Prima Secundae
Lecture 119: Fear, Boldness, and the Irascible Passions

Transcript
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Moves, huh? As it's said in the 2D animal. I assume you want to know that, huh? To the first effort, it should be said that heat being called back from the exterior to the interior, the heat within is what? Multiplied, right? And most of all towards the what? Lower parts, as you said before. That is about the nutritive part, right? And therefore, the human being consumed, there follows thirst. And also sometimes the what? Untying the stomach, right? And the emission of urine. And sometimes also of what? Seed, huh? Or this kind of emission happens, these superfluous things happens on account of the contraction of the stomach and the testicular membranes. As the philosophy says, huh? In the book about problems. I hope it's not extending Aristotle. And he implies it also to be what? The second one, right, huh? So, too concerned about this, right? Now, because into third objection, right? What about not all the exterior parts, I guess, those objections. Because in fear, the heat deserts the parts of the body, or the heart, rather, tending from the higher parts down to the what? Lower parts, right? Therefore, in those fearing, most of all, the what? The heart trembles, right? That's why it's in the little kitten there, you know, the dog there. And the members, which have some connection to the, what, chest or breast, right? Where is the heart, right? And when those fearing, most of all, tremble in what? Yes, you can tell that, you know, the little child's voice, and he's afraid, right? Even the dog. Well, on account of the vicinity or closeness of the vocal arteries to the, what, heart. And there also trembles the, what, the lower lip, huh? And the whole lower, what, jaw, on account of its closeness or attenuation to the heart. Whence the teeth on the, it's kind of the teeth, right? Bobbles, huh? And for the same reason, the, what, arms and the hands tremble, right? Or also because these parts are more mobile, right, huh? An account of which the knees, what, tremble in those who are afraid, huh? According to that of Isaiah. Now he's quoting Isaiah, so I'm going to go, solid, right, huh? Strengthen the, what, misled hands? And strengthen the, what, knees trembling, right, huh? I know somebody tried to change the fact in church now, you know. And that's probably old, though, right? What's that? Trying to kneel, you know, huh? If they don't have some support, you know, that's hard, you know, huh? And when you were ordained, you know, you went there to get you a special blessing, remember? But it's kind of in the center there. There's no place to hold on. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Yeah, I was kind of... But I did, in fact, go into church now. They've got to kind of hold on to the view there, you know. It's not fear, though, I guess, but it's something, I don't know. It's just a line of question, whether it makes you tremble. I'm just, just like a line of question, I didn't expect Thomas Aquinas to be talking about whether my hand's going to tremble or whether it makes you tremble. What bearing does it have on you? Is that a silly question? What bearing does it have on what? I mean, in a sense, now all the details of this are correct, you know, as to what the bodily change is, but you see clearly that the emotions are something, what, bodily, right? It's distinguished from the acts of the will, right? The acts of the will are not in the body, right? And you keep the formal aspect of the emotion, right? When you carry the word love or hatred, those words, from the emotions over to the, what? To the will, right? And this is one way that we carry names over, right? Is by dropping part of the meaning, right? So we keep the formal aspect of the emotions when we carry the name over to the acts of the will, but we drop the material aspect of it, huh? And so, you know, desire, let's say, which is for a good, right? That is not had, right? But a good that you love, right? But in the absence of it, you have a desire for that, right? So you keep that formal aspect of desire, right? Now, if you say, you know, in the Psalms there, I think there are three Psalms the first, you know? One time my student and I were trying to find, I think there are three Psalms there. The Psalms of thirst, right? For the soul is said to thirst for God, right? But that is, of course, a metaphor, right? Okay. So the word thirst, you know, properly names, right? The bodily thing, right? But the word desire or the word wanting is carried over with a new meaning, right? But it's carried over by dropping part of its meaning, huh? Okay. And, you know, when you go to God, for example, or generally speaking, sometimes the name is carried over as far as the difference is concerned in the definition, right? But the genus is dropped, right? Now, as Porphy explains in the Isogogi, right? Aristella talks about this before him. The difference, of course, corresponds more to form, right? And the genus to what matter, right? And so since God is pure act, right, the name taken from act is more able to be carried over for a reason of that. But the genus, which is taken from something more in potency and sometimes even from matter, cannot be carried over to God, right? But not even to the act of the will, right? So this is interesting in the way our mind carries these things over, right? It's beautiful in the Summa Contra Gentiles, you know, where he talks about how the names of the emotions are carried over to the acts of the will in us, right? And then the names of the acts of the will, some of them can be carried over to God, right? But none of those ones which formerly have as our objects something bad, right? So there can be no fear in God, right? And can there be anger in God? Well, Thomas said, well, no, only metaphorically speaking, right? Because the angry man punishes, right? And God out of justice punishes, but not out of emotion, right? So when God is said to be angry in Scripture, right, this is a metaphor, right? It's not being said properly, right? But, you know, Thomas will reason out of the 11 emotions that we have, right? Then there's liking or love, desire or wanting, pleasure or joy, right? Then there is the three about the bad corresponding