Prima Secundae Lecture 140: Growth of Habits: Addition vs. Participation Transcript ================================================================================ Now we'll look at the second article here, right? It depends upon the one we've just seen. An awful lot in that first article. The second one goes forward thus. It seems that the growth of habits comes about by addition. That's these advertisements, you know, for these companies that are managing your money, right? Wealth, growth, you use the word growth, right? Well, how does your wealth grow, right? Well, by addition, adding more money, you already have, right? And is that the way habits grow, right? You got some justice here and now, more justice in and add to it, right? And then you have more justice, right? That's what people think about grace, you know. I need more grace. I got like a container full. I got a bigger container. Yeah, yeah, yeah. If you have grace here, then you bring in some more grace. And then God's got this big treasury of grace, you know. Yeah, yeah. Or if I love God, then I bring in some more love with God, and then I give in some more love with God, right? Is that by addition, right? Well, first objection. The name of growth, as has been said, I guess in the previous, what, article, right? Is carried over from bodily quantities to, what? Forms, huh? But in bodily quantity, does not come about growth without, what? Addition. Once in the first book on Generation Corruption, it says that growth is an adding to the preexistent, what? Magnitude. You know what you're getting fat means, huh? You're adding fat to the fat you already got or something, right? My mother would say there's more of you to love. I've heard that too, yeah. A sweet way of... More of our habit is not, what, increased, right? Except by some agent, right, huh? But every agent makes something in the subject, what? Undergoing, right? Just as the one eating something causes, what? Or makes heat in the one eating. Therefore, there cannot be, what? Growth? Some addition. Without there being some addition, right? Moreover, just as that which is not white is in potency to white, so that which is less white is in potency to more white. But that which is not, what? White. White does not come to be white except through the arrival of whiteness, huh? Therefore, that which is less white does not become more white except through some whiteness coming upon it, huh? But again, this is what the philosopher says in the fourth book of Natural Hearing. From the hot, there comes to be something more hot, right, huh? Nothing, what? No hot being made in the matter, right, huh? Which would not then be hot when it was less hot, huh? Therefore, like reason, not in other forms are increased. Is there any, what, addition, huh? It's already hot. I answer, Thomas says, that the solution of this question depends on the one that's gone before, right? The premissa. For he said above that the growth and diminution in forms, and what, that criticism there, right, in the book of Apocalypse, right? Is there any criticizing some of the diminution of charity or? You mean a hug of all? Well, yeah, but I mean, there's some criticism, you know, that they kind of decline. Oh, they lost your first love, yeah. Yeah, yeah, yeah. So that's a diminution, right, of the virtue of what? Charity. Charity, right? That can happen, right, huh? Okay. Keep on being Euclid, my job team will diminish, right? Okay. For it's been said above that growth and diminution in forms, which are intended or omitted, happens in one way on the part of the form itself, considered by itself, right, huh? But from the diverse, what? Partaking of the subject, yeah, there's two ways, huh? And therefore, the growth of these habits and other forms does not come about by the addition of form to form, but it comes about through this that the subject more and less perfectly partakes one in the same, what, form. And thus it is that through the agent that is in act, there comes to be something hot in act, right? As it were, newly beginning to partake of the form, huh? Not that it becomes the form itself, but it partakes of it, right? As it said in the seventh book of metaphysics. Thus also, through the intense action of the agent, it is made more hot, as it were, more perfectly partaking of the, what? Form. Form. Not, as it were, what? That's something that adds to the form, right, huh? Okay. And you see, sometimes students, when you're saying the same thing again, right, or talking about the same thing again, oh, I heard that already, no? As if there's nothing to be learned, right, huh? As if they could not partake of the same truth more, what, fully or more, what, perfectly, right? That's a common thing, right? Let's tell us something new, you know? Yeah. That's like the old lady at Midnight Mass at Christmas, and the priest was preaching, and she said, I heard this last year. I heard this last year. I'll start using my sermons. I suppose a guy who teaches high school is like that, and repeats the same thing going over again, without going any deeper into it himself, right? Yeah, yeah. And after a while, it just becomes. It rots in your head. Yeah, yeah, yeah. It's not living there. I wouldn't know I'm up to Laval there, you know. But I knew the physics pretty well, you know, for an undergraduate, right? And especially the first two books, you know, because my teacher, Kisuri, could translate the commentary in the first two books, and in fact, when they were redoing it one time, he had me be one of the proofreads and so on, right? So if I knew any text, I knew that, you know, text in physics there, and especially the first chapter, right, you know? I knew it in English. I knew