Prima Secundae
Lecture 123: The Nature of Anger: Objects, Powers, and Reason

Transcript
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And I taught St. Mary's, we had, you know, one of these Hungarian freedom fighters, you know, that was staying there, and they were really, you know... Close to despair? Yeah, yeah. Yeah, because they were like, what's the chance of being here? And what she was talking about, after the pull of the Soviet Union, he said, well, one of the reasons for the dysfunctions there, is because, imagine yourself getting locked in a room with somebody who's severely emotionally disturbed, violently, so, you catch really what they're going to do. You're constantly on edge, on eggshells, walking on eggshells, and then you're freed up from that, to live your own life that way, so how are you going to do that at least in the short term? And Shakespeare's narrative pull in The Rape Book of Greece, right, huh, leads to the banishment at the end of, what, Tarquin, right, who's committed the evil deed, right, huh, but it's the anger that is aroused because she kills herself, right? You know, it's a famous story there in Roman history, I guess, right? But Shakespeare has it in the great narrative pull. Okay, the second one goes forward thus, it seems that the object of anger is something, what, bad, huh? For Gregory Nyssa, who's actually, what, Gregory Nyssa, as they say in my foot, though, take the word for it, so Thomas is deceived by the fallacy of the equivocation. Equivocation. Oh, Gregory. Yeah. But it's a word equivocal by chance, right? He's not taken in by those words equivocal by reason. Most people fallacy of the equivocation. For Gregory, something like that, says that anger is, as it were, the, what? The armor bearer or something? Yes, of concubiscence, huh? Like a soldier, right, insofar as it fights against that which impedes concubiscence, huh? But every impediment has the notion of something, what? Bad. Therefore, anger regards, what, the bad as an object, right, huh? So Aristotle says the animals fight over food and sex, right, huh? So some other animals, you know, preventing them from enjoying their own food or their own mate, then they get in fights. They get angry, yeah. So they can enjoy their mate or their food at their own leisure, right, huh? Moreover, anger and hate come together in their effect. Because for both of them, it belongs to what? Being harmed to another. Being harmed to another. But hate, obviously, regards the bad as an object, right? Therefore, also what? Anger. Yeah. So the man who hates somebody harms him, right? And the man who's angry harms him, right? Moreover, anger is caused from what? Sadness. Sadness. Whence the philosopher says in the 7th Book of the Ethics that anger operates with sadness, huh? Okay? But the object of sadness is something bad, right? Therefore, also, anger, right? But against this is what Augustine, huh, says in the 2nd Book of the Confections. That anger desires revenge. There's something to define anger as the desire for revenge, huh? Okay. But the desire for revenge is the desire for the good, huh? Hmm. Hmm. Because Vindicta pertains to what? Justice. Yeah. So the guy's talking about the little boy next door comes over to his house there, and there's a nice plant there, you know? There's a nice plant there, you know? On the back there, on the end of the woodwork deer. He looks at the guy, and he pushes it off, and falls around and smashes, right? He's got the kid. He doesn't need a kid like that, right? Yeah. Yeah. He deserves a little punishment, right? Yeah. Yeah. He deserves a little punishment, right? He gets something, right? Yeah. He gets something, right? I think of a little kid that was here one Sunday, and he wanted a glass of milk. I put it in a glass of milk, and he picks it up, boom, dropped it right on the floor, and then he looked at me and says, nobody's perfect. What'd you do? What'd you do? I said, well, let's work on being more successful. We're perfect, and clean up the mess we make. That's my best response. Yeah. With anger or not, Father. I think I controlled it pretty good. He's a sweet child, and I didn't want to overwhelm him with sorrow. So I said, well, let's work on being more perfect. Induce him with sweetness. Father Michael later had to clean the entire toilet. Now, keep going. More of our anger is always with hope, huh? Whence it causes what? Pleasure in you. As the philosopher says, they say, I'm going to write it. Because they quote the Greek poet, you know, how delish that is to get revenge, you know? And sometimes, you know, some forms of fiction, too. You know, you represent, you know, somebody who wanted to get revenge. The whole movie or something, the whole play, the thing it's about. I know a real story. I saw this guy when I was in Chicago a year and a half ago. I saw this guy on television. He was some wicked murderer. He