Prima Secundae
Lecture 105: The Causes of Sadness: Evil, Desire, and Unity

Transcript
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Answering that one objection there that is not, what, going to be carried over to everything that is affected at first cause, right? Not everything has to have that, whatever is the object of love, primarily, right, is not primarily the object of everything that depends upon love, right, as a cause. Thus, therefore, in that way in which an object is the cause of the passion, that's true of all the passions, right, what I fear is the cause of my fear. Yeah, but in general, I'm just saying that the object of any passion is the cause of that passion, right, huh, okay? So, as I say, the cause of fear is the object of fear, okay? The cause of love is the good I love, right? So, he's applying that, huh? Thus, therefore, in that way in which the object is the cause of the passion, right, huh, more properly is the cause of sadness or pain, the bad joined to one, then the good, what, lost, huh? That's more the object of it, right? So, bad is the object of sadness, right? And if it's more the cause of sadness, right, then the good, which is not, it's object really, right, lost, huh? But the other side of the coin to that is that the good loss is not a cause of sadness, except insofar as it takes on the ratio of a, what? The bad. Of something bad, yeah. Just like the bad, lost, or disappeared, is not a cause of joy, except insofar as it's good, yeah. We've got to stop now, who is it? You've got an awful lot of smart stuff to sit here, you know, it takes a while to absorb this, huh? He's a pretty smart guy, I think, you know? Thank you, Dr. I was talking to the student last night, he was asking me about the Eucharist, you know, before we got into our classroom, you know, and I was given my famous distinction between spiritual food and material food, and I used to think of three differences, right, and say, well, in material food, the lower is the food of the higher, so I eat the cow, or I eat the carrot, right, and they're below me, right, but in the case of spiritual food, the higher is the food of the, what? Lower. Lower, right, and then the second difference is that in material food, the food is dead, right? Yeah, hopefully. Yeah, I tell the joke about my cousin down like to stay kind of rare, you know, and so I remember him saying to the waitress, you know, he's trying to emphasize the fact you want it to be rare, you know, you want it to be rare that when I take my fork, you know, say, move! It didn't really want it that rare, though, I don't think you know. Well, in the case of spiritual food, I mean, the food is alive, right? And then the third one is that in material food, the food is changed into the one fed, right? So the, I don't become like a carrot, I don't turn orange, I don't turn like carrots, but it's turning human flesh and blood and so on, huh? But in the case of spiritual one, it's the, what? Reverse, right? And so, you know, in Thomas' prayer there, for communion now, one of the things he asks, you know, the Father, you know, that he might so receive the body that our Lord got from Mary, right, that he would be incorporated in the mystical body of Christ, right, yeah? So one of the senses being assimilated to the Ironman, right, yeah? So you ask me, is there any, you know, spiritual food besides the Eucharist? Well, I was quoting Dionysius there, you know, where he says the higher angels are, what, as if they were food for the lower angels, right? Because the Enlightenment, right, huh? And, you know, Socrates speaks of a feast of reason, right, huh? See? Well, in a sense, Thomas is, what, feeding my mind, right, huh? But Thomas, in his mind, his mind is more alive than my mind, you know? He says, our minds are almost dead, you know? So, so, so, so, it's a superior mind, right, that's feeding our mind, right, huh? And he's assimilating us to his way of thinking, right, huh? Which is superior to our way of thinking, right, huh? Right. So I... Road is a natural road because the nature of a thing, or what it is, is what's first in that thing. And then the natural road is over the senses to reason, where nature of man is to be an animal that has a reason, right? So in the case he's an animal, he has senses, right? He doesn't just have senses, he has reason, right? But the general and time comes before the particular, right? So the road is from the senses to reason, so it's kind of a basic syllogism, right? We're going to apply that to what Thomas is doing in a sense, huh? Okay, let's see our little prayer here. In the name of the Father, from the Son, from the Holy Spirit, Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, guardian angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Deo gracias. God, our enlightenment. Guardian angels, drink the lights of our minds. Or to illumine our images and arouse us to consider more carefully. