Prima Secundae
Lecture 121: Boldness and Courage: Analysis of Audacity in Danger

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Order now, whether the bold are more prompt in the beginning than in the, what, the dangers themselves, right? To the fourth one perceives thus, it seems that the bold are not more prompt in the beginning than in the dangers themselves. For trembling is caused from what? Fear, right? And fear, of course, is contrary to what? Boldness, right? But the bold, right, are sometimes, what, are afraid in the beginning, as the philosopher says in the book on, what, problems, huh? Incidentally, we don't know if that is in fact the work of the, what, the philosopher, right, huh? I was talking to Warren Murray this morning there, about something that went on in class last night, you know, and I was comparing the author of the De Phallaches, Acostum Nobidis Artistas, that's the work that's, this is Dubious Thomas, right, you know? Some people think it is, some are not. And I was comparing what he says with what Elbert the Great says there about the fallacy of simply in secundum quid, right? And the author of the De Phallaches says that we make this kind of mistake going from the, what, secundum quid to simpliciter. And Elbert the Great says we usually make this going from secundum secundum quid to simpliciter. But sometimes the reverse, right? So I was taking some examples, right, huh, with them last night. And you'll find that most examples are going from the secundum quid to simpliciter. And I used to say to my students, you know, when I was teaching an assumption, they'd say, no. I know it sounds kind of abstract to you, this kind of mistake, you know? But you're making it all day long, you know? Because you're doing something you shouldn't be doing, or you're not doing something you should be doing, right? Okay? And why do you do something you shouldn't do? Well, because in some way it's good. But simply it's bad, right? So you're going from what? Something being in some very limited way good, right, then? To saying what? It's good simply, right? Okay? You can take a very simple example, you know, delicious poison. Is it good to drink? Well, it tastes good. So in some ways it's good, right? But simply you'd say it's what? If you look at the whole picture of something bad, right, huh? Okay? But if I want to poison you, I'd probably try to, you know, get a poison that tastes good, right? Or make it taste good like good, right? And then you say, oh, yeah, I want one of these. And that finishes you off, right? Okay. Or then you don't do something you should do because in some ways it's bad, right? So I said you don't study because it prevents you from going down to the party or down the hall, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah. So in some way it's bad, right? It prevents you from going to the party, right? And there's nothing that's so good that it doesn't prevent you from doing something else that is good, right? So in some ways it's bad, right? So you're making this mistake all the time, but you're going from what? Secundum quid to sul ticiter, right? Okay. But in the Mino, when Mino says, you know, you know what happens in there? Socrates says, I don't know what virtue is. And he's maybe being ironic. He says, I don't know what virtue is, right? And Mino says, well, I don't know what virtue is, you know? And Socrates says, oh, tell me, you know? And so they have a conversation and it appears in the conversation that Mino doesn't know what virtue is either, right? Then Socrates says, let's put our heads together and try to find out what it is, right? And Mino says, well, how can we go looking for what we don't know we're looking for? Well, in a sense, he's saying that because it's what? Not known, simply, therefore, it can't even be known in some way. Okay. I used to use the example to try to teach them a little bit of that. I'd say, I come into class and I say, I don't know how many students are in class today. I'm an awfully smart guy. And I know how to direct myself to what I don't know. And that way is what? Counting, right? So now I count the thing, right? And let's say I get to 23, huh? Okay. Now, how did I direct myself to 23? Because I didn't know I was looking for 23, right? I went through with an amazing facility, right? How did I do it? You know? Well, I had to have known 23 in some way. Because 23 is, in fact, the number of students in class today, right? And I knew I was looking for the number of students in class today. And that was enough to tell me to take the road of counting, right? And if they'd ask me, what is a student, I would have taken a different road. Because counting would never tell me what a student is if he was in class. Okay? So, this is in the sense of what Minou is saying, right? He's saying because we don't know something, we can't direct ourselves towards it. And therefore, we shouldn't pay somebody who's trying to find the cause of cancer or some other disease, right? Because he doesn't know he's looking for it. You know? Just by chance that he'd come across it, right? That's not true, is it? A man who's, you know, in cage should be at least a better chance of getting to the cause than someone who's just, you know, shooting the breeze, right? Okay? And bumps into him in the cause, right? So, for the most part, we're reasoning from what is so secundum quid to what is so, what? Simply, right? And, but occasionally we have reverse, right? In this example of Minou, right? So, Thomas Aquinas says that logic has what? Maximum dificultatum. The greatest difficulty, right? And that logic is the exception to the rule that you study the easy before the difficult. Because you have to learn logic pretty early to proceed well in all the parts of philosophy, so you have to learn logic early. But it's extremely difficult because you're dealing with things that are not sensible, right? Or even imaginable, right? So, in that sense, you know, geometry and even natural philosophy seems to be easier, right, than logic. But logic is something you have to learn to know the road of, the way of proceeding, the way to go. I've heard in academia people saying that logic is just, it came from dead white males, and therefore it can be bypassed, and it can be more fruitful endeavors, and it just seems like it's shooting themselves in both feet. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. The thing that's talking about the modern philosophers is that they rarely even talk, if at all hardly, about these kinds of mistakes, right? And even if you've studied these kinds of mistakes, and to some extent learned what these kinds of mistakes are, right, you can still make that kind of mistake, right? And, but if you don't even talk about these kinds of mistakes, and try to recognize some examples of them, you know, and get some experience with these kinds of mistakes, you're bound to, like, fall into these things. And you go to the modern philosophers, and that's where it is, one after another, you know, huh? People without experience being foolishly bold, the way to harken back to the last particle. I recognize that homosexual marriage is a square circle, right? Okay, so we're up to article four here. Trembling is caused from fear, right, huh? Which is contrary to boldness. But the bold sometimes in the beginning tremble, as the philosopher says in the book of problems, it is the philosopher, right? Therefore they are more prompt in the beginning than what? And therefore they are not more prompt in the beginning, because they're trembling, right? Than in the, what? Being in the dangers themselves, right? Moreover, passion is increased by the increase of its, what? Object, right? Just as if the good is lovable, so what is more good is more lovable, right? But the difficult is a object of boldness, and therefore when you increase the arduousness, you increase the boldness. But... But... It becomes what? But when it is present, it becomes more arduous and more difficult, the danger, right? So the danger when it is present becomes more arduous and difficult. Therefore, the boldness ought to increase. Moreover, from wounds infected, anger is provoked. But anger causes what? Boldness, right? That's interesting, right? We were speaking before about hope causing boldness. Does anger cause boldness? For the philosophy says in the second book of the rhetoric that anger is what? Audacious, right? Protective of audacity. Therefore, where we are in some dangers and are struck, are rendered more what? Bold. The person in Obama's book. Once the Indian stories talk about the danger of audacity in the life of the mind. What is it that Nietzsche uses the term? Bold imagination, right? That's really the cause of error, right? Bold imagination. Daring imagination. That's really one of the volumes there of Benedict XVI there, you know, in the Gospels and so on. Great Jesus of Nazareth, right? And occasionally you get some of these, you know, opinions of the scriptural scholars, you know. There's a lot of bold imagination there. I guess, you know, in Mark and Luke, I think, Mark likes to say, they come to Christ, you know, who am I, you know. And Peter eventually says in that thing, you are the Messiah, right? But in Matthew, he says, you are the Christ, the Son of God, right? So it's a more complete profession of faith, right? And if I remember correctly, it's in, I read it after that, in Matthew, that Christ says, you know, the Lord, Peter, and upon this rock I built my church, you know. Matthew says, God has revealed this to you and so on. He didn't say that, I don't think, in Mark, right? And it's kind of appropriate, you know, that you have a complete profession of faith there, you might say, to the divinity as well as the humanity of Christ, right? Before you say, we're going to build on your faith, right, the whole church, right? And of course, the scriptural scholars say, well, Mark was the original one, right? And then later on, they started to think maybe he's divine or something like that. And that was Advent. This is bold imagination, right? They're trying to, so, you know, I hear some of these odd things that I, fortunately, never met before, you know. He mentions them as he goes along, you know, sometimes, you know. So bold imagination, huh? But against this is what is said in the third book of the ethics, that the bold, right, are, what? Flying before, I guess, right? And are willing before dangers, but in the dangers themselves, they, what, fail, right? They start to dissolve, right? Well, Thomas says, the answer should be said that boldness, since it is a certain motion of the desiring power, it follows the grasping of the, what, sensing power, the sensing, knowing power. But the sense, knowing power, right, is not, what, coletiva, right, huh? Which means bringing together, right, huh? Okay. So when you define and reason, you bring together, right, the genus and the differences to make the definition, or the major and the minor premise to make the, what, syllogism, right? Nor are the inquisitive of, what, the individual items that stand around the thing, right, huh? But it has a sudden, what, judgment, huh? Subitum dichi, huh? Now, it happens that sometimes, that according to a sudden grasp, are not able to be known, all the things which, what, bring about some difficulty and some activity, right? Whence there arises a motion of boldness to, what, approach the dangers, huh? But when one already experiences the danger, then they sense a greater, what, difficulty than they estimate. And therefore, they, what, defail, fail, right, huh? They start to weaken, huh? But reason, what, disgusts, right? All the things which bring some, what, difficulty to the negotiation, to the activity. And therefore, the, what, brave, who from the judgment of reason into some dangerous things, in the beginning seem to be more, what, remits, right? Because not, what, I suppose, passionate, right, huh? But with the deliberation