Prima Secundae
Lecture 108: Remedies of Sadness: Pleasure, Weeping, and Friendship

Transcript
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The hope, you know, huh? The hope for the salvation of sin or something? You know? As soon as despairing and fearing, it'd be clear those emotions could not be said even metaphorically, you've got, you know. You know, we'll like this there. It's hard to try to take emotions of true experience and time and try to transplant them into eternity, too, I don't think. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I was, you know, rereading my favorite book there, you know, the Sumacanjantilas, right? And Thomas is talking about this and how it can be applied to God, right? And he's arguing, you know, that we take the names of emotions and we carry them over to the acts of the will, in man's will, right? Our own will. And we drop the bodily aspect out of them, right? But we keep the formal aspect, right? And then the next step is to carry over some of these names even to God, right? And Thomas will argue that only joy or pleasure and love can be carried over to God, right? Okay. And the others cannot properly be done. But then he comes back and talks later on about how some can be carried over metaphorically. And he talks about anger and pity and even God has said, you know, I regret that I obeyed man, you know, huh? And so on. And it doesn't really change, though. But he does, what? something different than he had done before, right, huh? Which we do as a result of our change of heart, right? So it's not that God is a change of heart, but he's metaphorically said to repent of having made man or something of this sort, huh? So always remember it's been mine and the other thing we want to go back to God eventually with all these things, huh? But there's always other things that say this is useful for that I've been talking about, huh? You can't study ethics without, what, knowing emotions because some of the virtues are concerned with emotions, huh? Do all of the emotions carry over the will of human love? Yeah, those names, yeah, yeah. The 11 names could carry over to our will, yeah, but not to God's will, right? As a proper act of the will. Yeah, yeah. But you drop off the bodily aspect, right? So there's a, yeah. So you have to distinguish between the sensible fear, the emotional fear, and the will of the fears? Yeah, yeah. There's a distinction there between. Yeah, yeah. Where does he do that? Well, in the first book of the Summa Karni Gentili he does this very nicely, Oh, okay. Towards the last part there, you know, where he actually takes up the will, he takes up the will, you know? Oh, I see. And then he takes up, after the will attached to it, he takes up, you know, the pleasure or joy of God and the love of God, right? Actually, the chapter on the joy comes before the chapter on love, right? Oh, okay. And of course, if you think about joy, you can see the reason kind of for that, because the object of joy is a good possessed, right? Oh, okay. See? Why love can be for a good that you don't yet have, right? So it's not quite as obvious that love is going to be found in God, even though we seem to talk about love of God more than, you know, God is love and so on, John says, I guess so. But Thomas has to find out that you can love something even when you have it, right? I mentioned how Socrates argues in the symposium, right? That if you love something, you want it, and if you want it, you lack it, you know? And therefore, he's arguing that love is not such a great thing because you love the good and the beautiful, but if you love something, you want it, and if you want it, you lack it, so love must be lacking in goodness and beauty. And I used to, you know, use that, you know, and say, well, if God, you know, loves, then God wants, and then if God wants, God lacks the good, and so, you can see, people have a little problem with love, right, huh? The two and a half fight with joy, right, huh? So Thomas can actually, one of the reasons for saying that there's love in God is because there's joy in God, huh? And joy is about having the good that you love, right? So if there's joy in God, there must be love in God, too, right? See, actually, reasons from there being joy in God to there being, what? Loving God, huh? It's beautiful, too, the way he ends up, you know, he gets to the last three chapters there in the first book of the Summa Conscientilis, 102 chapters, right? The last three chapters are about the beatitude of God, right? And of course, he's mainly showing this, you know, from the fact that the beatitude is the supreme good, and the fact that God's understanding, you know, is so perfect and so on. But he has one argument that kind of strikes you, you know, kind of surprises you to find it there. He's saying, you know, it involves, happiness involves what? Joy or delight, right? But he's shown in the second chapter on the beatitude that God is the beatitude itself, right? He says, other things being equal, you love more your own good than the good of what? Another, right? And of course, he appeals to the fact that we love more those that are joined to