Prima Secundae
Lecture 114: Hope and Fear: The Irascible Passions

Transcript
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In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, Guardian Angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Deo Gracias. God, our Enlightenment, Guardian Angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order them in our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, and John Docter, help us to understand all that you have written. Son, and of the Holy Spirit, Amen. I'm thinking about Guardian Angels, you know, when I got off the airplane, I said to my wife, you know, I'd ask my Guardian Angel to watch over the airplane, right? She says, well, that's mine, too, she said. Watch your angel, play your angel. Yeah, we must have been getting cowards down at our own age, you know, and applying these crazy contraptions. It's kind of, yeah, actually, coming in, it was kind of, you know, for a while, it was going like that, you know. That makes me kind of nervous. That's the stuff, you know, up and down. I heard some of you who've been in airplanes, and they go, oh, really down, and one of my cousins are here, saying, I'm not going to fly again, you know. She's like, you know, up and down, up and down. It scares the woods out of you when the video goes, big drop out of you. It's like, whoop, whoop, whoop. That's why it's not serving meals on the plane. Okay, so we're up to Article 8 here, huh, in Question 40. To the 8th, one goes forward thus. It seems that hope does not, what? Yeah, or aid operation, but more that impedes it, right? For security pertains to, what? Hope, right? But security gives rise to negligence, huh? Which impedes operation. Shakespeare says that, right? Security is mortal's chiefest enemy. Okay, therefore, hope impedes, what? Operation, right, huh? Okay. So when you're running for office there, you should have gone scared, they said, right, huh? Moreover, sadness impedes operation, as has been said above, huh? But hope sometimes causes sadness. Oh, yeah, I guess, of course. For it's said in the book of Proverbs, chapter 13, that hope, which is deferred or delayed, afflicts the soul, right, huh? The soul is in purgatory. And therefore, hope impedes, what? Operation, right? So I suppose those who are in purgatory are impatient to see God as he is, huh? Mm-hmm. So we've got to pray for those souls. Moreover, desperation is contrary to hope, as has been said. But desperation, most of all in warlike things, right, aids, what, operation, right, huh? For he said in the second book of the Kings, chapter 2, that a dangerous thing is desperation, huh? We're going to sell our lives, you know, a good price, as they say, huh? Therefore, hope makes a contrary effect, huh? Impeding operation, huh? Okay. See what idea that contraries have contrary, what causes, right? So if desperation makes you fight like a wild man, right, be very fierce, well, then hope would have the opposite effect, huh? Okay. But against this is what is said in the first epistle to the Corinthians, chapter 9, huh? That the one who, what, plows up, I guess, huh? Yeah. Yeah. Are to plow in the hope of the fruit of what? Receiving the fruit. Mm-hmm. And the same reason is given in all this, huh? Well, what does Thomas say, huh? The answer should be said that hope, per se, huh, has that it aids operation, right? By intensifying it, huh? Intendendo, I guess, would be intensified, probably, huh? You're saying per se now, right? Gratidens, it could be something different, right? And this from two things, huh? First, from the notion of its own object, right? Which is the good that is difficult but possible, right? There's three words there, right? Bonum arduum possibere, right? We have the grammatical reverse order, right? Mm-hmm. The possible, difficult, what, right? For the estimate of the, what? Arduousness of it, the difficulty of it, excites the, what? Arouses the attention, right? And the estimate that it is, what, possible, does not slow down or retard the attempt, right? Whence it follows that a man intensely operates and it comes to what? Hope. Secondly, by reason of its effect, huh? For hope, as has been said, causes delight or pleasure. It gives you, what? Hope to attain this, right? Mm-hmm. Which aids operation, as has been said, huh? Whence hope aids, what? Operation, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay? There are two very interesting reasons he gives there, huh? Even before it has its effect, right? Mm-hmm. Okay, now what about the first objection, huh? That security, that hope, security pertains to hope, right? And security begets, what? Negligence, huh? What we say about Monsigniana, his principal passion is fear, okay? By a man who has hope, right? Obtaining the truth, you know? Doesn't have that fear, he's going to be negligent, right? In his thinking, huh? Mm-hmm. Can never be said about Monsigniana, give half a course on a paragraph of Thomas, or something. It invites me, sometimes, but there's something to learn from that, right? Because Deconic read Thomas more carefully than Kisurik, and much more carefully, you might say. And Dionne read it even more carefully than