Prima Secundae
Lecture 130: Habit as the First Species of Quality

Transcript
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Okay, so let's go back and reread now the first article in the 49th question, right? Which is 7 times 7, by the way. Just like in the famous, what, 49 words of Shakespeare, right? Which is the best short agitation to use reason that I have ever read, right? I have a standing offer, you know, to anybody in 50 words to give you a better agitation. Or even 100 words, that might not. You have 100 words, you know. Shakespeare did it in 49 words, huh? Okay, to the first, then, one goes forward thus. It seems that habitus is not a, what, quality. It's not in that genus of how, which is called quality, the abstract word, right? For Augustine says in the book on the 83 questions, this name habit is sent from this verb, which is to have. But to have not only pertains to quality, but to other genera. For one is said to have some quantity, right? And to have even money, right? Exterior things like that. Are you part of the money class, huh? And that is of the sort, right, huh? Okay. And therefore, habitus is not a, what, quality, right, huh? Moreover, habitus is laid down as one of the predicaments. That's the Latin word for categories, right? As I mentioned, both the word category in Greek and predicamentum in Latin come from the word to predicare, to be said of, right? So you find that in the Gospels, right, huh? They use the word category, right? They're categorizing. They're accusing Christ of being this or that, right? This is clear in the book of the predicaments, that we call in English the book of the categories in the Greek word. Okay. Now, what is that one predicamentum that is called habitus? Well, that's one called echin in the Greek, which is the verb, right? Sinative. And habitus is called often in Latin, right, huh? They have clothes on, right? Okay. But one predicament is not contained in another, right? Therefore, habitus is not a, what, quality, right? Moreover, every habit is a disposition, as is said in the predicaments. But disposition is the order of having parts. But this pertains to the predicament of situs, which we call position here. Therefore, habitus is not a, what, quality, right? But against all, this is what the philosophy says in the predicamentis, that habitus is a quality, the difficile immobides, right? So he's saying it's a quality, right? He's saying it's a more precise quote there. It's a disposition, right? But disposition is a quality, too. So Thomas has got to clear up all these words. He can say people get lost at these. One of the great, Jerome Leroy's quoting, ex verbis in order not to be prolatis, from words put forth disorderly. Heresy arises. Correct. Yeah. Be careful about these words, right? Are there fallacies that come from words? How many? No, six. Six, seven outside of language, yeah. You've got to watch this, right? Not to be called the mother of God, but the mother of Jesus. The story is said. It's a story, yeah. You've got to watch that. Notice Thomas began by agreeing with Augustine, doesn't he, right? I answer that this name, habitus, is taken from what? Having, right? Incidentally, there, you know, in the book on specific refutations, when he talks about the fallacy of equivocation as being the most common one and so on, right? And then later on, he says, you know, being aware of this fallacy, you know, makes you more attentive to words and so on. And some words are very difficult, right? And it's these common words, like being, he says, and one, and same and so on, that are hard to, what? Show different meanings, yeah. And this is true about to have and habitus, right? From which the name of habitus is derived in two, what? Ways. In one way, according as man, or any other thing, right? Is said to have something, right? In another way, according as something, in some way, has itself, in itself, or towards, what? Another, right? Now, about the first, it should be considered that to have, according as it is said with respect to anything that is had, is common to diverse, what? Whence the philosopher, right? Among the, what? Post-Predicamenta lays down, what? A very, right? Because they follow upon diverse, what? Genera things, huh? That's not the whole truth about the Post-Predicaments, right? There's a lot of difficulty about them, right? That's the third part of the categories, huh? So, in the first four or five chapters here, it tells the thing you have to know before you take up the Pregaments, right? And then you have the, taking up the ten categories, and then you have these Post-Pregaments, right? And there are five of them, right? And the first one is Opposites, right? And then Before and After, or Before, actually. And then Together, right? Or Hama, Simo. And then Motion. And then To Have. Why take these up? But there's different reasons for the five, right? But you see, for example, we not only want to know the different, what? highest genera. We want to place things in these genera, right? In order to place things in the genera, you've got to distinguish one from another, which involves opposites, right? And there's going to be an order inside his genus, right? He's a seven. From the highest genera to the lowest, and so on. So you