to that, hate or dislike, right? Aversion, pain or sadness, right? And then the five that we're talking about now, in the irascible, where you have arising from desire, when the good is difficult to achieve, you have two emotions that can arise, right? Hope or despair, right? Depending upon when you can overcome difficulty. And then out of aversion, turning away from something, if there's some difficulty in avoiding it, there can arise either fear or audacity, as you're going to talk about next, right? As to whether you think you can overcome it, right? And then out of sadness can arise, what? Anger, right, huh? But out of joy or pleasure, no irascible emotion. There's no difficulty in being pleased, right, huh? But in sadness or pain, there can arise anger. You think you can do something to get rid of whatever is causing your, what? Your pain, right? And so, but out of those 11 emotions, they can, the formal aspect of them can be carried over to the acts of our will. But to God, the only ones that can be carried over are love and joy or pleasure. You can't carry over desire or wanting because that's for a good you don't have. You copy. universally perfect, right? And you can't have any of those ones that have regard to something bad or any difficult. It's really difficult for God, right? And any of the ones that have something bad is not Jekyll. God's nothing to fear, nothing to get angry about. But then some of them, Thomas says, can be carried over to God metaphorically, right? Like anger. Right. But fear can't even be carried over metaphorically, right? But anger can because God's punishing us out of justice, right? As a sort of likeness to the angry man punishing the man who makes him angry, right? Desire. You come walk you by me and knock me like this. I suppose, you know, they all mow it up. Just stop that. And so you've got to punch this guy for doing this, right? And so that's a beautiful text there, right? There's only two of the eleven names can be carried over properly to God, right? Because love, I mean, joy or pleasure is in the presence of the good, right? So God is joy over his own goodness, right? And love is for what? The good, whether you have it and don't have it, right? Well, God of course has it, right? So he can have love, too, right? And you take joy in what you love, right? So, if God didn't love himself, he wouldn't take joy in his what? His goodness, right? No, his desire for the good is precious. Well, again, is that something God lacks, huh? No, but out of love, he doesn't like to see that lack of a creature. Yeah, yeah, yeah. His desire is good. Yeah, yeah. But the love is to wish good to somebody, right? So it's about love that God wishes good to us. So desire will also be said metaphorically? You know, God desires salvation of all. Yeah, yeah. It can be metaphorical, yeah. It can be metaphorical. Yeah, yeah. So that's kind of hard to see. Mm-hmm. I mean, some people in the pews, I think, think that God has emotions, right? C.S. Lewis is talking even about the angels, right? He talks about the love of the angels is ferocious, right? And he's trying to get across the idea that the love of the angels is something much more, what, intense than our love. We're kind of, you know, body and soul are kind of divided, you know? Nice fault in nature, anyway. There's kind of a division there, right? The flesh, you know, we're, you know. Yeah. So it's kind of a, so our love is not as intense as the love of the angels. And trying to get that across is, it's for, it's just a kind of finding a word to metaphorically at least, explain how much more intense our love is, right? And God's love is much more intense, obviously, than a kind of infant thing, right? But God loves us in loving himself, right? In like himself, right? It's all very interesting, but I still don't grasp the, what difference does it make whether you tremble or not because of fear? But if the emotion has a bodily, in other words, if you're going to define the thing that has a bodily element, you're going to want to improve that bodily in your definition. In your definition. So is there, okay. So in other words, the bodily transformation that takes place in the emotion is part of the very essence of the emotion, right? It belongs to the nature of the emotion to have that bodily transformation. And so he's going to want to talk about what, so different bodily transformations take place in different emotions. Different bodily transformation takes place in anger and fear. But that shows you the difference in the nature and so on. That's why we share the emotions, you see, with the other animals, right? Okay? Just like we share eating with the other animals, right? Now, of course, you know, our eating may be more refined than the other animals, right? We cook our meat sometimes and we, we, we, we, we, sauce or something, you know, or we take some wine or something, you know? But, nevertheless, we, we have eating in common with the other animals and reproduction, body reproduction, right? And we have the emotions with them, right? By the act of the will, we have this in common with the angels and God himself, right? So, the things we have in common with the angels and God, we have in a imperfect way compared to the way they have. And the things we have in common with the beasts we can have in a higher way than they have, right? But, the fine arts, right? The places we have in the music of Mozart or Handel or Bach or somebody or the plays of Shakespeare, that's kind of the most human, right? And it is australially well said, right? Have you seen that essay on it towards the Dalvation of Music? You know, the fine arts are too high for the animals and too low for the what? Yeah. Yeah. I have to put Mozart on and I used to pretend that the cat liked Mozart but I don't think she did at all. But if I go out to the kitchen there, you know, and get a little sandwich beer or something, you know, and just a little bit of that crinkling of that thing. I looked down and the cat was right there. He couldn't. When we were kids, we had a cat and the cat would be kept out in the kind of the garage there, you know, that's the thing. And when you open the back door, the cat would wrap that from the garage and out to the back door. And we used to try to see if we could open the door so quietly