that is due to the thing, right? They, what, approach, right? Agree to enter, right? But when they are in the dangers themselves, they do not experience something that was unforeseen, right? But sometimes they are less than the things that they had, what, taken into account, right? Because they're talking about things that could happen and so on, right? And therefore, they persist more, right, huh? Or also, because on account of the good of, what, virtue itself, they take up dangerous things, right? And that the will of the good in them perseveres, right? No matter how great are the, what, the dangers, right? But the bold, on account of their guests only, right, making hope and excluding fear. So when they get into the thing and something they didn't foresee takes place, right? Then they, what, panic, right? Yeah, yeah. Now, to the first about trembling. The first, therefore, it should be said that also in bold things there happens, what, trembling, right? On account of the calling back of heat from the exterior to the interior, right? That's because your life is in danger, right? So the blood is drawn back from the outside to the inside, right? That's why you have what they call the white fear, right? Why, if you're in danger of being embarrassed, right, huh? Which is an exterior thing, right? Then the blood bursts out to the thing and my face gets all red and I'm embarrassed, right? So, but in the bold, the, what, heat is called back, right, to the heart. And in those fearing, it descends to, what, the lower parts, right? I talked about that before, huh? Now, what about this subjection here? To the second it should be said, huh? That the object of love is simply the, what? Good. Whence being increased, meaning being a greater good, right, huh? Simply, it increases the, what, love, huh? So if I love something because it's beautiful and you make it more beautiful, well, I love it even more, right? Okay. But the object of boldness is composed from the... good and the bad right and the motion of boldness in the bad presupposes the motion of hope in the what good and therefore if so much is added of difficulty to the danger that it exceeds hope there does not follow a motion of audacity but a what diminishing of it right but if there is what nevertheless the emotion of boldness the more there is danger the more what the boldness is what regarded right then you have shakespeare saying that right including somebody saying you i'm all numbered by the french order it is right you know well then all the more should be your what boldness right and all the more should be your rising to the occasion right and that team is better than our team now they're really good let's watch them out there you know and then you gotta play all the better right yeah you know rise up more effort right now to third should be said that from an injury is not caused anger unless there is some what hope as will be said below in the treatise on anger right and therefore if there is such so great a danger that exceeds the hope of victory there does not follow what anger right but it does but it is true that if anger follows right then boldness will be increased right so if i get angry with you i'll be probably bolder right unless i lose hope of binging myself right you know now with boldness um it exists in passion but it also exists in the world i suppose yeah yeah yeah maybe the equivocal of the word right yeah you have to bother because when he talks about reason um and thinking up with the dangers and thinking about them and thinking about what can happen um and going into the danger like that it seems it's approaching more with the will and reason rather than simply you know yeah it's talking more about virtue right but but it the virtue of courage say though is is is in the body right but it's partaking of reason right there's something of it's listening to reason right i see you see i see it's talking about i see in the one case it's not about the passion and it's not about the perfection yeah yeah it's at the beginning of the nicomachian ethics there still talk about you know the the part of the soul that is reason itself right and then the part that is not reason and then you may subdivide that into one part that can listen to reason right and the other cannot yeah yeah and that's what uh you know more virtue really is right it's partaking of reason the actions yeah or even the will right justice it's almost like saying you know what is essentially rational is more rational than what is rational participation right but you know if you listen to mozart's music right that's the best example we have of the truth the best sign of the truth that the emotions can partake of what reason right it's funny that i was i was um curious about corelli a bit you know and i have almost all corelli's music right so i was looking up on the thing i think it must be a little more about corelli you know and uh so i typed in my corelli you know and it comes up all these things you know we keep what's the thing yeah i said well i'll skip to that if i can get it more reliable so i went to another one there and it's really you know uh they're just into this baroque uh treasures they have there right and so they're beautiful really beautiful the pictures you have sometimes in there but you go to one of them and uh they've got uh you know view of the whole baroque period you know starting with jeremy gointin and so on give the whole history of it and then they had one where they had all the principal baroque composers and i hit upon them with the corelli you see one of the principal ones but they have you know corelli and bach and handle and so on all the great kinds of them but even geminiani people have storage you know and um they have a um a little biographical sketch of them you know and then they have some little snippets from his pieces right then they have another one but they actually have whole pieces right and you know beautiful beautiful things set up you know because