us, you know, by birth, like a brother or sister or mother, father, and those we associate with, you know, in our life and so on, huh? And so, God must love the beatitude more than we do because he's the beatitude itself and therefore he has more joy, more pleasure in his beatitude, right? It's him. See, well, you and I will be blessed by partaking of the beatitude of God himself, huh? You know? Like Thomas at the end of the Adorote Devote, right, huh? Yeah. Instead of your glory, right, no? I'd be blessed in the center of glory, right? And so, my beatitude will be partaking of God's beatitude, huh? It won't be me, myself, right? It's kind of strange he says that, you know, but it just brings in the kind of perfection of God's joy, you know? I mean, if your son is successful in life or your daughter or something like that, you have more joy than someone else's son, you know? It's natural, right? That's because they're tied to you in some way, right? Once you rejoice more with him. Even Thomas, when he has division there, was his sister, I think, had died before him or something, and he said, what about Brother Sohn? So he wanted to know what happened to his brother, you know? There's a brother there, you know? I forget, I think he's at least in purgatory, but I think he admitted at least to heaven, right? But Thomas himself wanted to know that, right? Because he's attached to his brother, right? Because one of his brothers didn't die, so it's marvelous. that's what he was. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. So now we get to the remedies of this terrible thing, sadness or pain, right? Then we're not to consider about the remedies of pain or sadness. And about this, five things are asked. First, whether pain or sadness is mitigated, diminished, I guess, through any, what, pleasure, right? Second, whether it is mitigated by weeping. Third, whether through the compassion of, what? Friends, huh? Fourth, whether through the contemplation of, what? Truth. Last, not least. Whether through, what, sleep, huh? In a bath. Knits up the, what does Shakespeare say, knits up the graveled sleeve of care, right? Sleep does, huh? Of course, some of these people can't, you know, sleep at that time, huh? Remember when my grandfather died, I think they gave my grandmother the old thing to help her sleep, you know? Because they couldn't sleep, you know? But the sleep is, you know, a little bit of, yeah. In Bolnia, it's at the bath, right? Or something, yeah? Okay. Very concrete, right? Christalos says somewhere that the pleasures of the bath are those of a free man. The pleasures of the bath, right? Those of a free man, right? I know some people tell me, you know, do you sing in the bath, in the shower? A lot of people sing in the shower, you know? Oh, he says, you're singing in the shower there. I said, well, well. You see, I have something to do, you know? It must be causing you some kind of joy when you start to sing, you know? You don't start. Whatever time you're going to sing, Mozart's the opposite. To the first, then, one goes forward thus. It seems that not just any pleasure mitigates just any, what? Sorrow or sadness, huh? For pleasure does not mitigate sadness unless, except insofar as it is, what? Contrary, huh? For medicines come to be through contraries, as it's said in the second book of the Ethics, right? If a man's too hot, you cool him down, right? If he's too cold, you heat him up, right? Simple. Simple. Medical heart, right? Aristotle's father, as you know, was a medical doctor, right? Apparently a very good one, you know, for the time, because he was the, for the king. So that's how he became known to Philip. So, and then Philip decided to get Aristotle to be the, what, teacher of Alexander, right? So Aristotle was supposed to have written a book on Homer just for Alexander, right? And, of course, you hear the stories that was told about the, when Aristotle published the metaphysics, right? We were publishing men in those days, you know? Alexander's supposed to have written Aristotle, you know, why did you save it for me, you know? Why did you share it with other people? And Aristotle says, well, only those who already understand the science will understand the book, he says, you know, right? But Homer's supposed to have kept, you know, Homer by his bedside there, right? Because he conquered the world, right? And some of these stories, you know, historians say, you know, that the Athenians, you know, up against the Persians, you know, inspired by the reading of Homer, you know? So, he's quite a, as Thomas said, you know, poetess de duchere, adecuat virtuoso, per dicentum representacionum. And, you know, Achilles there, you know, working, you know, in mortal glory, you know, his hands, you know, you know, clot of blood, you know, and so on, the way he describes it, you know, glorious, glorious things. But they say that inspired the Athenians, right? Because a lot of the Greek cities didn't really come out and fight, but the Athenians and Spartans, right? They stopped those, saved Europe. But not every pleasure is contrary to every, what, sadness, right, huh? So, no, it's like loneliness