Prima Secundae
Lecture 134: Intellectual Habits and the Possible Intellect

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I think that's what we were told even in recent history, in the last 50 or 60 years, that even the Franciscans, you couldn't be ordained a priest unless you had memorized one of the four Gospels. On St. Francis Day, you had to memorize all the Psalms. You just had to. Of course, they used to do the Psalms every day, and then in a course of a week, they would recite all the Psalms. So it wasn't as hard. You don't have any distractions like we do today. But still, that was common. I know from the few Psalms I memorized, in the same way the few poems I memorized, you start to notice things you wouldn't notice otherwise. Even in the course of memorizing it, you notice things, right? You didn't notice. It was most famous for his memorizing. One book, Memorize the Faith, talks about that. But again, Aristotle has a book on memory and reminiscence, right? When we speak of prude memory, it's something like the prude animal. But in the recollection, you kind of call it in an early way, right? And then it kind of sticks in you, right? I'll tell you that story about, my mom told me that some farmer out where she grew up in Missouri, he had a mule. They were out plowing on a field one day, and lightning came and struck the mule and knocked him flat. And the farmer thought he was dead, but he got up. And any time that mule went through that field, he'd get to that spot and go around it. The rest of his life. And I know, I'm not touching that spot. That was a bad day, aren't you? He remembered. It's a smart mule, you know. Don't step on that. Obviously, you didn't know that lightning never strikes twice at the same time. So they say. So they say. You know, we sit where we eat usually. We eat in the dining room, in the kind of family room there. I can see out the back way, there was a pipe coming down from the roof, right? And where's that attracted to that, right? So I saw this Robin come in and, you know, land there, right? And Robin, like he's got the place, right? I said, Rosie, I think they're going to put a nest, right? Sure enough, they're watching the building of the nest, right? It flies in, you know. There's a little more. Rosie doesn't know if it's secure enough, but I think it will be. I think they're on the other side with another one of those pipes, you know. They seem to like that for some reason, you know. I think they would pick a branch of the tree, but it's more secure from the squirrels, I don't know. Because even those powers are moved to operating from the command of reason. You want to think about something you know, you command your senses to form an image of it. But the exterior grasping powers, right, huh? As sight and hearing and things of this sort, are not susceptible to some habits. But according to the disposition of their nature, they're ordered to determine acts. Just as the members of the body, which are not habits, but more in the powers commanding their motion, right? Where did the ability to dance come from? Where does that come from? There was never a very good dance, but there's something in the body there, I don't know. Yeah. So, from this Article 3, you're going to be looking later on for habits or virtues, especially in the desiring sense power, right, huh? Okay. Passing reference to the others. But you know when they talk about the great physicists of the 20th century and so on, 19th century, they seem to get their new ideas in the, what, 20s or 30s, right, huh? When they get older, their imagination, what? Burned out. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So Einstein in 1905 has got three papers worthy of the Nobel Prize, at least two of them, not three. I think he got the Nobel Prize for the pro-electrical effect explaining that, rather than the special activity, because it took so long time for special activity. But he didn't do his good later on in life, right, huh? His imagination's not as good, right? Heisenberg was fairly young. He got some of his ideas, right, huh? When he talks about the theory and understands it, right, and I see his works to get better and better, more and more, clearer, you know? It's older, right? He understands better, but his imagination is not as good, right? I know I review Euclid, my imagination is not as good as it was 20, 30 years ago, right? I got a little more tired, you know, trying to follow something, and so on. But I understand these things, impressed with them more and more, you know? To the fourth day. Then one goes forward thus. It seems that in the understanding there are not any, what, habits. For habits are conformed to, what, operations, huh? I repeat, operations, you form a habit, right? But the operations of man are common to the soul and the body, right? As is said in the first book about the soul. Therefore, also the habits. But the understanding is not the act or form of a, what, body, as is shown or said in the third book, huh? The soul, right? Therefore, the understanding is not the subject of any, what, habit. Or, everything that is in something is in it through the, or in the way of that which it is. There is, he is received according to nature. That's what I used to always say. But that which is a form without matter is act, what, only, huh? But what is composed from form and matter has potency and act together, right? So matter is to the form and its ability, or potency is to what, act, huh? Therefore, in that which is form only, there cannot be