that the cat would not hear and stuff. But you never could open the door without the cat hearing that. So after a while I used to tell the cat, we're going to have steak, you know, you and I are going to have steak today, you know. And she seemed to understand a little bit. But she, you know, they come around your leg there and if you don't give them something to tidbit, they'll remind you with a little bit of applause, you know. And I don't have to see another cat when they do that, you know. but I don't seem to take real interest in music of Mozart. I can't really say to pretend that she did but I think it was just a fiction by part. So you want to realize that the emotions, right, are something that, what, you may have more refined emotions than the other animals have, but basically suddenly we have in common with them, right? And we have acts of will and of understanding but in a perfect way compared to the angels of God, right? You read Deneus' explanation of the word the seraphim, you know, and realize what love is, right? You know, that their love of God is all ferocious. So now you see when you go on to the virtues, there are some virtues that are in the irascible appetite, right? And some virtues are in the kisla appetite, like temperance will be in the kisla appetite, and courage will be in the irascible, right? And then some virtues will be in the will, like justice, right? And of course some virtues will be in reason itself, like wisdom, and so on. And so you have to understand these things, right? And see that the difference between the emotions and the acts of the will. You see, in music, music is basically a representation of the, what, emotions, right? The reason why the music of Mozart say, and the music of the Baroque is better than the romantic music, Is it represents the emotions in a state where they're sharing in reason. That's the one thing the romantic guy doesn't believe in, right? that the emotion should partake of reason, should be subject to reason, right? And so when your music, when your emotions are moved in harmony with the music of Mozart or the Baroque, then you're being kind of disposed in a remote way, at least, for the virtues of temperance, right? And that's why Plato talks about that in the Republic and so on. Maristella talks about it in the Eighth Book of Politics, right? It's important to play the music that the children and adults in that manner listen to, right? And, but... Aristotle also says, kind of strangely, you're at first sight, you know, but he says that in music, the representation of the virtues that are considered the emotions, right? So, like in Mozart's last symphony, like the 36th and the 41st among the five last symphonies, they're both a representation of magnanimity, right? Which is one of the great virtues concerned with Jurassic, right? With hope. And they're both in, what, C major, right? Mozart represents, say, fear or anger, they use, what, a minor key, and usually, what, C minor or D minor, right? The two concertos that have anger represented in them are the C minor in the 24th and the 20th, the D minor concerto, right? And the fearful scenes in Don Giovanni are in D minor, right? So Mozart understands, you know, why the, you know, sadness might be more in, let's say, G minor, right? So the minor keys are used to represent anger, right? Fear and sadness, right? For that sort. And the major keys are to represent joy or love or, you know, hope, right? And when Mozart changes the key, it's always significant, huh? When they compare Mozart with Haydn, of course, Haydn recognized Mozart as the master, but Mozart learned things from Haydn, too. And they eventually surpassed him, right? At the end, Haydn is, what, imitating Mozart and running from Mozart, right? It's beautiful, beautiful. It's like Albert the Great, you know, going down to Paris at the end, after Thomas had died. He's definitively teaching Thomas now, you know, against all kinds of, you know, and, but Haydn will, will, will, will modulate to another key in his variety of spice of life, right? But Mozart, there's a real, what, reason for doing it, huh? So he represents the emotions, but in this way that's, what, in harmony with reason, right? And this is what Aristotle talks about, right? The reason why there can be moral virtue in the emotions is because the moral, the emotions can, to some extent, partake of, what? Of reason, right, huh? And so they compare the emotions and reason sometimes to a man and a horse, right, huh? If you read my friend Washington Irving, you can read his Western narratives there, right? Beautiful descriptions of the taming of the horses out there. And, of course, when you first get one of these wild horses out there in the prairies, you know, they'll throw you off, you know, you know? But you've got to, you know, they can tame rather quickly, you know? And then the horse would, what, obey the man and be a better horse for having that spirit, right? Well, this is kind of the way, you know, when you get on your emotions, the first thing the emotion might do is throw you off. Throw reason off, right? But if you keep on coming back upon it, right, you might eventually, what, tame in some way, right, huh? But in a sense, you know, what good parents do in a sense is to, what, tame your emotions somewhat so that when you get old enough to have some use of your reason, right, the emotions are more apt to, what, listen to your reason, right? Aristotle's a bit of a comparison where he says, you know, should reason rule the emotions like a master rules his slave or like a father rules his son, right? Is the way he puts it, right? And, of course, he concludes that he should rule it like a father rules his, what, son, right, huh? And the reason why he says that is that the master rules the slave for the good of the master, right? And the slave has no saying about what he's going to do today. Right, the son, the father rules the son for the good of the son, right? And the son has something to say about how he does the money, right? So it's a beautiful comparison, Aristotle, saying that reason should rule the emotions like a, what, father rules his son, you know? My father was a very good man in many ways. He was telling me this one story about his business friend, you know? This guy had all kinds of hopes for his