would be opposed to, what, friendship, right, huh? So, if I'm lonely, I'd seek a friend, then I'd be seeking the contrary, right, huh? This is what the argument is saying, right, huh? Therefore, not every pleasure mitigates every, what, sadness, huh? Moreover, that which causes sadness does not mitigate sadness, huh? Well, that seems reasonable. But some pleasures cause, right, sadness, huh? Because, as is said in the Ninth Book of the Ethics, the bad man is saddened because he is pleased, huh? Not every pleasure, therefore, mitigates sadness, huh? Moreover, Augustine says in the Fourth Book of Confessions, huh, that the one who flees, what, from his country, in which he was accustomed to, what, yeah? Um, will be with his friend, now, what? Dead. Dead, huh? For his eyes, right? Let's seek him, right? Where they are not, what, accustomed to see him, huh? Mm-hmm. Subtle accustomed there. From which it can be taken that, what, those dead friends, rapsing friends, what, had in common with us, right, huh? Mm-hmm. Then they become ours, right, huh? Sorrowing over their death, death, go ahead. Yeah, then they become onerous, right, huh? Yeah. But they most of all communicated with us in, what, pleasures, right, huh? Therefore, those pleasures become, for us, weeping, onerous, right, huh? None, ergo, none, therefore, does every pleasure mitigate every, what, sadness, huh? Some people, after, you know, someone's died, and close, you know, they can't stand music for a while, you know? That's kind of a joyful thing, but, but against this is what the philosopher says in the seventh book of the Ethics, huh? That pleasure expels sadness, huh? And that which is contrary, and that which is, happens, right? Maybe not contrary, right? If it is, what, strong, right, huh? Okay, well, it's not only the contrary pleasure, apparently, but any pleasure, right? Especially to be strong, right? Now, what does the master say, huh? I answer, it should be said, that as is clear from the things foresaid, that pleasure is a certain rest of the appetite in the, what, suitable good, huh? So we speak of the beautiful as, what, how restful it is, right? Got a beautiful feeling, you know, huh? But sadness from that which is, what, repugnant to the appetite, right? Okay, so, pleasure is a rest of the appetite in the good that is suitable, right? Sadness is from what is repugnant to the appetite. Whence, in the same way, pleasure is to sadness in the emotions of the appetitive powers, just as in bodies, rest is to, what, fatigue, yeah? Fatigat, see on the one, huh? Fatigue, huh? See what the word he is. Which happens from some, what, unnatural, what, change, huh? For sadness implies a certain... Fatigue, huh? Speaking, right? Or a certain what? Sickness, as it were, of the appetitive, what? Power, huh? Now, who's that in Shakespeare, right? Twelfth Night, isn't it? The brother of the counter. Look at that sadness, right? He's sick, though. He tries to, he wants to ruin the marriage of somebody, right? So he pretends, you know, that he has his girlfriend pretend to be the other girl, right? And be up carrying out a rude conversation, you know, the day before the wedding, right? Yeah. All's what, not all's what, but no, much ado about nothing. Yeah, much ado about nothing. Much ado about nothing, yeah, yeah. And then, because he comes to the wedding there and he announces her, right? And he fades and, yeah, it's a beautiful thing, you know. Don John is the name I forget, yeah. Okay. Just therefore, as any rest of the body brings some remedy against any, what? Fatigue, right, huh? Coming from, what? Any unnatural cause, huh? So any pleasure brings some remedy to, what? Mitigating, right? Sadness. From whatever it proceeds, right, huh? Well, maybe Thomas is going to say that it was contrary, more so maybe, huh? But then he applied rejections, right? That's interesting, though. We do use the word restful there for beautiful, right? You define the beautiful, you know, we say the beautiful is what pleases when seen, right, huh? Which is like the definition of the good, of what everyone wants, right? But Augustine, in the day, very religion, I think it is, he says, the beautiful is what pleases when seen. And then he raises the Socratic question, right? Is it beautiful because it pleases us? Of course, it pleases because it's beautiful. He says, I have no doubt it pleases us because it is beautiful, he says, right? Just like they asked that same question, you know, is it good because you want it or you want it because it's good, right? And that's a question Socrates taught us to ask, you know? So he's a good Socratic there, to Augustine. So, but we also say the beautiful is what? Restful, right? So it pleases us, right? But it's also restful. You think about contemporary art and how beauty has been sort of left by the wayside and it is not restful. Most of it is supposed to spur intellectual excitement or it's supposed to... Exposions all the time, exposions all the time. Or stir up the emotions in an unpleasant way. Yeah, yeah, it is, yeah. Now, to the first, therefore, it should be said that although not every pleasure is contrary to every sadness in species, right, is nevertheless contrary in, what, genus, huh? And therefore, on the part of the disposition of the subject, any sadness is able to be mitigated through any, what, pleasure, right, huh? I think you might say that one that's contrary might do so more so, right? So if I'm lonely, right, then calling up a friend, enjoying this conversation, right? Or just have a bowl of ice cream or something. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Although there's nothing wrong with a bowl of ice cream. No, no, no. And this guy in high school, you know, I go out to his house and he says, you know, you want some ice cream? And I said, oh, yeah, fine. He got a great big... I said, I've never seen, you know, through so big a bowl of ice cream, you know. But then I realized that Aaron, of course, you know, he had been in the minor seminary, right, of some missionary order. And it was that rough, you know. And the food, I mean, the bread had worms, I mean, it had flies in there, you know. And he got this, what they call, spastic stomach. Oh. So he came out, you know, huh? And he was underweight, you know. He was... So his aunts and mother were trying to fatten him up, you know. So there's these big bowls of ice cream and all. That worked. Especially if you got a habit of it. It worked. So my brother used to sit when he was a kid, he was in high school, he was a big help in ice cream. And my mother said to him, this is a typical high school boy. My mother said to him, you're going to get really fat if you keep eating ice cream like that. And he was puzzled. He said, it melts, it goes right through you. Yes. Well, he lost ten pounds recently. So that's good. The second should be said that the pleasures of bad things do not cause sadness in the present, right, but in the future, right, huh? In so far as the bad have penance about the evils about which they had, what? Pleasure, right, huh? And to this sadness one can aid through contrary, what? Pleasure. Pleasure, sorry. Now, the third objection, back to the objection for a second here, Guston's. So I suppose Guston says in the fourth book of the Confession that he flees from his native country and where he was, what? Guston's lived with his friends. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So if you go to a place where you used to walk with your friends and have long conversations, you know, your friend is now dead, maybe you don't want to go walking there, right, because he reminds you of this, huh? Okay. It was pleasant to walk with him, right, huh? So Thomas very suddenly here says, To the third it should be said that when two causes are inclining to what? Contrary emotions. One impedes the other, right, huh? But nevertheless that finally conquers which is stronger and more longer lasting, right, huh? And the one, therefore, who is sad about those things in which together with his dead friend or his absent friend, he was accustomed to the light, right? There are two causes moving him and contrary, I found here. For the death or the absence of the friend, when you think about it again, right, cogitata, inclines to what? Sadness, huh? But the present good inclines to what? Pleasure, right? Whence both through the other is diminished, right, huh? It's interesting how you associate a particular piece of music sometimes with the place, right? Where you, what, heard it, right? Here you serve a certain piece of music, I think, in San Francisco, and I think in Quebec, you know, and, you know. And there's no maybe necessary connection between that piece of music and that. Where you associate a certain piece of music with a certain person, right? But nevertheless, because more strongly does the sense of the present move us, right? The memory of the past and the love of what? Yeah? Then the love of another. Pleasure? Main story. Main story, yeah. Hence it is that finally the pleasure expels the sadness, right? Whence after a few things, Augustine adds, right, that his dolar, right, gave way to what? The first pleasure. Yeah, yeah. It's kind of hard to passage in. So we take a little break now. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Thank you. Can't wait forever. Whether sadness or pain or sadness is mitigated through what? The tomb, right? The second one goes for it thus. It seems that weeping does not mitigate sadness. For no effect diminishes its cause. That's a nice argument. But weeping or moaning is an effect of sadness, right? Therefore it does not diminish what? Sadness. That's a pretty good one. Moreover, just as weeping and moaning, I guess. How do you translate to me too, seniors? Crawling. Yeah. Okay. Is an effect of sadness, so laughter is an effect of what? Joy, right? They call it sighing too. But laughter is not less than joy. Therefore, weeping does not mitigate sadness. I know it's like you had proportion there, right? He's arguing for the proportion here of ability. Moreover, in weeping, there's represented to us the bad thing that is saddening us, right? But the imagination of a thing that saddens increases the sadness, right? Just as the imagination of a thing delighting increases the joy. Therefore, it seems that