something that is at the same time in potency and in, but only in that which is composed from matter and, what, form. But the understanding is a form without matter. Therefore, habit, which has potency together with act, as it were a middle, existing between both, cannot be in the understanding, but only in the conjunction, huh? That is composed from the soul and the body, huh? It seems to make sense there to the natural philosopher, right, huh? But maybe he doesn't have a universal understanding of act and ability, but one gets to the ninth book of wisdom, right? Moreover, a habit is a disposition by which someone is well or badly disposed to something, as is said in the fifth book of, after the book is in natural philosophy. But that someone is well or badly disposed to the active understanding comes about from some disposition of the body, whence it is said in the second book of the soul, that those who are soft in flesh, they seem to be, what? Well, act by the mind, huh? That's the perfection of their sense of touch, right? So, to kind of give a few lectures there, we talked about the neglect of the sense of touch, right, huh? Of the basic thoughts come from the sense of touch, like good and love and so on. Therefore, the knowing power or habits are not in the, what, understanding, which is separate, but in some power which is an act of some part of the body, right? Your flesh is well-complexed. And I always thought in my teaching years, you know, that the more intelligent girls are bad-looking, too, for the most part. So there's some truth to what he's saying there, right, huh? That's a bad component, yeah. You know, and I found that in the truth. How does something do you want to talk? No, he said, suckers are the ugliest bad athletes, right? By saying some truth about this woman, right? But again, this is what the philosopher in the sixth book of the Ethics lays down, scientium, right? Episteme in Greek. And sophia, sapientium. And what? Nous, intellectus, right? What I call natural understanding. Which is the habit of principles. To be in the understanding part of the soul, right? So does this one have parts? It has potential parts, as Thomas has said. It's interesting, because in Aristotle, it takes up the word part there, and whole in the fifth book of wisdom. And he just distinguishes between the, what, interval whole, or composed whole, and the, what, universal whole, right? But Thomas says the potestative whole is in between those two, right? He's an out, right? It's like Aristotle in the Poetics, right? He just distinguishes tragedy and comedy, right? Now, he doesn't talk about the two forms that Shakespeare has in between, right? But Aristotle does speak of part there, in the sense of the potestative part, right? Part of the power, right? The soul, right? In the dianime, right? There's even a quote there, right? It doesn't have the quote there, but it says the part dianime, right? Or, you know, in Latin. About the part of the soul now, which it understands, and grass, and so on, right? So you call them parts, right? But he's using the word part in a different sense, and the two he distinguishes, and the, what? This book, right? My answer should be said that about knowing habits, some have opined opinions that are diverse, right? They have opined diversely. For some, laying down that the possible understanding was something one and all men, right? This is that strange opinion on some of the years. They were forced to lay down that the knowing powers are not in the understanding itself, but in the interior sense powers. By you or what? Supposed to receive something from this. But it is manifest that men, what? Are diversified in their, what? Habits. Whence they cannot lay down, right? Knowing habits to be directly placed in that which, existing one in number, is common to, what? All men, huh? Whence the possible understanding, whence if the possible understanding is one in number in all men, like Vera was said, right? Thomas spends a lot of time, and he's always, you know, arguing against that position. Then the habits of sciences, according to which men are diversified, could not be in the, what? Possible understanding, which is one, is in a subject, but they would be in the interior sense powers, huh? Which are diverse and diverse, right? You've got better memories than others, and so on. But this position, first, is against the intention of Aristotle. For it is manifest that the sense powers are not rational, per essentium, essentially so. But only by, what? Partaking, right? As is said in the first book of the Ethics, huh? I know it's that distinction between the essential and the partaking, it's a little bit like the distinction between the through itself and through another, right? So Aristotle many times says, and Thomas says many times, that the through itself is before the through another, and the beginning of it, right? So I think when he says that it's before, he means in the second sense of before. So sugar can be sweet without the lemonade being sweet, right? The lemonade can't be sweet without the sugar, right? And the lemonade is sweet through the sugar, right? Or the dishcloth is not wet through being a dishcloth, but it's wet through the water, which to itself is wet, right? But it's almost like that when you say that the, what? What is so essential is before what is so by participation, right? In some way, it's a cause of that, right? And it helps you to understand, you know, some people have thought that there had to be something bad to itself, the