Prima Secundae
Lecture 101: Pleasure, Sadness, and Contrariety in the Passions

Transcript
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guys. Unbeknownst to the bad guys, you know, the ships come up the river there, the Corsairs of Umbar or whatever there, and they thought they were there to help them. And they said this roar went up to the front of it. And oh, I remember just, my heart sank when I read that. They said, oh, I can imagine this rejoicing in the end there. Oh, no, no. That was a great scene. So they say to somebody, you should be sad that you did that, right? You know? But if a person regrets what they've done, you know, what they've done, right, then you might rejoice in that, right, that they are repentant of what they did. The Greeks tend to call it repentance or joy-making sorrow. Time for another article? Oh, my name is Salmon, yeah, I don't know. Whether every sadness is contrary to every, what? Pleasure, right, huh? Just as whiteness and blackness, white and black, are contrary species of color, right, so pleasure and sadness are contrary species of the, what, passions of the soul. But whiteness and blackness are universally opposed, right? Therefore also pleasure and, what, sadness, huh? Moreover, medicines come about to contraries, but every pleasure is a medicine against every, what? Sadness, huh? So the cops give the kid who's lost for home is crying because he wants to get home and give him an ice cream cone, right, and calm him down. I was like, they're near a place all the time, right? They give the guy ice cream cone until they find his mother, you know, or whatever he's lost. As is clear through the philosopher in the seventh book of the Ethics, the discussion of pleasure and pain there, huh? Therefore every pleasure is, what, contrary to every, what, sadness, huh? Moreover contraries are, what, things that impede one another, right? But every sadness impedes some pleasure, right? As is clear through that which is said in the tenth book of the Ethics. Therefore every sadness is contrary to every, what, pleasure, right? But against this, of contraries there is not the same cause. But from the same habit, it goes forth that some rejoices about one thing and is sad about its, what, opposite. For from charity, it happens that one rejoices with those rejoicing and weeps with those weeping, as is said in Romans 12, 15, right? Therefore not every sadness is, what, contrary to every, what, pleasure, right? I answer, it should be said, that is, as is said in the tenth book of the Metaphysics. Contrary is a difference according to form, but a form is both, what, can be general and special, right? Whence it happens that some contraries according to the form of the genus, are contrary according to the form of the genus, as virtue and, what, vice. And according to the form of the, what, species, as justice and, what, injustice, right? But is cowardice and temperance opposed according to the species? Maybe according to the genus, right? One's a virtue, one's a vice. It ought to be considered, however, that some things are specified according to forms that are, what, absolute, as substances and, what, qualities. Some are specified by comparison to something outside, as passions and motions receive their species from their ends or their objects. Some, in those things, therefore, whose species are considered according to forms of absolute, it happens that, what, a species which are contained under, what, yeah, not to be contrary according to the, what, notion of species. Not, however, does it happen that they have some, what, affinity or agreement, right, to each other? For intemperance, injustice, which are in contrary genera, in virtue to it, and, what, vice, right? They're contrary in, what, because they belong to contrary genera, right? But they are not contrary to each other according to the notion of their own, what, species, right? But they rather would be that intemperance is contrary to temperance, right? Injustice to injustice, something like that. But they do not have any, what, affinity or convenience towards each other, right? Agreement to each other. But in those things whose species are taken according to their relation to something extrinsic, it happens that the species of contrary genera not only are not contrary to, what, each other, but also they have a certain, what, agreement and affinity to each other. In that, in the same way, they have themselves to contrary, right? It induces a, what, contrariety. Just as to, what, approach to the white and to approach to the black has the notion of contrariety, but in a contrary way to have oneself to contraries has itself the ratio of similitude as to withdraw from the white and to, what, exceed or approach to the black, right, huh? To lead your