had murdered a bunch of people. They talk about somebody he murdered in prison he met that was like a child abuser or something. And he talked about how he stabbed him and how he liked it. I mean, he was like, he was enjoying it all over and just telling it. Yeah. But that's, anyway, that's a strange kind of point. Okay, so anger is always with hope. Whence it causes pleasure, as the philosopher says, right? The same with the rhetoric. But the object of hope and pleasure is something good. Therefore, also anger, right? Well, what does Thomas say? He says that the motion of the desiring power, right? You know, some of you use the term potencia here, use the word virtutis, right? The emotion, the appetitive power, follows the act of the grasping power, right? The knowing power, right? So oftentimes use the word apprehensivity, though, isn't it? But it has that sense of what? Yeah, you contain the thing known in the knower, right? Learning is trying to get something into your head, right? Why love is more the reverse, right? Going out to the object, huh? I left my heart in San Francisco, right? It wasn't a heart transplanted. But now the grasping power, huh? In two ways, grasps something, right? In one way, in the manner of something, what? Incomplex, huh? As when we understand what is a man, right? Now, when I was studying logic, you know, Thomas would call that simple grasping sometimes, huh? Understanding what something is, right? Okay? And that's the first act of reason, huh? And corresponds to the first part of logic, right? And the ace of goge of porphyry and the categories of Aristotle belong to the logic of that first act of reason. In another way, in the manner of something complex. We take two of these things that we've grasped in the first kind, and we put them together, right? As when you understand the man to be white, you know? White to be in a man, right? Whence, in both ways, the desiring power, since it follows upon the knowing power, right? The grasping power. Can tend into something good or, what? Bad, huh? In the manner of something simple and incomplex, when the appetite simply, what? Follows. Follows or inherits to the good or refuses the bad. And such motions are desire and, what? Hope. Pleasure and sadness, and others of this sort. But in the manner of something complex, when the appetite is carried into something good or bad, when it's carried into something in which there's something good or bad, right? Either, what? What? Because it happens about another, or by tending in this, or what? We flee. Just as manifestly appears in love and hate. I haven't seen any texts in the treatise on love there. He says, He says, He says, He says, It has, in a sense, a two-fold object, right? So to love somebody is to wish good to them, right? So in a sense, there's two objects that are involved in love, right? The good that I wish to someone, and the one to whom I wish it, yeah. And therefore, they sometimes distinguish, sometimes, too, because I have the love of wishing well for the one to whom I wish some good, the good, and I have the love of wanting for the good that I wish for them, yeah. Just as manifestly appears in love and hate. For we love someone insofar as we will to him that some good be in him, right, huh? Okay, so you've got the aliquem, right, and the aliquabonum, right, in Latin here. We hate someone insofar as you wish to him to be in him something, what, bad, right, huh? And likewise, he says, in the case of what? Anger. For whoever is, what, anger, seeks to revenge, seeks to be revenged about someone or about something. And thus, the motion of anger tends in two, right, huh? To wit, in the revenge which it desires, right, and that it hopes as a certain good, right, whence it delights in it, huh? So it tends also in that about which he seeks, or about whom he seeks revenge, right? Just as in something contrary and harmful. I guess that's a person, right? That pertains to the ratio of, what, evil. So it tends towards, what, revenge, or the one one wants to have revenge on, I guess. But a two-fold difference should be noted about this, huh, in regard to anger, in regard to hate and love, right, huh? Which the first is that anger always regards, what, two objects. Love and hate sometimes regard one object only, as when someone is said to love, what, wine, or something of this sort. Right. Yeah. Like salmon. Yeah, right. Good, good example. Good example. Second is because, what? Each of the objects. That love regards. Is good. Is a good, right, huh? For he wish, the one loving wishes good to someone, as it were, being what's suitable to him, right, huh? And both of those things that hate regards has a notion of something bad, huh? For he wishes, the one hating, the bad to someone, as it were, to someone, what? As something unsuitable to him, not to that person or something. Yeah. But anger regards one object according to the