Prima Secundae
Lecture 137: The Causation and Growth of Habits

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Now, whether some habit is caused from acts, it seems to the second one goes forward thus. It seems that no habit can be caused from act. For a habit is a certain, what, quality, as has been said above. It's the first species of quality. But every quality is caused in some subject insofar as it is receptive of something. Since therefore the agent from this that he acts does not receive something, but more he, what, sets forth something from himself, he admits something. It seems that it cannot be that some habit an agent is caused from his own, what, acts. Moreover that in which is caused some quality is moved to that quality, just as in a thing that is, what, heated or cooled. Now, what produces an act causing a quality moves as is clear about the thing that is heating it or chilling it, right? If therefore in something was caused a habit through its act, it would follow the same thing with the mover and the moved. Shocking. The agent and the patient, right, huh? Yeah. Which is impossible, as said in the seventh book, the physics, huh? So, if a reason by thinking causes a habit in my reason, the reason is acting upon itself, right? But then the reason is undergoing at the same time, right, huh? So, same thing, acting upon and undergoing. You know, that's really terrible. It's really terrible. It's destructive of all philosophy. Serious stuff here. No wonder that guy stopped reading books. But I was showing something now, right? You really need to hope to be a, what, philosopher, right? And this is what comes out in a beautiful dialogue called the Phaedo, right? Because they would love to know whether the soul is immortal or not. They really want to know if the soul is immortal, right? And then Socrates developed some arguments that the soul is immortal, and they're kind of satisfied, except for those two hard thinkers there, Simeus and Sibis, and then they come in with their objections, right? And all of a sudden, Socrates' arguments collapse, and you can't trust an argument, right? And you look good, and the next moment you say it's defective, right? So you kind of despair, but so Socrates at that point, you know, he tries to lead them out of that despair, right? And the guy who's, you know, narrating it, you know, says, I never admired Socrates more than at this time, right? And then the other guy who's listening to it says, yeah, how did Socrates do, you know? It's beautiful the way Socrates leads them out. I remember my cousin Donald being so amazed by this way that Socrates does it, huh? And it is a really interesting way he does it, huh? But that's the duty, in a sense, of the teacher there to give hope to the student, right, huh? And not to, what? Yeah, I told you the example there with Monsignor Dian there, you know, where Gassiric was saying, you know, he didn't follow the class and so on, he had some questions about it, so he came and saw Monsignor in the office there, you know, and so you talk much differently in the office than he did in the class. He said, wait, what are you doing there? He says, oh, it's the business of the teacher to encourage the student, he said. I said, no, just discourage him, right, huh? You know? I was lucky to have Gassiric and Dekonic and Dianne kind of in that order, right, huh? Because Gassiric would encourage you the most, right, and then with Dekonic you get more caution, you know, and with Dianne, you know, as my friend Warren Murray says, you know, his principle of passion is fear, right? But that fear of being mistaken, right, huh? The fear, you know. And his first reaction to a new idea is to reject it, you know. So he had to justify it, you know, and so on. So, more of an effect cannot be more noble than its, what, cause. But the habit is more noble than the act of seeing the habit, which is clear from this that it renders more noble acts. Therefore, the habit cannot be caused from an act preceding the habit, huh? Against all this nonsense is what the philosopher says in the second book of the Ethics, where he teaches that the habits of the virtues and the vices, and he's thinking there are the moral virtues at that point, are caused from, what, acts, huh? Thomas says, I answer you, it should be said, that in the agent, sometimes there is only an active, what, principle of its act. Just as in fire, there is only the active principle of, what, eating. And in such an agent, there cannot be some habit caused from its own, what, act. And hence it is that natural things are not able to be accustomed to something, or just accustomed to it, as is said in the second book of the Ethics, right? So it's hard to accustom your eyes to ear, right? Or your ears to see, right? I just can't do that, right? You know, keep on, you know, putting my ear to the painting there in those books, you know, and I still can't. I can't taste the water like that. But there is found some agent in which there is both an active principle and a, what? Passive of its act, as is clear in human acts, huh? I just need to say, well, it's a magician there, it makes me think of the syllogism, right? The conclusion of the syllogism, right, is something that my understanding is in potency for, right? But in the premises, I have an active, what, principle, right? That's an example, isn't it? What he's saying here, it seems, I don't know. For the acts of the appetitive power proceed from a, what, desiring power, according as it is moved from a grasping or knowing power, representing its object, huh? And further, the intellective power, according as it reasons of all conclusions. Hey, just like I was saying. You read this before, didn't you? No, I didn't. I didn't. I wouldn't be excited about it if I did. It has, as an