Prima Secundae
Lecture 111: Hope, Desire, and the Irascible Appetite

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You know, Aristotle in the ethics, or in the rhetoric, you know, he talks about the contrast of the young man with the old man, right? And the young man shows all this hope, you know. That's why he's easy to deceive, right? The old man is, you know, more cautious, you know, and fearful, you know. And eight, where their hope confers to what? Operation, right? To the first man, one goes forward thus. Yes, it seems that hope is the same thing as desire or cupidity, right? For hope is laid down as one of the four principal passions, right? Now, if you look at the Vatican II there, the one there on the Church in the Modern World, begins at the four principal passions, right? So hope is laid down as one of the four principal passions. Sometimes Shakespeare puts the four of them right together, you know. But Augustine, enumerating the four principal passions, places cupidity in place of hope. This is clear in the 14th book of the City of God. Therefore, hope is the same as cupidity or desire, huh? I don't know about that Augustine now. He was more in rhetoric sometimes. Moreover, passions differ according to their objects, huh? But as I mentioned before, that's more what you do in the Kibsavu. Although it is into the Rassavu because it arises in the Kibsavu. But the same is the object of hope and cupidity, namely a future, what? Good. Good. Therefore, hope is the same thing as cupidity or, what? Desire, huh? So there's no hope in heaven, right? Because good is present there forever. You've got a hold of it. You know what does Donnie have? You know, I'll abandon all hope you enter here, right? It's going to hell, right? Yeah, yeah. But in a sense, you know, you go to heaven, you abandon hope too, right? Yeah. If it be said that hope adds above desire the possibility of obtaining the future good, right? Against this, that which is procidant as itself to the object, it does not vary the species of the passion, right, huh? But possible has itself progenent to the future good, which is the object of cupidity or desire and hope. Therefore, hope is not a passion differing in species from desire or cupidity. There you go. Well, maybe you're not thinking of what the Rassavu really is, huh? But against this, of diverse powers, there are diverse passions differing in species. But hope is in the irascible, dumas. Desire and cupidity in the concubiscible, right? Now notice, the irascible appetite and concubiscible appetite are named from the passions that, what? From one passion in them, right? So you've got to be careful the way they're named, right? Because ira is just one of the five passions of the irascible. So desire or concubiscible, right, is only one of the six concubiscible, right? But why are they named from that passion, right? Well, it's because of what Shakespeare says, right? Things in motion sooner catch the eye than what not stirs. So concubiscible and anger, emotion is very strong, right? And that's why, as I mentioned before, in As You Like It, right, huh? He says they're in the very, what, wrath of love, right? Clubs cannot part them, you know, and get them married off right away, you know, that's the idea. But it's because you can compare those two passions because of their, what, strength, right? So lovers go at it, and the guys graving each other go at it, you know, you know, grapple with each other, you know, in a loving or irascible way, yeah. I answer it should be said that the species of passion are considered from their, what, object, right? This is the famous point that Aristotle makes in Deion, right, huh? That we know the soul through its, what, powers, and the powers through their acts. And the acts through their, what, object, right? So by knowing the difference between color and sound, we come to know the difference between seeing and, what, hearing, right? And then seeing and hearing, the difference between the ability to see and the ability to, what, hear. And then through the powers, we know the, what, kind of soul we have, what's a sensing soul, right? Or not, right? So he talks about the plant soul, he talks about, what, food, which is the object of... Big theater. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Some monks must be plants. They're plant-like. Big theater. Now, about the object of hope, there are four conditions to be noted. Now, what is this all about? This sounds completely complicated, right? First, that it be something, what, good, right? For properly speaking, there is no hope except about something, what, good, good. And by this, hope differs from, what, fear, which is about something, what, bad, yeah. Secondly, that it be, what, in the future. For hope is not about something present, already had. So I don't hope to understand the Daigman Theorem, once I've understood it. And through this, hope differs from, what, joy, which is about a, what, present good, right? Third, it requires that there be something, what? Difficult, arduous, right? Obtainable with what? Difficult. With difficulty, right, huh? For one is not said to hope something, what? Minimal, which is at once in his power that he had, right? So do I hope to have a drink of water right now? There's no difficulty. I mean, reaching over with my hand, taking a sip of water, right? He's taking candy from the kid. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Don't hope to do that. You do it. And by this, hope differs from desire or cupidity, right? How do they translate cupidity there in English to give a different, what? Use cupidity. Yeah, they don't know. They don't know English. Which is about the future good absolute, right, huh? Okay. Whence desire pertains to concubisable, hope to the, what? Right. Irrascible, right? So to do philosophy, you need, what? Hope, but not just desire, right? Mm-hmm. And fourth, that that difficult thing is possible to be, what? Obtained. For one does not hope for that which he is not able at all to, what? Obtained. Obtained. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Because he has some hope for doing better, you know. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Thus, therefore, it is clear that hope differs from what? Desire, just as the passions of the irascible from the passions of the what? Concupiscible, right? In account of this, hope presupposes desire, right? Just as all passions of the irascible presuppose passions of the concupiscible, right? So hope and, in fact, despair presuppose what? Desire, right? And fear and what? Boldness presupposes what? Aversion, I suppose, right? Why anger arises from what? Sadness, right? From pain, right? So if I'm stepping on your toe and you say you're stepping on my toe and I say, so what? Well, that's to arouse some anger in your part, right? But from joy, there arises nothing of the concupiscible. That's why you have this odd number of emotions in the concupiscible, right? Irascible, rather. Five, right? You know, probably if I agree, you say, well, why are the concupiscible emotions in an even number? And the irascible, yeah, yeah. Well, there's no difficulty arising from the possession of the good, right? Just enjoy it, right? Right, yeah. That's why you end up with five instead of six, huh? Well, in the case of the concupiscible you have, but the good and the bad, so... Yeah, yeah. Well, if I stick on your toe and you don't think you can do anything about it, you just fear. Fear is a guy like me, right? Wither away. Yeah, yeah. It's a sadness of fear, yeah. Sadness of the continuing pain and fear that will continue. Now, to the first, this is a text from Augustine, right? You've got to handle Augustine with reverence, right? The first, therefore, it should be said that Augustine lays down cupidity in place of hope on account of this that both regard a, what, a future good, right, huh? And because a good that is not arduous is regarded as, what, nothing, yeah. Yeah. And thus cupidity, most of all, seems to tend towards the arduous good in which also hope of what tends on. Yeah. See, he's excusing Augustine a bit there, right, huh, you know? That's the same kind of reason that St. Barnabas used in describing the soul as the image of God. He taught, he refers to that, beatific populace. It's able to be blessed, but you wouldn't be blessed if it was easy to attain. Only you'd attain glory because you did some great thing, a difficult thing. You know, one of the little religious magazines my wife gets there, you know, is talking about, what is virtue? And I said, well, that's what the guy says, you know? And he's talking about virtue as being the perfection of operation. But strictly speaking, it's not the perfection of operation, but you can see why he says that, right? You know? And so, I mean, you've got to kind of interpret what these people say a bit, you know, to speak all together. So, I don't know if we can excuse Augustine here and let him off the hook here, but Thomas is. Well, if he's reverentorism, I guess I'll be reverentorism. It would take the same time. Now, the second one says they get the same object from both, right? Okay. To the second should be said that the object of hope is not the future good, absolutely, right? But with, what, arduousness and difficulty of obtaining it, right? It's kind of nice that he's in from the text of Augustine, and Augustine is kind of thinking of that, right? You know, and if he says, okay, then that's, point out how they do different, right? But their, likeness is the cause of deception, right? So, you can think that desire and hope are the same thing, because they're close, right? They're both about a future good, right? So, he would make the mistake of maybe confusing hope with anything but desire. When Augustine makes it, Inadvertence of calling one of the principal passions, what? Kipiti, was it? He used the word there? Mm-hmm. In place of hope, right? I think so. I'll excuse Augustine, you know. Now, Augustine has a use of words of some of the media. It's a marvelous song. It's this one that makes me take a turn it out together. He speaks of an immature and perverse love of reason. There's not enough to love reason. There's an immature and perverse love of reason, right? Now, my old teacher, Peseric, had a, you know, passage they used to put from Augustine, from Albert the Great, at the beginning of his translation of the first two books of physics, where Albert says that if you study these things for anything other than for the sake of knowing