Deconic, right? Yeah. Why Kisurik was saying twang, you don't read it very carefully. That first started out. Yeah. Then you kind of built up there, you know? To the first effort should be said that hope regards the good to be, what? Obtained. Obtained, huh? By security regards the, what? Evil to be, what? Avoid it. Avoided, huh? Mm-hmm. So, what is social security? Opinion, right? Yeah, yeah. Some bad thing to be avoided, right? Because when you didn't like social security, you said, quote, the Shakespeare, security is the mortal's chiefest enemy. Yeah. Sure is. So, we've got a little different context there, huh? When security seems to be more opposed to, what? Fear, whose object is the bad, right? Mm-hmm. Then it pertains to, what? Hope. Yeah. And nevertheless, security does not cause negligence except insofar as it diminishes the estimate of it being, what? Difficult. In which also is diminished the notion of hope, because hope is about a good, difficult, but possible to be obtained, right? So, it's kind of interesting what he's saying there, that security, what, does not cause negligence except insofar as it diminishes the estimate of how difficult it is, right? In which also diminish the right skill of the rule, right? For those things in which man fears no impediment are, as it were, already not regarded as, what, difficult, right? So what do you think about that, huh? What about our friend Socrates, right? What would you say about him? Doesn't he have that fear of, what, being mistaken? That fear that I might think I know and I don't know? I've often wanted to ask some professors, some people, did you ever have any fear that you might not know what you thought you knew? What? But at the same time, you had to have that, what, hope of what? Yeah, yeah. So truth is a, what? If truth was just a good, then desire for truth would be enough to pursue it, right? But because it's a difficult good, right, you need hope, right? But hope also has to regard, you have to regard as a difficult good, able to be, what, obtained, yeah. You know, the president of TAC there used to say, the former president, Dillon there, that Euclid is kind of curing people of their despair of coming to know the truth, right? Yeah. You can really see when you first study Euclid, huh? Hey, I'm really knowing something, right? Yeah. You know? Maybe it's possible to really know something somewhere else, too, you know, and not just somewhere. Somewhere over there, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Do you find Euclid difficult when you're out there? Yeah, yeah. It's time to get to be a junior, then you look back and you see the, you laugh at the freshmen there who are stumbling over the text of Euclid, huh? My son-in-law got to be teaching the two daughters, you know, their Euclid, right? One of them liked it, the other one didn't, so. Okay. Now, the reply to the second objection, right? Well, it's sadness impedes separation, right, huh? Notice the way Thomas answered that. To the second it should be said that hope, per se, causes what? Delight, right? Because by hope you regard something good, right, which is a cause of pleasure, the good, right, as what? About difficult, right? As something, what? Difficult but possible, right, huh? And if you ever stood in, what, pleasure and anticipation, right, huh? You assume he's going to show up or she's going to show up for the wedding, right? Unless Ms. Havisham didn't get her groom, right, you know? But I mean, as long as you have this hope, you know, the person's going to show up for that, right, huh? So, how common is that distinction between the per se and the per se dance? You bet that in the study of fallacies? What fallacy is that? Does it always that belong among the kinds of fallacies? Yeah. It's interesting in the, if you take the most general thing like being, right, huh? What is the first distinction in the fifth book of wisdom of being? What's the first distinction of being? What is the distinction of being? Yeah. And then, later on, he'll distinguish per se dance into three kinds, and then under being per se, he will distinguish three kinds of distinction, right, huh? Being according to the figures of predication, and then being as true, and then being as act and ability, right? But notice the universality of this per se and per se dance, huh? And, of course, it enters into the distinction of what causes, huh? I'm just going through the parts in the Summa Cantu Gentiles there on good and bad, right, huh? And good has a per se cause, right? And once in a while, I could have a per se cause, right? Like I dig in the ground to plant a tree, and I find a treasure there, right, buried by Captain Kidd or somebody. But what about the bad? What kind of cause can the bad have? Only a per se and per se, yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And Thomas goes through the different kinds of causes that show this, right? But it shows you how important that distinction is of per se and per se and per se, right? Because good and bad is very universal, right? Most people don't understand good and bad, huh? Which is bad, I think. But, you know, when Aristotle defines the good as the good is what