active principle, the premise, per se, what? No termite, okay? Whence from such acts there can be, what? Some habits caused in the, what, agents, right? Not as far as the, what, first active principle, right, huh? But as he guards the, what, beginning of the act which moves the, what, moved, huh? For everything that undergoes and is moved by another is disposed through the act of the, what, agent. Whence from the multiplied acts is generated a certain quality in the passive and moved power, which is called a, what, habit. But just as the habit of moral virtues are caused in the impetitive powers, according as they are moved by, what, reason, huh? So Plato compares that to a man taming a, what, a horse, right, huh? And the habit of science is caused in the understanding according as it is moved by the first premises, which are the axioms, right? Then as you go forward in geometry, you're moved by the previous theorems that have been shown, right? And they move you to the, for the conclusion, right? To the first theorem, it should be said that the agent, insofar as an agent doesn't receive anything. But insofar as it acts moved by another, thus it receives something from the mover, and thus they have it as well. To the second, it should be said that the same, according to the same, cannot be moved or removed, right? But nothing prevents the same by itself to be moved according to diverse things, right? Let's put it in the definition of syllogism, right? Speech in which some statements lay down, another falls necessarily because of those laid down, right? So it's another, right? To the third, it should be said that the act preceding a habit, insofar as it proceeds from an active principle, proceeds from a more noble principle than is the habit generated. But reason itself is a more noble beginning than is the habit of moral virtue in the desiring power generated through the customs of the act. And the understanding of principles is a more noble principle than the science of what? Solutions, yeah. Intellectives above, shins, yeah. Wonderful. Give me time for one more article or whatever. Whether through one act a habit can be generated. Ah, I think it's the opposite side. To the third, one proceeds thus. Because it seems that through one act a habit can be generated, right? Oh, it's going to take a further side. For demonstration is an act of reason. But through one demonstration is cause science, eh? There you go. Which is a habit of one conclusion. Therefore, a habit can be caused from one act, eh? Now you know what it's like to sit in Monsignor Dion's class, right? A habit can be generated by one act, right? Super. Moreover, just as it happens that an act increases through multiplication, eh? So it happens that an act grows through intention, right? But acts being multiplied, a habit is generated. Therefore, also, if one act is much, what, intensified, it could be a cause genitive of a habit. Moreover, what about the repentant sleeve there, right? Yeah. In the crowd, isn't it? Yeah. That may do with the next question. Moreover, health and sickness are habits. But from one act, it happens that a man can be, what? Healed. Filled or sick. Yeah. I hear people going, he's a chiropractor. He's, you know, oh, fling, fling, fling, all of a sudden he's fixed. Yeah. Yeah. Therefore, one act can cause a habit, eh? Yeah. Against this is what the philosopher says in the first book of the Epyx, that one, what, swallows it, does not make spring, nor one day, eh? So, likewise, neither does one day make one blessed or happy, right? According to the habit of a perfect virtue, as is said in the first book of the Epyx. So, as Thomas says, virtue is the road to happiness or beatitude, right? And vice is the road to what? Misery, right? And therefore, the habit of virtue, and also, for the same reason, another habit, is not caused by one act, eh? Well, I answer, Thomas says, that it should be said, as has been said, a habit is generated through an act insofar as the undergoing power is moved by some active beginning. But for this, in order that some, what, quality be caused in the undergoing, it is necessary that the active one totally conquers the passive, eh? The overcome it, you know? The overcame the nerve, yeah. Once it seems that because fire does not immediately conquer its, what, combustible, it does not at once inflame it, eh? But little by little, paulatama, it gets rid of the contrary dispositions. That thus totally conquering it, it impresses its, what, likeness? Yeah. Now, it is manifest, however, that the active beginning, which is reason, does not wholly, is not wholly able to overcome, right? Superventure, the appetitive power in one act, eh? In that the appetitive power has itself in many ways and to, what, many things, eh? It is judged, however, by reason in one act, something to be desired according to determine, what, reasons and circumstances. Whence from this is not totally, what, concretely appetitive power, that it be born to the same thing, for the most part, per modem naturi, right? Because the virtue is like determining it to one, right? So it's said to be per modem naturi. Nature not being able to be more than one thing, as a teacher Shakespeare says, eh? Which pertains to the habit of virtue. And therefore, a habit of virtue cannot be caused by one act, but to, what, many, right? So he's saying that the reason cannot entirely overcome it, right? And that's the way the sense of the man is trying to, what, the playlist comparison, make the horse docile, right? The horse first will pull the man off, right? He can keep on getting on, but eventually he breaks down the horse, right? And my friend, Washington Irving, describes this, you know, with the wild horses in the west there, right? And it's pretty quickly that they get, but not even