face and tend towards virtue, right? And this, most of all, appears in contradiction, which is the beginning of opposition. For an affirmation and negation of the same, this opposition consists, as in white and what? Not white. In the affirmation, however, of one opposite and negation of the other, there is, what, tend to be agreement or similitude as, if I say, black and not what? Not white, huh? That's quite a lot of distinction there to think about to absorb this here. I mean, I'm sorry that you got into this here. It's a late time of day, huh? Maybe sad because of that, right? Or even pain, huh? This is quite a distinction here, you know? But sadness and pleasure, since they are, what, passions, are specified from their, what, objects. And because, according to their genus, they have contrariety, right? For one pertains to the pursuit, right, and the other to the flight, right, huh? Which have themselves in the appetite, as Aristotle says, like affirmation, negation, and reason. As it's said in the sixth book of the ethics, right? And therefore, pleasure, I mean, sadness and pleasure, which are about the same thing, have opposition to each other according to, what, species, huh? And sadness, however, and pleasure about diverse things, if these diverse things are not opposed, but simply, what, other, right, disparate. They do not have opposition to each other according to, what, knowingness. But they are also disparate, right? Just as to be saddened about the death of a friend, and to delight in contemplation, right? If, however, those diverse things are contrary, then pleasure and sadness not only do not have contrariety, according to the ratio of a species, but they also have, what, convenience and affinity, just as to rejoice in the good, and to be, what, sad, and what, yeah. Thomas says it. Ere is magna pars miseria, right? Ere is a great part of misery. To the first therefore, he answered the first objection, that whiteness and blackness, being qualities, right, do not have their species from their relation to something exterior, as do pleasure and sadness. Therefore, there's not the same reason, right? That's a distinction that he saw in the text. Now to the second, then, it should be said that genius is taken from matter as is clear in the Eighth Book of the Metaphysics. That's the book on substance according to its parts, matter, and form, right? Now an accident in place of matter is their subject. It is said, however, that pleasure and sadness or pain are contrary according to their, what, genus. And therefore, in any, what? Yeah. There is a contrary disposition of the subject to the disposition that he has in any, what, pleasure. For in every pleasure, the appetite has itself as accepting that which it has. In every sadness, it has itself as fleeing from it. And therefore, on the side of the subject, every pleasure is a medicine against every, what, sadness. And every sadness is impeding some, what, pleasure. But especially when the pleasure is contrary to the, what, sadness, according to, what, yeah. What does Hell say about Prince Hell? You know, he's, you know, lost his horse and he's larding the lean earth as he walks along. He says, you know, if it's not for laughing, I should pity him. Well, laughing is a kind of joy, and pity is a kind of sadness, right? Not for laughing. So he'd be laughing at some of these predicaments, you know, and he wants to get serious about it, you know. Prince is clear the solution to the third. Or, in another way, it should be said that though not every sadness is contrary to every pleasure, secundum spatium, right, huh? Nevertheless, as far as their effect, they are contrary, right, huh? For from one of them, it has strengthened the animal nature, from the other, in the way it's molested, right? You can look at this article again if you want. Well, it's time and I'm sure it's been a bit interesting, huh? Appreciate it. Thank you. On a rainy day, at the end of the day. Thank you. All right. Father and Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Deo gratias. God, our Enlightenment, Guardian Angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and ambrose us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Praise you. Help us to understand what you have written. St. Albert the Great. Albert the Great, yeah. Praise for us. Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. I must only say, Bishop and Doctor. He didn't want to be Bishop for very long, though, I don't think. So we're going to have a little poetry here today, now. I mentioned how Theobald was one of the, what, editors of Shakespeare, huh? I think Nicholas Rowe was the first guy, huh? He was a poet laureate of England. And then Dryden came along, the poet, huh? And then, like, Theobald's edition comes, right? Theobald is quite critical of Dryden's edition, right? He took liberties, right? Now, in Shakespeare's words, they have two different excellences, huh? Sometimes you save the words of Shakespeare because of their wisdom, right? And sometimes you save the words because of their, what? What? Excellence, right? So, one of each of these is Theobald, right? But as far as the excellences, Theobald's famous, what, emendation, right? Now, this is the scene here in Henry V, Act II, Scene III, which is describing the death of, what? Falstaff, right? Okay. So, Pistoff says, No, for my manly heart doth yearn. Bardolph be blithe, nem rouse thy vaunting veins. Boy, bristle thy courage up, for falstaff he is dead, and we must yearn therefore. Bardolph says, Would I am with him, where so Mary is, either in heaven or in hell? These thoughtless guys. But the hostess says, I'm not going to describe his last things. Nay, sure, he's not in hell. He's in Arthur's bosom. Instead, he's in Arthur's bosom. The king, I'm king. He's in Arthur's bosom, if ever a man went to Arthur's bosom. I made a finer end, and went away as it, and it had been any chrism child. A part, and even just between twelve and one, even at the turning of the tide. That's the old prejudicial diet, the turning of the tide, right? For after I saw him fumble with the sheets, and play with flowers, and smile upon his fingers' ends, I knew there was but one way. For his nose was as sharp as a pen, right? And, now this is in the, what, original folio, right, huh? The folio has, and a table of green fields. Does that make any sense? I knew there was but one way. For his nose was as sharp as a pen, and a table of green fields, huh? This is where Theobald corrected the text, right? The folio, he says, has a table of green fields, huh? Now, what did Theobald do? He turned it to, and a babble to green fields. And then what? A babble, babble, you know? You know how it's in scripture, you know, talking about the desolate man, right? Let no field, you know, escape our riots, you know, and so on. So, a babble of green fields, huh? Okay? So, anyway, this is the Ralph edition, huh? A babble to green fields. The folio has a table of green fields, huh? The emendation is Theobald's, right? And it's generally adopted, so you get, obviously, Texas Shakespeare is going to have Theobald's. White calls it, quote, the most felicitous, conjectural emendation ever made of Shakespeare's text. That's quite an honor for Theobald, huh? It is sustained by the preceding play with flowers, huh? So, various other corrections have been suggested, but they're not worth mentioning. Okay? Now, in the new Hudson, Shakespeare, right, huh? Another edition of Shakespeare, huh? Or, of course, they have the text, Babble to Green Fields, right? This is Theobald's emendation of the text of the folios, huh? And is perhaps the happiest emendation in all literature. Oh, that's quite bigger. Yeah, yeah. Now, Kittredge's edition, right? You know, Kittredge is the famous Chaucerian and Shakespearean scholar, right? Todd Harbin, so. And Kittredge says, you know, it's a stroke of genius, huh? Okay? So, I give that as an example of the excellence of Theobald in terms of the poetic excellence of Shakespeare, right? He's restoring the poetic excellence that has been lost in that obvious defect, huh? Now, the other thing we go to Shakespeare chorus for is what? Words of wisdom, right, huh? Okay? Now, in Act 4, Scene 4 of the Hamlet, right, you have the famous education to use, what? Reason, right? You know that? What is a man, if his chief good and market of his time, be but to sleep and feed a beast no more? Sure, he that made us with such large discourse, looking before and after, gave us not the capability and godlike reason to fasten us unused, huh? So, in the education, Shakespeare defines reason, right? Capability, or I have shortened it to ability, for large discourse, looking before and after. And he gives us, what? Tells us what it is to use reason, right? You look before and after, scores and so on. And then he gives you, touched upon five, actually, excellent reasons why you should use your reason, or use it more than you do, right, huh? But anyway, in another edition of Rolf, you have been at the Hamlet. This goes back to his book, I think. This is George Woodward, 831 Main Street, Worcester, Mass. Shakespeare class, February 19th, 1896. You get some kind of notes there, much better in these older editions, you know? So you've got to pick around, your wife's always complaining, you know, came out another volume of Shakespeare. No imagination. Yeah. Now, Rolf has got two quotes apropos of the such large discourse, looking before and after, right? And the first one is from Samuel Johnson, who is also an editor of the works