all want, right? Well, some people say, what do you mean? A lot of people want bad things, right? But do they want the bad as such? No. They want the bad because there's some little good in it or because some appearance that it has of the good, right? So the good as such is wanted and the bad only per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and per se and dangerous on account of some hope joined to it right for those who despair of what flight become weakened in their what flee but they hope to what vindicate their what their death and therefore from hope they fight more what sharply yeah once they become dangerous to the host right So now we're going to pass to the other chief passion in the, what? Irrassable appetite, right? So the chief passions, the principal passions are, what? Joy and sadness, right? In the concupisable, and hope and what? Fear, right? So, if you look at the place we're in right now, now, question 40 was the first question in the, what? Irrassable appetite, huh? And notice he takes up first hope and desperation because it's the opposite, right? And then secondly, fear, right? And audacity or boldness because it's the opposite, right? And third place comes what? Anger. And there he touched upon altogether five, what? Emotions, right? So there's five emotions in the irascible and in the concupisable there were, what? Six, yeah. Now, if you're a Pythagorean, why is there an even number for the concupisable and an odd number for the, what? We see hope and despair arise from what emotion in the concupisable? Because the concupisable is more basic than the irascible, right? What? Yeah. Well, hope and despair arise from desire, right? So if you desire some good and there's no difficulty in getting that good, then there's no reason to bring in the irascible emotions at all, right? So you're a typical American sitting in front of the TV there watching a football game, whatever it is, and you've got a bowl of popcorn in there or chips or something. I mean, you know, so you don't need any hope to get those chips into your mouth or that popcorn into your mouth. You do the value of the thinking, right? But if what you desire is a good difficult, right, to obtain, right, then there arises either an estimate that it is possible, right, in which case you have hope, or estimate that it's not possible for you to overcome that, right, huh? And then you have despair, right, huh? And then fear and audacity arise in what emotion in the irascible, I mean in the concupisable. Yeah, the opposite of what? Of a desire, right? Aversion, right? Aversion. Returning away from this, right, huh? Okay. Now if I pick up the menu and it says salmon, right, you know, there's an aversion right away, right, huh? Okay. But I'm a free man and I'm just in control of what I order from the thing, you know? So I don't have any fear that's going to be imposed upon me, right, huh? But when you invite it out to somebody's house and you're serving salmon, now you've got a little more of a problem, right, this is fear, what are we going to do? Okay? So if there's some difficulty to avoid something that you have an aversion for, right, if you think you might not be able to avoid it, right, then you start to feel what? Fear, right, huh? If you think you can overcome it, you know, there's a certain boldness, you know, huh? And, uh, what's it, right? Okay. Now, where does the last passion, which is going to be, what, anger, right, what does that arise from, huh? Passion in the concubisable, does it arise from? I think you have bad, I'm sorry, I think. Yeah, yeah. But it's more, of course, the hate and love underlie desire and aversion, too. But doesn't anger arise more from sadness or pain, right, huh? You know? So if you're stepping on my toes and I say politely, you're on my toe, you say, so what? Well, then I'm going to get, what, angry, right, huh, you see? Or if you call somebody, you know, a particular sentence that he doesn't want to be called, that causes him a little bit of pain, right? And, uh, he's going to, what, be angry, right, huh, okay? And so, but anger arises if you're thinking you can do something about it, right, huh? So anger is kind of in the presence of a bad that is already here, right? It's upon you, right, okay? I've been insulted, right? Or you're actually stepping on my toes, right? Why fear is something in the, what, future, right, huh, okay? Just like hope is for something in the future. So from sadness arises, this anger, if I think I can overcome it, right, okay? And, uh, but now you say, if a mosquito, I say, is laying in my thing and bothering me, you know, I don't get pretty angry, you know, you know, because there's no difficulty in getting rid of that, right, huh, see? But if you're stepping on my toe and refusing to get off, there's no difficulty here, you know? It has to be met, huh? And that requires a certain amount of, what? Difficulties. Anger, right, yeah? I remember this friend of mine had kind of a nasty little kid next door, right? Kid comes over to his backyard there and they have kind of a thing with a potted plant, right? The kid looks at my friend and he takes the plod and he, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pff Pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, p pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, p pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, pfft, p Warren Murray and I were wanting to making a tape of all the different emotions there to show it to another friend. So, we're through with hope and desperation as far as the Pima Sikundi is concerned here. And now we're going on to fear, right? Consequently, we're not to consider the premium, he says. First, about fear, and secondly, about what? Audacity, right? Because fear is the principal emotion and audacity is the, what? Secondary, yeah. Now, he says about fear, four things ought to be considered. First, about fear itself. Secondly, about its what? Object. Third, about its cause. And fourth, about its what? Effect. I wonder why he says a different article for the object and the cause, because I thought the object of the emotions was the cause of them, right? So when he argued, you know, that good is the cause of what? Of love, right? It's because it's the object of what? Love, right? And in general, we say that about emotions, right? I mean, what causes your fear? Well, it's the things you fear, okay? Because emotions are being what? Yeah, the appetite, the faculty is being acted upon by the what? Object, yeah. That's why we call them passions, because passions means what? Being acted upon, yeah, undergoing, right? First out extends the word passion, you know, from the emotions to the what? Sensing, right? And the ultimate understanding, which is a different kind of passion and a less full sense of the word passion, right? Okay, to the first then, oh, wait, and fourth about the effect. Now, about the first, four things are asked. Gee, Thomas is going to be more thorough about this fear, huh? He must be like once in a while, right? Well, they describe Thomas when he was stumped on something, fall to the ground in prayer, you know, and lead on the floor, they're praying, and then like, ah, I've been enlightened, you know? About the first, four things are asked, huh? So you notice, if you look at the footnote there, you've got a question for each one of these four things, right? Okay. Now, the first question is about fear, it's a kundumse by itself or in itself. About the first, four things are asked. First, whether fear is a passion of the soul. Strangest essence, right? There's some doubt about this, huh? Second, whether it is a special passion, not the name of something common to many passions. Third, whether there is some natural fear, huh? Well, I'm convinced that there is. And fourth, about the, what, species of fear, huh? Didn't ask that about others. What? Didn't ask that about others. No, no, no, no. And, ah, so, a special consideration of fear, right? Used to joke about when Ziniani, you know, when he's in the Vatican II there, the Cardinal called them, he'd flower over to Rome, right? Then they'd say he'd sell his return ticket and come back on the boat. I don't know if that was true or not, but he was afraid to... Oh, I don't know about afraid. I think it's more pleasant to sell on the boat. Like, no jet lag on a boat. Yeah, yeah. To the first end one proceeds thus, it seems that fear is not a passion of the soul, right? For Damascene, huh? Great doctor of the, what, Eastern Church, in the third book, huh? Orthodox faith, huh? He says that fear is a, what? Power, right? A virtus. Secundum systolin, huh? Which he translates as, what? Contraction, right? Oh, like systolic here. That's a contraction? I guess so, it must be. There you go. Used to have, in my college, I used to have a course taught by the Greek and Latin professor for pre-med majors, right? Yeah, yeah. So you learn some of these Greek words that are used, you know. Then these words don't seem so mysterious, right, huh? Yeah. Very common in Greek, huh? Essentia desirativa, desire of what? Being, I suppose, right? But nulla vertus is a, what? Passion. As is proven in the second book of the Ethics, right? Therefore, fear is not a passion, right? Hmm. You know, we'll see if it gets Damascene off the hook or not. Moreover, every passion is an effect coming from the present of some agent, right? Mm-hmm. But fear is not about something present, but about the future, as Damascene says in the second book, huh? Mm-hmm. Couldn't you have given that same objection against hope or something? Yeah. Therefore, fear is not a passion, right, huh? Moreover, every passion of the soul is a motion of the sense desiring power, right? Apetitus means what? It can mean desire, I suppose, in Latin, right? But it's also used to name the, what? The ability to desire, right? Mm-hmm. The desiring power. And here, I think, it's desiring power, right? Okay? Just like the word understanding, right? Or intellectus, right? You can name the act or you can name the power or you can name the virtue, you know? So. But the sense is not apprehensive of the future, but of the, what? The present, huh? Since, therefore, fear is about a future evil, it seems that it is not a passion of the soul, right, huh? This is touching upon the idea that the irascible is closer to reason, right? In