son, right? And so they're in Minnesota, and, of course, he got his son into Amherst College, which is a kind of prestigious college, you know, East here and so on. And the kid wasn't really, you know, suited for Amherst, wasn't even suited for college. And, of course, the first year, of course, he slunked out of Amherst, right? So now he's coming back, you know. What does the father do? He says, what do you want? What do you really want? The son said, I'd like to have a flowing station, you know, a gasoline station, you know, working cars. And, you know, my sister, okay, so daddy was a wealthy guy, so he sits him up in a flowing station, right? Everybody's happy, right? I think my father's telling me this, because this was kind of, you know, he never tried to, you know, force us into something not suitable to us, you know? The, the, um, suddenly my father comes to the factory there, you know, and one of his business friends, you know, and the guy would say, oh, see me working down there in the back, you know? We're going to get from the ground up. That's the last thing I wanted to do is spend, you know, my life and farm equipment, you know? But, uh, but, you know, if my father was willing to me, the father was a son, right? Rather than he was a master, a slave, you know, we want you to, you know, if I'm a lawyer, he should be a lawyer, or if I'm a doctor, he should be a doctor, or if I'm a businessman, he should be with a company or something, you know? And, uh, so that's what a good father does, right? I mean, he gives guidance, right? And, uh, but he, but the son has something to say about what he's going to do in life, right? But because of his bodily aspect, right, the emotions are not obviously fully, what, subject to reason and so on, right? And so they have to be, what, accustomed to listen to, what, to reason, right? It's interesting, when Thomas is talking about the sins of, uh, of intemperance, right? He says, uh, there's an article there, I think it's called, These Are Childish Vices? And he has good reason for calling them that, right? Because a child is not corrective, right? He's let, to go his own way, eventually he can't control the child, right? He becomes uncontrollable, right? And so if you give in, there's a word to you, you can keep the emotions, when they're moving through some kind of excess, eventually you can't, what, control them anymore, right? I used to hear about, you know, when they would convert a, uh, the prostitutes in Paris, that was kind of a standing example right now. But, you know, a lot of times these women would relax into their sins, right? And so you're so accustomed to these things, right? So Aristotle's very strong there in the ethics, right, you know? It makes a great deal of difference, right? How a person is brought up, right? It makes a great deal of difference, he says, or rather all the difference, right? As if there was very low chance for someone who was brought up, what, you know, let's go wild, you know, in these, uh, families now where they don't have a father, and so on, right? My father would come home, and if I'd been misbehaving, you know, say, you sit in that chair, now you don't get out of that chair. My mother, I sit there, I don't, you know? And my mother, you know, would marvel at my father's, you know, command, right? You know? It goes back to what Anxiety says, right? You know, the ruler has to be in some way separate from what he rules, right? So the parents try to join the kids and be a playmate, you know, and all that, that's not, they lose their authority, right? But, you know, the truth is, on the emotions here, is a key thing for understanding music, and for understanding fiction, and for understanding rhetoric, right? But, in this context, for understanding moral theology. And, of course, you know, the old, we'll meet the four cardinal virtues, for example, that's a common thing, right? And you said temperance, and fortitude, or courage, and justice, and prudence, right? But, you know, the four different powers of the soul, right? So prudence is in the reason, and justice in the will, and courage in the irascible, and then temperance in the concupisal, right? It kind of is a kind of, the anchor is there, you know, in the soul, right? So you want to see that there's, you know, the general thing here, without getting too concerned here about all the detail about the bodily change, right? But that there is definitely a bodily change associated with these emotions. And it's very obvious in the case of anger and emotions like this, you know, with the bodily change, just to some extent, right? Anger and fear and so on. So you might have to talk about that bodily change. Okay, a little break now, or am I too? I'll set up the great thing, okay. To the fourth one proceeds thus, it seems that fear impedes operation. For operation is most of all impeded in the disturbance of reason, right? Which directs us in our doings, huh? But fear disturbs reason, as has been said. Therefore, fear impedes operation. Moreover, those who do something with fear more easily fail in what they're doing, huh? Just as if someone is upon a beam, right? Posited on height, right, huh? On account of fear of easily falling, right, huh? But he would not fall if he, what? Went upon the same beam, laid down on the ground, right? And then opposed it to him, right? On account of the defect of fear, right, huh? So, therefore, fear impedes, what? Operation, right? In our backyard there, you know, my father put up a kind of a wooden fence, right? I mean, there was a wire there in between, but the thing was about that wide, you know, and we as kids, we'd get to walk along that thing, you know. Okay? It was a lot of fun, you know. And, you know, about this height off the ground or something, you know, about that height. But if that was between, you know, two skyscrapers in New York, you know, and you'd try to walk across there, you know, you'd probably fall off. You'd get so frightened, right? That's a good way of saying it impedes operation, right, huh? It's all because of your fear, right? And I've seen sometimes, you see on TV or something, you know, the guy walking between the two buildings, you know, and my wife and I can watch the thing, you know. And I can watch it, I mean, but, I mean, I just didn't even want to do