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Pray for us. And help us to understand what you're ready. Father, Son, Holy Spirit, Amen. Now, just talking a little bit about the importance of this treatise on the emotions, right? The feelings, huh? And the names of the emotions, huh? Are picked up and carried over and placed upon the acts of the, what? Will. Will, okay. But you do so changing somewhat the meaning of the words, huh? And more precisely, you drop out the bodily aspect of it, right? Okay? Material aspect of the emotion. And you keep the formal aspect, right? Okay? Now, why do we do that, right? Why do we carry over the names of emotions and place them upon and use them to name the acts of the will? Well, why don't we give names to the acts of the will, right? Independently of the names of the, what? Emotions. Why is that? Does it actually have done that? So, like, the Eskimos have seven words for snow or something like that? Yeah, yeah, yeah. Not that I know of, really. Emotions are more known? Yeah. And the emotions are what? They're sensible, right, huh? Right. Okay? And so we're being led from what's more known, right? And sensible to something that is less known and not, what? Sensible, right, huh? And I can remember as a boy, they're sitting in church at the Tivity Church there in St. Paul, Minnesota. Tivity of our Lord. And the preacher's talking about the love of God, right, huh? And I was trying to figure out, what does that really mean, you know? I knew what the love of candy is, which I had. And maybe I had a love of girls at that time, too. But it didn't seem that I had that sort of thing for God, right, huh? You know? And, of course, I didn't have, you don't have an emotion in that sense for what? God, right, huh? The love of God is an act of the what? The will, huh? Okay? And you notice when Thomas, when he goes through here, although he's talking first about the emotion, right? He'll sometimes allude, right, and touch upon what corresponds to this in the, what? Will, right? Okay? And that's following this road from the senses into what? Reason, right, huh? Okay? So, you can say that this treatise on emotions is useful not only for what it's directed for, right? Understanding emotions, but it's useful for understanding the acts of the will, right? Now, I was reading my favorite book there, the Summa Contra Gentiles, right? And Thomas has a chapter there that's been going through the will and so on of God. He has a chapter that they're not these passions or emotions, right, in God, right? And then he talks about how we do carry over the names of these things, but drop out the thing. But then he's saying he's going a step beyond now our own will, right, and going to the will of God, right, you see, and probably all 11 names, right, of emotions, and maybe even some of the, you know, species of those emotions, but all 11 names could be carried over to acts of will in your will and my will, right? But Thomas argues that of the 11 names of the emotions, only two of them can be properly carried over to, what, God, right? What prevents some of them, now none of them can be carried over to God as far as the bodily aspect, honestly, right, but even the formal aspect, right? And Thomas says, well, sometimes it's because of the object, right? If the object of the emotion is something bad, then this emotion, this name, cannot be carried over to God, even formally, in a formal aspect, because there's nothing, nothing bad can happen to God, right, okay? But then Thomas says, but we distinguish the emotions not only by their, what, object, like good or bad, but how they are towards that object, right? So that, say, joy and desire or wanting both have the good as their object, right? But joy is in the presence and the possession, the having of that good, and desire or wanting is in the, what, absence and lacking, the not having that, what, that good, yeah. So desire, for a different reason than sadness, right, or something as bad as an object, even though desire is good as an object, there's something about desire that's for a good that you don't have, right? Well, God is universally good. He has every good, right? So you can say to Moses or Abraham, I will show you every good. And Thomas says, myself. Himself, right? And so desire, then, cannot be what? It's said to God properly, right? But joy can, because both the object is appropriate to God, which is the good, right, and the way of being towards that good, right, which would be what? The possession of it, right? Now, Thomas says, now, something like fear, he says, right, that could not be in God for two reasons, right? One, because its object is a bad, and nothing bad can happen to God, so he can't be afraid of some bad thing happening to him, right? But also, because fear is about something that could happen to you, right, that hasn't happened to you yet, and that implies that you're subject to some kind of change in your condition, and God is unchangeable, right? So there's at least two reasons, right, why there couldn't be fear, right? In the case of desire, just maybe one reason, right? So, can any other emotion or its name be carried over to God besides joy or pleasure? Yeah, yeah. And then you have to realize that love can be both in the, what, presence and in the, what, absence of the good, right? Right, then, okay? So, that's why I think the philosopher is said to be a lover of wisdom, and not just a man who, what, wonders, right? Because wonder is a kind of desire for wisdom, huh? And when you acquire wisdom, then you don't have desire anymore, but you can still, what, love wisdom, right? So, whether I'm pursuing wisdom and have not acquired it yet, or whether I've pursued it and acquired it in some way, right, I can still, what, love wisdom, so