the, uh, in the, uh, in the keepsable, right? So that's five last symphonies, right? The 36th and the 41st are about magnanimity, which is about, what? Hope. And the 38th and the 40th are about courage, which is about fear, right, huh? In Mozart. The most reasonable music ever written. The most beautiful music ever written. What did John Paul II say? The church could not fail to do homage to the genius of Salzburg. I have physical quotes that I just did in Mozart. Make a little florilegium for yourself in Mozart. Yeah. But against this is what Augustine says in the 14th Book of the City of God. Is that Augustine enumerates fear among the other passions of the soul, right? And this is Augustine, right? He is somebody. Augustine, Thomas said, kind of the greatest minds there that you just had, huh? John Paul II has got an encyclical on Augustine, so you want to realize, you know, the importance of Augustine for the whole tradition of the church, right? And in the context of the, what do you call it, the Catechism of the Catholic Church, right? And most quotes are from Augustine, aren't they? Yeah. Except for maybe the Bible, right? Yeah. Quite a few from Thomas, too, but even more from Augustine, so. He's really still the big shot, right? I answer you, it should be said, that among the other emotions of the soul, after sadness, right, fear has more, obtains more the aspect of a passion, right? Mm-hmm. When it's the idea that a passion is, I've got the idea of something, what, a type more of the bad, originally, than the, what, good, right? Yeah. Okay. Now, kind of the English word for passion would be suffering, right, huh? Okay. Which obviously has something to do with the bad, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. Which Shakespeare says in one of the plays there, you know, a woman says, did you suffer love for me? Well, there he's trying to move it away from the original meaning of suffering, right? But even there, you're applying the word suffering to, I don't know, to love, huh? Yeah. Which of my attributes, you know, did you suffer love for me? Well, you're moved by something. Okay. Okay. Okay. about her, you know, that moves you to love her, right? So you underwent, you know, love, huh? And of course, the other English word there that I use sometimes, or Pacio, is undergoing, right? And that, though, originally, the aspect of something bad, right? So if I say, you know, he's undergone a lot in life, or she's undergone a lot in life, what does that mean? A lot of good things happened to him or her? No, no. So, or if you say you're under the weather, right? Does that imply usually something good or bad? What, has this cheered you up or something? No, saying that you've been acted upon in a way that's somewhat harmful to you, right? Okay. I already told you about that guy who was teaching a philosophy there, one of the public universities there, and he described the students you know as saying, why are you doing this to me? It's like you're undergoing something, you know? Yeah. It's like you're as... So notice what Thomas says here, among other emotions of the soul, after sadness, right, huh? Pain, right? So when I'm in pain, right, you know, if I be seeing an aberration, whatever it is, I'm really undergoing something, let's say, right, huh? Okay? Come under the knife and stuff. But after he says sadness, Timor, fear, more has the notion of what a passion is, right? Okay. Now, this has been said above, huh? To the notion of passion first pertains it be emotion of a, what? Undergoing power, right? Passive power. To which, what? It's compared its object through the manner of a, what? Active mover, right, huh? Okay. In that the passion is the effect of the, what? Agent, right? And by kind of extension, in this way, also to sense and to understand are said to be a pati undergoing. I think Aristotle says this very explicitly in the second and the third book, right, of the, um, Deima, right? But he'll point out differences between them, right? Like he says in the third book, you know, that when the senses undergo a strong object, they're kind of, what? I ain't able to see lesser things, right? So if I shine a bright light in your face and then you can't see things that are dimmer for a while, you know? But he says this is not true about the understanding. If you understand something very understandable, you can understand even better lesser things, right? Okay. So, um, I notice, you know, the greatest minds I've known, like Deconic's mind or Dion's mind, so on, they had a good judgment in music, right? Okay. Now music is reasonable in what sense? What way? Is it reasonable like a theorem of Euclid is? In what way is music reasonable, right? Yeah. That the emotions can partake of reason, right? Okay. The way Aristotle teaches us in the Nicomachean Ethics, huh? Okay. And, uh, so it's not as understandable or knowable as, say, geometry is, right? But the man who's understood something higher, when he turns to something less reasonable, only reasonable by participation, he's a better judge, right? Okay? So they would judge, you know, that Mozart was very good or Bach was very good or something. And the same with, you