Prima Secundae
Lecture 103: Interior vs. Exterior Pain and Species of Sadness

Transcript
================================================================================

In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Dios, gracias. God, our Enlightenment, Guardian Angels, take from the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, Angelic Doctor. Pray for us. Help us to understand what you have written. Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. So, whether exterior, what, sorrow, is greater than the interior, to the seventh, one goes forward thus. It seems that the exterior pain, I guess, is greater than the interior pain of the, what, heart, huh? For the exterior pain is caused from a cause as repugnant to the good consistency of the body, in which there is, what, life, huh? But the interior pain or sorrow is caused from the imagining of the, what, evil, right, huh? Since, therefore, life is more loved than the imagined good, right? It seems, according to the fore said, that the exterior pain is greater than the interior pain, huh? I think those famous words of Shakespeare there, or Hamlet, there's nothing good or bad, but thinking makes it so, right? I think thinking there may be just taking me to the sense of what, imagining, right? Time of its interior, right? You imagine your situation in life, you know, one way and the other way. You imagine it, it's not so bad, but in some ways, you know, people I associate with, they're all depressed about the election, you know, and they're talking about how to get over this. One guy says to his doctor, you know, I know it was something, it must be something for depression, you know, and so he says to his doctor, you want, you know, 13 pills of that, you know? He was just joking, of course, you know, but the doctor said, really? You know, yeah, this election, I've got to have this thing to relieve my depression. Moreover, things move more than the likeness of a thing, huh? But the exterior pain is arriving or coming from a real joining of something contrary, right? Like my fist hitting you or something, right? Or my knife, you know, into your flesh. But the interior pain is from the likeness of the contrary thing being apprehended, right? Therefore, more is the exterior pain than the interior pain, huh? Moreover, this is the third one now, a cause is known from its, what, effect, huh? But the exterior pain has, what, more strong effects, huh? For more does a man die from, what, exterior pains than an account of an interior pain, huh? And therefore, the exterior pain is greater and is more fled from, right, than the interior pain, huh? What does Shakespeare have the one character say in, I shall like it, men have died from time to time and so on, right? But not some love. Okay, but again, this is what is said in Ecclesiasticus 25, huh? Every, what, plague is the sadness of the, what, heart, huh? And all malice, the iniquity of a woman, huh? I don't know. That's going to go over too much today. It's the only thing, health, no fury, like a woman scorned. There's a new version of Anna Karenina coming out shortly, you know? The famous novel there, you know? Interesting. But the iniquity of a woman overcomes other, what? Iniquities, right? I think iniquities, we say iniquity, but iniquity, I think it's a lot better, huh? It says weakness. Yeah, wickedness, yeah. What's that woman there in the Old Testament, Jezebel? Jezebel, yeah. Yeah, it's pretty, pretty bad. But, you know, she explains, you know, the state of Macbeth, right? She's kind of, you know, propping him up to the deed of killing the king, right, huh? It's crazy, finally, but, you know, she's talking about, you know, she can take the baby, you know, that she has, you know, stash it, you know, and she's that tough, you know. So, I don't know. But, therefore, the sadness of the heart exceeds every exterior, what? Plague, right, huh? That sense seems to say, what, omnis plaga, I guess omnis is modifying plaga. So, he's saying that the sadness of the heart is every, what? Plague, right? Doesn't that have to be said, right? Okay. Because he'll move. Yeah. Now, answer, it should be said, that the interior and the exterior of pain come together in one thing, and in two things, they, what? Differ. Differ, right? They come together in this, that both are emotion of the desired power, as has been said above, right? They differ, however, according to those two things, which are required for sadness and what? Pleasure, right? To wit, according to the cause, which is something good or bad, that is, what? Joined, huh? He says conyuntum, because in the case of pleasure and pain, right, or joy and sadness, the good or the bad thing is now joined to you, right? But in the case of desire, it's