it in Greek. I knew it in Latin. I knew it. So here, what is the kind of teaching? The first book of physics. So this will be the exciting moment, right? And so, you know, we started to explain everything else. Gee whiz, like the new text albums, you know? It's beautiful to hear that, right? And then when Dianne came on the board, you know, he's doing British, he's really, you know, but you kind of kind of said about the first thing, you know? So these teachers, you know, they were understanding the text much better than you were, right? And so when speaking in the modern lingual, you know, you know, they kind of gave me kind of a quantum leap, right, in understanding the, what, the first chapter there in physics, right? It's been my doctorate thesis where I was contrasting Descartes, you know, with Aristotle about the three roads and so on, and the people basically preceding, you know, Chris. They kind of brought that out very clearly, you know, Descartes' confusion there about certitude and what? Precision, right, huh? And am I taller than you or shorter than you? Probably taller. Yeah. But now let's be more precise. How much taller am I than you, right? The more precise I get, the more sure I get. I'm more sure I'm taller than the table here, right? Then how much I'm taller, how much? And so does precision and certitude go together, huh? Okay. If one was to understand by addition, huh, this growth in forms, right, huh, this would have to be either from the side of the form itself or from the side of the subject, right, huh? Mm-hmm. If, however, from the side of the form, as has been said, such an addition or subtraction would vary the, what, species, huh? Just as is varied the species of color when one goes from, what, right. Yeah. If this addition were understood from the side of the subject, this could not be except either because some part of the subject receives the form, which before did not have it, as if one is to say that, what, cold man who first, what, freezes in one part, huh, when now he, what? Freezes in many parts. Yeah. And you go on to the ocean there, right, huh, it's a cold day, you know, yeah. Get your feet, you know, accustomed to it and gradually go up, you know, but he'll change your good breath, you know. That's when I go back in. Yeah, yeah. Then it's kind of a new subject, right, receiving the form, huh? Mm-hmm. Or because some subject is added, right, partaking the same form, just as if heat is added to heat or white to what? White, huh? Yeah. But according to both of these ways, something is not said to be more white or hot, but what? May use, huh? Great. Great. My whole body is now cold, right? There's one guy who's working on the summer there and kind of construction jobs and so on. But he had a swimming pool, so he'd come home in the afternoon and he'd, he'd have a snark on him. He'd jump down the pool. And stay at the bottom of the pool for about 15 minutes, 20 minutes. Yeah. And we'd bring your temperature down, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah. You're really cool. Yeah, yeah. After the day of working, you know. Yeah, yeah. That's a good idea. But because some accidents grow by themselves, in some of them, yeah, yeah, it can be, come about growth. Through addition, right? For some motion is increased through this, that to it is added something, either the time which it is, or according to the way in which it is, right? And nevertheless, it remains the same species in account of the unity of the, what, term. But the motion, nevertheless, is increased through intensity also, right? According to the participation of the subject. Insofar as the same motion can be made either more or less expeditiously or promptly come about. Similarly also, a science can, is able to be, what, increased according to itself by addition, right? So I had some more theorems, right? Memorize a few more lines, right? Just as when someone learns, more conclusions of geometry, right? See, the same example I've got. Stole it from me. There grows in him the habit of the same science according to the species, right? But there is growing or increase, nevertheless, of a science in someone, according to the partaking of the, what, subject by intensity. Insofar as someone more expeditiously and clearly, right, one man, as himself, another, in considering the same, what, conclusions, right? Okay. So didn't they do that to you out there at TAC? Didn't they get you up on the board to do a theorem from geometry? Yeah. And some people did more expeditiously and clearly than others? Okay. And what did you do? Oh, very clear, very clear. Or else I would just decline. That's two ways, then, of what, doing it, right, huh? When I was teaching in college, you know, you might do the same thing, you know, year after year, right, huh? And sometimes it has one section of the same course, right? And so you have to try to keep these sections parallel, right, huh? Because, you know, if one guy gets ahead of the other, you can't, right? Well, I'd find maybe the second or third time I taught the same thing. I'm saying it better, more clearly, I think, but less time. You know what I do with the last ten minutes, right? So I go ahead, you know, then you get all the stuff. You know, but the worst thing would be if you had, you know, a Monday, Wednesday, Friday class, which is like 50-minute classes, right? And then Tuesday, Thursday, never get the same course on Tuesdays, all the tests of where you left off and where you, you just, it's terrible, right? You have to, you know, make very clear notes to know where the heck you left off, you know. Okay. But in bodily habits, or habits, yeah, none multidation, not much, right, does it seem to come about