know, fiction, right, huh? You know, Shakespeare was the one for the moderns or Homer for the ancients, right? Okay. Aristotle calls Homer the poet, right, huh? You know? I was reading Alexander Pope's introduction there to the Iliad this morning. You know, he was talking about how Homer is the greatest poet, right? And how he excels Virgil and so on, huh? So, but men whose minds are considered things that are very understandable, when they turn to these lesser things, they can kind of see that, right, huh? My wife was complaining about the music in one of the churches there down in El Paso. She said, no sense of what church music should be like, you know, huh? But someone who's got a good mind and has studied high things, you know, could see that right away, you know? Why, the senses are kind of overcome by bright light or bright taste, right? There's some foods, you know, that are so hot, you know, some of these hot things, that you can't taste anything after them, right? You know, they're so hot, right? Okay. But still, there's an undergoing in both ways, right? Receiving, huh? But as you go further away from the body, the original sense of passion, the receiving is, what, actually perfecting the thing, right, huh? So when you receive the sound of Mozart in your ear, your ear is being perfected, right? When you receive the teaching of Thomas, your mind is being perfected, right? And so on. When you receive a kick, you're not being perfected, you might be rehabilitated a bit. Okay. And in this way, he said, even to sense and to understand, he said, to be a pakti, right? Okay, and undergoing. Secondly, more property, magis propria, right? Okay. That is said to be a passion, which is the motion of the desiring power, right? At adhok, magis propria, right? Even more property, right? The motion of a, what? Desiring power that has a bodily, what? Organ. Organ, right, huh? Okay. So notice, he's saying there that the desiring power, like the will, even, right? Is more, what? Moved, right? More undergoes than the senses or reason, right? But not as much as the, what? Sense, desiring power, which has a bodily order, right? Which comes about with some bodily change, right? At adhok, and even further, propria isime, huh? It's a relative, right? Okay. Those motions are called passions, which imply some nocumentum, right? Now, you know, from the point of view of logic and of naming things and of knowing things, if I, you know, start sticking you with a pen right now, right, you'll be very much aware of the fact that I'm acting upon you, right? And I'm really acting upon you, though, with my talk, right? Because your ears are being bombarded, at least by the sounds. I don't know if the thoughts are going in. But at least the sounds are going to your ear, right, huh? Or even, you know, looking at somebody, I mean, you know, the light is acting upon you. But it's not as obvious that you're being acted upon by the light as it is by, what? The pen. So in something bad like that is, you're being acted on in a way that's contrary to your nature. You're more aware of the fact that you're being, what, acted upon, right? So that's kind of the first name of what? Undergoing. Suffering, right, huh? And if the word suffering had been extended the way the word passio, Latin, extended, we could say, you know, sensing is a suffering, right? And understanding is a suffering. You're going to still have a sense of saying that, right? But in fact, the English word has been, what, suffering has stopped at the first meaning, so to speak, right? But the word passio has been carried over, right, huh? Okay. Now in C.J., I'm saying there are those who can't move a word, right? The word is stuck there. They can't carry it over, right? And, but I, in English, trying to accommodate English, I've used the word sometimes, undergoing, right, huh? Which is maybe not as strong as suffering, right, huh? But undergoing, as we said before, seems to imply at first something, what, bad, right? I'm under the weather, right? I've been acted upon by the weather, but in a way that is, what, not perfecting me, but making me worse, right? I've undergone a lot in life, something says, or something like that, huh? Bad things have happened to me, right? You know, horrible things. Okay. So when it gets to the most probesime, right? Like, this is like the first meaning of the word, right? Okay. So, you know, when we speak too even of the will as being more moved by something, right, than the reason it's being moved, although I could say it's being moved too, right? You know, moved by the arguments, right? But you're moved by somebody's situation or their misery or something. Interesting. What is the definition of tragedy, by the way? Yeah, yeah. It's a likeness of an action that is serious, complete, in some magnitude, in sweetened language, right? Right? Acted out rather than narrated and moving us to, what, pity and fear so as to, what, purge these, right, huh? Okay. And we always often take the prologue of Romeo and Juliet, right? Because Shakespeare is kind of preparing the way for tragedy, right, huh? And so he says, whose misadventures pitiates over those, do with their death bury their parents