all at once, though, you can't do it, right? Can you train a dog all at once? Well, in a sense, trying to train your emotions is like training a dog or a horse, right? But you can't overcome it right away, right? The existence there. But in the desiring powers, right? I mean, excuse me, in the apprehending powers, the grasping powers, the knowing powers, it ought to be considered that there is a two-fold passivity, right? One, which is, what, the possible understanding. The other, the understanding, which Aristotle calls the, what, passive one, which is the particular reason, right? And that's, what, a bodily organ, huh? That is the vis cogitativa, right? With the memory and imaginative powers, right? With respect, therefore, to the first passivity, which is the possible understanding. There can be something active, right? That by one act, totally conquers the power of the passive. Just as one proposition, per se known, convinces, right? The understanding to assent firmly to the, what, conclusion. What does not make or do a probable proposition, right? Like you have in dialectic, right? And therefore, you need many probable arguments, right? To kind of bring reason into agreement. Whence, from many acts of reason, it is necessary to cause the habitum opiniativa, the pining habit, huh? Even on the part, right, of the possible understanding. But the habit of science can be caused from one act of reason, as regards the, what, possible understanding. So when you do that first theorem in Euclid, right, you're doing something marvelous, right? But as regards the, what, inferior apprehensive powers, it is necessary for the same acts to be many times, what, repeated or reiterated. That something be firmly impressed upon the memory, right, huh? Whence the philosopher, in the book on memory and reminiscence, and memory and recalling, says that meditation confirms the memory, right? So you have to repeat the thing, right? So I'd say to Surrey, you're always talking about the same thing. Well, you're going to have to put up with this, isn't it? Ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha, ha The bodily habits are able to be caused from one act if the active is of great power. Just as sometimes a strong medicine at once induces what? Health. Health, right? And so this is clearly the response to the objections, right? So it's mainly in regard to the imperative powers that you need this repetition. Yeah. So if you're going to be a parent someday, you've got to repeat things here, huh? Don't do that. Pow! It applies in the knowledge to me, too. Yeah. Believe it or not. Believe it or not. I keep telling you about it. You've got to finish the project. So in the noise, can you have it be caused by one act? No, he said in the understanding there could be. In the possible understanding, not on the side of the sense bars that serve the reason, right? There you have to repeat the thing, right? Yeah. I wonder, just partly from a psychological, the moral standpoint is that St. Alfonso says there are some, they sin bad habits, especially venereal habits, that the strength of the pleasure involved in the sin is enough to contract the habit. He says after one act, now I don't think he's arguing strictly, but he's pointing out a psychological fact that if somebody's not inclined to practice virtue, I suppose in some way he's cultivating his life already in himself, at least in his imagination, so that it's sufficient one time and he'll go back to it again and again and again, as if it had happened after one time. That was what that lady said when she came, we were talking about child abuse and we were talking about, what if somebody tells you, well it was just, it was the first time it ever happened and her emotional response to that was, there's never a first time, what I think she was talking about is that this kind of, this kind of vice is something that once, for the first time you've got the habit. I think that was my interpretation of it because I remembered that. He's going to say the mass there in Japan, I guess that didn't pan out, but how many languages did he, what, learn, you know? It's kind of amazing, huh? Was it Catherine of Siena? Yeah, I was just about to touch on it. What? Catherine of Siena, who learned how to read and write because our Lord taught it to her. Yeah, yeah. And also, Padre Pio, there's a work in biography by Raffin, is it, or Ruffin, or Ruffin, where there were a number of people who were healed, but it was purely through God's grace because physically the impediment seemed to still be there, for example, in the vision. Oh, yeah, in the vision, yeah, like the girl, she couldn't turn. She was born without coral. Yeah. Beautiful sense of that. You notice the difference between these two reasons, right, huh? Because the second reason is to produce a, what, a virtue or power that could be acquired by us naturally, right? Right. Why, the first one is one that's more essential, right, to God's infusing, right? Because here you have a habit that you need to have, right, huh, but cannot be produced at all by what? Nature. By nature, huh? Yeah. Now, the first objection there, right, why does God do this for man? Isn't he easy treating others unequally or something, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that God, of those who guards his own nature, has himself, what, equally towards all, right, huh? But according to the order of his own wisdom, for a certain reason, what he gives to some, he does not, what, give to all. Yeah. But that's because, you see, he's in need of this particular thing, right, huh? It's kind of interesting, you know, I was reading Thomas there where he's talking about divine providence and how it extends to all things and so on. And yet, you know, one of the objections is, well, bad in the human