absent, right, huh? In the case of love, it could be the one, but the love can be even when the thing is not joined to you, you can love, right? Absence makes the heart grow fonder, right? Okay. So he says, you're going to differ as regards this, both of the things you require for you, right? The one is that they can be joined to you, right? We'll see what the difference is when he says that. And the other thing, there must be a, what? Apprehension of it, right, huh? Okay. Now he says the cause of the exterior pain is a bad thing joined to one, right? That is repugnant to the, what? Body, right, huh? Well, being in the body. But the cause of the interior sorrow is a bad thing joined that's repugnant to the appetite, huh? So these guys who are sad and depressed because of the election, right? It's contrary to what they, what? Wanted, right, huh? Okay? It wasn't contrary to the body the way that a knife would be, right? Or, you know, bring you with a torch or something, right? Also, now, the second thing, the apprehension, right? The exterior pain follows the apprehension of the sense, right? And especially of what? Touch. Touch, right? Okay. So the pain you get from, what, a knife or the pain you get from, you know, a bow torch, you know, going in here, is what? Felt by the sense of touch primarily, right? The same way that they, you know, jab you in the eye, you'd be feeding it with, what, sense of touch, the pain in the eye, right? You even get a little stuff in your eye, right? It's sense of touch, right, that is apprehending this, right? Okay, something that shouldn't be in the eye, right, but it's, um, okay. But the interior pain follows the, what, interior grasping, right? Either of the imagination to it or also of reason itself, right, huh? So, he's mentioned then what the difference is, right, huh? The difference both as far as... The joining, right? And the other is what? The apprehension, right? If, therefore, one compares the cause of the inner pain or sorrow to the cause of the exterior one, one pertains per se to the appetite of which what? Both is what? Of which either is what? Pain or sorrow, right then? How do they translate that? As a repugnant? Through being repugnant to the body? Well, you're down here now. If, therefore, one compares the cause of the inner pain to the cause of the exterior, right then? One of them per se pertains to the appetite, right? To which both these pains belong, while the latter belongs to the appetite indirectly. To another, yeah. For the interior pain is from this, from this, that something is repugnant to the appetite itself, right? To the exterior sorrow, from this, that it's repugnant to the appetite because it's repugnant to the, what? Body, right? Now, that's what he means by, per alia, right? Through another, right? Right, okay? Now, the one is repugnant to the appetite, per se, through itself, right? The other is repugnant to the appetite through the, what? The body. The body, yeah. And then he gives the common principle. Always, what is per se, is before that which is, what? To another, right? Okay? That's a very important before, right? Okay? So, water is wet before the, what? Cloth is wet, right? Hmm? Right. Yeah, yeah. Ernst Dahl uses that when he's showing that the friendship of virtue, right, is better than the friendship, useful friendship, right, huh? The friendship of pleasure, because the person is loved per se, right? In the other case, he's loved per alia, right, huh? Another, huh? You could pilot the argument there to the unmover, right? Because the move-mover is by the mover through another, because moves another to be moved itself, right? Why the unmover mover is a mover per se, through himself, right? And not through another, because moving him. So, before the move-mover, then, there's an unmover mover, right? Which is God, huh? Whence from this side, huh? The interior pain is preeminent to the exterior one, huh? Because it's per se posed, right? To the appetite. Likewise, from the side of the, what? Grasping, huh? The side of the knowing. For the grasping of reason and imagination is higher, huh? There's higher knowing power than the apprehension of the sense of, what? Touch. When simply, and per se speaking, the interior sorrow or pain is greater than the, what? The exterior, right? A sign of which is, that even, what? That one will voluntarily undergo, or receive exterior pains, right? That he might avoid, what? Interior one, yeah. Example of that in your experience of life. It was a man, when he's seeking something that he wants very much, right? That he wants to undergo a lot of travail of the body, right? He might, for the sake of honor, for the sake of the woman, who it is, right? He might, what? Fight, right? And be injured in that