growth through addition, right, huh? Because the animal is not said to be, what? No. Simplicitare or beautiful, unless all his parts are such, right? That something, however, is led to a more perfect commensuration, this happens according to the transmutation of simple qualities, huh? Which are not increased except according to intention on the side of the subject participating, right? Okay. Now, how this has itself in regard to virtues in particular, well, we'll say something about that later on. Mm-hmm. Okay. Now, to the first objection here, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that also in bodily magnitude, there happens two ways to be, what, growth. In one way, the addition of subject to subject, as in the growth of, what, living things, right? So there's a real, what, addition there, I guess, right? Okay. Adding fat to fat, right? Another way, through only, what, intensity, without audition, as in those things which are rarefied, huh? So, I mean, when you rarefied the water, it gets, what, steam, yeah. But are you adding more matter? A lot of things to think about that. Don't get into the details of what rarefaction really is. But I can't see what he's saying there, right? They're not, uh, it's not, like, growing, but eating too much, you know? Hurricanes eating too much, they say. How about you guys? We had a nice big cake today. Huh? Corpus Christi. They celebrated Corpus Christi today, huh? What about the agent acting upon it, right? Well, to the second, it should be said that the cause increasing the habit makes always something in the subject, not, however, a new, what, form. But it makes the subject more perfectly, if I take the pre-existent form, or, what, extends it, what? To water. Yeah. In a sense, you know, when I studied the early Greeks, huh, you find out something interesting, that all the changes, the one that's most known is change of place, huh? So we take money out of your pocket and put it in my pocket. That's a change of place, right, for the money, right? And that's how I get, you know, get more wealthy, you know. And you get a diminution, right? I get more poverty. The IRS gets, yeah, yeah, yeah. But the thing you also noticed was that there was a tendency in the early Greeks to regard change of place as the only, what, real change, right? And that any other change that seemed to be different than it could be explained by a hidden change of place, right, huh? So Berkowitz sips him some coffee, right, huh? And it's kind of bitter, right, huh? Okay. And then he's distracted and goes out of the room for a moment. When he's out of the room, somebody takes some sugar and puts it in Berkowitz's coffee and stirs it up so that it's, you know, pretty much concealed. Berkowitz comes back and he says, Ah, what was bitter is now sweet, right? My coffee has changed from bitter to sweet, huh? There's been a change of quality, huh? I've discovered a new kind of change, huh? From Pedicles and we have it in the fragrance, huh? Fools, he says, huh? You have no far-reaching thoughts, he says, right, huh? The coffee was and still is bitter. It doesn't change its quality at all. The sugar was and still is, what, sweet, right? What's taken place is a change of place from sugar in the bowl to in your coffee that's mixed up in there. And you think you're tasting sweet coffee. No, you're tasting the sweet sugar that's in the coffee. You dummy, right? Okay, so there you see the, you know, difference there, right, huh? Okay. Now, you know, I make tea in the morning, so you put the water in the kettle and so on. And it's cold and then it becomes, what, warm and finally hot, right? Ah, ah, ah, the water is there, stays there, and it goes from cold to hot. There's another change of, what, quality, huh? Well, you dummy, right, huh? You've got to realize that in the water there, there's these little tiny things. You can't see them, but they call them atoms or molecules, right, huh? And they're kind of snoozing, you know, in the beginning there. And then what you call heating is them starting to go, what, faster, right, huh? And then why, that's why it starts to bounce out, you know, come, you know, spread out, you know, because it's going faster and faster, right, huh? And that's a, what, change of place, right, huh? Okay. And you notice that same tendency, modern science began with the study of change of, what, place, right, huh? And there was an attempt to reduce, like this example, going from cold to hot to a change of, what, a concealed or hidden form of change of, what, place, right, huh? But now, so you see this, then you realize the change of place is really addition, right, huh? And, you know, I forget somebody, you put sugar in your coffee? Oh, bless, thank God. Something to be sorry. My wife was meeting somebody, put five teaspoons of something like that, sugar. Oh! It's just kind of, oh, poor, right? But that's addition, right, huh? You put one in, no, no, no, no, right? You know? Or you put salt on, you know, and some people get too much salt in their food or something like that, you know, and so on. But you can see how coming from the fact that change of place is what's most known to us, right? And there's tendency to, what, you can imagine change of place in a way you can't imagine change of quality. And then for the temp, therefore, to kind of say the change of place is the only change, and you reduce the other ones to this, right, huh? Einstein, in the book The Evolution of Physics Theory, you know, he talks about the first theories, even modern times, about hot and cold, right? And you put a hot body together with, what, a cold body, right, and eat them together for a while, and the hot body would not be so hot, and the cold