it's better to call me a lover of wisdom than one who desires wisdom, although I am, for the most part, desiring wisdom maybe too, right? So, this is such a beautiful, this treatise is, right? Although it's a treatise on the 11 emotions, and we're going through the concubiscible emotions now. So, let's talk about those. Six ones, right? And then the treatise found this on the five irascible emotions like hope and despair and fear and anger and so on. But this is also useful for understanding the acts of our will and ultimately for understanding even what? Some things about God, right? And why there's love and joy in God, but that's it. As far as, you know, properly speaking. So isn't it beautiful? You see, the treatise said how basic it is, right? And you can see we're following the first road in our knowledge, the road from the senses into what? Reason, right? Now, what else is this treatise useful for, right? Well, obviously to understand human beings because human beings live somewhat or sometimes very much so. On the level of senses, on the level of what? Emotions, right? And especially the young, right? Women, perhaps, men. Men are subject to their emotions, right? But then it's also useful for, then, for what? Fiction, for epic and drama, right? Plays and stories and so on. In two ways. In one way for understanding the characters represented is undergoing some, what? Emotion, right? So Othello has some emotion when he kills Desdemona, right? And some people are, what? Coriolanus is angry when he turns against Rome, right? So you have to understand the emotions to understand the characters and why they're acting the way they are, right? It's also necessary to understand the emotional effect that a, what? Work of fiction has on us, right? So when Aristotle defines tragedy, right? It's the likeness of an action that is serious, complete and of some magnitude, right? Acted out rather than narrated, right? In sweetened language, he says, right? But he says, moving us to, what? Pity and fear, so as to, what? Purge these, right? He sees that in the beautiful premium, or I should say prologue, we call it, to Roman Juliet, right? Because in the, it's written in the form of a Shakespearean song, right? Fourteen lines. But he'll say, you know, whose misadventured piteous overthrows do with their death bury their parents strife, right? So there he touches upon pity in those lines, right? And then in the third quatrain, the fearful passage of their death marked love. You see? So you get pity and fear, right? So to understand the kind of play it is, one that moves us ultimately to pity and fear, right? So as to purge these, right? When I was trying to work out a definition of comedy, I was trying to say, what were the emotions that comedy moves us to, right? And what is the kind of catharsis or purgation that it does, right? So this treatise is basic to understand both the emotions that are at play and the characters represented in the plays, right? And are responsible for some of their, what, actions and their tragic mistakes and other mistakes. But also for understanding the, what, emotional effect that this kind of fiction has, right? Then it's useful as a background for rhetoric, right? Because the second means, rhetoric is the art of what? Persuasion, right? And there are three means of persuasion. The image I project of myself, you know, it's a knowledgeable man, who is your good and your tricks and so on. And then the way I move your, what, emotions, right? And then finally the arguments and the parent arguments that I use, right? And so Aristotle, and this is true in all kinds of rhetoric, but both in political rhetoric, right, and in the rhetoric in the courtroom, huh? My mother always tells me about being on jury duty, you know, when she was young, and there's an accident there involving a taxi cab and some, you know, somebody's other car. And it looked like the taxi cab driver was not guilty, you know, was not responsible for the accident. It was the other guy, you know? But the jury all wanted to vote the other way because they said the taxi cab company can afford to pay. So I'm feeling sorry, right, for the other guy, right? And my mother said, I wasn't right if I do that, but that's the way they were. So you see the way the jury's influenced, right? So if I get the jury feeling, you know, angry towards somebody, they're going to be more apt to fight him guilty or more guilty than he is, right? Or fear him whatsoever. I get them feeling sorry for him, you know, having pity, you know, that in law school they have an advocacy writing course where they teach you how to put a spin on the basic facts of the case. You can't ethically change the facts of the case, but you can put a lot of emotionally-laden verbiage around the facts so that you sway the jury one way or the other one that judges you. You think he can do? So I start on the rhetoric then, the second book of the rhetoric there, he has a whole section on the emotions, right? Now it's more particular in aiming towards persuading the jury in perspective, you know, the political assembly, right? But this is kind of a background for that consideration, right? And then for the science of ethics, because the ethics is about the virtues and the vices, and a number of these virtues and vices are about the emotions, right? So courage is about, and