it. Moreover, what, laziness, I guess, the Greek sea of laziness, right? There's a certain species of fear, but laziness impedes operation, right, huh? Therefore, also fear does, right, huh? But against us is what the apostle says, well, that's St. Paul, right? He's called the apostle by? Yeah, yeah. Ian and Peter. Against us is what the apostle says in the Epistle to the Philippians, chapter 2. Work out your salvation with, what, fear and trembling, huh? You don't hear that? Trouble, huh. Yeah, you don't hear that much very often in... Well, this one. So you get that, you see, unfortunately, the word tremor, right? Yeah. It's right there in St. Paul, right? Okay. I answer it should be said that the operation of, the exterior operation of man is caused by the soul as from a first, what? Mover. But from the bodily members as from, what? Instruments, huh? Or tools. Now, it can happen that an operation is impeded both in account of the defect of the instrument or tool and in account of the defect of the chief mover. Now, on the side of the bodily instruments or tools, fear, as such, huh, is always apt to, what? Impede the operation on account of the defect of, what? Heat, right? Which defect happens from fear in the exterior, what? Memories, right, huh? And what was I hearing about that, some pianist there, he had the, he was so rattled, making his performance for some big event that he had to add it taped in or something, you know? He said, he's afraid, right? He's going to make a mistake, right? The building was cold and so... So he was taped in? Yeah, yeah. What did he have taped in? He played in the piano, right? Oh, he had it taped in? Yeah, yeah, yeah. Or edited, yeah. Or did he play it and then he later on, when they were going to release it, you know, he had it edited, you know, so he had all the right notes, you know? But because of the lack of temperature in there and the fear, so... I just have to read it somewhere, I forget these things. But on the part of the soul, if the fear is, what? Moderate, right? Or moderate it, right? It does not much disturb what reason, right, huh? And then it confers to operating well, right? So as I say, even the sporting events, right, huh? A little bit of fear that you might lose to this other team, right, huh? You've got to play your best and you've got to take advantage of the opportunities that arise in the game and so on, right, huh? It confers to bene operando, right? It's not excessive fear, right? Insofar as the little moderate fear causes a certain solicitude, right? And makes a man more attentively take counsel and to operate more intensely, right? More attentively. But if the fear increases to such a great extent that it disturbs reason, it impedes the operation even on the part of the, what? Soul. But about such a fear, the apostle is not, what? Speaking, right, huh? Okay? They say the same thing is true about philosophy, right? If you had such a fear of being mistaken that you don't use your reason at all because you think you might make a mistake, well, then that's not going to be good, right? But a moderate fear, right, of making a mistake, right, will make you use your reason more, what? Carefully, yeah. Hmm? Can I ask a question? Sure. Well, the part of this will appear to be moderate without much disturbance of reason conduces to working well. Someplace else, does he discuss that? Yeah. Well, it's been true in general about the emotions, right? That if they're moderate, they don't disturb reason that much, right? But in excess of a very strong emotion, right? Will, right? You can see that, even with anger, you might say that, right, huh? Very strong anger really doesn't impede reason, right? But a little bit of anger doesn't do that. Okay. You're talking about Pope Benedict there, you know? Kind of very mild man, right? But a couple places where he went, you know, they had somebody, you know, kind of act against him, right? You know, he can be very strong, apparently, but he has to be, right? Okay. You mean the cardinal of the wrestling? Yeah, yeah. Or even when he was Pope. Yeah. And to this is clearly the response to the first one, right, huh? That said about excessive anger. I mean, if you read it. Now, those who fall from the, what, beam placed on high suffer a disturbance in imagination on account of the, what, fear of a fall imagined, right? You see how that is, right? The imagination, that's right. So it's more of the imagination rather than the fear? Well, the fear because of the imagination, right? Okay, okay. I don't think the objection. No. What about this thing? Everyone fearing refuses that which he fears, and only flees from that which he fears. And therefore, since laziness is a fear about the operation, right? Doing a little bit of work, right? Insofar as it's laborious, it impedes the operation, right? Because it draws the will from it. But fear which is about other things, to that extent, aids the operation insofar as it inclines the will to doing those things through which man flees that which he, what? Fears. Fears, huh? So sometimes I'm reading it there. Thomas said this is a difficult thing to absorb this chapter, right? So I'll read through it today, right? Then tomorrow I'll do it again. My little fear, right? That might not, you know, be up to pretty absorbing it today, right? But I'll familiarize myself with the text nevertheless, right? Leave until tomorrow, you know, my full digestion of the text, right? Sleep on it. Yeah, sleep on it, yeah. Sometimes you wake up and get the solution, right? Wake up this morning when you see your mind works. I don't know. Mm-hmm. Have you got time to do a little audacity or not? Four articles. Then we're not to consider about audacity, right? Now, how do you translate your text there? Sometimes you translate boldness, huh? Yeah. Boldness is also the way they translate it sometimes. Once the Indiana is always concerned about audacity and thinking, right? About this, four things are asked. Whether audacity is contrary to, or boldness is contrary to fear. Second, in what way does audacity have itself to, what? Hope, right? There's a connection there, too. And then, about the cause of audacity and about its, what? Effect, huh? To the first, then, one goes forward thus. It seems that audacity is not contrary to fear. For Augustine says in the book