body would not be so, what, cold? Yeah. Well, there's some substance called caloric, I think was the name they used, and some of the caloric drifted out of the, what, hot body into the cold body, you know? So they're kind of explaining what is a change of quality, or it might appear as really a kind of disguised, what, change of place, right, huh? So, you can't realize why people would speak of, you know, changes taking place by, what, addition, right, huh? You know, these paintings at the French school, the painting, those dyeing things, you know? Well, it changes its color by more dots, that's all, right, huh? This addition of dots and dots, and you get a little color. That one by the seashore there, or the one by the lake there, you know? Yeah, Mornay. Yeah, it's kind of an interesting thing, right? It gives a little idea what's behind this kind of thinking, right, huh? So they have a hard time, you know, realizing sort of kinds of change, huh? They don't really try to, it's hard to understand the ability to enact, right? In an intrinsic sense, huh? In bodies, can't, what, in Heisenberg, in his field thing there, he talks about the well-known formula. Every elementary particle is composed of all the rest. And when he says the well-known formula, I think he means not, you know, well-known to the public in general, but among the students of the elementary particles, right? Because in the experiments, out of any elementary particle, you can eventually get all the rest. So they must be, what, composed of all the rest, right? You can't get something out of nothing, right, huh? But does that really, what, follow, right, huh? If you can get tables and chairs and other things out of the trees, then they must be composed of chairs and tables, and, you know? No. There's not actually a chair and a table and a bed in the trees out there, I don't think, anyway. You know, and Xavier, you know, he kind of saw, you know, that he started anywhere in the natural world and eventually get everything else. So he said, everything must be composed of everything else, huh? And then he, you know, but then he had the idea that there's a greater mind, right, that was going to separate out these things, right? The greater mind began to separate things out, so, and to order things, huh? But he's kind of tied still to the change of, what, place, huh? And Pedicure says love and hate, and all love does is bring things together, and hate separates them, but that's really just a change of, what, place, right? Now, if you can get hydrogen and oxygen from water, does that mean the water is composed of hydrogen and oxygen? If you can get protons and electrons from atoms, they must be composed of them? Well, maybe. But then, you see, when they got to these experiments with the elementary particles, the particles you get out of the elementary particle might be bigger than the original one. It doesn't make too much sense if you think of this as simply a change of place, right? Smaller, right, huh? So when Warren Murray talked to Heisenberg, you know, Heisenberg insisted upon his admiration for Stalin's understanding of potency, right, huh? Ability, right, huh? He talked about it very much in the GIF for lectures, right, huh? Heisenberg, huh? I reminded those things when you had these problems with people who have, give me a little more love, right, give me a little more justice and a little more, yeah. To the third, it should be said that that which is not yet white, huh, is in potency to what? The form itself, right? As it were, not having the form, right? And therefore, the agent then causes a new, what, form and subject. But that which is less hot, or white, is not in potency to the form, since it already in act has the form. But it's in potency to a more perfect participation, or mode of participation. And this follows from the action of the agent, right? Now we come to the third. Should we take a little break here? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Now, there's a, you know, in the famous text there, in the ethics there, right, where Thomas divides order in comparison to reason, right, and he says, you make a distinction of four, right, there is the order which reason does not make but considers, and that's the order of natural things, right? Then there's the order which reason makes in its own acts and thoughts, and that's considered in logic, right? Then there's the order which reason makes in the acts of the will, and the acts proceeding from that, and that's considered in ethics and domestics and politics. Then there's the order which reason makes in exterior matter, like in the wood or something else, and that pertains to what they call mechanical arts, right? Right, okay. So, but when he says the order not made by reason, he says, and here then we include, besides the natural order, the order that's considered in metaphysics, right? Okay. Well, he's got all the parts of philosophy there, plus the mechanical arts, but he doesn't make mention of, what, mathematics, right? Okay. Now, usually when he divides, you know, if you divide theoretical philosophy, like you do in the sixth book of metaphysics, right, you have natural philosophy and mathematics and metaphysics. And so some of the texts, I guess, do put mathematics there too, right? But the original texts, you know, the ones that I first saw, didn't mention mathematics at all, right? Well, I don't know where the Leonidas is goofing there, because if you go to this other text, right, where you speak of the three orders, right, then you get kind of a problem there with mathematics, right, because the order, is that an order made by reason, or is an order found in things, right? Well, there's a foundation