race for the most part. And how can you say that you're acting for an end when, for the most part, you're failing to achieve the end, right? And so Thomas has to stop and talk about why you have this situation of, uh, malum in specie humana, ut in foribus, right? Evil in the human race for the most part. And he gives two reasons. One, of course, is from original sin, right? But the other is kind of taken from the nature of man, that he's born, what, not having the various virtues that he needs to be well disposed towards his end, right? So he's kind of like a, a, what, Sarastasis in Dianima there, quotes it. It's like a tablet on which nothing's been written, right? Like a blank page, right, huh? And he quotes it very well as, you know, saying that man's mind is like prime matter in the beginning, right, huh? So it's open to all things, right, huh? And, uh, there's more ways to be bad than to be good, right? So if we just, you know, the chances are that you're going to be bad, unless you get brought up well, right, huh? Narastasis, even, you know, from a human point of view, in the ethics, you know, it makes no little difference, he says, how a man is brought up, right, huh? What habits he's brought up in. It makes, he says, a great deal of difference, and then he says, or rather, all the difference. And, uh, when Aristotle talks about the, the end, huh, he says, such as a man is by his habits, right, huh, so does the end appear to him, right? So, if your, your habits are lusty, you know, then these sense pleasures are going to seem to be the end and goal of life, right, huh? And, uh, if you're, uh, ambitious, you know, in an ordinary way, right, huh, then to, you know, become king or become, you know, like, Richard III seeks to be king, right, or, or Macbeth does, you know, right? It's going to seem, you know, everything that's going to lead to that, even if you have to kill somebody, right, on the way, um, that's the thing to do, right? Right? So, um, to be well disposed towards your end, right, you need these, what, virtues, right, huh? So, if you're born without these virtues, right, then you're kind of open to anything, right, huh? And then probably, what, since there's more ways to miss the target than to hit the target, right, you're more apt to, what, end up bad in some way, right, huh? They have these silly programs on TV there, you know, where they have four chefs, you know, and they've got to, they've got to, they've got to give them some ingredients in the basket, now they've got to make a main course, right, huh? And then they judge who's the best, right, huh? Something wrong with this guy's thing, because he didn't do this right or something, you know, and there's many ways to wreck a meal, right? And he just, you know, starting from scratch, right, huh? Most people would, you know, probably make some mistake, got too much of this or too little of that, or this is too dry or this is too seasoned or something, right, huh? They always tell the story with my little relatives there, and supposed to make coffee cake or something, you know, and cheese, coffee greens in there, you know, instead of, instead of coffee, you know? And so that's coffee, you know, so, and so everybody's been eating this thing and pretending to like it, but, you know, there's no ways to go wrong, right? I mean, it's just, you know? Yeah, that's innovation, that's all. Yeah, yeah. Trial and error. Trial and error. Did you see how essential, you know, it kind of struck me, you know, how essential it is, this whole consideration of virtues, but, you know, being productive. You've got these, what, virtues, huh? That your, uh, hairstyle insists you can't be pruded, right, if you don't have, what, the virtues whereby you're well disposed towards your end. Because of what he said there, right? Such as a man is by his habits, right? So does the end appear to him, right? So if you've got the wrong orientation towards the end, you can't decide what is suitable to the end, because the end is not suitable in the first place. And, uh, but this is behind, kind of, the, you know, for the most part, in men, right? In a civilization, it used to, uh, have that tradition of trying to instill habits in children. Mm-hmm. Then the civilization changes, and they are jettisoning all this, even the whole concept of virtue, and the virtuous habits. Yeah. And on the individual, it's a disaster. But the collective, all the collective of all the individuals, when they're all on board from virtue, the societal or cultural impact is going to be disastrous, too. And you have people, you know, talking about ethics, you know, without talking about the virtues and the vices, right? This, this, this could be done. So, now the, you've got to the second objection, is it? Mm-hmm. Okay. To the second, it should be said that this, that God, in all things, acts according to their mode, does not exclude, but that God, some things, he does some things, which nature is not able to do, right? But from this, it follows that he does nothing against that which is suitable to, what? Nature, right, huh? Okay. So, I mean, you know, it's a natural desire, man, to understand, you know, things, to know their cause, and to know what a thing is, right, huh? You can't really know what God is, strictly speaking, unless you see him face to face, right? So, I mean, is that contrary to our nature that he gives us, the medium vision? No. It's kind of fulfilling what is natural to us, right, but over, in an abundant way, right, huh? To know the cause, and to know the what, right, huh? I mean, Aristotle says, you know, philosophy begins with wonder, wonder, wonder is a natural desire to know what and why, right? And ultimately to know what God is, and that he's the cause of all things, right? And so, you're not going