notion of the good, to which, what, revenge, which it desires, huh? Because the sign of that is that when he succeeds in revenging it, then, then he has pleasure, right? You know? Right. Yeah. And another, according to the notion of the evil, to which the harming, harmful man, or harming man, right, de quo, of whom or about whom he wishes to have revenge, right? And therefore, it is a passion, quodamoda, not santichite, right? Otherwise, it wouldn't be a special passion, right? And there is a passion in some way composed from, what, contrary passions, huh? And this takes care of all the objections, Thomas says. One object is saying this object is something bad, and the other one is saying it's something good, isn't it? They said, contrary, they were talking about something good, right? And that is, so he's applying to all of them, you know, huh? Okay. So the first three objections there, they're all pointing out to something bad there, right? And the two siddh khanthras, one from Augustine, one from the philosopher, right? Indicates something good there, right? He sees an element of truth in both. So Thomas doesn't always take one side and say, that's got the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth. And the other side is all false. But sometimes he sees an element of truth on both sides, right? So if these teachers out there, TAC, are in disagreement as to whether they have an actual desire to see God, right? Maybe there is an element of truth on both sides, right? Mm-hmm. Yeah. So you can see any more easier cases, you know, I always say to the people, can you know what you don't know? Not simply, right? You can't know it fully or completely, right? But in some imperfect way, you can know it, right? It's an example I've told you this before, I think. The example I used to always give in class was, I come into class, I'd say, I don't know how many students are in class today. I didn't know, right? I am a marvelous guy, and I know how to direct myself to what I don't know. And so I count the students, and let's say I get to 23, right? Now, that's pretty simple. But how did I direct myself to 23 when I didn't know I was trying to get to 23? You knew it was a number. Yeah. See? I knew there was a number of students in class, and 23 is in fact the number, right? I didn't know 23 was the number of students in class. I knew it in some way because it is the number of students in class, isn't it? Okay. We used to take a young lady, you know, and I'd ask her, you know, this young lady's going to contradict herself. I'd say, do you know my brother Mark? And she'd say, no. And I'd say, do you know what a man is? And she'd say, yes. Do you know what a brother is? Yeah. That's where Brother Mark is. So you do know him, don't you? But notice, knowing what a man is, in some way you know every man in the world, right? But it's very imperfect in an incomplete way, right? You know him, what a brother is. You know every brother, in some way, right? But not simply, right? Yes. But the second fallacy outside of language is the fallacy of simply and not simply, right? And I pointed out in the Mino, right? In the Mino, Socrates says, I don't know what virtue is. And Mino says, well, I know what it is. And then they have a conversation, which is really an examination conversation. And it appears that Mino doesn't know what virtue is either, right? And Socrates says, let's put our heads together, right? And see if we can, you know, find out what it is, right? And Mino says, well, how can we go looking for what we don't know? And if that objection was the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, then there'd be no art of logic, right? And no art of accounting and calculating. Because these two arts are arts for coming to know what you don't know. Yeah, yeah. But there's a way to, you know, calculate what you don't know, right? Income tax time, right? You know? I don't know what I owe or don't owe, or what they owe me, or what? But there are ways to find out. Wait till after April 15th, you'll find out. I'm knocking on your door, I'll tell you. That's from Greek logic. Were there other cultures that had an approximation of logic, some form? Well, I think they had more, the Greeks had logike, which we call logic, and then logistike, which doesn't mean logistics, but it means the art of counting and calculating, right? So those are the two main arts, general arts, for finding what you don't know, right? But if somebody asked me, you know, what is a student instead of how many students there are, I would have taken the art of logic, right? They would say, well, we've got to find out what the genius is now, and the differences of student and so on, right? There is a path to, you know, come to finding what's more difficult than a number and so on, but there's an art, right? So, it is. I think it's marvelous what Plato has done, right, I mean, genius, genius, that