of the 83 questions that audacity is a, what? A vice, right? But vice is, what? Opposed to virtue, right? Since, therefore, fear is not a virtue, but a passion, it seems that to fear is not, what? Contrary audacity, right? Well, that reminds me as a kid there where you, sometimes you give, what? Anger is a vice or a sin, right? We've got to be careful about that, right? Because even our Lord is angry, right? In some of the passages in the Gospel, right? So you've got to be aware of how the words are used sometimes here, right? More to one thing, one is contrary. That's the famous thing that Socrates says, right? In Plato and Aristotle. Because they say contraries are, what? These species that are furthest apart in the same genus. Well, on a line, you know, how many points can be furthest apart? Just the end points, right? There can be many points that are the same distance apart, but only two can be the furthest apart, right? Like black and white in color, right? But to fear is contrary hope. And I talked about my own thinking there about what comedy, right? I said, well, comedy is the contrary of what? Tragedy. So, if what? Yeah, then comedy should be boldness, right? But there's not to be hope, right? But hope seems to be in some way contrary too, right? Okay. Therefore, if hope is contrary to fear, of course, people send us both that thing, you know, they have hope and they fear, right? They seem to be contrary in some way, right? Therefore, it's not contrary to without absentee. Moreover, each passion excludes the opposite passion, right? But that which is excluded by fear is, what? Security, right? As Augustine says in the second book of Confessions, that fear gives us, what? Warning against security. Security is mortal's chiefest enemy, as Shakespeare says. Therefore, security is contrary to, what? Fear. Therefore, not audacity. But against all this is what the philosopher says in the second book of the Rhetoric, that audacia est timore contraria, that audacity or boldness is contrary to what? Fear, huh? Well, I answer it, Thomas says, huh? It ought to be said that it's of the ratio or the definition of contraries that they most of all are distant from each other, right, huh? As is said in the tenth book of the Metaphysics. That's the book on the one and the many, right? And that's where you take up contrariety. Now that which most of all is distant from fear is, what? Audacity, right? For fear refuses or flees from the, what? Future harmful thing, right? On account of its victory over, what? The one fearing, right? But audacity or boldness, huh? Approaches, right? The imminent, what? Danger. On account of, what? Its victory over the danger, what it thinks will be a victory over the danger, right, huh? David, of course, did something else, right? But he went boldly against David, right, huh? Like David had some fear, right? And he might not win. Whence manifestly to fear is contrary, what? To audacity, right, huh? So the one leads you to, what? Run away from something where you think you might be, what? Overcome. And my boldness makes you push it with the view that you're going to, what? Many vidivici, you know? I've overcome, right? Shakespeare translated that, I came, I saw, I overcame, right? So there's a little bit of, you can't translate exactly that, the brevity of the great Caesar, but you need to be changed. That's boldness, right? Of course, Washington Irving describes the boldness of some of these Spanish captains, right? Something. Even in a great deal of number, right? To the first effort should be said, huh? That anger and boldness and the names, now we're talking about the names, the names of all the passions, right, can be taken in two ways, right, huh? In one way, according as they imply absolutely, the emotion of the sense-desiring power to some object or in some object that is good or, what, bad, and thus they are the names of passions. In another way, according as at the same time, with this motion, they imply a recess from the order of, what, reason. And thus they are names of vices. So I'll give you an example from my own upbringing yet, you know, in the catechism, anger was given as a, what, as a vice, right? But then in the Gospels, you know, there are a few places where Christ is angry, right, with the hardness of the Jews. Yeah. Yeah. And he's spoken as being angry there, right, in the text. Well, I mean, obviously there's a different meaning here of the word, what? Anger. Anger, right, huh? And Augustine is speaking in this way about audacity, right, huh? And Augustine, you'll probably speak about it, right? Audacity in a philosopher. But we now speak about audacity according to the first mode, right? Notice how he orders that objection first. It's not maybe the most important objection, but it's an objection that's based upon the meaning of the word, and unless you're using the word in the same meaning, you're going to be all messed up in your understanding of the matter, huh? Now, what about it being contrary to hope, right? Well, this is interesting what Thomas says here. To the second should be said that to one thing, by the same, there are not, what? According to the same, there are not many, what? Contraries. But according to diverse things, nothing prevents many things being contrary to one thing. This is just that he goes this far, right? And thus it has been said above that the passions of the irascible have a twofold, what? Contrary. One, according to the opposition of good and bad, right? And thus fear is contrary to hope. Because hope is about the good and fear about the bad, right? But in another way, according to the opposition of approach and recess from something, right? And thus fear is contrary audacity. And to hope is what? Desperation, right? So that's interesting what he says there, right? So he's speaking of a twofold contrary to it, right? That's interesting. I was telling you how when I was trying to understand comedy, I was trying to find the contrary of fear, right? And I thought it was boldness, which is in one way, right? But comedy is not so much concerned with boldness as it is with hope, right? I was telling you, I was reading this book on the, was it Terence's comedies? And the guy, you know, translated, oh, Terence's comedies, I guess, have come down to us and talking about them. And then he