of, what, Shakespeare, right? And the second one is from, what, Theobald, right? Okay? Who's earlier than Johnson, right? That's kind of funny because they're both excellent, the ones he quotes. But Johnson, you know, was influenced, unfortunately, by Dryden's attack upon Theobald, because Dryden was angry that Theobald had criticized his edition, right? And he had, you know, tried to make more English, 18th century, you know, and kind of corrupt the text and so on. And so he wrote the Duncian, right, attacking, you know? Okay? But it's kind of interesting, he quotes these two guys, right? You know? But anyway, this is the quote from Johnson. It's about the whole phrase, right? So he says, such latitude of comprehension, that's kind of his paraphrase of large discourse, right? Which has the idea of universal discourse, right? Such latitude of comprehension, such power of reviewing the past and anticipating the, what? Future, right? Now notice, Johnson doesn't give us the whole meaning of before and after. You have to go to the 12th chapter of the categories, right? For the five, you know, senses there of before and after, right? But he seizes, obviously, upon the first meaning of before and after, which is in time, in the 12th chapter of the categories. So he says, the power of reviewing the past and anticipating the future, right? So we see, you know, that he knows where to begin, he said. So it comes to mind first, right? That Aristotle begins in the right place. So it helps us to, what? Appreciate that. Well, here's how the movement begins in. Now, the Theobaldi mark that he has here is just on the last part. looking before and after, right? Theobald remarks that looking before and after is, quote, an expression purely Homeric. Now this is very interesting, he says that, huh? Because he's now referring to the poet, as Aristotle calls him out. And he says, Theobald refers, for example, to Iliad, book 3, 109, and book 18, 250, right? Okay, now, that's why I brought my home here. Yeah, down in the Greek here, a lot more translation. Now the one in book 3, huh, is the one where they're going to have stop the war, in a sense, and have many Laos and Alexander, what, fight? And whoever wins will take Helen and forget about the war, right? This is a nice way to solve the problem, right? If I had two armies killing each other, okay. So Hector has just got to speaking. So he spoke, and all of them stayed stricken to silence. But among them spoke out many Laos of the great war cry. Listen now to me also, since beyond all others this sorrow comes closest to my heart. It's his wife that was stolen by Alexander. And I think the Argyze and the Trojans can go free of each other at last. You have suffered much evil for the sake of this my quarrel since Alexandrus began it. Now, as for that, one of us, too, to whom death and doom are given, let him die. The rest of you will be made friends with each other. Bring two lambs, let one be white and the other black, for earth and the sun died. And for Zeus will bring yet another. Bring that he may seal the pledges, the strength of Priam. Priam himself, that's the father of Alexandrus. For his sons are outrageous not to be trusted, lest some man overstep Zeus' oaths and make them be nothing. Always, now this is the key words now, always it is that the hearts of the younger men are frivolous. But when an elder man is among them, he looks behind the men in front. So the dog comes out far better for both sides. Incidentally, you could apply that to the election, right? Because the young people kind of re-elected Obama, right? Why the older men are somewhat wiser than the younger men, right? That's why he said, King, what, there, you know, you're old before your time. What do you mean? You're old before you're wise. No fool worse than an old fool. You know what I'm saying, right? But you expect the older to be a little bit wiser than the younger, right? So English fiction there, to play the young man means to play the fool. That's a stock phrase, play the young man. If you want to play the young man, go ahead. That's a key thing, huh? But when an elder man is among them, he looks behind him and in front. So it's like Shakespeare's, what, phrase before and after. Although Shakespeare's one is more in terms of time, right? It's in terms of place, but they go together, right? Now the second part is even more striking, huh, in the book of N16. Because that's the place where Patroclus has been killed, the best friend of Achilles. And Achilles is now, who's been pouting and staying out of the war, is now to come back, right? Now, of course, the Trojans have been doing pretty good, but Achilles is out of the action for a while, right? And they're down there by the ships and so on. So, well, Poulidamus is going