the objection that begins the second part of the dialogue is an objection to even being logic, and so the resolution of that objection, right, is discovering the beginning of logic, right, there's a way of directing yourself to what you don't know, to what you do know, right? So where science, under Christian tutelage, you could say really developed in a form, a more mature form than the sort of nascent form that the Greeks had, and you compare that achievement culturally with other civilizations which didn't have it, who did not have the concept that the natural world was knowable, they thought of it as being arbitrary, either because Allah was arbitrary or because the gods were arbitrary, yeah, yeah. Now, the first person to really say we needed the art of logic, in my knowledge, is in Plato, or Socrates, rather, in the Phaedo, right, where he says we need an art about arguments, right, an art that would tell us the difference between a good argument and a bad argument, right, and among good arguments, between one that is certain and one that's only, what, probable, right, and that's basically the way Aristotle, who's called the father of logic, right, the art of arguments is divided into those three parts, right, so the prior and the posterior analytics are about an argument you can trust completely, the book about places, called Topics in English, is the arguments you can trust up to a point, right, and the little part about arguments in the rhetoric, too, but less trustworthy than the ones in the dialectic, and then the one that I'm doing on Wednesday nights with these students, since gravitation is about arguments you can't trust at all, right, you know, see, but Socrates makes a beautiful comparison, he says, arguments are like men, right, there are few men you can trust completely, I suppose you can trust Pope Francis with your daughter, right, right, but most men, he says, there are few men you can trust completely, but some men you can trust up to a point, some more, some less, right, and some men you can't trust at all, right, if you can't tell these apart, you're very naive, right, and I tell the girls in particular, there's very few men you can trust completely, most men you can trust up to a point, and some men you can't trust at all, but you must know that if you've got any smarts, right, well, that's what Socrates says, you know, if we don't know arguments, we're going to trust an argument we shouldn't trust, or trust an argument more than we should, right, or trust an argument we shouldn't trust at all, right, and so, that's the first saying we need a technique, he says, the Greek says technique peri lobus, an art about arguments. And this really well applies to sources of information of historians or writers, some you can trust greatly, totally, just about others, partially, and then some you just know you don't trust at all, newspapers, too. Well, there's always an element, as St. Augustine points it out, history is something that, there's various kinds of knowledge, things that we believe, and later come to understand, like when you learn your ABCs, you just believe your teacher, until later you begin to understand our language and writing and all the rest. Some things we believe, among other things he says, but there's one thing that we believe and will never understand, and that's history, because I'll never be at the Battle of Gettysburg, I have to take somebody else's word for it. And that's always a dicey situation, because if I read any historian, other than an eyewitness, even an eyewitness, I can only trust so much, because he only sees and knows so much. But anybody other than the eyewitnesses, it's already, it's already, you know, a lot of conjecture. So, that's where history is a little different than this, because this is something that's just based on one reason, it's very definite. And history is, well, you rely on somebody's word for it, who has a lot of other influences in there. Whether, even if he's a good and honorable man, just his ignorance makes it play into itself. Anyway. I think he's seen a part. He's also seen a part. Yeah, exactly. So, you know, we know that George Washington was the first president, right? Yeah. Or as Chesterton says in the beginning of his autobiography, he takes it on his credulous nature, he takes it on faith that he was born on such and such a day, such and such time, because he wasn't exactly cognizant of what happened. He doesn't take somebody's word for it. That's what Gus and Desmond thinks on the utility of bleeding, right? That you believe that your parents, those are your parents, right? Subjective aspects as well, like Tacitus and its history of Germany, Germany or whatever. He was a big fan of the Germans. He thought they were the greatest. And you can see he's kind of sour on all of the corruptions within Roman civilization. And so he idolized more whether it was