was quoting that, what? You know, Faith, Hope, and Charity from St. Paul. But he's kind of changed the meaning of it there. He's saying, but in comedy, it's not charity, it's hope. You know, but it stood out for him, right? That hope is what, you know, is being implicated in these, what? Or being moved in these comedies of Terence, right? So, I gradually saw the point, right? I was influenced a lot by, Tommy's pointing out, that the principal fashions are, what? Joy and sadness and fear and hope, right? And so the two principal forms of fiction, tragedy and comedy, right? Which, other ones seem to be kind of, you know, between those two, right? The two principal kinds are going to be concerned with the principal, what? Passions, right? And so comedies with hope and mirth, which is a kind of joy, and tragedy with pity, which is a kind of sadness and, what? Fear, right? So the principal forms of fiction, happens with the principal passions, mainly. Comedy's also trying to purge melancholy, right? But that's a kind of sadness, which is a principal passion, too. Okay. That's a beautiful thing that's happening there, right? But between, say, love and hate, you used to have one contrariety, it would seem, right? To the third, it should be said that security does not signify something, what? Contrary to fear, but only the, what? Yeah. It's a lack of fear, right? But it's not another emotion, right? For that man is said to be secure, who does not, what? Fear, right? When security is opposed to fear, as a, what? Privation, right? But audacity, as a, what? Contrary. So contraries are, what? Forms that are furthest apart, right? Species that are furthest apart. Privation is the, what? Lack of a form, right? And just as the contrary includes in itself privation, advice implies the lack of, what? Virtue, right? But advice is not simply the lack of virtue, right? Advice is a real habit, right? A real inclination to do what you shouldn't do, right? So audacity includes, what? Security. Yeah, that's a very important distinction, now, that they make between the contrary and the lack, right? So I used to say, you know, which is easier to convince to vote for your candidate? Someone who's supporting the opposite candidate, or someone who hasn't met up his mind yet? See? Because the one guy simply really lacks, right? Conviction, you should vote for your candidate, right? The other guy has a real conviction, you should vote for the other guy. You see? Or I said, you know, what's the difference between someone who doesn't know, say, a theorem of geometry or some other science, and someone who has a false opinion about the matter? And he's going to resist you more, right? And which is easier to bring up to be, say, tempered or, let's say, chaste, right? The little boy or girl who has neither the virtue nor the vice, but lacks both of them, right? Or someone who's acquired the opposite of the vice now, but they're going to resist you, right? In a way the other person will not, right? So you see the difference there between the contrary and the lack, right? So at least he had a joke there when I was teaching. And a student comes in and he thinks he's a little ahead of the other students because he reads a few books or something or some articles or something on the subject, right? But usually he's picked up a number of mistakes or errors. So he'd tell them, you know, you're really further away from the truth than the students who haven't taken up the matter at all yet, you know? And it takes a while, you know? The little teacher could certainly could have had some bad teachers, you know? It took him a long time to get rid of some of these mistaken notions, right? So someone who has no opinion at all might be easier to convince, right? Than someone who has a contrary opinion. So the man has a contrary opinion and has a real opinion, right? He doesn't just lack the true opinion. He has another opinion that is, yeah. Contrarity implies... Well, you see, if I have a false opinion, I lack the true opinion, don't I? But does everyone who lacks the true opinion have the false opinion? And again, you know, a newborn baby, is he chaste? Does he have the virtue of chastity? No. No. But does he have the contrary vice? No. So you might tell my students, now it's your age. If you don't have the virtue, you've probably got the opposite vice. You don't have the virtue. You've got a real bad habit, you know? You see? What about the newborn baby has neither good nor a bad habit, right? One more article or not? I don't want you to take one more. Okay. Whether audacity follows hope, right? To the second, one proceeds thus, it seems audacity does not, what, follow hope. Now maybe this is going to touch upon, you know, how quite hope is a principle of passion, right? Rather than audacity, right, huh? For audacity or boldness is with respect to bad things and terrible things, right? As is said in the third book of the epics. But hope regards the good, as has been said above. Therefore, they have diverse objects and they're not of one order, right? Therefore, audacity doesn't follow upon, what, hope, right? Moreover, as audacity is contrary to fear, so desperation is contrary to hope. But fear doesn't follow desperation, right? Rather, desperation excludes fear, as the philosopher says in the second book of the epics. Therefore, audacity does not follow hope. Moreover, audacity intends some good, to wit, victory. But to tend in a difficult good pertains to hope. Therefore, audacity is the same thing as hope. Therefore, it does not follow to hope, right? But against this is what the philosopher says in the third book of the epics. That those who are of good hope are, what, bold, audacious, right? Therefore, it seems that audacity follows, what, hope, right? Well, Thomas says, I answer it should be said, that it has been said many times already, all of these passions of the soul pertain to the desiring power, right? Now, every emotion of the desiring power can be reduced to the pursuit or the flight of something, right? But pursuit or flight is a something both, what? Per se and what? Perachidens. That's the famous distinction, right? This distinction that Aristotle gives of one and being in the fifth book of wisdom is being per se and being perachidens. Now, perachidens can be the, what? Pursuit of