God, right, and they should be forced to, by necessity, he says, huh? Study it. You have a perverse attitude towards learning. You know? Well, it's stuck in my mind, right, huh? You know, someone, you know, who sees the lowest things without a view of using them as a stepping stone to the higher things, right? That's really perverse attitude, right? Mm-hmm. And someone doesn't realize the weakness of reason and the need of help, right, to get somewhere as an immature love of reason. Mm-hmm. So they run off and use their reason to judge things that they're not ready to judge yet Yeah, I was thinking about that today, and I'm trying to distinguish between what would an immature love of reason be and a perverse love of reason be, and you can cause it both. I was thinking about it just today. Yeah, yeah. One, in the sense of just immoderate, that's sort of characteristic of youth. They don't know the measures of things. Yeah, yeah. That's one way, anyway. But the immature one, I would say, is one where you don't realize the need of the help that reason has. You need logic, you know, and you need a good teacher, you know, and so on. I just read Thomas, reading the exposition of the Gospel of St. John, right, just kind of, you know, what did, what did, what did, what did, what did, what did, what did, what does it, you know, was it Thomas, he's got to know the exposition of the Gospel of St. John, right, and I just got struck, I haven't read it for a while, you know, and I said, how much there is in there, you know, huh, that's absolutely incredible, but, you know, our Lord is talking to me about how they're not accepting His Word, right, and it's because they don't, what, they're not, what, humble enough to be taught, right, and I said, well, there's no wisdom without a teacher, he says, you know, you need a teacher, right, and you can see how even Thomas would need Augustine and Elbert and so on, you know, and so, I mean, it's kind of an immature level of reason if you think you can do reasons without all these helps, right, these things that prop it up, right, and there's a part of things like logic and things like, what, a good teacher, right, huh, Duane, you know, read very, very carefully these, sir, exist to me, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh, huh Thomas gives five arguments to show that reason is not sin, so, I mean, I was comparing it to Shakespeare's definition of reason, you know, where it includes and touches upon most of the reasons that Thomas gives, plus gives some other reasons in our attention, also, so, beautiful thing, okay, yeah, to the third should be said that the object of hope not only adds possibility upon the object of desire, right, but also, what, yeah, difficulty, right, or arduousness, which, uh, makes hope pertain to another, what, power, right, okay, now, because the Plato and Aristotle used those words, what, thumas, for the eras. and epithumia for the concubisable, right? So they were aware of this divergence, right? And so Plato has that in the schooling of these people, right? Some things were to develop in the irascible for ordering it, and some in the concubisable, right? They're ethylates, they're irascible, you know? What's the words of Thomas MacArthur there at West Point? You know, they had to put over the gym, you know, these fields of friendly conflict, you know, they're going to learn how to behave, you know, for these fields. He says, I don't recall exactly where it's now, but... But then you had things like music and so on, so the soul didn't become, you know, just... Beastly. Beastly, yeah. Plato's all the things. Yeah, which makes hope pertain to another power, right? To the irascible, which regards the arduous, as has been said in the first part, right? And then he says, against this objection from the Perachetans, possible, however, and impossible, do not entirely Perachetans have themselves to the object of the appetitive power. For the appetitive power is the beginning of what? Motion. That's when Aristotle takes it up, it's in the third book, I have to take it up reason, right? And he's talking about it now as the source of what? The motion of the unknown. For nothing is moved to something except under the aspect of it being what? Impossible, right? For no one is moved to that which he estimates impossible to be, what? Attaining, right? So why didn't the Greeks go to the moon, huh? It's impossible, right? In account of this, hope differs from desperation according to the difference of possible and what impossible, right? And Thomas, I mean, in Shakespeare, Mozart's development sound, sometimes he will put the melody first in the major key and then he'll change it to the minor key when it goes into despair, right? Kind of subtle the way he does his lessons. Now, I'm curious about the second one. I'm dying to... Oh, he's going to see an Article 2 here. The second one goes forward thus. It seems that hope pertains to the knowing power, right? For hope seems to be a certain, what? Expectation, right? For the Apostle says in Romans chapter 8, If over what we do not, what? See, we hope for, right? We expect by, what? Patience, huh? But expectation, expecting, seems to pertain to the knowing power of whom it is to expect something, right? I expect