to, what, urge them to get back inside the walls of the city, where they can fight better from, you know? But Hector overrules them, right, huh? So, it's just around nightfall, so Achilles doesn't come back into battle, but he roars, you know, at the edge of the battle, you know, and so on. Now the Lady Herod of the Oxides drove the unwilling, wearierless sun god to sink in the depth of the ocean. And the sun went down, and the brilliant Achaeans, that's the Greeks, gave over their strong fighting in the doubtful collision of battle. The Trojans on the other side moved from the strong encounter in their turn, and unyoked their running horses from under the chariots, and gathered into assembly before taking thought for their supper. They stood on their feet in assembly, nor did any man have the patience to sit down. But the terror was on them all, seeing that Achilles had appeared. After he had stayed so long, the difficult fighting. Now, first to speak among them was the careful Paulydamas. The careful Paulydamas. Panthrus's son, who alone of them looked before and behind him. He's the only guy who looked before and behind, right? He was companion to Hector, and born in the same night with him. But he, that means Paulydamas, was better in words, the other with the spear far better. One guy who's in the brain. Yeah. He, in kind intention toward all, stood forth and addressed them. Now take careful thought, dear friends, for I myself urge you to go back into the city, and not wait for the divine dawn in the plain beside the ships. We are too far from the wall now. While this man was still angry with great Agamemnon, for all that time the Achaeans were easier men to fight with. For I also used then to be one who was glad to sleep out near their ships, and I hoped to capture the oarswept vessels. But now I terribly dread the swift-footed son of Pileas. So violent is the valor in him, he will not be willing to stay here in the plain, where now Achaeans and Trojans, from either side sundry between them the wrath of the war of God. With him the fight will be for the sake of our city and woman. Let us go into the town. Believe me, thus it will happen. For this present, immortal knight has stopped the swift-footed son of Pileas. But if he catches us still in this place tomorrow, and drives upon us in arms, a man will be well aware of him, and be glad to get back into Sacrédulia, the man who escapes. There will be many Trojans the vultures and dogs will feed on. But let such a word be out of my hearing. If all of us will do as I say, though it hurts us to do it, this night we will hold our strength in the marketplace, in the great walls and the gateways, and the long, smooth, plain, close-jointed gate timbers that close to fit them shall defend our city. Then early in the morning, under dawn, we shall arm ourselves in our war gear and take stations along the walls. The worst for him if he endeavors to come away from the ships and fight us here for our city. Back he must go to his ships again when he wears out the strong necks of his horses, driving them in a gallop everywhere by the city. His valor will not give him leave to burst into ponds near Sacra town. Sooner the shuffling dogs will feed on him. Then looking darkly at him, Hector of the Shining Helm spoke. Pulidamus, these things that you argue please me no longer when you tell us to go back again and be cooped in our city. Have you not all had your luck of being fenced in outworks? There was a time when mortal men would speak of the city of Priam as a place with much gold and much bronze, and so on. Now when the son of devious devising Ponus has given me the winning of glory by the ships to pin the Achaeans on the sea, why fool no longer show these thoughts to our people? Not one of the Trojans will obey you. I shall not allow it. Come then, do as I say, and let us all be persuaded. If it is true that Brodicilius is risen beside their ships, then the worst for him if he tries it, since I, for my part, will not run from him out of this sorrowful battle. I'd rather stand fast. The war got as impartial before and now he's killed the killer. So spoke Hector, and the Trojans thundered to hear him. Fools! Fools! Since Pallas Athena had taken away the wits from them, right? Contrast that with Pullidamus, right? Where he says, in the beginning part I read, first to speak among them was the careful Pullidamus, Pontus' son, who alone of them looked before and behind. So that's just marvelous, that Theobald, right, has got the, you know, they call it the happiest imitation of history of fiction. It's a new Shakespeare, right? University adopted, right? And then he's seeing this likeness between Homer, this is kind of a stock phrase, you find it even in the Odyssey, you know, for the man who looks