magnanimity are about irascible emotions, right? And temperance is about concupisement, you know? And mildness is about anger and so on, right? So it's a foundation for all those, what? Sciences, right? The science about the poetic art, and to that you can join to music, right? Because music is representation, in part at least, of the, what? Emotions, right? So in classical music, you know, the minor key, other things being equal, you know, the minor key is more suitable for an emotion like sadness, or an emotion like fear, or an emotion like, what? Anger, right? You know? Most that's what? Because you always have anger at D minor and C minor, right? And the sad quintet is a G minor quintet, right? While the major keys are for joy and for hope, and, okay? Sometimes Mozart takes a melody, and the concerto, he turns it from the major key to the minor key, where the things turn from a kind of hope to a kind of despair, right? So, to understand, in a sense, what music, right? This is the foundation for that, too. So, you realize how universal this is in importance, huh? Okay, now we're reading this treatise here right now about pain, right? Sadness, right? And like he did with love, he's going into the... what causes and the effects after he's talked about the thing itself. So we left off last time I said, question 36, right? Article 2, where the concupiscence is a cause of what? Sorrow, right? To a second then, one goes forward thus. It seems that concupiscence, which is a word for wanting, right? Is not the cause of pain or sadness. For sadness, per se, as such, regards something bad, as has been said. But concupiscence, desire or wanting, is a certain motion of the appetitive power towards the what? Good. But the motion which is in one contrary is not a cause of the motion which regards the other contrary. Therefore, concupiscence is not a cause of what? Pain or sadness, right? Moreover, pain or sorrow, according to Damascene, is about something bad that is present, right? But concupiscence, wanting or desire, is about something in the what? Future. Therefore, concupiscence is not the cause of what? Pain. Moreover, that which is, per se, delightful, is not the cause of what? Pain. Pain. But desire is, in itself, pleasant as a philosophy, says the one rhetoric, right? Some guy's thinking about drinking the beer, you know, and desiring the beer, you know, or something like that, or favorite food or something, you know? It's giving us some pleasure, right? This anticipation, right? Therefore, concupiscence is not the cause of sadness or pain, if it's the cause of what? Pleasure, right, huh? But against this is what Augustine says in the Ingridian, huh? Sub in 20 bus, huh? Entering in, I guess, huh? The ignorance of things to be done, and the desire for what? Bad things, huh? Mockish things. They, what? Infer for their followers error and, what? Pain, right? But ignorance is a cause of error, and therefore concupiscence is a cause of, what? Pain, huh? So if you have ignorance and concupiscence, right? Augustine says you're going to have error, which means to follow from ignorance, right? And sadness, right, huh? Well, what does Thomas have to say about this, huh? My answer, it should be said that sadness is a certain motion of the animal desiring power. That means the sensing desiring power, because the animal is defined by senses, right? But the emotion, the repetitive motion, has a certain likeness with the natural desire, right? And notice, we use the word wanting sometimes, even of the, what? Plant, right? See, the plant wants sunlight or wants water, right, huh? And sometimes you get a plant and water for a while. You'll hear it, you know, absorbing the water, right, huh? Oh, God, you are my God, and I seek for you my flesh, pines, soul thirsts like the earth, parched, life is without water, right? You can't compare it, right? The thirst of the soul for God with the water, thirsting for the soil, thirsting for the water, yeah. Now, he says you can assign a two-fold cause of the natural, what? Desire, right? And one by way of end, where the end is one of the four kinds of cause. And the other is, whence there is a beginning of motion, which is the definition of the mover, huh? Just as the descent, huh, the cause of the descent of the heavy body has an end, that for the sake of which it seems to be falling, is the place down below, right? But the beginning of the motion is its, what? Natural inclination, which is from, what? Yeah, yeah. Notice those two words there, right? Although principium can be used for any kind of cause, you think, first of all, of the cause, in the sense maybe of the mover, right? And phinis, right? End is the cause in the sense of that for the sake of which, right? So in the apocalypse, God says I am the alpha and omega, right? The first and the last, huh? The beginning and the end, right? In the Greek, if I recall, it's archie, right? Which is the word for principium, beginning. And telos, right? The word for end, right? So God is a beginning and an end of all other things, right? And therefore, he's a cause in two different ways, right? And this is the way Thomas divides the first three books of the Summa Congentilism. Because in the first book, he considers God by himself, right? In himself. And then in the second book, he considers God as the principium, the archie, the beginning