it's going to happen. Kind of looking out for us, I see in the word etymology in some way. Yeah, that's a good way, yeah. Looking out. Expect out, yeah. Looking out. It can be before and after, right? Therefore, hope pertains to the knowing power, right? On Columbus' ship, they went out to look, to look out for the land. I mean, they were expecting it. Yeah. Moreover, it seems to be the same thing, hope, as what? Confidence, maybe? Yeah, fiducia, yeah, confidence. Whence the ones that are hoping are, we call, what? Confident, right? As if using for the same thing that they, what? Are confident and they hope, right? Mm-hmm. But confidence, just as, what? Faith. Faith seems to pertain to the knowing power, right? Mm-hmm. Therefore, hope, right? Confident about being elected, huh? That means you think you're only going to be elected, right? Mm-hmm. I'm confident that this will, I think, so it seems like the knowing power, right? Mm-hmm. Moreover, certitude is the property of the knowing power, right? Mm-hmm. But certitude is attributed to hope. Mm-hmm. Therefore, hope pertains to the, what? Knowing power, huh? Mm-hmm. But against this, hope is about the good, as has been said, right? Mm-hmm. But the good as such is not the object of the knowing power. It means the good as good, right? Mm-hmm. But of the desiring power. Therefore, hope does not pertain to the knowing power, but to the desiring power, huh? Well, let's see what Thomas says. The answer should be said that says, since hope implies a certain, what? Extending, right? Of the appetite towards the good, it manifests that it pertains to the desiring power, right? For emotion, two things pertains properly to the desiring power, but the action of the knowing power is perfected not according to the motion of the knower to the thing, but more according as the things known are in the knower, right? But because the knowing power moves the desiring power, representing to it its own, what? Object, right? According to diverse aspects of the object, what? Grasp. There follows diverse motions in the, what? Desiring power. Now, another motion appears or follows in the desiring power from the apprehension of the good, another from the apprehension of the, what? Bad. And likewise, a different motion from the apprehension of the present and the, what? Future. The absolute and the, what? The arduous, the difficult. The possible and the, what? Impossible. And according to this, hope is a motion of the appetitive power fouling upon the grasping of a future good that is difficult, is possible, nevertheless to be, what? Obtained. Obtained, right. You got all that in there? Put that in here now. That's the four things we talked about before, isn't it? To wit, the extension of the appetite in such a, what? Object, right? What about this text here from Romans 8.25? To the first, therefore, it should be said, because hope regards the, what? Possible good, right? There arises twofold, in two ways, to man, the motion of the, what? Hope. Hope. Just as, what? Something. In two ways, something is possible to someone. In one way, according to his own, what? Virtue. And another, according to the virtue of power. Of another. Of another, right? What, therefore, one hopes through one's own power to obtain, one is not said to expect, but to hope only, right? I know that's the thing about the Latin word, the expectare, right? You know, like inheritance. It's bad. But properly, one is said to expectare, what he hopes from the aid of a, what? Alien power, right? End of the power. The one is said to expectare, as it were, exalio. See, he takes the X as being, right? Mm-hmm. Spectare, right? Mm-hmm. So I guess you could translate it, like, look for or from, or something like that. From another, yeah. Yeah. Insofar as the grasping power, right? Preceding, not only regards the good that one intends to obtain, but also to that by the power of whom one hopes to obtain it, right? According to that of Ecclesiasticus, 51, I will be, what? Looking. Looking for the aid of a man, right? What would we say? Haseko, is that sound? Mm-hmm. Look to the mountains or something. What is that? I can't remember now, but that's the same. Okay, the motion, therefore, of hope is sometimes called expectatio, looking for, an account of the, what, inspection of the power. Yeah, the knowing power preceding, right? About nothing, right? Haseko upon the mountains from when it comes to us or something like that? Yeah, yeah, I think that, yeah, it's one of the songs there, isn't it? Yeah. The songs that I sent it, isn't it? Yeah, I think it's one of those. I read something from Francis de Sales, who's talking about this. He wrote a letter to a bishop who wanted to design his office, because he was overwhelmed with that. Yeah. And he tried to encourage him. He said, all the time we spend worrying about whether you should step down or not, you're not going to be worried about doing your job. Yeah. Whereas you should put your eyes on the Lord when it comes to us. And then you do your job better. And he uses the example of a man who wants to put away his wife. He says, all the time he's agonizing whether he's going to put her away or not. He's not worried about loving that. That's what he should be doing. To a second it should be