sadness, that weeping does not mitigate what's sadness, huh? But against this is what Augustine says, huh? Who is this Augustine? He's quoting all the time. But against this is what Augustine says in the fourth book of the Confessions. That when he sorrowed over the death of his friend, right, huh? There was some requeous, some breast, right? A little bit from him in these tears. Oh, his eyes and tears. Yeah, his eyes and tears. When I was growing up, they always say, you know, that a woman, you know, weep more readily than men, right? And it was good for their thing, but the men kind of held it in. And it wasn't bad for them, you know, because they weren't being purged of their sadness, you know. Men don't cry. I answer, it should be said that tears, I guess, and moanings and so on, naturally mitigate sadness, right? So I took this as one example of purgation, right? Catharsis, huh? And this for a two-fold, what, reason, huh? First, because everything harmful inwardly, right? Interiorly closed in, more afflicts one, right? Because the intention of the soul is more multiplied about it, huh? You're dwelling on about it, going over and over again, right? But when it is, what, diffused to the outside, then the intention of the soul, in a way, is, what, broken up, right, with the exterior things, huh? And thus, the interior sadness is, what, diminished, huh? That makes sense, doesn't it? Mm-hmm. And account of this, when men who are in sadnesses show outwardly their sadness by weeping, is it, or moaning, or sighing? Sighing. Or even by, what? Words. Words, huh? The sadness is, what? Yeah, mitigating, huh? You see it, kind of in these, you know, funeral homes there, you know, when somebody is constantly seeing friends come in, right, and they're, you're being kind of distracted by them, you know, huh? Okay. Now, the second is a very subtle thing, though, he says, huh? And secondly, because always an operation that is suitable to a man, according to the disposition which he is, is pleasant to him, right? He's doing what he should be doing, right? The one that's, they have a good cry. Yeah. Have a good cry. That's what they need. But weeping and moaning, whatever it is, are certain operations that are suitable to the man who's sad or in pain, right, huh? And therefore they become, for him, what? Pleasant, huh? He's doing what he should do, right, huh? Since therefore every pleasure in some way mitigates sadness or sorrow, as has been said, it follows that through weeping and so on, sadness is, what, mitigated, huh? So there's two different reasons he gives, right? He's a pretty subtle guy, Thomas, huh? I think he's, yeah. Yeah. Much better than a modern psychologist, huh? Wouldn't trust those guys at all. You know, when they have some, you know, thing happens in the high schools, you know, and they get all these psychologists going in there, you know, to, uh, to mess up the kids. Yeah. Now, notice, this is what he says here. To the first theory of it should be said that that relation of cause to effect, right, is contrary to the relation of the thing, what? Causing the sadness, right? To the one who is sad, right, huh? Because the thing is causing you to be sad in some ways opposed to you, right, huh? But every effect is convenient, fitting its, what? Cause. And consequently, it is, what? It's delectable to it, right? That's one of the reasons he gave in the, what? The same. Yeah. In the body article, right? And therefore, the, um, effect of sadness has a contrary relation to the, what? One of the sadness. One saddened, then what is causing the sadness to him, right? The one is opposed to him, the other follows upon what he is. And on account of this, the sadness is mitigated through the effect of sadness by reason of the force at Contrariate. You know, Richard, well, Thomas, huh? He'll kill his wounds, right? The loss of his friend, huh? That's kind of the tragedy, right, huh? To stay out of the battle there, he's kind of responsible for the death of his friend, Patroclus. So, now, the second one here, talking about the proportion that we talked about, right, huh? That laughter is to joy, but weeping is to sadness, huh? To second should be said that the relation of the effect to the cause is similar to the, what? Relation of the thing delighting to the, what? Delighting, the one who's delighted. Because in both there's a certain, what, agreement. For everything that is similar increases its, what, similar. And therefore through, what, laughter and other effects of joy, joy is, what, increase. Except, perhaps, procedents and... Excess. Excess, yeah. And when also he's answering the answer, he's not giving the reason why weeping diminishes the sadness, but why laughter doesn't diminish the, what? Joy, right? Down to the third there. That the imagination of a thing causing sorrow, as such, is apt to, what, increase sadness, right, huh? But from this, that the man, what, imagines what makes that that is suitable to him according to his, what, state, there arises a certain, what, pleasure, right, huh? And for the same reason, if someone breaks out into laughter, the state in which he seems to be, what, sorry, from