have prior and posterior, and then Hama, right? So dog and cat are Hama, right? But dog and animal are not Hama. They're not together, right? But animal is before dog, right? And before dog or animal is what? Living body, right? Okay? So there's, you see why he takes up opposites and prior and posterior, right? So he can place things where they belong in the categories, right? Notice he used the word place there, right? Taken from the continuous. And some things are not before or after, but together. So odd number, even number, you divide it into those two, right? They're together, right? Not before or together. Or animal to dog and cat or something. Then he points out a distinction. He's always seeing a distinction that nobody else sees, right? But among those things which are had, there seems to be this distinction that in some of them there is nothing as a middle between the haver and that which is had. And this is kind of a strange thing, right? As between the subject and its, what? Quality or quantity. There's no medium between the haver and the had. to the haver and the other and the other Some things there are in which there is some middle between the two, but only a relation. As one is said to have a companion or a, what, a friend at the time. I know it's just kind of a way of speaking in a way, right? You know, he's talking about abstraction, you know, talking about relationships, you've heard that word all the time, you know. Relationship is even more abstract than relationships. It's what it is, you know, a relation, you know, relationship. But we sometimes think of a relation as being between two people, right, huh? But it's more what I am towards you and what you are towards me, right? Some things there are between which there is some middle, not to be sure, acting upon or undergoing, but something in the manner of what? Acting upon or undergoing. Insofar as one is, what, adorning or covering, right? And the other is adorned or covered, right, huh? So you're wearing, you're wearing something for a long time and it's kind of what fits you, right? And it's like it's been, what, attracted to your body, right, huh? As if your body is acting upon your thing, right? Or you wear a shoe for a while, right? And if it starts to fit better, right now, you know, it kind of adjusts itself to your, what, your foot, right, huh? And you have a hard time parting with it, right, huh? Remember Brother Richard didn't want to park with his little jacket used to wear to school, you know. So my mother was, you know, the woman who don't like this wearing the same thing all the time. So he didn't give up the jacket. So one time he came back from school and she said, oh, let me help you off with your coat. She took it off and she threw it over the flowers and the bushes and all of a sudden they went and just covered the garden. And now it's a young girl just wearing that jacket, you know, wearing it out, right? But they do get kind of comfortable sometimes, don't they, right? Yeah. And you know when a... Men especially. Yeah, yeah, yeah. You know when a... It's accustomed to men. So he says not to be sure enacting upon or undergoing, right, but something in the manner of enacting upon or undergoing, right? Since I'm conforming it to myself, right, huh? Sometimes you get to wear glasses then you get this kind of indentation in your nose, right, or be hangry or something, you know. It's almost like part of you, you know. You're a watch all day long and it kind of starts to become a part of your body almost, right? Yeah. Once the philosophy says in the fifth book of wisdom that Habitus is said to be, as it were, time-quam, right? A certain acting upon of the haver and the had, right? Just as in those things which we have around us, right, like our shoes or our clothes or, you know, a hat. Maybe after a while it might actually fit your head, right? You see these other titles sometimes, you know, for, you know, individually made suit for you, right? You know, it's going to really fit you, you know. But even a suit that you buy, you know, mass-produced stuff, you know, get it pretty close and then you act upon it and finally it does really fit you nicely. And therefore in these is constituted one special genus of things, right? Which is called, the predicamentum in Latin, they call it Habitus, right? Aristotle uses the Greek word, sorry if you read my finger, but, eke, right? Eke, to have, right? Habera, right, huh? They call it Habitus, right? Which is the word you use right here in the text behind the Latin there, huh? I know what word you use in English? English or what? English. Yeah, I know what you use in the word. But if you have the Latin text, it says Habitus there, right? Okay. So, you see, it's not that sense of what? Yeah. We speak of, you know, habit here now. Since we're using it, it's not just Habitus down here, right? It's a kind of an acting upon undergoing, right? About which the philosopher in the fifth book of the Wisdom, where he takes up some of these words again, that between the one having the clothing, right, and the clothing that is had, there's a middle of what? Having, right, huh? If however one takes to have, insofar as a thing is said, in some way to have itself in itself, right, or towards itself, or