of all creatures, right? And then in the third book, he considers God as the end, huh? And then he takes up the providence of God, directing things towards this end which is himself, right? Now, Thomas then applies this to the emotion of the desiring power. The cause of the emotion, the repetitive power, in the manner of an end, is its, what? Object, right? And as has been said above, the cause of pain or sadness is something bad joined to you, right? But a cause in the sense of whence there is a beginning of such emotion is the interior inclination of the desiring power, right? Now, he says, this is before inclined to the good, right? And as a consequence of being inclined to the good, secondarily, it, what? It puteates, huh? It goes against, right? The evil that is contrary to the good, you want, huh? So it's, you desire health before you, what? Rejects. Sickness, right? Okay. Is that true in philosophy, too? I mean that you, it's because you desire knowledge that you flee, what? Ignorance, right? Ignorance is to be avoided because knowledge is desirable, right? So it's more fundamental to desire knowledge than to flee, what? Ignorance, yeah. Okay? And therefore, of this motion of the repetitive power, the first beginning is, what? Love, right? Which is the first inclination of the desiring power to achieving something, what? Good, right? But the second beginning is hate, right? Which is in the first inclination of the appetite to fleeing, what? Evil, right? But because concupiscence, or cupiditas, it's a synonym there, this text, is a first effect of love, right? By which we most of all take pleasure, as Iain said. And therefore, frequently, huh? Augustine, huh? Now, Augustine, you've got to watch this guy. Lays down cupidity, or concupiscence, for what? Love. And in this way, he says concupiscence is universal cause of what? Sadness, right? Because what comes absolutely first is what? Love, right, then? Okay? Because you love the good. Love, right, then? Love, right, then? Love, right, then? Love, right, then? Love, right, then? Love, right, then? then you reject what is opposed to it, right? I've got to be careful what Augustine is saying here, right? Thomas says in one place that Augustine tries to follow Plato as far as he can without coming into conflict with the faith. Well, I've read the Symposium, right? Which is the Dialogue on Love. And there are six people who speak at the Symposium. And they go around the table, each person's speaking in turn, right? And of course it happens that the speeches get better as they go around the table. And last is what? Socrates, right? Just before Socrates, the man in whose honour he's supposing is being held, because he's won the prize for his tragedy, right? He's a great tragic poet, Agatha, right? A real poet, right? And right before him was what? Aristophanes, right? The comic poet, right? Now, it's interesting, he puts the tragic poet next to Socrates, and then the comic poet is further back, right? So I used to say to the students, who's more profound when he talks about love? Because they both are something to say about love. The comic poet does, and the tragic poet, right? But who seems to be more profound when he talks about love, huh? Yeah. Because everybody thinks of Roman and Juliet, right? When you think of love and Shakespeare, you think of some tragedy, right? Rather than of what? Comedy, yeah. Yeah. So it's very interesting, you know. And Agatha's speech is better than Aristophanes, right? And before, these two guys, they have the rhetoricians speaking, right? But who's more profound about love? The poets, the rhetoricians, who do you think would know more about love? The poets, right? That's their subject, so to speak, right? Well, then when Socrates gets to speak, he touches one of the two places where he touches, that I know of offhand, here and in the Apology, right? But he touches upon the amphibole of to speak well. And Socrates, you know, says, I thought we were, when you said we're trying to speak well about love, right? You didn't mean we were just going to praise love without, which is one sense of speaking well, right? If I say, you know, he spoke well of you, right? That implies he said good things about you, see? It doesn't say that you're necessarily true, you see? But Socrates says, I thought when you said to speak well, love, you meant to speak truly. I thought that's what we mean, to speak well, right? And I have the same, you know, glance at the amphibole of speaking well in the Apology, right? Where those who have voted for his combination, the prosecuting attorneys, I might say, they have warned the jury now. Watch out, Socrates is a good speaker. And Socrates says, I don't know what they meant. They say I'm a good speaker, you know? So you're not a good speaker in the way they are, right? Because they're rhetoricians, and they're very, what? Persuasive, right? And that's one sense of being a good speaker, and the one we usually have in mind when we say somebody's a good speaker, right? He can persuade the crowd or persuade the jury and so on, right? But he says, if he means by a good speaker that I speak the truth, well, then I am a very good speaker. And he goes and tells the truth, right? So, Socrates says now, and maybe put it in the form of a kind of a syllogism, because most people would admit this, the premise is to