a lot of the free music you don't know but the baroque represents the emotions right uh sharing and reason right and mozart's music is the same and so you realize that you know there's something real to what played on aristotle said that there was a part of the soul there a particular reason right but i remember when i was first you know listening intensely the music of mozart and i'd come in and talk about it with my teacher historic you know and say dwayne you think that's more understandable than it is right you know because you know the music um sounds reasonable but you can't exactly see what the reason is right you know what i mean um seven very general terms right you realize that it's reasonable by participation right it's not it's not thought right but it's partaking of thought of reason and that's why i think you know um i'm very suspicious of a philosopher who doesn't like mozart and the baroque right and um you know i remember seeing an article in the wister paper there about some professor philosophy at clark university and he's all into jazz so he can't be a good matt portico's church house there you know he's got one of mozart's piano concertos on you know and so uh and uh he kind of thought once i was a separated substance he'd say you know get a jelly doctor of music so to speak and uh the material and the same opinion you know and so on but uh but uh you know violence music is of course you know very irrational right and it moves people to to all the irrational action and uh i remember when my cousin was in the navy there right and it was down in newport where at that time you still had a navy base there in newport and uh those were the time of rock and rolls we'd keep going you know and then we played this crazy rock and roll thing and the people were picking up these clapable chairs and oh you'd never get into one of these you know those chairs would fold up you'd like you know you're fighting those things well you know you would never uh and then sometimes you see these riots at these rock concerts too you know but it's not making people reasonable right it's making them unreasonable and uh it was um jewish pearl stern his parents were in the music they're used to german they love music and he mentioned in his biography autobiography how when they came out of a mozart concert they were full of this energy and joy and they felt strength and they came out of a wild vodner concert they were like drained they felt drained and then yeah it was very striking to see that they you know how their lives my teacher sorry to say you know the romantic music it tears you out he says did you know that carl stern was a professor of and inspiration to uh bernard hathenson uh and uh i often think a little bit though what aristotle says when he's comparing or contrasting reason with the senses right and the way in which they're being acted upon by their object right and the senses because they are in a bodily organ right when they're acted upon by an object that is too strong they're kind of what weakened right and so you know if you taste something you know it's very hot That, you know, can't taste anything afterwards for a while, right? And, you know, if somebody shines a bright light on you on your face, you're kind of, you know, blinded, right? And, but he says, in the case of reason, you understand something very understandable. You turn to something less understandable, you can understand it better, right? And you can apply that even to going from, what, philosophy, good philosophy, to music, right? You can recognize a music that is reasonable, right? If you have considered things that are very reasonable, right? And so, when I had Clark, there was, he listened to jazz, right? Now, I know other philosophers who are into jazz, that's their thing, you know? They're not, I know right away, not philosophers, right? So, I mean, you need to be somebody for a position, an assumption, you know? You know, I got this question, how can I listen to it? You know, it's kind of like something I tell you, didn't it? I used to always ask, you know, also whether you know, do you prefer a beer or wine, you know? The guy prefers beer, but then there's something wrong. It's not true. I also, you know, coffee or tea, that is where you get them. But, I used to joke, you know, it's, you know, Higgler drank, you know, coffee, you know, you know, a great excess, you know, huh? It gets them going, you know, like that, you know? Kind of the practical man that gets going by coffee, right? It's the name of the coffee place there, you know? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? Starbill's? 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But, you know, Aristotle, you know, when he reads the guys before him, right, he reads them very carefully, right, and he recalls what they said, right, and if he disagrees with it, you know, he gives a reason why he disagrees with it, and if he brings out their reason, you know, why they thought what they did, he'll answer that argument, you know, that they have, right? In the beginning, he gave you the physics there, you know, he disagrees with Malises and so on, and he considers both the falseness of their position and the reason they gave for it, why it's not good what the defect of reason is, and come on, falseness, don't do it at all. They hardly even recall that their predecessors said something different than what they're saying, let alone they don't recall the reason they gave what they said, they don't give a reason against the position of the ordinary thinkers, or make any attempt to show away the argument that they gave, you know. As Thomas said about the Latin, they speak as if wisdom began with them, right? In Berkeley, you know, that's a kind of illusion, he's talking about the difficulty their mind has, and he says in the Principia, he says, some say it's due to the obscurity of things, or the weakness of our mind, but I think it is because we insist upon certain principles we