towards another, right, huh? Since this way of having oneself is according to some quality. In this way, habit is a, what? Quality. Quality, right, huh? About which the philosopher in the fifth book of Wisdom, right, in the physics, said Habitus is said to be a disposition by which, right, or according to which one is disposed either well or what? Yeah, yeah, and either towards oneself or towards another, right, as health is a, what, habit, right, there, and well-disposed toward my own body, right? And thus, now we speak of, what, habit, right, in that sense, whence it should be said that habit is indeed equality, right? Now, the first objection, huh, which is taken from Augustine's, talking about the origin of the word from to have, right, to the first, therefore, it should be said that that objection proceeds from to have taken in a common way, right? For thus it is common to many, what? Genera. Genera, as had been said, right? To the second, huh, which is taken from this Habitus that's, like, at Nippon undergoing, right, and it's naming one of the ten categories. To that second one, it should be said that that argument proceeds from habit according as is understood to be something, as a word in the middle, between the one having and that which is, what, had. For thus it is a, what, in its own right, a sudden predicament, right? And highest genera. Now, you've got something like that, you know, don't you call the monk's clothing a habit? Okay. So, it's touching upon that. Not to change a different habit of you, so you're going to get to fix you after a while, right? You kind of turn it to get into somebody else's habit, right? And it wouldn't fit you quite, you know, it's not adjusted to you, right? You know, like when the belt there, you know, you tend to tighten it up until you get it tight enough without being too uncomfortable. You know, it's kind of molded to your size of your Midwest. And the belt doesn't fit me anymore, you know? It might have fitted me 20 years ago. Save it for the next one. I give it to all the kids. Now, in the third one, it gets more particular by this distinction of two kinds of disposition. He's distinguishing the one that's called, what, position, you might say there, right? Which is type of place, right? To the third, it should be said that disposition always implies, what, the order of something having, what, parts. And this happens in three ways, as the philosopher joins there, right? Either according to place, and that's the one that's a separate genus, right? Or according to potency or according to species, but these are kind of the same, but one is imperfect, right, compared to the other. In which, as Simplicius says in his commentary in the predicament, so, he comprehends all dispositions, so, bodily ones, in that he says, secundum locum, right, according to place. And this pertains to the predicament, which in Latin they call situs sometimes, so, which is the order of parts in place, so, if you just take the shape of the body, that would be... Thank you. Thank you. Not to scatter you, right? But if you take sitting or standing, you've got to have something outside you to be sitting or standing. Or laying down, right? Unless you've got a magician now like that. I mean, if you lay down, you've got to have a bed or something underneath you, right? A mat or a floor, at least, to lay down on, right? Okay? So that's why it's put it at the last six, you know. The reason there's something outside of you, right? So if I crouch, as you say, and I sit, my body could be in more or less the same shape, my body like that, right? But there's got to be a chair or something like that for me to be, what? Sitting, right? So it's the arrangement of my parts around the chair, right? Around the place where I am. But what he calls secundipotentium includes those dispositions which are in preparation and suitableness, not yet perfectly. As science and virtue, that is what? Begun. But when he says according to species, he includes the perfect dispositions which are called what? Habits. Yeah. As science and virtue complete. So we'll let Thomas have it then that habits is quality, right? Or he's going to talk about that habit is the quality of this, but that way, right? Okay? But now he's going to kind of introduce us to the division that Aristotle made of the species of what? Quality, right, huh? You've got to be scandalized because there are four species. Okay? So, Berkwist always says, you know, this rule of two or three or both is what? For the most part, right, huh? Therefore, it's a good rule, right? Then, you know? But if you have more than three, it's very hard for the mind to understand it, right? It tends to try to reduce it into either two or three to see that it's exhausted, right? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. If you call these accidents, right, and these down here accidents, right, you see an accident is something that exists in another, is in a subject, right? Well, that's true of these here, even the relations. But here, it's not so much something existing in me, right? I am clothed, right? I am a geometer. I'm a geometer because of something existing in me as in a subject, as a little knowledge of geometry in my mind. So you say, I am clothed, for example, right? Well, clothing is not really in me, right? Okay? So Thomas sometimes refers to these last six as not accidents, these are the adverts. Actually, the entire, right? Having themselves in an accidental way, right? Now, what does that mean? Well, say, I can be a man without being a geometer. I can be a man without being a father, right? Okay? I can be a man without being clothed, right, then? I can be naked, right, then? And so, these things have themselves in an accidental way, right? I can go out of this room and I never won't be in this room now until next Thursday. I won't be in here. Okay? But it has itself accidentally, right? Accidentally. In an accidental way. Something can be present or absent, right, then? And I'm still a man, right, then? I don't cease to be a man when I walk out this door. I don't cease to be alive. I hope not. Not yet. I don't cease to be alive. Now, I'll just re-read my favorite book there, you know. That's what God didn't do with us. And he's talking about the incarnation there, right, then? And how they had a hard time understanding the second person, God, who's God, becoming what? Man. The Word became man. And he says, in fact, well, this is something coming after what the Word is. So it must be an accident or accidentally having self-demand, right? Well, when you study the substance of God, you realize it can't what? It can't have an accident, right? And man cannot be an accident to the man, but it is a substance. Well, therefore, they thought it's got to be having self-accidently, right? And therefore, they're saying that God is in Christ as in a temple, right? Okay? Or he's that clothed with human nature, right? Which would be down here, you see? And that's for his heresy, right, then? But, you know, they eliminated this sense, right? And tried to explain it in this sense, right? Okay? I was making more of a serious mistakes, but you see why they're doing that, right? And, you know, one of the scriptures says, you know, that human nature is found in habitus, right? As if Christ was clothed, right? And Tom said, that's a metaphor, right? Because just as, you know, a man who is clothing, you see kind of the clothed, that's the part you see of the man to the world's part, right? Clothes make the man. So, the invisible second person becomes visible to his human nature, right? That's kind of a metaphor, right? You see? He's not really, because he's taking on human nature to be a man, right? He's taking on human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature to be a human nature To the second one goes forward thus. It seems that habit is not a determined species of quality. Because, as has been said, that habit, according as its equality, is said to be a disposition by which or according to which we are well or badly disposed, right? The thing that is disposed. But this happens according to what? Every quality, right? For according to figure, it happens that someone is well or badly disposed. I don't know what that's different to the one's figure. And likewise, according to heat and cold, right? And according to all of these, right? It's too hot, too hot, too cold. Therefore, habit is not a determined species of what? Quality, right? That's an interesting objection, right? Moreover, the philosopher in the categories, in the predicaments, says that coldness and heat, heatness, hotness, are dispositions or habits, huh? As health and what? Sickness, right? But hot and cold are in the third species of quality. Let's say something's called sense qualities, right? Undergoing qualities. Therefore, habits or disposition is not distinguished from the other species of quality, huh? You can see how difficult it is for someone to understand the categories without having a commentary on the categories by Thomas Aquinas, right? And Thomas doesn't have a commentary on the categories, right? But you can pick up things like this, you know? You're going to pick up a little understanding of quality here, right? And so, I run around there, you know, seeing little things here and there, and it helps to come back to categories, and I'm like, oh, yeah, now, yeah, now I see something, right? Moreover, the feature of the mobile, difficult to be moved or changed, is not a difference pertaining to the genus of quality, but more pertains to emotion or passion. But no genus is determined to a species through the differences of another genus, right? But it's necessary, the differences there is say come to the genus, as the philosophy says in the seventh book of the metaphysics. Thomas uses that principle that each genus has its own species, and Aristotle does this in the categories, right? There's a chapter in the anti-predicaments, the before-the-predicaments. And he says, you know, one science is not different from another science by being two-footed or four-footed, right? Those are differences in the genus of substance. It's such a beautiful example, right? My old teacher, Kassir, used to say, he can tell a man's understanding by the examples he chooses, right? Aristotle is so clear, you know, huh? It doesn't take these, you know, flowery, you know, exciting, you know, things, but ones that are very clear, right, huh, you know? And Thomas uses this when he's showing that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the