sense, right? He doesn't want to lose his honor. He doesn't want to lose the woman or something, right? He doesn't sleep much anymore. Insofar as the exterior of sadness or pain is not repugnant to the, what? Interior appetite. It, in some way, what? In a way? Yeah. And joyfully, by the interior, what? Joy, yeah? Sometimes, however, the, what? Interior pain. Yeah. Is with the interior pain, right? Yeah. And then the pain or sadness is, what? Increased, huh? And goes on. Not only, not only is the interior pain greater than the exterior, but it's also more, what? Universal, right, huh? Yeah. Because whatever's repugnant to the body can also be repugnant to the interior, what? Appetite, right, huh? Okay? These horrible scenes in the battlefield, they're going to amputate a leg, right, huh? They're going to do it all the time in the Civil War, right? Because they couldn't save the legs, so they can't even now. Oh, I see. See? So that's repugnant to the interior appetite, right? Sure. But so, to the body, right? And whatever is grasped or apprehended by the sense is also able to be grasped by the imagination and reason, but it is not, what? Convertible. Convertible, right, huh? Okay? So, imagination and reason can know, what? Somewhat what the pleasure of wine is, let's say, right, huh? Or the pleasure of sleeping when you're tired or something, you know? But the exterior sense can't know the joy of the fear of Euclid or something, right? And therefore, significantly, in the authority adduced, right, in the siddhkantra, own this plaga, right? It's time to be more universal, right? The sadness of the heart is, right? Because also the sadness, the pains of the exterior plagues are comprehended under the interior, what? Sadness of the heart, huh? So, before I go to the plagues of Euclid, he's got some predictions to apply, right, in this case, huh? He's saying that in pleasure and in sadness, right, you have two things involved, right, huh? And one is what? He joined with something bad in the case of sadness, to you, and the other thing is the apprehension of this, right? And he's saying that in the case of the interior sadness, it's joined to the appetite per se, right, huh? And in the case of the exterior one, it's to the body, right, huh? Right. And the per se is more so than the, what, per alia, huh? The two itself is more so than the two another, right, huh? Okay. Just like we were saying before, my examples on the water is more wet than the clock, right? Or the fire is more hot than the air around the fire, right? So what is per se is more so, right, than what is per alia? to another. And then he says, but also the knowing power is a greater knowing power, right? And then he goes to the second point, right? You know, if I was reading this text there, I'd, you know, put the nun's soul in the, you know, leave a little blank there, you know, and then another place, make it, right? It's also more universal, right, huh? Okay? Because the interior apprehension, yeah, you can be sad interiorly, about an evil of the body, right? If you've lost an arm or a leg or something like that. And I'm like, I just had a tooth pulled, you know? I lost part of myself, you know? So, but then you can also be, what, about spiritual things, right? Immaterial things, non-bodily things, right? You can be sad about those as well, interiorly, right, huh? By the sense of touch, which is the main sense there, doesn't really know about those things, right, huh? Okay? Or even something like, you know, loneliness, huh? Loneliness is what? Caused by the absence of a friend, right, huh? So, that's a more spiritual kind of sadness, though, right, huh? Right. Okay? So, that's why he says it significantly, omnis plaga, right? Every plague, right, huh? Okay? Is the sadness of the heart, right? So, I suppose, in the condemned, or damned, right, huh? You know, there's that universal, right? To the first, therefore, it should be sad, huh? The first argument, now, is taken from the opposition to the, what, life of the body, right, huh? Okay? It's arguing that the exterior pain is, what, because something is opposed to the consistency of the body, right? And therefore, to your very life, right, huh? Well, Thomas says, to the first, therefore, it should be said that the interior sadness can also be about those things which are contrary to what? Life. To life, huh? And thus, the comparison of the interior sorrow to the exterior one should not be taken according to the diverse evils which are the cause of the pain, but according to the diverse comparison of this cause of pain to the appetite one, which is per se, in the other words, probably, right? The second objection was saying that in one case you're being affected by the thing, in the other case, by