before and behind him. So the two greatest poets, Homer and Shakespeare, right? And then he's seeing this likeness, and he's seeing this likeness, and he's seeing this likeness, and he's seeing this likeness, and he's seeing this likeness, and he's seeing this likeness, See, the same thing is characterizing what? Reason, huh? That's very, very pressing. I speak of all few of all's work. I don't know it, but... Yeah, so the inundations are good, too. I understand. I'm seeing some of such an imagination for the imagination. For a reason, right? I have many other testimonies of witnesses from other fictional writers, you know, to this being the key thing. But I won't belabor you with all of them, you know? Enough to be poet, huh? That's what I call someone, by Antonio Messia. Now, we are on Article 4, remember, at the end there? Let's go over the Bible again, a little difficult text, huh? Whether every sadness is what? Contrary to every what? Delight, huh? Now, what is the, what kind of opposition is contrariety, huh? The farthest apart in the same Jews? Yeah, yeah. That's why they say it can only be too contrary sometimes, right? Just like there's only two points that are furthest away in the line, right? The end points, huh? So, I answer it should be said, that is, it's said in the Tenth Book of Wisdom, the Tenth Book, after the books in Natural Philosophy, the Physica, the Tata Physica. Contrariety is the difference according to what? Form. This is the contrast between what? Having and lack, right? Or the having is something formal, but the lack is a lack, an unbeing of something, huh? And the opposition of being and unbeing, right? Contradiction, right? Now, form can be both what? A general form and a special what? Form. Whence it happens that some, what? Things are contrary according to the form of their genus, right? Which is more general, just as virtue and what? Vice, huh? And some things are contrary according to the form of their species as justice and what? Injustice, right? So even temperance and what? And injustice are opposed as virtue and vice, right? In general, but not in particular, like temperance and intemperance, or justice and injustice. But then Thomas sees the distinction, huh? Notice that's implied when you say that reason looks before and after, right? The reason sees distinctions, huh? That can be seen from the axiom of before and after, which is that nothing is before or after itself, right? So today can be before tomorrow and after yesterday. But can today be before or after itself? No. So there must be always some distinction between what is before and what is after, right? So reason must see a distinction before it can see a before and what? After, right, huh? So which is better, Carbonet, Sauvignon, or Pinot Noir, right? Well, if you can't taste a distinction between them, you're in no position to say which is better, right? If I can't distinguish between two students, can I say which one is better? So presuppose, you might say, to seeing a before and after is to see a, what? Distinction, right, huh? So if reason is the ability to see before and after, right, it must also be the ability to see, what? Distinction, right? And therefore to see division, which is a kind of distinction, and even definition, which involves distinction. Now he said, it should be considered that some things are, what? Specified, they are, what? As to their very nature, right, huh? According to absolute forms, now. The word absolute, now, is kind of a crazy way. But absolute is often used by Thomas in contrast to, what? Relative, right? Towards another, right, huh? So he says, some things are specified according to absolute forms, as, for example, substances are, right? Dog and cat and horse. And qualities, right? Like the virtues, the vices, and so on. But some are specified in comparison, ad aliquid extra, right? That's added being towards another, right, huh? So seven is something also absolute, right? And what is double and what is half? Yeah, yeah. So what is half could be more than what is double. You know, I mean, half the city of Worcester, right? And double my house or something, right? So it's not something absolute, right, huh? But it's towards another. And you see the word ad aliquid, of course, there you think, first of all, maybe, of the category of ad aliquid, huh? Prosti, right? Which we sometimes translate in relation, but the Greek is very, what? Precise, prosti. And they translate it in the Greek, in the English, in the Latin, rather, the commentary says, ad aliquid, right? Prost is towards, and T is towards something, right, huh? Okay? I mentioned my great discovery during the Gospel of St. John, right, huh? We say in English, the beginning was the word, and the word was what? Yeah. But in the Greek it is, and