shouldn't insist upon. Well, Aristotle, he talks about the difficulty in knowing, right? He says sometimes it's on the side of what we're trying to know, right? Sometimes it's on the side of our, what? Mind, right? So the difficulty in knowing what motion is, or what time is, or what matter is, is a difficulty due to the thing itself, right? Because motion, because motion, and time, and even matter, hardly exist, right? The difficulty in knowing God, Aristotle says, is an account of weakness of our mind, right? He's too knowable for our mind. And when Thomas, you know, comments in that text, he says, well, a difficulty can be either due to the object or to the doer, right? And you can apply this to other things besides knowing, right? So you see, some things are difficult to love, right? And some, you know, are difficult to love because they're not very good. So I used to take, you know, an obvious example. It's difficult to love cancer, you know? Is that a fault in your heart that you just can't love it? You have no love for it, you know? There are the difficulties, because the object, right? But now, it's difficult to love the common good, you know? Difficult to love God, right? And these things are very good, right? God is most good, right? But then the difficulty must be in you, you know? So that's a beautiful distinction, right? But how you lose to it, you know, some of the thought, you know, that there's difficulty due to the obscurity of things and the weakness of our mind. But I think, I think it's something, that there's some principles we insisted upon, right? God said, well, if we insist upon certain principles we should not have insisted upon, isn't that a sign of weakness of our mind? You know? He doesn't realize right away there's something questionable about the way it's proceeding, right? But he's not really recalling why Aristotle said this, right? Because he's giving any reason against that being the cause of, what? Our error, right? And if you have a hard time lifting something, right, then, it can be because the thing is too heavy or because you are, what? Too heavy. Palsy of old age. Right, right. You know? So I'm not as good now at lifting heavy things as I was when I was younger, right, huh? Don't like going around with suitcases there in the airport or something. Things would have maybe bothered me when I was, you know, 20 years younger or something, you know? So that's really a fundamental distinction, you know, because in the object or in the, you know, if we turn the lights off here, you know, and try to get a little dark in here, I'd have a hard time, what, seeing you, right? But then the difficulty would be in, what? The thing. And there's a, what? Not much light, right? You see? But if you, you know, put one of these lights right in front of me, you know, like this, you know, I wouldn't even know who's interrogating me, right? You know, I think a bunch of people. And we say, well, if it's light that makes things visible, right, then it's due to the weakness of my mind that I can't stand this bright light, huh? That's what the moderns do, right, you see? You know, Satyanyi, on a moment of truthfulness, said, today, he says, we no longer bother to refute our predecessors. We just wave them goodbye. Well, even, you know, even Rush Limbaugh, you know, a little philosopher, right, but, you know, he's thinking very nicely of the new pope, right? And, you know, how people don't want to consider the reasons for, you know, being opposed to abortion, being opposed to contraception, being opposed to homosexual marriage, right, and so on. You know, that's the past, right, you know? And, you know, how are they going to feel to young people now who are all in favor of these things, you know, but no longer bother to refute our predecessors and just wave them goodbye? That's the past. It's, who is it in Shakespeare's Troyes and Cressida, right, you know? That's the best criticism of fashion, of course, of fashion, right? It would be a beautiful fashion and endangered, right? Was it Lennon said, well, if our theories don't meet the facts, it's just too bad for the facts. The thing I always noticed when I studied a modern philosopher, I never had the impression that I was learning about things for him, you know? I'm learning about him, right? You know? Well, when I read Euclid, you know, I think I'm really learning about angles and figures and things and very interesting things, right? And when I read Aristotle, I'm learning about whatever he's talking about, right? But when I read Kant or Barclay or Hegel, you know, I'm learning about what he thought, you know, but not about things at all. I still have an impression that you're doing that, right? I mean, when I read it, you know, a good modern scientist, I have an impression I'm learning something about things, right? He's teaching me some things about things that I didn't know about, you know? And Mathieu, La Lumière, you know, it's a beautiful little book, Mathieu, La Lumière, Matter and Light. But I don't have an impression of the modern classes at all. That's like all the end of the class. Really? I saw a little text there from the new Pope, you know, huh? There's some publication, you know, and one of my sources there, you know, who my wife sent it to us. And it's kind of interesting, you know? He's talking about this wonder, you know? And wonders being, you know, beginning. But, you know, I find more wonder than modern scientists like Heisenberg, you know, and so on. And then I do the modern philosophers, right? And then I go. The Greeks are much closer to the modern scientists. The modern scientists are closer to the Greeks, you know, than the modern philosophers, right? It's very, very strange stuff. It's a huge problem where you have a culture where young people are, they're schooled, but they're not educated. Yeah. And so they're sort of educated in unreality or schooled in unreality. And how do you turn the tide back to the right reason? Okay. Okay. Okay.