the likeness of the thing, right, huh? The second should be said that the interior, what, sadness does not proceed from the likeness of the thing, grasped, right, huh? But it's from a cause, right? For the man who is, what, sad interiorly, he's not sad interiorly about the likeness apprehended, right? But about the thing of which it is a likeness, huh? Doesn't a man sometimes, you know, he dreams that somebody he knows has died, let's say, right, huh? And so, is he sad because of his dream, or because of the thing of which the dream is a likeness? Except he said, you know, so-and-so's still alive, you know, something like that, right? I think we've had something like that, you know, where we dream that we've lost someone or something, right? She's kind of denying the premise there, right? The guy's saying that you're saddened by the likeness of something. No, it's by that which it is a likeness that you're saddened, right? Which thing, he says, is the more perfectly apprehended through some likeness, the more that likeness is, what, more immaterial and, what, abstract, right? Because immateriality is the basis of knowing, right? And therefore, the inward, what, sadness or pain, per se speaking, right, is greater, right, huh? As it were, what? As being about a greater evil, right? And account to this, that by the interior grasping, the evil is more, what? Known, huh? You've got cancer, you're going to die, you know? Six months to live, right? But the interior apprehension of the doctor's apprehension, which they do now, right, is more knowing of what the thing is, right? Than the exterior senses know, right, huh? Okay, now, the third objection, right? He's arguing that he has strong effects, right, than the exterior one. Bodily changes, right, are more caused from the exterior sadness, because, what? The cause of exterior pain is a, what, thing that is corrupting you, right, being joined to you in a body way, which requires the apprehension of touch, right, huh? Also because the exterior sense is more bodily than the interior one, right? Just as the sensitive appetite is more, what, bodily than the intellectual one, right? So when Aristotle takes up the emotions there in the premium to the dhyana, right, he talks about how they involve the body, right, huh? Right. Remember, you know, holding my arms in a little kitten, you know, and a big dog, you know, huh? You can have to feel that kind of, you know, shaking your hands, right, huh? You know, so there's a bodily thing involved in that fear, right? And it comes to this, as has been said above, huh? From the motion of the sense appetite, more of the body is, what, changed, right? So you get angry, right, huh? Or you get fearful, and your body is undergoing changes, right? If it's too much, it can piss you off, right, huh? And of course, sometimes you see it, too, that people are said to die of joy. You've heard that, huh? Sejana? There's some truth to that, right? But there's a bodily change, right? It's too much, right, huh? Shakespeare touched upon that, right, huh? Yeah, oh yeah, oh yeah, that's kind of famous thing, it's even in fiction, right? You've heard people dying of joy? No. Well, no, no, no, no, I mean, I mean, you're kind of overcome by the joy of something that's happened, right, you know, and they collapse, right? Yeah, the body's been changed, yeah. But in a fourth story, things like anger and what? Fear, right, huh? So some people, you know, died, you know, getting too angry, right? A lot of people have died of what? Fear, fear, you know, the body's changed, right, huh? Okay? But Thomas is admitting that there might be a more bodily change with this exterior sadness, right? Because emotions are themselves something bodily, right? And Aristotle's talking about how he defined things in the Daniel there, right? He's talking about, you know, if you could define fear or something else completely, you'd have to bring in the body as well as the soul, right, huh? And when the names of emotions are carried over to the will from the sense-desiring power, you drop off of the body aspect, right? Okay? Now we get to what? The species of what? Sadness, right, huh? To the eighth So the species of what? Sadness, right? So the species of what? Sadness, right? So the species of So the species of what? Sadness, right? So the species of what? Sadness, right? So the species of Then one proceeds thus. It seems that Damascene unsuitably assigns four species of what? Sadness, huh? Which are epichidia, and that's the one that's where kind of sadness about spiritual things, right? I'm tired of praying, I'm tired of going to Mass every morning, aren't you? Yeah. And this is kind of, you know, this is, you know, I think in the tradition of the church there, you know, the translations, they would kind of, you know, kind of, not properly translate this way, epichidia, right? They use the word laziness, which is more of a bodily thing, right? This is kind of, you know, you're kind of being tired of the spiritual thing, you know? Right. So I often see it just kept as epichidia. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I remember years ago there, we were trying to get a priest to do something, I know, we was having a benediction or something, you know, and he said, well, we'll be all churched out then, he said, you know. My wife was very annoyed at the priest to say, but it's, you know, churched out. That's kind of, you know, cheating, right? Yeah, yeah. I thought he said it's a good holiday, it's about fighting against the chedia. Yeah, yeah. In the spiritual life. Akthas, huh? Or anxiety, according to Gregory Nicenum, right? And then, I'll call a footnote down there. Nemesius, right? It's a different guy, right? Nemesius. N-E-M-E-S-I-U-S, the other text. Is there a footnote on your book or not? Gregory of Nicenum? Yeah, but there's another guy, named Nemesius. And they're saying that that's him, right? So we, in the universe, they're going to say it, right? You see, and then, later on in the third objection, right? N-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M N-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M-E-M Pachelborn, I guess, who was the abbess in her convent, right? So you're confusing the two, right? And I was saying, we're already into this, we're already in Thomas a lot, right? Where they're confusing the two, right? And even Thomas, if you go to the Navarre thing there, you know, you can still get the pseudo-Thomas, right? There's some guy, Thomas Anglia, must be Thomas of England or something, you know, who's confusing the Thomas of the Jelly Goose, right? And so they kind of identify some of these things, right? But sometimes, you know, there are two people who have the same, what? Name. Name, yeah. And, you know, I was going through these things where I was like, I was looking at the paintings there about the, you know, portrait of Charles, I mean, Cardinal Guevara, you know? But I can't even see these names coming up, you know, in contemporary, you know, people, you know? So sometimes people, what, mix up those two, right, huh? But that's not really the philosopher's problem, because he's dealing with the universal, right, huh? So the names that get him will be the names that are biblical by what? Reason, right? But this is just an example, you know, where it comes up, right? It's not really a strictly philosophical thing, but a name like that, huh? Okay, so, misericordia, which would be what? Pity or mercy, right? And invidia, which is what? Envy, right, huh? Now, the first objection is interesting, huh? Sadness is opposed to what? Pleasure, right? Or to joy. But of pleasure, they are not assigned any, what, species, right? Therefore, neither should species of sadness be assigned, huh? Okay. Second objection. Moreover, penance is a certain species of, what, sadness, right? So penance is sadness over your sin, isn't it, right? Okay. And likewise, what, nemesis and zealous? Yeah. What? How do they translate nemesis? They have indignation and jealousy. Yeah. Because zealous has, in one sense, you know, jealousy, right? But nemesis would be, what? Indignation, yeah, yeah. The era of Stalin is the distinction between envy and indignation, right, huh? Because envy is sadness over the good fortune of another, right, huh? Okay? But indignation is, I'm indignant that Obama is re-elected, right? Because he's unruly of dishonor, right? You know, it's a different kind of sadness, right, huh? Okay. Which are not comprehended under these species, right, huh? Therefore, insufficient is the force of division, right, huh? You wonder, is Tom's going to, you know, what's he going to say about this division, right? Is he going to accept it as being sufficient, you know? Or is he going to say, you know, this is just a partial thing? Or is he going to, you know, what's the authority of this division, right, huh? Moreover, every division ought to be through, what? Opposites. Opposites, right, huh? But the force said, do not have opposition to each other. For according to, what, Gregory, wherever Gregory is, Gregory is in the museum. Um, echidia is sadness, what? Stopping the voice? Amputance? Amputating the voice? Stopping the voice. Anxiety is sadness, what? Weighing one down? Envy is sadness in alien goods and the goods of another, right, huh? And misericordia is sadness, right? In alienis malis, in the evils that, you know, you're sad or what's happened to another, right? In New Year, sad or what's the goods have another, right? Okay. I don't