real for the German tribes. It was kind of interesting to see his bias. Can I break here? Whether anger is in the concubiscible, that's a strange thing, Thomas, did you know that yet? To the third, then, one goes forward thus, it seems that anger is in the concubiscible. Fertullius, meaning Cicero, in the Tuscalian questions, says that anger is a libido quede, right? Which is a kind of desire, right? But libido is in the concubiscible, right? Therefore anger, right? We often say that anger is the desire for revenge, right? Well, desire seems to be the name of a passion in the concubiscible. Moreover, Augustine says in the, what, rule, I guess, that anger grows into, what, hate. And Tullius says in the same book that hate is inveterate. Anger. Yeah. Anger grown old. Yeah, yeah, terrible thing. But hate, of course, is in the concubiscible, just as love. Oh, I can see it as good as a question. Very convincing, yeah. Therefore anger is in the concubiscible. Moreover, Damascene and Gregory Nicenus say that anger is put together from sadness and what? Desire. Desire. But both of these are in the concubiscible. But both of these are in the concubiscible. Therefore anger is in the, what, concubiscible, right? But against this is that the concubiscible power is different from the irascible one, right? If, therefore, anger were in the concubiscible, it would not be, what, the irascible power would not be named from it, huh? That's a good argument there, huh? In authority, anyway. Now, what does the Master say? The answer should be said, that as has been said above, the passions of the irascible in this differ from the passions of the concubiscible. That the objects of the passions of the concubiscible are good and bad, absolute, huh? Absolutely. But the objects of the passions of the irascible are good and bad with a certain, what, elevation or what? Difficulty. Difficulty, right? And Thomas comes back to that, you know, when you talk about how the word hope is transferred to a theological virtue, right? But something very good and noble, right? Elevating. Now, it's been said, however, that anger regards two objects. To it, the revenge which it, what, desires, right? And the one about whom it seeks, revenge, huh? And those are two different objects, right, huh? Sometimes, you know, in these marital things there, you know, the guy thinks he's got the wrong person, and he kills the wrong person. He thinks he's fooling around with his wife or something, right? So he's seeking revenge, and revenge on somebody, right? But he's got the wrong on whom he should be revenging. Wrong somebody. Yeah. Yeah. I thought, when I was in California, there was this case where the guy, he drove a truck or something like that, and a cement truck. And he happened by chance at noontide to be near his house, right? I was like, oh, I'll stop in and have lunch with my wife. And he saw this beautiful convertible in front of his house. I was like, who that is, right? And so as he approached the house and started to come in, you could hear the voices from the bedroom, right? And he, because he gathered what was on. So he was too embarrassed to go in to interrupt them. So he went back, and his truck was going to drive off, and then he got a second thought. He backed up his truck and lowered the cement into this beautiful convertible. So it just got to lose him. That was a great, great start. Yeah, yeah. That was good to imagine. Sure. Yeah, yeah. Because the guy was trying to sue him or something. I don't know what the scar was on. Talk about the audacity of that guy. It's so overdoing. Yeah, yeah. Very good. Take your punishment. Yeah, if you want. Yeah. Marvelous. I mean, it's like he didn't. You know, my Italian father-in-law used to always, you know, use that expression, you know, put you in spent shoes. Yeah. It's the mafia, you know. That's what they would do. Put you in spent shoes. Give you a swim in the river. So he's lucky he didn't get that, right? Yeah. He's got his car. So, the passions of the irascible differ from the passions of the gibiscible, in that the objects of the passions of the gibiscible are the good and the bad absoluta. But the objects of the passions of the gibiscible are the good and the bad with a certain elevation, right? Or difficulty. Now, it's been said above that anger regards two objects. Revenge, which it desires, and the one about whom it seeks revenge. And about both, anger requires a certain, what? Effort, you might say, right? Because it does not arise the emotion of anger unless there be some magnitude, right, existing about both of these. For both of these are, what? For whatever things are either nothing or valde modica, very little, right? We think not worthy of any, what? Anything. Yeah. As the faucet says in the second book of rhetoric, right? So you, you know, whack a mosquito on you. Is that revenge? No. You're not really angry, is it, huh? That's