against nature when you give man a big vision, right? You're giving him something that nature is not able to tame, that self. Okay, now we get to the next question, which is, oh, excuse me, there's a clear objection, yeah, okay. This is the thing, the objection is saying, well, since a habit is produced by repeated acts, right, aren't you going to get another habit here, right? To the third, it should be said that the acts which are produced from an infused habit do not cause another, what, habit, but they confirm the habit that already exists, right? So, when I make a confession of faith, right, like you do on Sunday there. mass and so on, you're not producing another, what, faith in you, right, huh? But you're confirming or strengthening the virtue you have already, right? Just as medicinal remedies are administered to a man that's healthy sometimes by nature, and therefore they would not cause another health in him, right? But the health that he had before, they corroborate it. So the act of love that proceeds from the virtue of charity does not produce another habit of charity in you, right? But it's what confirms the love you have, right? So now we're going to come to the topic of the growth of habits, right, huh? I've seen this in the early Greek philosophers now. They'll talk about the growth of habits, right, huh? That learning causes the mind to grow, right? They'll say that, right? Then we're not to consider about the growth of what? Habits, huh? And about this three things are asked. First, whether habits grow, right? They're increased or not, huh? Secondly, whether they grow by, what, addition, huh? Which is the way a city grows, right? That's the way a habit grows, you know? They have a few houses there, you know, and then they have some more houses along here, right? You know? And I live in Shrewsbury, you know, and it's getting kind of busy now in Shrewsbury. And more so than when I first moved to Shrewsbury, you know, we moved there in 69, right, huh? So now it's getting kind of crowded, you know? I was coming home from, maybe from here, yeah. I was going to go to the drugstore and pick up some of my medicine, right? I said, well, I'll go to the second entrance to Shrewsbury, you know, because then I can drive around more easily, you know, in the corner and go into the thing. The cars would line up all the way down to 98. What? You know, you know, look. So, but notice, huh? That's the way a town grows is by, what, additions, right, huh? Right. When we first moved there, there were still some farms in town, right? I remember we used to stop, you know, en masse after Sunday, you know, with the kids, you know, and stop and talk to the horses there, you know, in this one ranch, you know, because the kids like to watch the horses, you know? And so we'd stop and park right there next to the fence there, you know, and talk to the horses, right? Those are all gone now, the horses, the dog, and their houses there, you know, where there were, you know, some farms left, you know? So is this the way habits grow by addition, right? No, right. And third, whether each act or any act, right, causes the habit to, what, grow, right? Okay? Because there have to be a number of acts, huh? To the first, then, one goes forward thus. It seems that habits are not able to, what, to grow or to increase, huh? For growth is about quantity, as is said in the fifth book of the physics, huh? But habits are not in the genus of quantity. We saw that. They're in the genus of, what? Quality. And therefore, about them, there cannot be, what, growth, right? Okay? Well, obviously, the word growth is, what, equivocal, right? Right. And, but it's seen first in, what, quantity, right, huh? As Monsignor Dion says, he can't move the word, right? Thomas will explain how the word can be moved here, right? But that's a good way he begins with objection, right? It makes you stop and think, huh? Moreover, a habit is a certain, what, perfection, as is said in the seventh book of the physics. But perfection, since it implies a, what, end in turn, does not seem to be able to receive more and less, right? You reach the end, that's, that's the end, right? You can go any further. Because your style gives in, in the fifth book of wisdom, is one meaning of perfect, what has reached its end, right? Therefore, habits, a habit is not able to be, what, increased, right? Moreover, in those things which receive more and less, there happens to be, what, some kind of alteration, huh? And for something is said to be altered, when from being less hot, it becomes, what? Yeah, you have the water on the stove there, right, huh? It's cold, and then it becomes warm, and then it becomes hot, right? So it's more and less, huh? But in habits, there is no alteration, as is proven in the seventh book of the, what, physics, huh? And therefore, habits are not able to grow, increase, huh? But against this, is that faith is a certain, what, habit, huh? How do you translate the word fides? You know, it means you say faith, right? Yeah. But you could say also, what, belief, right? Belief, meaning accepting without question. Yeah, yeah. But I think sometimes the word faith, at least in English today, you know, they kind of mix it up a little bit with hope sometimes, right, huh? You know? So we might say, you know, I have faith in you, I trust you, right? You know? You know, is that belief in you, or is that hope, yeah? So sometimes I translate fides by faith, but sometimes I translate it by what? Belief. Okay? And actually you can speak, you know, you know, use faith or belief sometimes for human belief, right, huh? Okay? Like I believe Euclid, right? You know? Even before I see the demonstration, right? You know? Because I've seen him show one thing after another, right, huh? So he says something is so, you