said. That that which man desires and estimates himself able to obtain, right? He what? He will obtain. Yeah. Predits himself to obtain. And from such faith in the knowledge preceding, the emotion following the appetite is called, what? Confidence. For the appetitive emotion is denominated from the preceding, what? Knowledge, right? Just as an effect from a cause, more, what? Known. For more does the knowing power know its own act, right? Than the act of the, what? Competitive power. I think it's good. Yeah. How many people use this? This, um... They add you all the time, hopefully, what does that mean, they kind of expect it, you know? They're not sure about what's going to take place, but they're kind of using more to talk about the mind, really, in a sense, aren't they, you know, than the appetite there. And hopefully we'll do this right, you know, not assuming that we can do it necessarily, you know, but hopefully. What's curious is sometimes, at least in English, they'll often, they'll interchange, they'll use that same, I think it's the same notion, and they will speak of it as, I believe I'll be able to do that. They use a belief as well, and I think maybe it's rooted in that, that comes from confidence. Yeah. I used to be annoyed sometimes when people, you know, would kind of confuse, it seems to me, faith and hope, you know, and they would, if they were the same thing, you know. And what does that mean when you say, Jesus, I trust in thee, is that, I have faith in you? Yeah. I hope in you. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Whether hope is in the brute animals, the third one proceeds thus, it seems that in the brute animals there is not hope. For hope is about a future good, as Damascene says. But to know the future does not pertain to the brute animals, who have only sense knowledge, which is not of future things. Therefore hope is not in brute animals, before and after. The dog, when he broke his leg, he had no idea he was going to get an x-ray, he had no idea he was going to get surgery, he had no hope. Any clueless? Any clueless? Yeah, he thinks he's going to be stuck with that cast now. Moreover, the object of hope is the good possible to be obtained. But possible and impossible are some differences of the true and the false, which are only in the mind, as the philosophy says in the Sixth Book of Metaphysics. Therefore, hope is not in good animals, in which there is not mind. Moreover, Augustine says, upon Genesis to Letter, that animals are moved by the things seen. But hope is not about what is seen, for what someone sees, who hopes, right? As it says in Romans 8, 24. Therefore, hope is not in good animals. But against this is that hope is a passion of the irascible, but in brute animals there is irascible, right? That dog is something, it's something, it's something angered at the dog. Therefore, hope, huh? You can see how this question kind of falls from the other one. I answer, it should be said that the interior passions of animals can be, what? But apprehended from their exterior motions, huh? From which it appears that in brute animals there is hope. For if the dog sees a, what? Leopard? I'm not sure. I don't know. It's hair. Oh, a hair. Hair, yeah. Or a, what? Some kind of bird there. A bird. A what? A bird. A bird, huh? Nimes distantum. Far away. It is not moved to it, right? As it were, not hoping to, what? Hoping to paint it. Yeah. Remember the cat walking around under the tree there, you know? Oh, yeah, to me like that. Because the birds were walking him or something. They could get them. Because the cat doesn't try to run up the tree to catch the bird. But she would go over there where the neighbor had kind of a little water thing for the birds come down and she'd get into the kind of flowers around there, you know? That's possible to get up there. Short distance, right? If, however, it'd be in propinquo, right? Hereby. Is moved, as it were, under the hope of attaining it, right? For it has been said above the, what? Sense. Yeah. The sensitive appetite of brood animals and also the natural appetite of... Insult. Insult things follow the grasping of some understanding, of some intellect, just as the, what? The appetite of the... Understanding nature. Yeah, which is called the will. But in this there is a difference that the will is moved from the apprehension of an understanding that is joined to it. But the emotion of the natural appetite follows the apprehension of a separated intellect, which instituted that nature, right? And likewise, the appetite of... The sensitive appetite of brood animals, which act by sort of natural, what? Instinct. Instinct, huh? Whence in the works of brood animals and of other natural things, there appears a similar process as in the works of, what? Art. Art imitates even nature. And in this way, in brood animals, there is hope and desperation, right? It's how it creeps, right? It's about the animal. He's trying to jump there and fight. He disparars it. The first, therefore, it should be said that although brood animals do not know the future, nevertheless, from a natural instinct, the animals move towards something in the future as if it foresaw the future, right? You know? Yeah. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art.