a modica of all day, right? Mm-hmm. Very little. Nullo dina, right? Once, because it has that, what? Effort, right? It's manifested anger is not in the concubiscible, but in the, what? Irriscible. Harvest minuscaya. Yeah. Okay. Now, the first one is to explain the word of Tullius, right? To the first effort should be said that Tullius libidem, he names, he's, he, desire is some, what? Future good. Future good, right? Having no discretion between, what? Difficult. Whether it be difficult or not, right? And according to this, he lays down anger to be under libidem, insofar as it is a desire for, what? Revenge. Revenge, yeah? Okay. But that's like, you know, you say that anger is a desire for, what? Revenge, right? The word desire is common to anger now and to concubiscible, but it's not, what? It's a genus there, right? Okay? Sick out of libido communities, right? Is common to the irascible and concubiscible, right? The second should be said about anger growing into hate, right? It's said that anger is said to grow into hate, not that the same passion in number, the same emotion in number, which was before anger, later becomes, what? Hate to growing old, but to a certain, what? Causality. For anger, do it sweat. Like the time, right? Will cause, what? Hate, right? And it happens in these oriental countries, I mean, near east. They're doing it now. Yeah. In China, they're at it again. But, I mean, sometimes you've got these tribes, you know, that must have had friction and then fought with each other, right? And this anger, you know, goes from generation to generation and it finally turns into what? Like the Balkans. The Balkans. It turns into hate, right? Okay. Again, he says that anger is said to be put together from sadness and desire, not as it were from what? Parts. But from what? Causes. Causes, right, huh? So my mother and father parts of me? Yeah. But more, ex cosis and ex partibus, right? You might speak of it as being, you know, part of me is my mother, part of me is my father. Part of me is my brothers. Part of me is my father. Part of me is my father. Part of me is my father. Part of me is my father. Part of me is my father. Part of me is my father. Part of me is my father. Part of me is my father. Part of me is my father. Part of me is my father. Part of me is my father. Part of me is my father. Part of me is my father. Part of me is my father. Father Rinelli is our, because Franciscan is the Immaculate, he's the General, Father General. He wrote a book on the Eucharist, and one of the things, one of the statements he makes about it is that when we receive our Lord in the Eucharist, there's always that mysterious presence of our Lady. Well, I used to, in a holiday, in Australia, and one of the parishioners, about an hour and a half after him, asked him up to the Friday, and banged the door, he was all ticked off, because I dare to say that Our Lady was in the Eucharist, you know, it's only Jesus and nobody else, you know, that would have been a distinction to use, right? Yeah. You could have said, what in the culture? You see, from the words of the Consecration, the body and blood of our Lord is there, right? And then the, they used to ask the sect, was the blood of our Lord in the, what? In the host, right? Well, not from the words of the Consecration, but because it's joined to the body, right? So, if you receive the body, you're going to receive the blood of our Lord, too, right? So, you don't have to receive under both species, right? To receive both the body and the blood of our Lord, right? But the blood is there under the appearance of wine, because of the words of the Consecration. And then, of course, you know, the rest of Christ, you might say, right? His soul, right? His divinity are there, right? Not by the words of the Consecration, but because they're joined to the, what? To what is there by the words of the Consecration, right? And Mary would be, after that, right? She might be with our Lord, right? But it would be, you know, much less than... His argument was, I think it was something like, you know, you wouldn't say that your, you know, your mother and father are you. Yeah, yeah. But you might say they're you, you know? Yeah. Yeah, that's what I was told, right? Yeah, yeah. And that didn't satisfy. Yeah. But, and even if I remember, another one of our priests, when I read these passages, my father of the Apostles, he would say the same thing, he would say the same thing. I'd be very careful about saying something like that. They misunderstand it, you know. I'd say we're having the 24-hour rosary there, you know, for abortion, abortion. But they're going to have adoration, right? And then the rosary, right? Kind of continuous, you know. But you're adoring our Lord, right? Not Mary so much. But the rosary, you know, you're praying to Mary, right? Okay. So, another article, right? But their anger is with what? Reason, huh? He