strife, right? The fearful passage of their death marked love, you know? Well, in this is the second and third quatrain of the prologue, but notice, huh, pity is a form of what? Sadness, right? And fear, at the very beginning of the thing he said, among the other emotions of the soul, after sadness, fear more is a notion of passion, right? Well, tragedy is moving us to a kind of sadness, right? A kind of pity, which is sadness over the misfortune of another, right? And then, uh, and to fear, right, huh? This could happen to me, you know? There's a woman of Trocce there, you know, and she sees the prisoners coming in, and there's a... She's especially moved by the princess there, you know? Before she was in her father's house, a happy young lady, you know? And now she's, what, a slave, right? And she has pity for her, right, huh? But then she fears something could happen to her. Of course it will. You know, that's, that's, you know? It's kind of interesting that the two emotions that he says, Magis rationum obtinet passionis, right? Are the ones that tragedy is, they make a greater effect upon us, right, huh? If you think of love, say, just even love in Shakespeare, right, you think more of Romeo and Juliet, right? The tragedies, right, rather than the comedies, so the comedies are something to say about love, too, right, huh? But if someone says to Shakespeare, just love, whatever we would think of Romeo and Juliet, right? Some tragedy, right? Or Antony and Cleopatra, you know? Or no more famous pairs. It's like Tavius is at the end. So, so, so most properly those emotions are called passions, which implies some documental, right, huh? Now it is manifest over that fear, since it is de mala, it's about something bad, right, huh, pertains to the desiring power, right, huh? No, still use the word peditivam potensiam, right? So you could translate it as desiring power, right? I've spoken before of why he names the desiring power from desire in particular, right? What's the reason for that? Yeah. Things in motion sooner catch the eye than what not stirs, right, huh? And desire seems to be emotion towards something, right? And, of course, the kind of strongest emotions are kind of love and, what, anger, right? And you're going to excess in these things and so on. Then they stand out, right? Because the desiring power, per se, regards the good and the, what, bad, huh? Just like reason regards the true and the false, right? It pertains, however, huh, to the, it pertains to the sensing, sensitive desiring power, right? For it comes to be with a certain, what? Body. Yeah. With a contractioni, as Damascene says, right? Yeah. Okay? So he takes that contractioni there as touching one of the bodily change, huh? Yeah. And, because Aristotle spends time on this in the premium to the Dianima, right? He talks about how you don't really know the emotions unless fully. You don't know the bodily change that accompanies these emotions, huh? I remember holding a little kid in my arms, you know, and the dog was, ah! I could feel the cat's hair, you know, huh? Just in her body, you know, and just holding my hands, so I just, you know? We had a cat out at the lake one time, and it was a real nice dog, you know, it wouldn't harm the cat even, you know, but the cat was scared stiff. Yeah. And she ran in the house, and under the bed, there's a bed out in the, you know, the screened-in area, you know, out there, you know, and wouldn't come out under the bed for about a day, you know? And finally, we kind of, you know, evolved, and we got her to come out again, and she came on, she took out the door, and she said, talk again. Funny. Funny, you know, these animals, I guess if you introduce them early, they'll play with each other, right? I had a cat one time when I was little, and the neighbor had a dog, and we let them, you know, stick each other out, and they play with each other, right? At my son's place, too, they have a dog, and they've got a cat, and they've got a rabbit. I guess the rabbit was brought up with dogs. Oh, boy. And so, I guess a lot goes with the dog, and with the cat, too. Somebody showed us a video of these kittens, but an older dog. It was a very mild plant, and the kittens were just crawling all over the dog. Yeah, yeah. Grabbing its snout, and doing it. Yeah. And the dog was kind of enduring it all. It implies a certain relation to the bad, right? According as the bad has, in some way, a victory, right? Overcoming the ratio, I mean, yeah, over something good, yeah. When most truly to it belongs the ratio of action. But nevertheless, he says, after sadness, and I guess the reason why this is, because that's about a present evil, right? Why, fear is about a future evil, which doesn't as much move us as the, what? Present, right? Now, what about this word virtus? I don't know if we can solve that use of Damascene's word there. To the first, therefore, it should be said that virtus names a certain, what? Beginning or source of action, right? And therefore, insofar as the inward motions of the appetitive power are beginnings of the exterior actions, are sources of those exterior actions, they are called, what? Virtues. Virtues, huh? But