know. I expect he's going to prove it, right? So before I see the proof, I expect that, right? But this is, of course, talking about believing God, right, huh? This is a theological virtue. Now faith is a certain habit, and nevertheless it, what? Rose, right, huh? Once the disciples say to the Lord, Lord, what? Increase our faith, right, huh? And I don't know if this is the same as the other text there where the man is dead, the boy that is sick or something, you know, and Christ says, you know, do you believe or something with that effect, and the man says, yes, but help my unbelief. Yeah. He wants to grow in it, right, huh? Okay? Therefore, habits are, what? Increased, right? Habits do, but grow, huh? No problem there about translating agente, right? I didn't translate it as grow and increase, right? But it seems kind of funny to say habits are grown, right? Okay? But therefore, habits grow. I could say that. Now, Thomas says, and it should be said that growth, just as other things, or maybe other words pertaining to quantity, right, from bodily quantities are, what, transferter, huh? Carried over, right, to, what, spiritual things, huh? Okay? This is what Thomas often will speak of, right? The carrying over of a, what, word, right? The word is placed upon this first, right? And they'll say in Latin that's the prima, the first, impositio, which means the placing upon, right? And then reason picks up that word, and carries it over, right, and places it upon a second thing, for some reason, right? If it's a word equivocal by what? Reason. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I have a student who comes to my class there last night, and his name is Richard, right, huh? He says, well, my oldest brother is called Richard too, right? So, is there some reason why these two guys have got the same name, Richard? No. So that's kind of a common example of a name that's equivocal by chance, right? So, my brother Richard is older than this guy, right, huh? But, some reason to come along and take this thing and replace my brother Richard and say, we'll pick this up and we'll carry it over. So, my brother Richard is older than this guy, right? I'm placed on this guy because of some, you know, similar hurt here or something, right? There was no connection, right, huh? Okay. But in the case of the name equivocal by reason, there's a reason why it's, what, carried over, right? And sometimes it's by, what, the ratio of the second thing to the, what, first, right, huh? Okay. Okay, so being or thing is placed upon substances like man and dog and so on and then it's carried over to, what, accidents like the shape of the man, the size of the man or the disposition of the man, right, or the dog, right, because it's something of the first, right, and there's a connection, right? Okay, so the shape is the shape of the man, right, the size is the size of the man, right? So for a reason of that, it's carried over, right? But sometimes it's carried over by a reason of a certain, what, likeness, right, huh, okay? There are other ways that things are carried over, huh? So he says, the word growth, just as other things pertain to quantity, are carried over, transferter, right? I've talked about that word transferter. You see the Latin word translaxio, right? Translaxio means a carrying, claxio is a carrying, right? And trans is a cross, it's a carrying over, right? And translaxio and the Greek word metaphoria have the same, what, etymology, right? Metaphoria, phora means carry, and meta means over, right, huh? So, but it's kind of funny the way these words are coming to English, right? Because in the case of metaphor, what do you do? Well, you carry over the word, but you don't carry over the same meaning, right? Okay? So honey is placed upon the substance that the bees produce, right, huh? And then the husband carries it over and places it upon wife and calls her honey. And this is what? You carry the word honey over, but not the same, it doesn't mean the same thing, does it? Yeah. Okay? Now you see the word translation, which has the same etymology as metaphor. In translation, you're carrying over what? The word? No. You're carrying over the meaning, yeah. And you're trying to find a word in your own language, right? That means the same thing as this word in, is it? Yeah. So, I might carry the word homo over and say, what? Man, right? Okay? Or anthropos. And you carry it over to man. I didn't carry the word anthropos. You do what in anthropology you do. But when you say man, man is not the same word as anthropos, right? But it means, has the same meaning, right? So, it's kind of funny, huh? That although metaphor and translatio have the same exact etymology carrying over, we've borrowed them and borrowed both these words and made an English word out of them, right? But one, for a case where you're carrying over the word but not the same meaning, right? Otherwise, you're not carrying over the word but you are carrying over the meaning of it into English, right? Okay? So, but in Latin there, Thomas will speak of a translatio nominis, right? Which would be like, more like a metaphor, right? But where the name is being carried over, right? Translatio nominis, right? Which is not the way we use the word translation in English, right? Okay? So, he's saying here, there's a transferter, that's the verb form, right? Trans is, you know, pharaoh is from what to carry, right? So, it's carried over. So, he says the word augmentum or growth, just as other words pertaining to quantity, are carried over from bodily quantities to understandable spiritual, what? Things, right? Immaterial things. Now, why do we do that, right? See? Well, on account of, he says, right? The connaturalitatama, the naturality, huh? Of our understanding to bodily things, right? And, which fall