was angry with their what? Hard-heartedness, wasn't he? Mm-hmm. What else was he angry? There's a couple places he said to be angry in that gospel. Yeah, he was getting to whip the cords. Does it say he was angry when he drove him out? Maybe one of the gospels does. Yeah. You know, you've got to be careful when they taught us in grade school and that anger is a sin, right? Yeah. Words are dangerous things. To the fourth, then, one goes forward thus. It seems that anger is not with, what? Reason, huh? Mm-hmm. For anger, since it is a certain passion, emotion, right, huh? It's in the sense-desiring power, right? Mm-hmm. But the sense-desiring power does not follow the grasping of reason, but the grasping of the sense part. That's why the other animals have it, right? And therefore, anger is not with, what? Reason. Reason, huh? Mm-hmm. And then he goes on. Fruit animals lack reason, right? And nevertheless, in them is found anger, right, huh? Uh-huh. Therefore, anger is not with reason, right? I know. It's got to have food. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. You know, talk to the rest of the way there, Brian. Fah, fah, fah. Then it's frightening me. It's a little mutt. But isn't it angry, you know, that the dogs have, you know? The cats get angry sometimes, too, but not as much as dogs. Dogs are, you know, irascible by nature, it seems. Depends. Call them retrievers, no. I don't think they have an irascible after. It's a little gentle dog. You can trust your kids, yeah? Yeah. Moreover, drunkenness, huh? It breeds us. Binds reason. Binds reason, right? But it aids for, what? Anger, right? Right. So how many fights start? Because you're not drinking, right, huh? Therefore, anger is not with, what? Reason, huh? I used to say, you know, that drinking there kind of reduces the emotions, right? So the emotion that you're kind of, you have a weakness for, right, is what's going to come out, right? So guys, you're irascible by nature. That will come out when he gets a drink, right, huh? You know, it's going to be accusable. That will come out when he gets drinking, you know. So they ask him, which comes out in you? Question. Conversation, over. It's interesting, though. You wouldn't think of fear, though, coming out, to be some drinking, would you? Yes, yeah. Sometimes people will get drunk and overcome fear or something. Yeah, yeah. To go out. To build confidence, yeah. Go to confession. I don't know about that. Wait before that you go. I don't know. I haven't heard that one yet. I haven't heard that one yet, but... Well, let's talk about the confession. Yeah, yeah. That was Canon 5, 16, 9. The Eastern Code. But again, this is what the philosopher says in the 7th Book of the Ethics, right? That anger follows reason ad qualitare. In some way. Yeah. In some way. You know, here is reason, but imperfectly, right, huh? So reason, in some sense, at least imperfectly, is saying this ought to be revenged, right? This ought to be resented, you know? Correct. And so on, right, huh? Who's the great guy there with anger there in Shakespeare's plays, huh? The character? Yeah, yeah. In one instance, a fellow? No, not so much. Coryolanus, right? Oh, Coryolanus, yeah, the play. Yeah. And the tributes of the people there, you know, they can get him to, you know? Push his buttons. Yeah. And then he'll move his events within the state. Then he turns against Rome. Oh. Okay. Actually, it should be said that it says in the state above, anger is a desire for what? Revenge. Revenge. But this implies a, what? Collatio. That's the word they use a lot of times when talking about reason, right? Putting together. Yeah. You know, Albert de Grey is always saying reason is collativus et discursivos, right? It's bringing together and then... Going forward. Yeah. And, of course, in your reason, you've got to bring these two premises together, right? And so on, huh? So, he's referring then to collatio, right? As a kind of middle term here, huh? This implies a collatio, bringing together, right, huh? Of the punishment to be inflected to what? And the harm. To the harm given to us. Yeah, yeah. Given to us. Once, in the second book, the philosophy says that the angry man syllogized, right? It is necessary to oppose such a thing, right? Okay. But to bring together confere and to syllogize is something of what? Reason. And, therefore, anger is in some way with what? Now, what about the first objection? It's just an emotion, huh? To the first, therefore, it should be said that the emotion of the desiring power can be with reason in two ways, huh? Thomas sees distinctions, huh? Brothers are just confused. In one way with reason, what? Commanding. And thus, the will is with reason. And then, let's do it. right? Once it is said to be the rational, reasonable desire. In another way with reason what? Speaking. Yeah. And thus anger is with reason. And therefore the philosophy says