this he, what, sorrow, as they were, he makes that which is not suitable, as Tully says in the Toskuna. That's very subtle what he's saying there, right? It's not appropriate, this laughter. Yeah, I think sometimes, at least I think, when the kid talks about, you burst out laughing, sometimes, I'm trying to think of an example, but let's say something, oh, I think of one example, there was a comedian, I can't remember his name now, he was on Taxi, the guy that played the vodka, remember that guy? Well, he was a stand-up comic, too, and they showed, he was in suicide, and his last appearance, he was, like, talking to the audience, but he was getting, he was voicing his grievances in life, and they thought it was all a joke, and everybody's laughing, and he was dead serious the whole time. And it was after that show, and everybody thought, oh, it was a great show, and they thought he was being ironic or sarcastic, and he went out and killed himself, and he was serious. And I think all those people, after all that laughter, they realized that he was laughing at the wrong thing, that they thought he was joking, that's the kind of thing, when something serious is going on, and you think it's a joke, initially you laugh, and later you kind of really regret that you laughed, because it was an inappropriate response. They had a comedy talk. Yeah, but I mean, yeah, the thing is, anyways, but if it happens, sometimes something sudden happens as bad, and you don't think it's real, or you think it's a joke, or something, and you just burst out laughing, and then you realize it's a joke, and you experience it. Now, whether sadness and joy, or, I mean, and pain, are mitigated through the compassion of friends, or they're going to help you, carry it with you, carry the weight, yeah. To the third, then, one proceeds thus, it seems that the sadness of the friend, what? Suffering with you, does not mitigate sadness, right? For of contraries, there are contrary are the effects. But as Augustine says in the Eighth Book of Confessions, when you rejoice with many, each individual is more free, more happy. Yeah, the whole world laughs with you, right? Because it makes them to, what? Become fervent, and they're inflamed from each other, right? Fibbling around, telling jokes, and so on. Therefore, for a like reason, when the many are, what? Saddened. Yeah. There seems to be, what? Greater sadness. More of this friendship requires, that one, what, pays back, I suppose, love, right? Obviously, a pain is love alone. But the friend, what? Sorrowing with you, sorrows over the sorrow of the friend who is sorrowful. That's a little bit of a, uh, alliteration, yeah. And, um, and the sadness of the friend condoling, is a cause to the friend before sorrowing, of its what? A new evil. Yeah. The sadness of the friend. Okay. And thus, the pain being duplicated, the sadness will seem to increase, right? Okay? Now they're all sad, right? Moreover, every evil of the friend is causing sadness, huh? Just as one's own evil. For a friend is not his self. But sadness is an evil. Therefore, the sadness of the friend condoling increases the sadness of the friend to whom he condoles, right? You don't have to say about Christ during the cross, right? He and his mother are thinking of it, yeah. Yeah. Was his, was his pain lessened by her sorrowing or increased? Yeah. Let's say it increased, wasn't it? Did you say that? It was, yeah. But against this is what the philosopher says, huh? Who is this philosopher, anyway? The ninth book of the ethics, right? That in sadness is a friend souring with one. One is consoled, right? A friend is consoled, yeah. Answer, it should be said, that naturally a friend souring with one in sadness is consoling, right, huh? Paraclete. Paraclete, of which a two-fold reason is touched upon by the philosopher in the ninth book of the ethics, right? Of which the first is, because it pertains to sadness, to weigh one down, right? Agravari, right? It has the notion of a certain burden, huh? From which someone, what? Who is weighed down, seeks to be, what? Weep, right, huh? When, therefore, someone sees about his sadness, others being, what, saddened with him, there comes to be a certain imaginatio, that the onus of him is being born with another, right? As it were, attempting to, what, relieve him from the onus, take on some of your sadness, right, and share it, right, so you don't have so much now, because I'm sharing your sadness, right? So you don't have so much there left to yourself, right? And, therefore, he more likely bears the, what? The weight of sadness, right? Onus, I mean, the word onus, onus. Just as happens in, what? Carrying, what? Heavy bodies, right, huh? Oh, that's an interesting reason, right? The second reason, and a better one is, right? Because through this, that the friends are sad, he perceives himself to be, what? Yeah. Just delectable, right, huh? So what does Romeo say, huh? Partying is such sweet sorrow, so why is the sorrow sweet, because sorrow is not sweet. Sweet is pleasant, right? So how can sorrow be sweet, hmm? Yeah, yeah, yeah. Dojo's going out to get a talk someplace, you know, and the boy's