sun because they have to have differences of, what, origin, because that's the genus you're in, right? So if the Holy Spirit didn't come from the sun, it wouldn't be distinct. Okay, so it seems here when you're saying that it's a quality, difficile mobile, right, huh, that you're bringing in a difference from another, what, genus, right? And therefore it seems that since habitus is said to be a quality, difficile mobilis, difficult to be changed, it seems it has not determined species of quality, right? Of course, sometimes you don't know the essential differences, right? So we use something more accidental to touch upon the somewhat unknown. But against all this is what the philosopher says in the categories, that one species of quality is habit and disposition. I answer it should be said that the philosopher in the categories lays down among the four species of qualities. I heard my logic teacher there in college say, no, there's another species you don't know about. It's all of it. Well, it's kind of interesting now because you enumerate them, right, huh? It's hard to see what? It's exhausted, right, huh? It takes a great tour of experience, right? And you get in quantity, huh? The division of quantity is into discrete and what? Continuous, right? So continuous quantity is one whose parts meet at a common boundary. The parts of a line at a point or a plane at a line and a body at a surface. And the discrete, the parts don't meet at a common boundary. Well, those are opposites. It's got to be one or the other, right? That seems to be exhausting, right? And so Plato is always dividing into two, right, and by opposites, huh? Okay? So you can see, you know, that when you get down even to more particular divisions, like if you divide numbers into odd and even, you can see that's exhausting. Can there be a number that's neither odd or even? Well, it's either divisible by two or it's not, right? Or you divide numbers into prime and composite. It's either measured by another number or it's measured not by another number, right? Only by one. You could do the same with perfect and imperfect. You want it to, right? You divide by opposites. When you get to three, that's a little more difficult, right? Although there's a famous sign that Aristotle says that three is the first number about which we say all. Which is a sign, you know, how often it is that three is all there is, right? Okay? You've got four, right? No wonder that theological professor will say, well, there's another one that we don't know about. I mean, the mind can't see it, you know, as being complete. It sees most easily when there's just two, right? What happens? Three theological virtues, huh? Four. There's a great deal of thought to say this is... Of course, the place where you don't have two or three most frequently is in what the name's equivocal by reason, right? So we saw before in the class the eight chief senses of what? In, right? That's eight. And we saw in the 12th chapter categories you have four senses of before, right? The fifth sense he gives there could be, you know, attached to the second sense though it's a different sense. But, you know? So it's harder to see, you know, is that all the chief senses? Of course, in the fifth book of wisdom there he has just three. But I follow the categories. Because the fourth sense is more remote as Aristotle says. The better it is before. It's quite different, right? From before in time, before in being, before in knowing. Now, the differences of these species is thus assigned by Simplicius. Now, he quoted before, right? And I noticed when he quoted before they had a quote on here. Clarissimus Aristoteles commentator. But even the Clarissima may not be the equal of Thomas, huh? So in the comment on the predicament, huh? The picture says that of qualities some are natural, right? Which by nature are in something and always, right? Some are adventitious, they come to it as a word made by something extrinsic. right, huh? What was adventitious? The adventure, they come to you from the outside, right? Oh, okay. Okay? And they're brought to being by something extrinsic. And can be lost, right? He's dividing into two. He's ambitious, right? Ian, far ahead of me, right? But Thomas will be far ahead of me. And these which are adventitious, they're acquired as were, are what? Habits and dispositions, huh? which differ according to factually, defeat, Each day, a miscibile, they can be lost easily or difficult, right? So I think what we call a mood, right? A mood, you can have a mood in the morning and then get your lunch or something and your mood is changed, right? You know, the boss is in a bad mood today, you know, or the wife is in a bad mood or something, you know. Something's bothering so-and-so, you know. But that can quickly pass that mood, right? And something happens when the person changes completely, right? But a habit, you don't go from being, if you're really a just man, you don't, you know, suddenly change to unjust. You've got to find the price first. It's a more slow, slow thing, yeah? Okay. But of natural qualities, some are according to that which is in what? Potency. The ability. And this is the second species of quality, yeah? This is inborn or ability or