the word was toward God. Prost? Yeah. So man has been, you know, taught, as I was taught by Aristotle, but my old teacher, you know, didn't say relation, you know? He says, Prosti, ad aliquid, right? Very concrete way of saying it. Well, as you know from our great teachers, Augustine there, and Thomas, and so on, they distinguished the divine persons by, what? Relations, right? The father to the son, and the son to the father, right, huh? So you say in the beginning was the word, and the word was toward God, huh? God there is standing for what? The father, yeah, yeah. Well, he's kind of indicating, you know, that the distinction is one of, what? Towards another, right, huh? Okay. There's not an absolute distinction, right? They are the same God, they have the same nature, and not just in kind, but the same numerical nature, right, huh? The father and I are one, as he says, huh? You've seen me, you've seen the father. Kind of a little playful there with the apostles, because you see them in his human nature, right? But if they saw him in his divine nature, they would have seen the father nature too, right? So, but notice, he doesn't apply it to an adequate category, but he applies it to what? Passions and motions, right? And why does he say that, right? Because in a way, there's something ad-aliquid in emotion or passion. It is towards something, right? Like coming into this room. It's towards something, right, huh? Towards some object, right? Wanting, huh? Okay. Anger, right? You know, I'm getting angry, I'm going towards you, right? When I want something, you know, I'm going towards it, right? Here's the bar, here's the... I went down to hear a doctor speaker there, a pro-life there the other day, up in Lemmonster, and it was being held at the Knights of Columbus place there, right? So I walk in, and it's kind of like a big, you know, dance floor would sit up in the chairs now, you know? I think I, real bar! Right there, real! No! I wonder if I walk over there and he starts serving me or not, you know. Just help yourself. I was in Islinger's in St. Paul that's going to be my father sometimes. Long, long bar. As a kid, I thought it was just so long. Goes in fighting, nevertheless. You tend towards it. Especially as an open bar. So he's not saying that a passion or emotion is a relation, right? In the category of relation or post-T, but there's something like post-T there, right? Yeah, and it's very nature specified by that, right? Now he says, in those things whose species are considered according to absolute forms, right? Like qualities or substances. It happens that, what? Species which are contained under contrary genre are not contrary sometimes according to the ratio of the species, right? Okay? So it's temperance contrary to injustice, right? I mean, when we say that, it's the contrary, that would you, you know. These old things, you know, when they say black, say white, you know, hot, cold, you know. You can jump to the contrary, right? You wouldn't say, you know, temperance, injustice. You say temperance, intemperance, right? But nevertheless, the genre are contrary. One is a virtue and one is a vice, right? While justice and injustice are contrary, both according to the genus and according to the species, right? It does not ever happen that they have some affinity or what? Agreement to each other, right? In particular. Intemperance. Oh, it seems that long yet. Intemperance and justice, right? Which are in contrary genre, right? To wit, virtue, and vice, right? But they're not contrary to each other according to their, what? Own species, right? Nor do they have some affinity or agreement towards each other. So you can kind of see that point, huh? But in those whose species are taken according to their, and notice here's the word habitudinum now. Well, it's just kind of a word for relation, again. Thomas is a, do something extrinsic, right, huh? It happens that species of contrary genre, right? Not only are, what? Are not contrary to each other, but also that they have some agreement and affinity to each other. In that they have themselves in the same way to, what? Contraries. They adduce, therefore, a certain, what? Contrarity. Just as to, what? Approach or to go towards, what? White. And to approach or go towards black, have the notion of, what? Contrarity. But, in a contrary way, they have themselves do contraries. They have the ratio of his militude. What does that mean? Well, if you recede from white, but you approach blackness, right? Then they would seem to be, what? On the same thing. Yeah. If I'm a lover of wisdom, then I must be a hater of, what? Yeah? Or if you love virtue, you must hate, what? Fights, yeah. And this, most of all, appears in contradiction, which is the, what? Beginning of, what? Opposition, huh? For