know, do you remember those things when you had the love and friendship course? I don't know if you were there, but it's for the English novelists, right, huh? And how they're talking about friendship and how they saw envy as what? Yeah, yeah. And this is what was corrupting friendship, right, huh? Now, when I was first studying these things there, and I was kind of influenced by Thomas that he talks about friendship, I mean, about charity, caritas, as a kind of, what, friendship, right, huh? Okay. And then he talks about the vices opposed to the virtues, right? Well, one vice that's opposed to, what, friendship or charity is envy, right, huh? But you could apply this to you in friendship, too, right, huh? Because if I'm your friend, I love you, and therefore I wish well to you, and as a friend I should rejoice in the good that happens to you, right? Right. Okay. So if I'm sad over the good that happens to you, that's really, what? Yeah, or it's a defect, right? It's like a temptation, right? Right. But if it came a bit shortly... It would destroy the friendship, right, huh? Right. And so I used to take with the students to the assumption there. I'd say, you know, a lot of them live on campus, you know, and they have a roommate, right? So I'd say, you know, and you're two girls, and you're in a shared room, you know. And so the other girl's got a real nice boyfriend, right, who's going places, you know, and he's handsome, you know. So, please give us an answer, you know. Or there's two guys, and they're both going to graduate. One guy, you know, has already landed a good job, you know, and, you know, you're struggling to find a good job or something, you know, or any job, maybe. And he'd say, you know, the goodness happened to your roommate, you know. I thought that would, you know, kind of make them aware of the fact that this is lurking there, you know. I remember your saying, I think, that success is hard on a man, but it's even harder on his friends. Yeah, yeah, yeah, that was one of the novelists saying that, yeah, yeah, yeah. It's hard for a man to take, you know, good fortune, though, without getting, you know, irrational. You know, they were just talking about the big game, you know, whatever it is. Yeah, yeah, yeah, I'm trying to say, 180 million is the only thing that's up to. Someone's got a winning ticket somewhere. Someone's got a winning ticket somewhere. Someone's got a winning ticket, you know. So my son-in-law called up and said to my wife, you know, I want you to know it's not us. I can't remember what he's talking about down there. He's right around Kansas, you know, where we're going, you know, Christmas time, you know. But they, you know, made a study of people, you know, who won these big prizes, you know, maybe not that size. And most of them are less happy after winning the prize than before they, because they weren't kind of crazy, you know, and had divorces and all kinds of things, you know what it was. And they had an old television special when you were interviewing past lottery winners, and every one of them was miserable. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So it's not really the punishment to win in that sense. I mean, so you don't have to do good things. So I think if you want to, let me see you amount of money. You know, not think of spending any of it until, you know, another year or something, six months or something, you know, until gradually, you know, all these crazy, you know, things that you're going to do with it disappear, and you, you know, realize what you should do with all this money, you know. It can happen that someone is sad both about, what, alien, yeah, and alien goods, and together with this, to be, what, weighed down inwardly, right? And to lose his exterior voices, if these things aren't really opposed, right? They can have both of these, huh? Therefore, the force of division is not suitable, right? But against this is the authority of both Gregory Nicene, but probably not him, and, what, damascene, right, huh? Okay. Now, what does Thomas say, huh? I answer, it should be said, that to the definition of a species pertains what it has from addition to the, what, genus, right, huh? Now, how, what does Porphy define difference there, you know, just kind of three definitions, kind of difference? Difference, difference is what, what, separates species under the same genus, right, huh? And then he has another one, you know, difference is sort of many differing in kind, right? Just how they are, what they are. But then he has, it's what the species has in addition to the genus, right, huh? He's kind of touching upon that, right? So the species is the genus with the addition of the difference, right? Or the difference is. But now he makes a