the sumum bonum, right? Or the optimum, the best, right? But, so far as can be understood from his reasons, he, what, failed in two things, right? In one, because, since he saw sensible pleasures and bodily ones, to consist in a certain motion and generation, huh? First of all, here's an example of the, of the klutzon, you know, if I'm, like a, like a giraffe, you know, all the things, I could feel the food going down and stuff. Well, that's kind of a motion and a generation, right? How can this be the sumum bonum, you know? So, he saw that, what, sensible pleasures and bodily ones consist in a certain motion and generation, right? Pouring the liquid down your throat or your stuff in your face, like this and that, right? Justice is clear in the filling up of food and things of this sort, right, huh? So, he, what, estimated, right? He guessed, in a sense, right? That all pleasures, what, follow generation motion. Well, these things are imperfect. That's a perfect act, becoming and motion. When, since generation motion are imperfect acts, it would follow that pleasure does not have the, what? Character or dimension. Yeah, yeah. It's always so hard to translate the ratio. I remember poor, the more they own there from Paris, you know. Now, how do you translate this ratio? You know, you know, something has to be done in class, you know. Or you, again, you know. You always have the sense of your notion, right? And then the aspect of the ultimate affection. But this is manifest, a, this manifest appears false in intellectual pleasures, right? For one not only delights in the generation of science, as when he, what? Well, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know, you know. Thank you. Learns or wonders, yes, as has been said above, but also in contemplating, according to knowledge is now acquired. So I think of one of these theorems that you could say, oh, you'd like to think about it again, you know. In another way, because he said that that was, what, optimum illud, that is best, which is simpliciter, the sumum bonum, right, huh, which is the good that is, what, abstract and not, what, partaken of, huh, so he spoke of the good itself, huh, it's kind of, you know, bonitas, it's the bonitas, right? Just as we, as God himself is the, what, sumum bonum, right? But we always speak of what is best now in, what, human things, huh, which is not the best of each other. But what is best in each thing is its last end, right? But the end, as has been said above, is said in two ways. In one way, the thing itself, and the, what, use of the thing, as the end of the avaricious man, is either, what, money, you can say, or the possession of money, right, huh? And according to this, we can say, the last end of man can be said to be either God himself, right, who is the sumum bonum suppliciter, right, or the, what, enjoyment of him, right, which implies a certain pleasure in the last end. And in this way, some pleasure of man can be said to be the best among, what, human goods, huh? So I think he's referring now to the pleasure of seeing God as he is, face to face, right? You will fill me with, what, laetitia, cum vulto tu, right? Your face, okay? So it's not the same that faces little grandchildren, they'll have my sumum bonum, right? Seeing the face of God, huh? Face to face. Now to the first one, huh, it's based on Plato's position that pleasure seems to be tied up with generation, right? I don't know why he's tied up with that, but he was. That not every pleasure follows, what, generation, but some pleasures follow operationes perfectas, right, as has been said. And therefore nothing prevents some pleasure from being the, what, being the best, although not every one is such, right? So it's going to be the, what, the operation which has, what, the best, maybe, object for its end, or for its object, God is the best thing for its object, right? God is the yes. There's a question again, the Confessions here, it says, Too late have I come to know thee, thou each in beauty. You know, what beautiful is that which pleases when seen, right? So if God is beauty itself, he's most beautiful, then the seeing of God must, what, be most pleasant, right? And therefore, in human pleasures, or at least you could say, right, among all the pleasures of man, the most pleasant of all would be, what, to see God as his, right? That would be the optima pleasure, right, huh? It's not the sumum bonum sapice, which is God himself, right? But among all pleasures, the pleasure of seeing God is the greatest pleasure there is, the greatest delight there is. The attitude is gaudium de veridate, right? But the looks there are the truth, right, huh? Saki against planus. Yeah, yeah, right. Now the second one here, right? That argument proceeds about the best simplicity, right? Through the partaking of which all things are good, huh? Whence in the addition of nothing does it ever become, what, better? That's the way God is, right? Can't improve God at all. He's incapable of improvement, huh? He's going to be stuck at this. He's stuck at his category. Very current. Yeah. I mean, there's no way to improve him. But in other goods, it is universally true that each good, from the addition of another, becomes what? Better. Mm-hmm. See, God can't be improved. What? God can't be improved. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So I suppose the saints in heaven, one can be more, their body, their face can be more beautiful than the other one, right? You know? Yeah. Although it can be said that pleasure is not something extraneous in the operation of virtue, but something, what, falling upon it, right? As is said in the first book of Nicomachinethics by the philosopher Aristotle, pagan philosopher. Now, to the theory it should be said, pleasure does not have that it be the best from this that it is pleasure, but from this that it is a perfect rest in the best thing. Whence it is not necessary that every pleasure be the, what? The best thing, right? Because not as pleasure, right? Or even, what? Good. Every pleasure is good. Pleasure of torturing you, right? Pleasure of asking for their, what sense of before? One sense of before, before and another sense of before. That's a torture. That pleasure to do that, right? I do it. You're calling. Whence it is not necessary that every pleasure be this, or even, what? Good. So, just as some knowledge, some reason of knowledge is best, but not all, right? So, Aristotle argues that he, what? Wisdom is the best knowledge, right? And wisdom, he says, is what? Right. It's a knowledge of God in two senses, right? Mm-hmm. It's a knowledge where what is known is God himself, right? And it's a knowledge which either God alone has, he says, or which God alone has perfectly. Or fully, right? So, that's why I say if Aristotle could partake of the divine wisdom, right? As we do in this life by faith, right? Then he would see this as even more wisdom than, what, first philosophy, right? You know, when Thomas says that in theology we consider God first, right? And then other things insofar as God is the beginning and the end of them, right? Well, it's because we're, what, imitating God's own way of knowing, huh? Because God knows primarily himself, right? He knows other things by knowing himself, right? Why in philosophy we don't, what, have that likeness to God's knowledge, right? We know God from his effects, right? So, Aristotle spends, you know, the first ten books or so studying the effects, right? It's not until the twelfth book of wisdom that he reasons out about God, right, huh? So, he's the last thing that Aristotle considers, right? Fitting into his work, right, huh? But God, in a sense, is the first thing, you know, we consider in theology and other things in comparison to God, right? So, we imitate God's way of knowing. So, Thomas points out there in the beginning of the second book of the Summa Conte Gentiles, and he's going to go from God to talk about creation and creatures, right? That the order in philosophy is the contrary of the order in, what, theology, right? Where God is the last thing considered, in a sense, in philosophy, and the first thing considered in what? Yeah. Yeah. That's why it's kind of, you know, out of order, you know, when they have the, you know, the professor of philosophy, they're always getting these free copies of introductions to philosophy and so on. Usually, they're kind of a series of readings, right? But they always have to be there about the existence of God, right? Well, that's not really where you should be beginning philosophy. By questioning whether God exists or not, right? Because that's not what comes first, for a reason, huh? You better start with Mother Earth, you know? You don't get involved with those feminists, but... That's right, yeah. Yeah. I mean, Mother Earth is kind of what the poets said first, right? You know, when the first philosopher said, no, it's water, not Earth. But Mother Earth is not a bad place to begin, right, huh? Of course, in English, you know, we get the English word for cause is kind of ground, huh? Grounds for divorce, right? It's legally a cause for divorce, right, huh? And that's why, you know, the English word for knowing the cause, you know, to understand, right? The ground, huh? To know the ground, huh? So, um, Mother Earth fits that pretty well, right? You know, that's kind of where you naturally begin, right? Ground seems, it seems more naturally to call Mother Earth ground. The ground of things and to say, God is a ground of things, and that he could extend the word, right? Okay, then, unless it's going on in the, the, so we have to stop now, or is it? Yeah, I think so. We seem to get to the third article, then we get to the fourth article. Well, next time it says we're going to cover sadness, we might as well start off with pleasure before we get to sadness. Oh, sad, how sad, how sad. I don't want to hear about this, huh?