the philosopher negates passion to be a, what? Virtue, which is a habit to us, right? A habit, right? So what kind of a fallacy was involved in this argument there, dumb man? If Aristotle meant by virtue some kind of habit, and Damascene meant by virtue any principle of action, then what kind of a fallacy was involved here? Yeah, yeah. The most common kind of fallacy, right? Aristotle says in the book on Systomorphic nations. That's why Thomas put it first, right? It's not the deepest objection, but it's the most common. Now, how can you be acted upon by something that ain't there? To second should be said that just as a body, as a passion of a, an actual passion of a body comes from the bodily presence of the ancient, right? So the passion of the soul comes from the, what? Animal. presence, the solely, soulful presence of the agent, even without a, what, bodily or real presence, right? It's present in your mind, right? But, you know, this is to say, you know, people, sometimes you call some embarrassing moment in their life, you know, and they've kind of grown again, you know? But it's because the past is, what, present to them, right? Okay? Well, likewise, through the imagination, so on, the future can be, what, present, right? It was the, the, the woman saint there was suffering a lot, and she complained to our Lord, you know, that he was only on the cross for so many hours, but she's been suffering for months or years. He said, well, no, no, no, he says, you know, from the beginning of my life I had, he said, you know, he formed, right? He's going to undergo, right? That's probably why Christ is not as jovial as people would like him to be, you know, at this, hanging over him all the time, huh? So, insofar as the evil that is, what, in the future, in things, is present according to the, what? The soul. Yeah. I was young, I used to go down to St. Paul Public Library from St. Paul, Minnesota, and they had a big music room, and you could take out about six of these old records for, for two weeks, right, huh? And you get to hear a lot of these things. But behind the desk, they, they had a, a room, you know, that was kind of, you know, sound from where they could hear, you know, what was going on there. And, uh, the, um, you could reserve a time, you know, I mean, you just, you know, whatever it was, it's open on the thing, you know, sign up for, sometimes there's some music, and then take the records in there and play them, right? And it was kind of, you know, the sound was kind of dulled by the, by the, uh, acoustics, or what I call it. But you could kind of hear, you know, in there, in there one day, and this guy was playing, you know, wedding marches, and things like that, over and over again, where everybody was kind of, you know, he's sitting in the room by himself, you know, but apparently he's about to get married, right? And he comes, he comes to practice. Yeah, yeah, well, he's, he looks so happy, you know, his marriage was as happy as anticipation was, right? But he, he, there wasn't what was present to him then, right? But, you know, I told you my experience going in there one time, I was kind of interested in the music of Prokofiev, right? It was pretty interesting. And I, I, I decided to hear some music of Prokofiev I'd never heard before, right? So I went in there to put it on, you know, I was listening to this awful stuff of Prokofiev, and the woman at the desk comes in, she thought I had the wrong speed. And he said, no, no, no, this is Prokofiev. It just didn't sound, it just didn't sound right to her, you know, I mean. So, I first heard the, what is it, the 36th Symphony there, you know, and it had these, you know, windows there and there, you know, go up like, you know, these two-story almost windows, you know, and it's one of these days with a dark blue sky and these puffy clouds that look really great, missing the beginning of the 36th Symphony, you know, it really stuck in my mind the rest of my life. And someone said, you know, if all I had survived of Mozart was the beginning of the 36th Symphony kind of action, it'd be enough to establish his greatness, huh? Just, uh, I had a lot of thoughts about that, those musical ones. It was good, you could take out six records and hear them, you know. You have to have the pieces at your house and hear them more than over again for a while to really know them, you know. Okay. But it's present according to the apprehension of the, what, soul. Right? Now to the third, we're just saying now the senses, right? You know, the thing that is present, right? To the third, it should be said that the sense does not apprehend the future. But from that which it apprehends that is present, the animal by a natural, what, instinct is moved to hoping some future good, right? Or fearing some future evil, right? The birds fly south or something, right? Yeah. What do they call those people who go down to Florida and go to snowbirds? Yeah, it's all tied. Expression. Okay. You know that you're from Florida, right? Yeah. Take a little break now. Take a little break now. Take a little break now. Take a little break now. Take a little break now. Take a little break now. Take a little break now.