under the, what? Yeah, yeah. So, Thomas says that all of our words seem to be taken from the imagination, right? From the continuous, right? And, if you look at these words that are equivocal, you know, by reason, huh? The common words. The first meaning of them seem to be something in the continuous, right? Something that can be, what? Imagined, right? So, we can imagine our bodies being in this room, right? And, that's the first meaning of to be in, to be in a room, right? And, then it's carried over to be a part in a whole, right? And, then it's carried over to a genus and a species. And, a species and a genus, right? And, then form in matter. And, then whole in the parts, right? And, then I've got you in my power. And, finally, until I left my heart in San Francisco, right? But, the first meaning of in is tied up with the imagination, what's most evident of that, right? To bodily things, huh? What's the first meaning of beginning that Aristotle gives? This is the beginning of the desk here, right? It's in the continuous, right? The point is the beginning of the line. The line is the beginning of the, what? Surface, right? The surface is the beginning of the body, right? And, that's the first meaning of, what? Beginning that Aristotle would give in the fifth book, right? And, then he says, we don't always begin at the beginning of the, what? Of the, of the magnitude, right? So, when I go to Boston, I don't go to the beginning of the road that goes to Boston. Because, I don't live near the beginning of the road. I live somewhere in the middle of the road, right? So, that's my beginning, right? In other words, convenient to begin, right? But, still tied up with, you know, a place, right? And, then he says, the third meaning is the fundamental part of the thing, right? So, the foundation is the beginning of a house, right? And, the keel is the beginning, he says, of a ship, right? And, some thought the beginning of a man was his heart, right? That's, that's known, right, huh? The fundamental part, the foundation is the beginning of a house, right, huh? Now, all of these beginnings, those first three meanings of beginning, the beginning is in the thing of which it is a beginning. Like, the point is in the line of which it is a beginning. The foundation is in the house of which it is a beginning, right? Then, you get the fourth sense of beginning, where the beginning is not in the thing which is a beginning. So, I'm the beginning of my children, right? The carpentry is the beginning of the table, right? That's a different meaning of the beginning, right? Much, much more different, right? And, then, he carries it over to the beginning in the mind, right? So, the definitions that Euclid begins with, right? Are the beginning of, what? Geometry, right? And, the axioms and the postulates that he gives, right? That's the beginning of geometry. That's the fifth sense of beginning, right? And, then, the sixth sense is, but any cause can be a beginning. So, even an end can be a beginning in that sense. But, the first meaning of beginning is something tied up with the, what? Like he says here, yeah, on account of the naturality of our understanding to body things which come under the, what? Imagination, right? That's why geometry is the science most proportioned to us, right? And, actually, we, geometry in a way, is more fundamental than arithmetic, even, huh? It's more imaginable. So, now, it's interesting, this is carried over even to God, right? Because God is said to be great, too, right? But, let's not go all the way to God today. Now, that is said in... In corporeal quantities, right, something to be, what, magnum, right, right, according as it is, what, brought to a suitable perfection of its, what, quantity, right, huh? Notice how we'd speak of somebody as being fully grown, right, huh? Or we'd speak of this plant as fully, what, grown, right, huh? And, you know, different kinds of trees, they have a certain, what, height, you know, for their kind of tree, right? And there's different animals that have a different height that they go to, right, huh? So the ant doesn't grow to the height of an elephant, let's say, right, huh? And fully grown, I mean, fully means kind of perfect, right, huh? You know? So this is the idea, huh? Things grow to their, what, pseudo-perfection of their quantity, right? Whence some quantity says regard is great in a man that is not regard as great in a, what else, huh? So you might call somebody, it's a giant, you know, huh? Whence also informs we call something, what, magnum, from this that it is, what, perfect, huh? Now, what man was called great in Thomas' experience? Yeah, yeah, apertus magnus, right? Albert the Great, huh? Some people wanted to start to have it now, calling John Paul the Great, right? Okay? But we have some of the popes who are called great, right, huh? Gregory the Great, huh? Leo the Great. Whence informs we call something great from this that it is, what, perfect, right? Okay? Or we called you a little man, right? I thought it was necessarily insulting to call you a little man. Get out of my way, little man. But a little man is, you haven't quite reached the full size of a man, right, huh? You know? Okay? It's kind of funny, you know, these girls going around buying these high-heeled shoes, you know? I remember, I forget where it was, you know, one of these girls had these high-heeled shoes and she had some accident with the car, you know, because the thing is kind of hard. Why do you wear those shoes, you know? Well, it's because some girls figure, you know, I'm too short or something, you know, huh? They wanted to, you know, if they didn't have the height to be the perfect height, you know, for a woman, right? And, you know, sometimes, usually a girl wants to dance with a man who's taller