evil itself, right? And all these bad things partake of it, like in the Manichaeans, right? But if you think about this distinction being similar to that of the essential and the participation, right? Then you realize that the bad is really, what? The lack of something you should have. Well, a lack of something we partake of something, right? So not going to be an evil through itself, right? That's a little side there. This is a very important distinction. God is being through his essence, right? We're not. My essence is not to be. My essence is, but my essence itself is not to be. But the philosopher lays down the intellectual virtues, which are wisdom, science, and understanding. Those are the ones in the looking reason or the theoretical reason. Are in that which is rational by what? Essence, right? Takes those up in the sixth book. So at the end of the first book of Nicomagic Ethics, Aristotle determines what human virtue is, right? And it involves reason, right? And then he distinguishes between what? The moral virtues and the virtues of reason itself, right? Then he takes up the moral virtues in books to what? Five, and then book six. He takes up the virtues of reason, right? Whence they are not in the sense powers, but in the understanding itself, huh? And he expressly says in the third book about the soul that the possible understanding, when it has thus become each thing, right, huh? That is when it's reduced in the act of what? Singular. Yeah. That doesn't mean singular in the individual sense, right? To the beastly. Through the species, right? The intelligible forms. Then it becomes an act in that way in which the one, knowing scientifically, is said to be an act. Which happens when someone is able to operate through himself, right? And I can go to the body and do a few jump to the 30s, right? I'm going to the body, right? It's like, able to operate through myself now, right? To it, by considering it. It is then also in potency in some way, but not likewise as before, what? Learning from another, from over-describing by oneself, right, huh? Therefore, the possible understanding itself is that in which is the habit of science by which one is able to, what? Consider, even when he does not, what? Consider, right, huh? So even though I'm not considering the Pythagorean theorem, I could go to the board and do it, demonstrate it. Moreover, this position is against the truth of the thing, even, right? For just as, what? Of that is the power of which is the, what? Operation, right? So also, that is the habit of that of which is the, what? Of that is the habit of which is the operation, okay? But to understand and to consider is the proper act of the, what? Understanding. Therefore, the habit by which one considers or understands is properly in the understanding itself, right? So to understand means the act of, what? Reason, right, huh? So the habit of which you understand in the Pythagorean theorem must be in reason, too. Because of what is the operation of that is the habit, right? I forgot that, I was, I was singing in Kittredge the other day. He's a man of wisdom, right, huh? Instead of saying he's a wise man, he's a man of wisdom, man of justice, right? So this is the word of there with that thing, in the way of saying the adjective, right, huh? He's a man of mercy, merciful man, right? He's a man of justice, just man. But here it's, he's what? That of which something is the, what, operation of that is a habit, whereby that operation is, what, well-performed, huh? Now, she's even compared to that first thing. To the first therefore it should be said that some say, as Simplicius notes in the commentary on the predicaments, that because every operation of man is in some way an operation of the, what, union of body and soul, as the philosopher says in the first book about the soul, right, huh? So is it I, the man, Dwayne Berkowitz, that understands, or is it my mind that understands? Well, you say, I don't understand, right? I've got a body as well as a soul. And therefore no habit is of the soul only, but of the, what, conjunction of the two. And to this it follows that no habit is in the understanding, since the understanding is separated, right? It's not in the body, as the argument proposed proceeds, right, huh? But ist eratio non kogit, this reason doesn't, what, coerce us, force us, right? For a habit is not the disposition of the object to the power, but more the disposition of the power to the object. Whence the habit is necessary that the habit that be in the very power itself, which is the beginning of that, what, act, right? Not, however, in that which is compared to the potency as a, what, object, right? Now, understanding itself is not common to the soul and the body, except by reason of the, what, phantasm or the image, huh? As is said in the first book about the soul. But it's clear that the phantasm or image is compared to the, what, possible understanding as a, what, object, huh? As is said in the third book about the soul. Whence it follows that the understanding habit is principality, it's not denying altogether that it's in the images, right? But it's principality, right, huh? On the side of the understanding itself, not, however, on the side of the phantasm, which is common to the soul and the body, huh? And therefore it should be said that the possible understanding is the subject of the habit, huh? To that belongs to be the subject of the habit that is in potency to many. And this, most of all, belongs to the, what, possible understanding, huh? You see