distinction here, or points out a distinction, I should say. Try to avoid saying he makes a distinction. But he makes a kind of art here, right? He points out a distinction, huh? Brings out a distinction. But to a genus, something can be added in two ways, right, huh? In one way, what pertains to it, per se, right, huh? And that's what we usually talk about when we talk about a difference in a strict sense, right? So you divide triangle into what? Equilateral, scalene, and isosceles. But not into red, white, and blue, see? But it's per se the triangle. They have three sides, right, huh? And this seems to determine what's per se the triangle, right? So it's three lines. It can be all equal, or just two of them, or what? None of them, right, huh? But red, white, and blue is not different ways of being, what? Being three lines, right? Just as rational adds to what? Animal, right, huh? And such, in addition, makes veros, huh? True species, right? Of some genus, right? As is clear by the philosopher in the seventh book and the eighth book of wisdom, right? In the metaphysics. But something is added to a genus, another way, as something extraneous from its, what? Definition, right? Just as if white is added to, what? Animal, right, huh? Or something of this sort, right, huh? Or green is added to triangle, right, huh? And such an addition does not make true species of the genus, right? According as we commonly speak of the genre and species, right? Go back to the case of Goge, a forfeit, right, huh? It's taken from Aristotle, but brought together the case of Goge. But sometimes, right, huh? Something is said to be, what? Species of some genre, on account of this, that they have something extraneous to which is applied the roxy or the genus, huh? Just as, what? Carbo and flama, flame, right? Are said to be, what? Species of fire, right? On account of the application of the nature of fire to some, what? Exterior. Exterior matter, right? And in a similar way, we speak of, what? Astrology and perspectiva, right? As species of, what? Mathematics, insofar as mathematical principles are applied to some, what? Natural thing. So you go back to Pythagoras, right? And Pythagoras is kind of a big name in math there, right? And Pythagorean theorem and so on. Even down to our theory, they still call it Pythagorean theorem, right? And so I read my friend Euclid of Alexandria, right, huh? And a lot of these theorems go back all the way to Pythagoras, I think, right? There's all kinds of discussion we really foresaw, right, huh? Well, but Pythagoreans divided the mathematical sciences into, what? Four, right? Rhythmaticate. Geometry. Music and astronomy, right? But music and astronomy are not purely mathematical, right? But they take the principles of arithmetic in the case of music and they apply it to, what? Physical sounds, right, huh? And they take the, what? Geometry and apply them to the sun and the moon and the stars and so on, right, huh? Okay. So in a sense, that's closer to being a species, right, huh? But if you say that mathematics is about quantity, right, huh? Well, it's a paracet division of quantity into discrete and continuous like you have in the categories, right? The numbers are discrete and continuous. It would be like line and surface and so on, right? That seems to be more paracet, right, huh? How much you are, right? And in this way of speaking, right, the second way of speaking, right, there are assigned here species of, what, sadness through the application of the notion of sadness to something, what? Exterior. Exterior, yeah, right. Which extraneous thing can be taken either on the side of the... What? Cause, right? Or an account on the side of the what? Effect. Yeah. Now I think it says, does it mean the cause of the object, or does it mean the object is the cause? Because before we said that the object of the passions is our cause, right? So the object of my fear is the cause of my fear, right? The object of my sadness is the cause of my sadness, right? Okay. Or from the side of the what? Effect, he says, right? Now what does this mean? Now the proper object of sadness is one's own what? Evil, right? Whence the extraneous object of sadness can be taken, either what? Only, because it is bad, right? But not one's own evil, right? And thus there is what? Mercy, right? Or pity, right? So I don't strictly speaking pity myself, but I pity the evil of another person because of the evil that's happened to them, right? Which is sadness about a, what? Alien evil, right? So it's kind of an extrinsic matter, right? Insofar as it is estimated or considered to be, what? One's own, right? So when I pity you, I take your evil as if it were my evil, right? Like, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say, say,