like, bye, Dad. And then Ria had to say goodbye, you know, and she was holding back her tears, my little daughter, you know, at the time, you know, and I could see she was trying to keep from crying, you know, and then finally she went out to the bus where I was. And then my wife would go say goodbye, and she said, that's a hard act to follow, she said. But you see, I would say, they love you, you know, huh? And then you've been just away for a few days, you know, huh? Okay. But that's in Romeo. It's partying is such a sweet sorrow, huh? How can sorrow cause sweetness, huh? So he says, the second reason, the better one, is because through this, that the friends are with him, he perceives himself to be loved by them, which is, what? Delectable, right, huh? Okay. Whence every pleasure mitigates, what? Sadness, right, huh? Whence, since every pleasure mitigates sadness, it follows that the friend condoling mitigates the, what? Sadness, huh? Those are beautiful, close to a reason, aren't they, huh? The first one, you almost have to, you know, go through the metaphor, you know, that sadness weighs you down, right? I can't fear this all by myself, and you're helping me to carry this onus of sadness, huh? It's beautiful, beautiful. I can't fear this all by myself, but I can't fear this all by myself, but I can't fear this all by myself, but I can't fear this all by myself, but I can't fear this all by myself, but I can't fear this all by myself, but I can't fear this all by myself, but I can't fear this all by myself, but I can't fear this all by myself, but I can't fear this all by myself, but I can't fear this all by myself, but I can't fear this all by myself, but I can't fear this all by myself, but I can't fear this all by myself, but I can't fear this all by myself, but I can't fear this all by myself, but I can't fear this all by myself, but I can't fear this all by myself, but I can't fear this all by myself, but I can't fear this all by myself, but I can't fear this all by myself, but I can't fear this all by myself, but I So I was in our Lord, was our Lord consoled by the sign of his mother's love for him? They don't say that, my son, they always say, because it was being increased, right? He got no relief from seeing his mother there. But he realized that she was undergoing. His knowledge that she was there willingly, he didn't even suffer with the things that caused him sin. So I'm going to ask him to console him in his sufferings, St. Faustina and other saints, and if someone like St. Faustina can console him in his sufferings, certainly not going to do so much work for him. My remembrance of it, like in Francis, when they talk about the passion, it seems that it increased his passion. I suppose you could say, in the sense that since she was innocent, she didn't deserve to suffer anything, which is like him. And yet she suffered more from his suffering than any of us have. And in that way, I suppose, it caused him sorrow that she didn't deserve to suffer anything. But then, I think of the follow-up. Of course, sometimes you could say St. Alphonsus' writings also for the effect of persuading people from sorrow for their sins, but money would have been consoled to know that she was there voluntarily. I mean, it's a little bit like, you know, suppose the father died, and the wife was, of course, moaning us, right? But say, you know, the son or the daughter, you know, was just as sad, you know? That would make her more sad in the sense, right? Because she would see that her daughter or something is suffering because of this, right? That by itself would be a cause of sadness, right? If you love somebody, you're going to be saddened by seeing that they're sad, aren't you? Yeah. There could be two things happening, both perhaps an increase of sadness, but also a consolation because of that beautiful love. Yeah, yeah, yeah. When Shakespeare says, pardon me, it's a sweet sorrow. They're causing sorrow to each other, right? By realizing how much they hate to be separated, right? There's a sweetness there, too. It's very, very subtle, huh? I wonder if these psychologists know this stuff when they go out to the high school there. Now, this is something for us guys here, huh? With the contemplation of truth, huh? Did you finish that part here? No, we didn't, I guess. He says that in both things friendship is manifested. The one rejoices with the one rejoicing, right? And one, what, sorrows with the one sorry. Doesn't St. Paul say something about doing both of those? Yeah. You're supposed to do both of those, right? Yeah. Judging those who rejoice, right? And therefore both, by reason of the cause, is meant pleasant, right? The person loves you, right? Okay? The second should be said that the sadness of the friend, secundum se contra start, so he's admitting that, right? That in some sense it can cause some sadness. That's what they're emphasizing in Christ there, right, huh? They don't emphasize being consoled in some way by it. But the consideration of the cause, which is love, more what delights, right? That solves the theory of rejection, right? That's right. That's right. That's right. That's right. That's right.