that in the history of modern philosophy, right? You know? But how strange everybody's got. They're not going one direction or another. Whence the possible understanding is the subject of the, what, think from the intellect's memory? Well, we're going to be in my memory now, you see. If you mean how the intellect retains these forms, right, huh? The habitual form, you call that memory, right? Well, you're not always using that form, right, huh? Mm-hmm. But it's subject to your will, right, huh? So I can pull up a definition of reason or a definition of reason. So there's a distinction between the habit of the intellect and the intellect's memory? There's a distinction between those two things? Well, they're somewhat similar to those two. So... I mean, if by memory you mean the habitual retaining of the form whereby you understand, right? Mm-hmm. And that's sort of the same thing, isn't it? That's what I'm trying to distinguish because it seems, you know, when you learn something for the first time, you know, if you don't repeat it, you kind of forget it. Yeah. But then if you... But in the... I'm just sort of, you know, activating it. But in the, there's a memory, you know, which is a sense power, too, right? Mm-hmm. On the interior senses. And that's kind of tied up with the singular, right? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. And I was laying in bed last night and I said, Oh, gee, did I forget to pray this for so many people you pray for every day? So I tried to say these prayers, you know, or I fall asleep, you know. And I said, I think I might have said them, I guess. I just can't remember, you know, because sometimes I'm delayed in the time I see them, you know. If I don't see them at a certain time, you know, then shouldn't they have said them, you know. And they said, well, you need to get a double advantage, and they said, we're going to take a choice of that person. I take it in medicine. I take two of these in the morning. Did I take two or did I take one? I got to the cap to the dead. I said, is it Tuesday or Wednesday? I think about the box that I had, the tea was open, so it's Wednesday. It's Wednesday. So there I got some box on Wednesday. This is proof, it must be Wednesday. But if you could not, you know, if that was the geometrical theorem, I couldn't remember, you know, in a sense, the image, right, of the triangle, you know. I couldn't recall my argument, maybe, you know. Erstal has a beautiful proportion there, right? He's saying that the images are to reason, like the exterior, what, colors, right, are to the eye, right? And can I see that monk over there in the wall without it being there? No. No. See? But my seeing it takes place in my eye, right? And so likewise, reason doesn't understand what a square is without imagining a square, right? So the proper object of reason is what it is, is something imagined, right, or sensed. But yet, that object is not that in which it sees or understands. It's kind of that subtle thing, right, then. I remember having a student in class there, you know, years ago, and he wanted to, I think he was thinking the brain is the organ of thought, like, I told in high school, I guess, the brain is the organ of thought. He said, well, so I was helping him stay his argument, right, and he said, you know, blow in the head in the face of thinking, just like a blow in the eye in the face of seeing, right? So the brain is the organ of thought, right? And I thought, well, the brain is the organ of thought, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah, that's, in front of his opinion, right? He said, okay, now, suppose you're in a room with no source of light except the light bulb that's turned down in another room, right? Now, a blow on the light bulb would refer to you as seeing me, right? Therefore, the light bulb is the organ of sight. No, no, it's not true. So, a blow on the eye interferes as seeing, right? A blow on the light bulb, in this example, interferes as seeing, right? But both are not what? The organ of what? Sight. Yeah. But there's some connection. If a blow on the light bulb interferes as seeing, there's some connection between the light bulb, which in this case is the source of light, and seeing, right? So, I say, if a blow on the brain or alcohol going to the brain interferes as a thinking, then there's some connection, right? But the blow on the light bulb is interfering with seeing not on the side of the organ, but on the side of the, what? Object, yeah. So, what is the blow on the brain or alcohol going to the brain or drugs going to the brain interfering with? The organ of thought or the object of thought? Well, you don't know. You've got to give me a reason for saying one or the other, right? It's not, it's kind of obvious, like in the case of the light bulb, that's not the organ of sight, you know? And then when Aristotle was shown by a separate argument, right, that the understanding can't be, what, material, right? And the way Aristotle shows it, basically, and he's kind of inductively sitting from the senses, and the senses have to, what, lack the object that they know, right? So, if my tongue was, you know, sweet, I wouldn't be able to taste things, right? It's got to be without any sense of taste. But then you get to the understanding, and that's able to know all material things in some way, huh? Therefore, it must lack any material, what, nature, right? Or he's got the example there of the, what, the fact that the understanding knows something, what, universally, right? And