something bad, right? On account of some good that is joined to it. And also, there can be flight from the bad. And also, there can be flight from the bad. And also, there can be flight from the bad. On account of some good that is joined to it. Count to something bad, what? Joined to it, right? But what is prejudice always follows that which is what? Per se. Per se, yeah. And therefore the pursuit of what? The bad follows the pursuit of what? The good, because the one is per se, and the other is what? Yeah. Just as the flight from the bad follows the flight from the good, the flight from the good follows the flight from the what? The bad. But these four things pertain to what? Four passions. For the pursuit of the good pertains to hope, the flee from the evil to bad, but the pursuit of a terrible bad thing pertains to audacity, right? That's kind of tragedy, right? The flight from the good pertains to what? Desperation. There's something unnatural about fleeing the good, right? It's something kind of unnatural to all the seeds, right? Pursuing the bad. Whence it follows that audacity follows upon the good. I mean upon hope, rather. For from this that someone hopes to overcome the terrible thing that is imminent, from this he boldly pursues it, right? So it's my hope of winning, right? It makes me, what, pursue this boldly, this thing, right? And to the fear, there follows what? Desperation, right, huh? Therefore someone despairs because he fears the difficulty which is about, what? The good hope for, right? Now it reminds me of what Thomas is saying there, you know, in his commentary on these psalms, right? You know, where sometimes he talks about, what? Fear and hope being necessary in the soul, right? We were talking before about the fear of the divine justice and the hope and the divine mercy, right? But Thomas said you have to have a certain balance between these, right? So if your fear is excessive, the fear of the divine justice, you will despair of your own salvation. But if your hope and the divine mercy, you know, he's a good guy, he's not going to put me down there. If you have this excessive hope, then you become what? Presumptial. Yeah. Just what that audacity is, right? So you can see how one kind of follows upon the other, right? Okay. This tied up with the fact that these are the principle of factions, right? And he says the first objection would follow the argument if good and bad were objects not having any order to each other, right? But because the bad has some order to the good, it is what? Posterior to the good. Just as privation is posterior to what? Habitant. So also, audacity, which pursues the bad, is after hope, which follows upon the what? Good, huh? This thing in the article. Look at the second objection again. Just as audacity is contrary to fear, so desperation to hope. But fear does not follow what? Desperation. Rather, desperation excludes fear, as the philosophy says. Therefore, audacity does not follow hope. To the second should be said that although the good is simply before the bad, nevertheless flight, per prius, right? Before is owed to the bad than it is to the what? Good, right? Just as the pursuit is before owed to the good than to the what? Yeah. Do you pursue the good or the bad? Yeah. Do you feel the good or the bad? Remember the bad, right? Per prius, right? And therefore, hope is before what? Audacity, right? Because you're pursuing the good before what? Pursuing the bad, right? So also, fear is before desperation, huh? Because fear is moving away from the bad, right? But desperation, in a sense, is giving up the what? The good, right? I despair of getting the grapes out of the fox. And just as from fear does not always what? Follow what? Desperation. But when it is what? Intense, huh? So also from hope does not always follow boldness. But it does when it is what? Vehement, huh? When it's strong, right? To the third, now, huh? He's claiming audacity is the same thing as hope, right? Okay. He says that audacity, although it is about the evil to which is joined the good of victory, according to the estimate of the, what? Estimate of the one who is bold. Nevertheless, boldness does regard the bad, right? But the good joined to it, namely the victory over it, I guess, the hope regards, right? And likewise, desperation regards the good directly, which it, what? Gives up on, right? You might say, or please. But fear regards the bad that is joined to it, huh? When, properly speaking, boldness is not a part of hope, but its effect. Just as neither is desperation a part of fear, but its, what? Effect. And encounter this also, boldness is not able to be a, what? Yeah. The same way you could say that, what? Yeah. Desperation could not be, yeah. It kind of arises, right? So it's my hope of victory, huh? I have some hope that I can win over these guys, right? I have a hope of winning, of victory. That makes me bold, right? Right, my fear of losing is so great, then I despair. When I was young there, we were in the Big Ten there in Minnesota, and the teams were in the Big Ten, and then we were going to play the Rose Bowl, right? So, I don't think we even sent out our best team, because we couldn't send the same team out twice, something like that. But anyway, they built it up in the newspapers, you know, for weeks, you know, beforehand, you know? And they're going to, you know, sink the Illinois team, and so on. Well, when they get out there, we got ahead of the game, right? And they just, you know, like these college teams, some days collapse, right? They're saying the second stringers, the third stringers, they're still beating the heck off the California team, wherever it was. We are, you know, all excited about that, you know? But, I mean, these guys, you know, they fear, and then they, well, that's how they're going to get back in the game, right? And then they just despair, you know? And even the second stringers, and the third stringers, just give a chance to beat the heck off these guys, and have part of the glory of beating the California team. That's very important, to see that hope and fear are what, I'd say they do it at all, but the, you know, the virtues are what? If you're the Lord, right? The virtues, right? Very important. Well, I guess we've got to stop right now, huh? We'll meet again next week here, I guess.