an affirmation, negation of the same thing, this opposition consists, right? As white and, what? Not white. Not white, huh? Now, in the affirmation of one opposite and the negation of another, there is, what? To be noted, a certain agreement and likeness, as if I say, for example, black, and then I say, what? Not white. There's an agreement of those two, right? Now, sadness and pleasure, since they are, what? Passions or emotions, let's say, right? But notice the word emotion is taking the word motion, and that was said to be towards another, right? And according to their genus, they have, what? Contrariety, right? Because the one pertains to the pursuit and the other to the flight, right? Which are in the disiring power, like affirmation, negation, and what? What reason? Yes. No. So you bring the steak? Yes. Bring the salmon? No. And therefore, sadness and pleasure, which are about the same thing, have opposition to each other, according to what? The species, right? But sadness and pleasure about diverse things, right? If those diverse things are not, what? Opposed, but are simply disparate on, diverse, they do not have opposition to each other by reason of their species, but they are also, what? Disparate, huh? Just as to be sad about the death of a friend and to delight in, what? Contemplation. If, however, those diverse things are contrary, then pleasure and sadness not only do not have contrariety, according to what? Gracious species, but also they have, what? Agreement and affinity, as when a man rejoices about the good and he's sad about the bad. And the first argument, he's saying, overlooks this distinction that he's putting out in the body of the article. That whiteness and blackness do not have their species from relation to something, what? Outside. As to, what? Pleasure and sadness. Whence there's not the same reason for both, huh? Now, the second objection here, right? Medicines come to be through contraries, right? No, so you're talking about pregation, right? That was borrowed from medicine, right? Okay. So the definition of comedy, the great comic authors there, they see it as purging, what? Melancholy, you know? So, by comfort, by murder, huh? Interesting, Shakespeare sometimes speaks of anger as eliminating pity, right? And then when Hal is seeing, you know, he snatched the horse of false death and he's larding between the earth and he walks along. You know, he's very annoyed at this practical joke being carried on him, right? And he says, if it's not for laughing, I should pity him. He's sweating, you know, embarrassing, you know. But if you laugh, you know, sometimes, you know, when a friend is in some kind of trouble, you know, and your first reaction is to laugh sometimes because of the comic aspect and he's kind of annoyed, you know, because he wants you to feel sorry for him or something, you know. But laughter can eliminate goody, right? And anger can too, right? Because anger makes you want to punish, right? Not to feel sorry for somebody. But any, what, pleasure is a medicine against any sadness, huh? As is clear through the philosopher in the seventh book of the epics. Therefore, every pleasure is to any sadness, what, contrary, right? What does Thomas say to this, huh? To second it should be said that genius is taken from matter, as is clear in the eighth book of the, what, metaphysics, and when he talks about matter and form. An accident, however, in place of matter is the, what, subject, right? That's why the sense in which an accident is in substance or in its subject is like form and matter, right? But it's not exactly the same, right? Now, it's been said that pleasure and sadness are contrary, according to their genus, huh? And therefore, in every sadness, there is a disposition contrary to the subject, there's a contrary disposition of the subject that's contrary to the disposition which is in, in a, what, pleasure, right, huh? The disposition of the subject, huh? For in every pleasure, the appetite has itself as accepting that which it, what, has, huh? In every sadness, it has itself as fleeing it, right, huh? And therefore, on the side of the subject, every pleasure is a medicine against every, what, sadness. And every sadness impedes every, what, pleasure, right? But, more so, right, most of all, especially, right, the Kipwe, when the pleasure of, what, is contrary to the sadness, even according to, what, its species, yeah? Whence is clear the solution to the clear, huh? Or it could be said otherwise, that although not every sadness is contrary to every pleasure, according to species, right, nevertheless, as far as their effect, they're contrary. For from one of them, the nature of the animal is, what, strengthened, right? From the other, it is, what, in a way, molested, right, huh?