therefore, it's separated from the source of individuation, which is matter is subject to, what, quantity, right? So, there's many ways to show that the understanding is not, what, not material. And therefore, a blow in the brain is not interfering with the, what? With the power itself, but with the object, right? And that's like, you know, you take that pain out of the womb, where it's going to be afraid of my seeing it, but not because my power is going to be afraid of it, right? But the object, huh? So, if the universal, the understanding of the universal is not in the body, right, huh? But the habit whereby you are perfected in thinking about that, right, is in the, what? Yeah, because the thing that has the operation is also that which has the habit whereby that operation is, what, perfected, yeah. I'm just curious, thinking that the intellect actually has habits, where, I mean, the inclinations to operations in one direction. Yeah, it's probably the, there's an order of these, what, thoughts in the mind, right? The habit of the mind is basically an order of the thoughts, right? Interesting, like the forms. Or the forms. Okay, you wrote the best book. Yeah, yeah, yeah. In fact, I was at the dinner here, there, at the tribune theater, and they sat me next to a young philosopher there, and so he's talking about teaching ethics and so on. And so I said, what is the first definition in the first book? Well, the definition of the purpose of life, right? I said, no. What's the first definition in the Nicomagian Ethics? Good. Yeah, yeah. So you're talking about that, you've got to start there, right? So, the habit consistency would be what? Forward order. Oh, interesting. Oh, okay. That helps. I remember my brother Mark, you know, when he was teaching geometry, right, and then correcting exams, you know, the geometry. And sometimes, you know, a student gets mixed up, right? And he takes the later theorem to prove the earlier theorem. And so, maybe it does follow, you know, if you assume the later theorem, you know, the earlier theorem follows, right? And so, you've got to be careful when you're correcting, right? It makes sense, right? Then the guy's really taking the less known to prove the more known, right? And what was unknown when the other day was known. And so, you know, the order has got to be there, right? You know, I see how much Indiana says to me one time, you know, I'm getting a little personal there, and he says, why don't you go see Fr. Boulay more often, he says, you know, why don't you pay my attention to Boulay, you know? I said, well, he doesn't have the order you have, let's hear. To be deconic in Indiana, he's got the order there, right? Yeah, and these theorems I was talking about earlier, you know, there are other theorems that lead up to those, right? So, you've got to see these ones first, you know, and it's kind of marvelous the way you rise in it, but even among those things I naturally understood, there's an order, right? Being is before one, and one is before the true, and two is before the good, right? You only understand something one. Okay. So, can we cut the first, we apply to the first objection here in Article 4? Okay, now we apply to the second one. The second should be said that just as the potency or ability for esse sensibile, right, belongs to what? Bodily matter. So the potency to understandable being belongs to the what? Possible understanding, right? So it's a different kind of what? But potency, it's a different kind of act there, right? Once nothing prevents, in the possible understanding, there'll be a habit, which is something in the middle between pure potency and perfect act, right? But there can't be anything like a habit in God, right? There's no potency whatsoever, any kind in God, right? So Thomas, I mean, Aristotle will talk about the mind, right? That the soul, before you learn or discover, right, your reason is in potency, right? And then after you've learned or discovered something by not thinking about it, we're in potency in another way, right? It's the first act and then the second act, right? But God is always in the second act, you're at the, you know, so God's, you know, understanding is actually understanding. Actually understanding everything, right? It says he's being, being all the being could possibly be. I mentioned how in the Ninth Book of Wisdom, right, Aristotle begins with what? The act called motion, right? And the ability for that act is the ability to be moved or the ability to move, another, right? And it's not to the second part of Book Nine that he talks about act and ability, what? Universally, right? Then you see other senses of act besides motion, and then other kinds of ability besides ability for what? Motion, huh? But it's objection, in a sense, shows you the way the human mind goes, right, huh? Because the man here is kind of stuck on the first, what, occurrence, right? So you studied the first book of natural hearing, the first book of the so-called physics, right? You learn that form is act and what? Matter is what? Pones your ability, right? And, you know, Aristotle makes a beautiful stigma, you know, that form is something godlike, right? And Plato shares that opinion with Aristotle, right? Thomas says, well, yeah, God is pure act, right, huh? So form being an act seems to be godlike as opposed to matter, right? And he gets interested in the argument and so on. He says, oh, my goodness, you know? But, you know, you've got to realize that your knowledge of act and ability there is somewhat