inability, right? So Thomas would place, you know, reason itself, which Shakespeare defines as a capability for large discourse, looking before and after, as in the second species of quality, right? And the ability to see, right? The ability to grow. The ability to digest, right? You know, ability to reproduce, right? The ability to get angry, right? Okay. We were talking on the radio today about Obama's real mad that his gun law didn't pass the Senate, right? They say he expected to pass the Senate, which is in control of the Democrats. And then he would be defeated in the house and he can ban the public and slow the house of it. But now his own party had done him in. So he's really mad. In here, right? So. But this is abilities you have, right? Like we talked about in the soul, right? The ability to soul. Some are according to something that is an act. And this either in the deep, right? Or according to the surface. If it be in the deep, it is then the third species of quality, which would be sensible qualities, right? Like I'm white or I'm cold. According to surface, it's the fourth species of quality, which is figure and form. Okay. Sounds pretty good to me. I have no objection. But this distinction of the species of quality seems to be unsuitable. Ah. For there are many figures and what? Quality. That's the fourth species that Aristotle gives. And quality taught is passivides, right? That's what Aristotle calls them, the undergoing qualities, right? That are not natural, but what? Adventitious. Adventitious. And many dispositions that are not adventitious, but natural. As health and what? Beauty is. Beauty, yeah. So that granddaughter there, Isabella the Rose. Her name is Isabella Rose. I call her Isabella the Rose. She said, I'm Isabella Rose, she said. Now she's got the idea. But Shakespeare said, from furish creatures we desire in Greece, that thereby beauty's rose might never die. That's kind of a metaphor for what's species to a genus, right? So beauty is what? A metaphor for beauty is the rose, right? And moreover, this does not belong to the order of species, for always what is more natural is before. What a mind that Thomas has. What a mind. I was so impressed with some creatures, right? And I was laughing it up, you know? And now Thomas has, you know, knocked him out. He's laying flat now. He's in that position of putting me flat. What a mind. Now notice what Thomas says here. Always what is more natural is before, right? Because nature is what's first in the thing, right? I was working on a talk there for Thomas Aquinas College, right? And I was going to talk about the order of nature and reason, right? And it's going to lead up to the ways in which nature is before reason, right? The nature before the reasonable. So I thought and thought about it, and I came up with five ways, right? And I was laying in bed the other hand, and I said, ah, there's another way! So I got up to six now, right? But they're all examples of what is natural as before, right? And here he's saying, Some are always what is more natural as before, right? He sees that so clearly, Thomas, huh? And therefore, in another way ought to be taken the distinction of dispositions and habits, which is the first species, from the other qualities, right? Now, Thomas can make some. For properly speaking, quality implies a certain what? Moda substance, yeah. Now, this is kind of strange, huh? Because you say something like quantity, right? But it took the time to go out to see what he does. For moda is, as Augustine says, upon Genesis to the letter, what measure what? Prefixation. That's beforehand. Yeah. That's one guy writing a doctoral thesis of the ball in the old days there. His thesis on the word modem. I don't know what he did there, but there's a lot that he said about it, huh? But, you know, when Aristotle speaks about the way of going forward, right? To put it in English, right? What the Greek word he uses for way there is tropos, huh? And in the Latin, they'll say, what? Modus, right? The modus procedendi, right? Aristotle says the tropos of going forward, huh? In English, we usually just put the way of going forward, right? Besides, you say way of proceeding, but that's using the Latin word, the way of going forward, right? You know, it's a very important word, proceed, right, huh? With a trinity, too, right? You say here, it's kind of such a moda is a measure of determinants. Yeah, yeah. A measure of determinants? Yeah. Yes. Yeah. Now, you see, Aristotle says the way of proceeding ought to fit the matter of the science you're in, right? So, it's measured by, what, where it fit, it's got the idea of, what, measure, right? It's supposed to measure, right, huh? Mm-hmm. Yeah. I go into the clothing store, the shoe store, and, what's my size, Rosalie? I don't know. But you have to measure these things, right, to know it's going to fit you, right, huh? That's not going to fit you, right? And so, I think it's beautiful, the Latin words there, right? And Monsignor Dion used to point out how sometimes the words in, what, one language are better than the synonym for another language, right? And many times, you know, Greek is very excellent there. You know, when Thomas is talking about, today, there, about why it was appropriate that the Word of God