say, if you love something, right, then you want it, right? That would seem to be probable, right? But if you want something, you lack it. So therefore, if the lover loves the good, or the beautiful, he must lack goodness and beauty, right? Because the lover wants, right? What he loves, right? And the one who wants something lacks it, right? Of course, in the beautiful, you know, English language, the word want can mean what? Sometimes desire and sometimes lack, and they go together, right? So I used to use kind of this syllogism with students there, just get them thinking. I'd say, is God really love? See, well, they admitted the premise that the one who loves something wants it, right? So if God loves the good, then he wants the good. If he wants the good, he lacks goodness. Well, in a sense, you say there's a mistake here, right? Because, as Tom explains in the tweet, is here, if you love something, then if you have it, you have what? Joy. If you don't have it, you have wanting or desire, right? So love is not necessarily followed by desire or wanting. It's followed by desire or wanting in the absence of what you love, right? But in the case of God, what he loves is himself. He doesn't lack himself, right? He loves his own goodness, right? His goodness itself. And therefore, there's kind of, you might say, a little mistake there in Socrates, right? Well, it's interesting here. He says, Frequenter Augustinus, frequently Augustin places for love, Cupidity or concubisence, right? A little photonic there, right? I mean, let's say he's getting into exactly his position, but it'd be a problem, right? But if you take concubisence to mean, what? Not really, strictly speaking, wanting, but loving, right? Then love is the cause of all the emotions, right? And therefore, it's going to be a cause even of, what? Sadness, right? So if I love my wife or if I love my children and something happens to them, right? Then I'm sad because of the love I have for them, right? If someone, you know, I read in the newspaper, someone dies, they don't know it all, you know? So I don't have any particular love for this person, right? If I don't have that same sadness, it makes you feel a little bit of something, you know, terrible to read about, but, you know? It's not like it's someone that you really love and know, right? And I love very much. And then that's the cause of your sadness that they're through nor in the living of their death, right? Or an injury or whatever it is, right? Okay. But, and then Thomas goes on to talk now about concupiscence or wanting properly, right? And not confusing it with love, right? But concupiscence, considered according to its proper ratio, right? Okay. is sometimes, right? A cause of what? Sadness, right? For everything that impedes motion, lest it arrive at its what? End or term is contrary to the what? Motion, right? And that which is contrary to the motion of the desiring power is saddening, right? Or causing sadness, huh? And thus, by its consequence, concupiscence is a cause of sadness insofar as by the what? Retarding the what? The good desire. Of the good desire, right? The delaying of it, right? Or of the total absence of it, we are what? Sadden, right, huh? So notice I was saying before, if you desire something, then you lack it, right, huh? And if that desire is what? Prolong, right? Then you're suffering what? The absence of this good, right? And that's going to cause what? Saddenes, right, huh? Okay. So if you want to understand something, right? But you just can't make sense of it, right? Then there's a sudden what? Saddenes there, right, huh? Okay. You want a beer, there's no beer available. It's going to cause some sadness, right, huh? You want a friend, and there's no friend available, right? There's some sadness there, right, huh? So in that sense, right? But it cannot be the universal cause of what? Sadness, like love would be, right? There's always some love behind sadness, right? Because the evil that's inflicted upon you is contrary to something you love. Because we more are saddened about the subtraction of what, present goods in which we delight, than of future ones that we desire, right? That's interesting. See, the first article is a little bit proportional to the first article about the causes of love, right? The first cause of love is the, what? Good, right? And the first cause of, what? Sadness is the bad, right? And Thomas is more the, what? The bad joined to you than the good lost, right? Because the good lost is, is caused sadness insofar as it seems or understood as something bad, right? So, the bad is a fundamental cause, but it's interesting that he brings in innocence here, right? Kind of a subtle thing here, huh? Now, the first objection is based upon not seeing how the, what, love of the good and the desire of the good is behind, right? Your opposition to the evil that's opposed to this, right? To the first it should be said that the inclination of the desiring power to achieving some good is also the cause of the inclination, the appetite to, what, fleeing something bad, right? If I didn't love life, I wouldn't, what, flee death, right? If I didn't love to be healthy, right, I wouldn't, you know, flee sickness, right? If I didn't love wisdom, I wouldn't flee folly, foolishness, huh? They had some, and I'll tell you earlier there, on TV last night, they're interviewing people. What do you think of this, you know, debt, you know, going over the cliff, you know? And they had no idea what he was talking about, you know? You know, they think it's a real cliff. It's a real bad thing, I don't know what it is, but they didn't have a size idea what it was, you know? It's kind of funny, you know, interviewing these people, you know? I remember doing the campaign, you know, and they were asking really stupid questions, saying, like, you know, do you think it was good for Obama to take, what was it, Republican vice-presidential candidate? Right. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Did you think it was a good idea for him to take Brian as vice-presidential candidate? Well, I don't know, maybe it was. It's just an impression, obviously, he doesn't have a vice-presidential candidate, it's his right, right? But just, you know, to reveal how, what? Aignant. Aignant these people are, you know, what's going on, right? One of my brother-in-law's friends was working for, you know, governor of race here, many years ago now, but he happened to get talking to him and he was amazed to me. He was going, oh, mistake with the governor candidate. And people, you know, who maybe are for him, but who are opposed to his, don't realize he's for the thing opposite that they stand for, right? And vice-versa, you know. Just complete madness out there, you know. Just, you don't realize. And from this it happens that the motion of the impeditive power which regard the good are laid down to be the cause of the motions of the impeditive power which regard the, what? The bad, right, huh? To the second he replies, huh? This is about the argument from the future and the present, right? To the second it should be said that what is desired, although really it is, what? Future. It is nevertheless in some way, what? Present. Insofar as it is, what? Oh, sped audintes, as St. Paul says, huh? So when you have hope in the strict sense, right, you see this thing is not only desirable, but it's, what? Possible for you, right, huh? It's going to come to you, right? You've got to rejoice, right, huh? This guy won this big super ticket thing here, you know, $140 billion or something like that. His wife calls him up at work, you know, and says, you've got the winning ticket, you know? It's about $140 billion. I said, don't say it. I'll come home and check it out. Okay, you want to come home and check the numbers themselves? Once you see the numbers, you know, one by one, you know, you go over it, you know, and you give it to your wife or your, you know, your friend. Yeah, you've got the right numbers. Then, you know, it's like you have the money, right, you know? Even though you haven't come down there. Some guys, you know, they call the police station and have the police escort them down there with the winning ticket because they're afraid to go down there. They think it's like someone's going to grab them. Yeah, they broke in at the St. Anne's there in Schoesburg. You've heard about that? You have all the presents here for the kids, you know, that they collect during the fall, you know? So we broke in there and stole it all, you know? Yeah, yeah. And it's even got in dredge reports on the national news and so on. Really? Wow. Yeah. But some toy manufacturers say they'll replace it all. You replace all the... Oh, okay. That's a yard, yeah. So I don't know. I assume they can take them up with it, you know? Is that your parish? No, no, it's the other parish in Schoesburg. We're at St. Mary's and at St. Anne's is down there with nine there, you know? We're in the center town. We're in the big parish, you know? Diocese, you know? We're the biggest contributor to the Bishops Fund and that sort of stuff, you know? We're wealthy. We're wealthy. Some people say we're snobby, you know? I thought yours was the daughter's parish. So, or it could be said that although the, what? Good desire to his future, nevertheless, it is a pediment that in the present is opposing the right, huh? It's delaying the right, which causes, what? Sadness, right, huh? So thirst can cause, what? Pain, right, huh? Especially if your thirst is, you know, delayed a long time, huh? Brother Mark used to say when you're out there in the desert, you know, get thirsty. First they can ice cream, soda, you know? And then I don't want to think you just have a soda and frankly, just have some water. It's getting desperate. Now the third one here about, what? Hope, and this is the thing we're saying already. The incubusence is desirable, according to what Aristotle says there, as long as there remains the hope of achieving what is, what? Desired, right? But when the hope is, what? Loss attracted to the impediment that's opposed to it, then the desire causes, what? Desired, pain? Yeah, yeah. Pains of unrequited love, as Hamlet says, right? Isn't Buddhism desire the cause of all pain? There's all people out there. Yeah, yeah. It's kind of admitting the truth of this, right? Desired, busy cause. But at the same time, the same desire is also the cause of pleasure, too. Yeah. So it's not, you know, Yeah, it's not prolonged in this hope of achieving, you know, that you're going to get the good, right? So if you kill all your desires, then you're also depriving yourself of possible pleasure. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.