limited, right? It's not the universe of health, you're the wise man, right? You know, the order of natural philosophy, it goes from what? The general to the particular, as Aristotle shows in the premium to natural philosophy, and it goes towards matter, right? And it does that twice, right, huh? When it goes from, you know, the physics to the Decelo and then to the book on generation corruption, it's going towards matter, right, huh? And it's going from the general to the particular. Because in the physics, you talk about motion in general. You talk in the Decelo about locomotion, which is more general than alteration and substantial changes. You're talking about generation corruption, right? And then you take up the soul, right? And you do the same thing, right? You go towards the body, right? Well, what do you do in wisdom, huh? As Monsignor said, you're in a separate way. You're going towards the immaterial, right, huh? So it's just the exact opposite in the sense of what you do in natural philosophy, right? So in a sense, the more a man immerses himself in natural science, the further he goes, the more he goes down into matter, right? It just makes it kind of hard for him to be a wise man, right? You know, each science has its own way of proceeding, right? So Decelo proceeds in a much different way there, right? He goes towards matter, right? When he gets into wisdom, he's going towards the immaterial, right? So he goes from material substance towards the immaterial substance and ends up with God, right, huh? But also, to some extent, he's going from the, what, particular, meaning the less universal, towards the more universal. You see it most clearly in the ninth book, right? The ninth book is, you see in Thomas' exposition, right? It has three parts, right? And in the first part, he's talking about acting ability, but in a, what, particular way. Second part, in a completely universal way. Third part, the before and after of acting ability, right? Then you see that God's going to be the first act, right? Really beautiful way it proceeds, right? But when you go from the first and second part, you're going from the less universal, right? Just the act really meaning emotion and the ability and reference to emotion, right? Then you're going to act in a bit of universal way in the second part. Then you see ability in a more universal way, right? And this objection, you know, from here is following the order of the ninth book, right? But when you take up, you could say with substance like that, you know, you take up substance in the seventh and eighth books, you start from, what, material substance, right? And then you come to a kind of a general knowledge of substance that you can use even in talking about the angels, right? So to some extent, you're going from that particular choice. And when you take up the one and the many, right? Well, I mean, everybody's got the one that's comfortable with being mixed up with the one that's the beginning of what? Number. Number, right? And you have to rise, you know, it's very difficult. And as Thomas points out, even those two great minds played in Avicentia, really, really great minds. Because they haven't quite seen it, you know, and they're getting the difficulties, right? So it's hard to rise, you know? But you go from the one that's convertible with being to the one that's, I mean, excuse me, the one that is the beginning of number to the one that's convertible with being. You're going towards the more, what, universal, right? And you have to do that in order to know that God is the one, right? And so, there are examples of that, but you kind of see that, in a way, it's almost contrary to the way that it proceeds, huh? And now, geometry is a third way of proceeding, right? There are the, what simple is before the composed, and the equal before the what? And that, you know, the great Euclidean observes that even in its definitions, right? So he's going to define equilateral triangle, then isosceles triangle, then scaly triangle, right? Or he's going to define square, you know, and the other, and rhombus and rectangles and so on. And that was the last ultrapezium, right? You know, because the first four are all, what, parallelograms with the opposite sides and angles are equal, right? But then, you know, beyond that, in the square, all the sides are equal, right? And all the things are equal, and so on. And he states the axioms, right? Quantity is equal to the same or equal to each other. If equals, they are equal to each other, and so on. And finally, the whole is more than the part that's unequal. And then you get, you know, the first book of Euclid ends up with the 47 theorem at the end. It's the Pythagorean theorem, right? And then the converse of it in the 48th, right? Well, then it's not until the, what, second book, in the 12th and the 13th, that you get the theorem about the obtuse angle triangle and the acute one, where the square opposite, the obtuse angle, is more than the sum of the one, and it's the exact amount that is more. And in the acute angled one, it's less, right? It's the exact amount that it's less than. And so those come later, right? The theorems are more about unequal. And he proves them by the Pythagorean theorem. You know? So the equal comes before, right? Or like I was saying about, he defines even number before what? Odd number. Because divisible into two equal parts, right? The other one is divided into, can't be divided into two equal parts, right? And he defines it as different from the even number, right?