than her, right, huh? But certainly not a man that's shorter than her, right, huh? Sometimes you see these odd mixtures, you know, in couples, but usually the man is a little bit, you know? Yeah, so you kind of need, what, some perfection of size there, right, huh? So it's because of that idea of perfect that he says is carried over, right, huh? And because the good has the notion of something, what, perfect, right, huh? An account of this and those things. Now, how do they translate mole in your English text? Have you had the English text there? It's a famous quote from Augustine. Things which are great, but not in quantity, to be greater is the same as to be better, as Augustine says. But what is mole in his, a little more concrete meaning, isn't it? What do you have? Is yours Latin or what? Well, this is Latin, I haven't been working at this one. Okay, and since good has the character of perfection, therefore in things which are great, but not in quantity, to be greater is the same as to be better. That's been said. Mole in, it's not the size of what concrete, and I forget what it means exactly. What do you have in your text? Yeah, things which are great, but not in quantity, to be greater is the same as to be better. Okay, we should look up there a bit more. In the Latin, of course, you have all this, what? Alliteration, right? In isque non mole magna sunt, you have two M's there, right? It's the same thing to be meus, more, that mele is better, right? So you have four words beginning with what? M's. They call that what? Alliteration, right? See, rhyming is at the end of the words, right, but alliteration at the beginning. So Shakespeare says, you know, in Tempest, full fathom five thy father lies. Medieval poetry, they are old fathers, the early, the most up to the nation, was the kids, the worst poetry. But Augustine, being a rhetorician here, right, he knows these things, right? But you can't translate these things, right? And keep the, what? Alliteration, right? Just like I used to kid the French there, you know. How are they going to translate, full fathom five thy father lies, well, father is pair, and five sank, you know, they don't alliterate in French, right? So you can't really, what, translate, right? I think what Samuel Johnson said, you know, that the poets force us to learn the language, right, because you can't really translate it into another language, it loses the, what, the spirit, right, huh? I remember the French and Spanish teacher there in the lunchroom one time, I argued with this dumb guy in education, right? He said, oh, you can read things in translation, not clear in the original, you know. Like, nothing's lost, you know, like that, you know. But to anybody who can read it well, you know, with ease, in the original, he realizes the translation, what, loses something, right, huh? They tell this story, you know, one of the anecdotes about Deconic and Dion, right? When Dion first read Shakespeare, he apparently read them in a French, you know, translation, you know. And Deconic says no. Forget about that, he said, and he gave him a copy of Shakespeare in English, right? And so, one time I was up in Monsignor's room there, you know, and I referred to something in Shakespeare, and so we just went to look at the text, and he had several just in the Shakespeare, and he gave him one of them, one of his, got this inscription from Deconic, you know. There's truth to the story, right? But the point is, you know, Father Billy would come in and he'd, you know, Shakespeare in English, right? And Monsignor, he's in class, he'd be in English, right, huh? And they kind of embarrass us because they seem to know Shakespeare better than we knew it, you know, and we're actually a native language, right, huh? But you lose so much, right? Like this, right, huh? So, but the same way with Augustine, Augustine's language is more what, that these things like alliteration, and a lot of times, beautifully said in Latin, you know, but the English, he translated mole there by quantity, and, you know, you lose the alliteration, but not that it's the end of all things, but makes it nice, you know, to, nice taste in the mouth, right? And he's quenon mole magna sunt idemest esse neus quadmilius. Oh, that's, he'd probably say much better than I do, you know, pronounce it much better, but, ole magna neus quadmilius. So, you kind of realize when you read Homer there, even in a good English translation, you say, this is kind of great poet he is, you know, but if you're reading him, you know, at ease, without a dictionary, you know, in Greek, you know, you would be even more impressed, you know, marvelous, huh? I was at this library sale, you know, and picked up a copy of, this last Sunday, of Isai's there, you know, The Agony, and The Works and Days, and so on. And the translator was talking about how, when you translate, it's like the Homer, it's in Dactylic, right? In Dactylic, you have, what, three syllables, and the accent, or the length, and the things on the first syllable, right? So, like in Shakespeare, it says, merrily, merrily, shall I do it now? That's, like, Dactylic, right, huh? But in translating, Hesiod, in English, it's easy to put it in the anapestic, you know, which is just the exact reverse. You have two unaccented, and then an accent to do it, right? And, so it's kind of funny, you know, that it was coming out that way in English, right, huh? But, you know, note of the translator, right, huh? So, but there's a problem about translating, you know? You can translate a philosopher in some ways better than a poet, right? Even though there's sometimes problems, right? Translating is a proper word, huh? So, I don't, I, when I translate episteme in English, I translate it now by a speech, John, I say, um, a reasoned out understanding.