in the book on problems that anger is with reason, not as being what? Commanding. But as by manifesting the injury, right? So the sense appetite does not immediately obey reason, right? But by means of the will, right? Okay. So in desiring candy, the reason doesn't have to endure much, right? But in desiring to avenge myself, I have to make a certain comparison, right? A colaxio, a comparison, right? And see that you deserve to be punched in the nose, right? What's he done? Now the brute animals, they have a natural instinct. They endowed with this from the divine reason, right? By which they have motions both within and without that are like the motions of what? Reason. Reason, huh? As has been said above, huh? Okay. There's something like that, son. Now as has been said to the third, it should be said, as it's said in the seventh with the ethics, this is what I was referring to. Ira outed ali qualitare rationem, right? Just as announcing that, what? Something is injured one, right? But sin non perfecti outed, right? So does anger here reason, yes or no? Some way. Yeah. Not simplicitare perfecti, right? But in some way it does, right? Okay. Now, maybe he's going to go on here. Let's see if he does it, huh? But it hears it not perfectly because it does not observe the rule of reason. It might do more, right? Okay. And you know, you read about the newspaper every day, you know, something gets angry at somebody and does, you know, more than required, okay? For anger is required some act of reason, right, huh? And is added the, what? Impediment of reason, right? Whence the philosopher says in the book about problems that those who are much, what? Drunk. Drunk? As we're having nothing of the judgment of reason, are not anchored. Yes, Jesus says that. But when they are a little bit drunk, right? Then they get angry, right, huh? As we're having the judgment of reason, but impeded, right? I think it's nearest I'll say somewhere, too, you know, that a man is more embarrassed by his concupiscence than by his anger, because concupiscence has less of reason than anger. Yeah. And, you know, when Thomas is supposed to grab the flame from the piece of wood, or is the flame, and chase the maiden out of the room, you know? There was anger, you know, overcoming concupiscence, right, you know? Here's reasonable, right? But concupiscence, you know, is kind of, doesn't matter very much, right? I said, yeah. I saw a lady going into the movie the other day, and she had a big bucket of puffer. She's got a fat, you know? My wife says, you know, see what I would be if I ate all that puffer? Well, it's kind of, you know, thousands sitting there, you know, eating these things, all these things there, you go from the microwave, you know, to the puffer, you know, which is, you can watch the movies, you know, the awesome movies, you know, but you line up there in the supermarket. And that's, like, when I went down to my sisters, they not only have the Oreo cookies, and they have double stuffed Oreo cookies, now they have mega stuffed Oreo cookies. It's like, more is better, more, more. Of course, I enjoyed them immensely. So, you know, you represent these great men like Coriolatus, right, there, in terms of anger rather than in terms of concubiscence, right? And the concubiscence is more for the comic here, right? You know? We've lost the comic work of Homer, you know, but the margeites, you know, kind of indicates the kind of worthless fellow, you know? And so you think of, you know, Falstaff, you know, eating and drinking, you know, to some excess, right? But you see, you know, Coriolatus is a man to be, what, feared, feared, and I suspect a lot of these men would get to the very top, you know, in government or even the army, somebody said they have this, you know, anger, you know, which you're kind of afraid of them, right? Yeah. I remember when LBJ there talked out at St. Mary's College, and I was, they had like the 100th anniversary of the college, right? So they had a number of people, and somebody, I guess, had some connection, you know, and so LBJ came out there, right? And I guess he had a little cold that day, but anyway, he was in kind of a, he wasn't coming out on the platform until time to give a speech, right? And he was there with some of the associates in kind of a side room, you know, and some of the Christian brothers around there, you know, and he was chewing them out, you know. Yeah, it's the word it is. So, you know, some of these guys, you know, they, the power like that, you've got to have the facts, you've got to have your briefing, you know, you've got to be right to the point, you know. Yeah, yeah. So, I mean, I think you finally, you know, you kind of think that even Napoleon or something like that, right? I mean, they, you know, they have some irascible, quite honest on that. Yeah. Move for another one or not? Move for another one. Move for another one.