become man, right, rather than the Holy Spirit becoming man, right? And he gives two main reasons, huh? The first one is that God's becoming man is for the salvation of man. But the ultimate salvation of man is to know the first truth, God himself. And therefore, the one who proceeds by way of, what, truth and the way of the mind, it's appropriate that he become man to lead us to that ultimate salvation, right? And then he said, and, there's a, you know, a harmony of the nature of man, right, and the word, and in Greek, we call the word logos, and we call reason logos, right? So that's kind of a sign of the connection there between logos in the sense of reason, which is what defines man, and logos in the sense of word, which is used in talking about the one who became. right? You see, there's an excellence there in English word, logos, right? But I see something in the Latin word intelligere. I don't see the Greek word to understand, right? And sometimes they interpret the Latin word intelligere to read within, right? But I see even more in the English word understand, right? I think the word understanding is a better word than the word intellectus in Latin, or the word nous in Greek, right? So sometimes, you know, Greek has it over the Latin or the English, and sometimes the Latin has it over one, but sometimes the English is... I told you about the linguists of Laval, you know, Warren Murray is telling me, you know, he says the greatest invention of the human mind is the English language. And it's interesting, you know, this is a study of all these languages that he's made, right? You see this marvelous, marvelous languages, English languages. This is, for him, the greatest invention of the human mind. You know, I mean, that's whether you agree with that or not, and it's kind of a little testimony to the excellence of the English language. So, but I see something here, you know, in the connection there between modus and what? Measure, right? Okay. But you can kind of see that in the way we speak in English, that the way of proceeding must fit. It's like my clothes have got to fit my body, right? I'm going to be impeded, right? Or my shoes have to fit my feet, right? You know, if they're pinching me or they're too big, you know, and I'm slopping around, you know. I'm not going to walk so well if the shoe is, what, too tight or too loose, right? It's got to fit me exactly, right? But that's a question of quantity, isn't it? It's a measure, isn't it? To fit. And so it's something like that, huh? He's saying that the way of proceeding has got to fit, the mode has got to fit the matter, right? That implies a student determination according to some measure, huh? But of course, notice, you say, what are you doing this, Thomas, for isn't this more appropriate to the category of what? Quantity, yeah, because the species of quantity are distinguished by the, what, the measure involved, huh? Okay? So you measure a line, you measure it maybe by, what, inches or something, right? But if you measure the top of the table here, you can measure it by, what, square inches. You don't measure a line much, right? So different species have got a different measure, right? Quantity is carried over, right? Even to God, in a way, when you say he's great. Quincidence implies a student determination according to some measure. And therefore, just as that by which is determined the, what, potency of matter according to substantial being is said to be, what, that quality which is a difference of what? A substance, right? Okay? Now, we spoke before the definition of genus, right? But the definition of difference is what? A name said with one meaning of many things other than kind signifying how they are what they are, right? Okay? The genus signifies what it is, right? Species signifies what it is, right? But the difference signifies quality, right? But in English, we'd say how it is what it is, right? Okay? They distinguish the, you know, the substantial quality from the quality that's an accident, huh? But this is why even in grammar, you can, what? Signify the accident or the species making difference by, what? An adjective, right, huh? So we can speak of an equilateral triangle or a green triangle, right? Grammatically, those are the same, right? The magician says they're not the same. No. Because green is an accident of triangle, right? But equilateral is a species making difference of triangle, right? Okay? That's important to see, huh? Okay. So he's talking about that kind of a quality, right? About how that is the difference of substance, right? So also according to the, as a potency or as a potency the subjects determine according to accidental being, there is said to be, what? An accidental quality, right? Which is also a difference, but an accidental difference, right? Okay? So the, the, in porphyry, the, the, pretty cool what they call difference, they sometimes call specific difference, species making difference, right, huh? As is clear through the philosopher in the fifth book of metaphysics, huh? Now, you better stop here, huh? Mm-hmm. 426, huh? Leave you restless. On the edge of my chair. Yeah, yeah. That's a cliffhanger. Yeah, yeah, yeah. That's a cliffhanger. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah. Yeah, yeah.