for the order of mathematics and things, right, but it's really completed in, what, reason, right, then? That's what I was thinking when you were talking before. I think that's kind of like mathematics, because quantity is in things, but mathematics is more. It's abstract, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. It's taken out of things. Yeah. And so it's kind of an abstract quantity, right, and it has a foundation in things, right? So, in some sense, it resembles logic, right, and we talk about the universal, right, which has a foundation in things, but, you know, it's universal when it's in the mind, right? As opposed to Plato, right, the separated forms, right, huh? And then the universals would exist, but in things, right, huh? Just like you and I do, you know? When we talk about what a man is, right, what is a man if it's cheap, good, and so on, but now you're talking about something universal, right, huh? But, you know, you're not just playing, right, with a chimera, you know, with a unicorn or something, you know, because you're dealing with something that has a foundation in things, right, huh? And, but you're separated what a man is from you and you, right? And we separated what a dog is from this dog and that dog, right, huh? And it's separated only the mind, and then only there is a universal, right, huh? And so the universal has a foundation in things, but dimine is completely, right? And the same thing is true about mathematical abstractions, you know, who is, who do you say, but he speaks of them, you know? So it may be that the Leonine has made a mistake, the new Leonine, right, in adopting those texts that put them together, right? But some would say that they always go together, so they put them together, right? You're saying that mathematics would be? It would be a little complicated there, right, to say, are you dealing with an order in things like you're doing in natural philosophy, right? Or are you dealing with an order in reason, like in logic, right, what's kind of a little bit of both, right? You know, it's got a foundation. It doesn't fit, it doesn't fit, you know? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. And there's a little complication, right, huh? Now, myself, you know, when Aristotle talks about rhetoric, right, huh? Rhetoric is sometimes considered part of logic, sometimes not. Aristotle says that rhetoric is a parafueza, parafueza, which could be translated in English by an offshoot. It's an offshoot, he says, of logic and of political studies, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. Now, if you read through Aristotle's, right, rhetoric there, he would talk about enthamim and example, which are two kinds of arguments, right, which are like, you know, syllogism and induction and dialectic, right? Right, huh? Okay. But then he'll talk about the various kinds of government, you know, and talk about the emotions, all these things, reference to the emotions, you're taking it to the rhetoric, right? So, what is the rhetoric, right? Would you put it with the third order? Political philosophy goes in that third, right? The order which reason makes and the acts of the will and acts of the will, or as you put with logic, right? Well, it's an offshoot of both, right, huh? So, you can use the text, you know, to explain what this is, but you wouldn't put it simply under one or the other, right, huh? Okay. Well, then when I was teaching philosophy and science, let me just put the order in other words, so you see what I'm making here, the order not made by reason, but nevertheless considered by reason, right? And this is the natural order, and this is a concern of actual philosophy, right? And Thomas has the footnote, says, and the order considered in wisdom, right? Or not made by reason. Then, there's the order made by reason, but he doesn't bother with, you know, the rule of two or three, you know. He said, you don't even see that, right? But the next three orders are the orders made by reason, right? So, we have the order not made by reason, the order is made by reason, but he immediately divides into four, right? There's something worse if he divides into ten categories, right? But when Thomas explains it, he always divides into two or three. It's the order made by reason in its own acts and thoughts, right? Okay. And this is considered in the science of logic. Then there's the order made by reason in the acts of the will, right? Emotions, too, he could have, okay? And then the acts of the will, right? And this belongs to practical philosophy, ethics, domestics, and politics, right? And then finally, there is the order made by reason in, he says, exterior matter, okay? And so, you have all these practical arts, like carpentry and cooking and so on, right? Okay? And these two is done by the matter in which they make, right? We require different tools and different way of working, right? So, I used to take example of wood and glass, right? You know, you don't take glue. You don't take a hammer and a saw. I used to contrast my wife and my brother-in-law. My brother-in-law is a carpenter, you know? And his tools are the hammer and the saw. And my wife, she makes, you know, she makes wrestlers, she makes things. But she used the needle and the, you know, and the scissors and so on, right? They cut the material, right? Well, you don't see my brother-in-law, they're trying to cut the wood and scissors. So, you have a matter that requires different tools. You can use the same tools, you can use different kinds of wood, right? But wood and cloth, right? You use the scissors, the little one, and the saw together, right? Or the hammer, the one, and the needle to put it in the beginning. You know, the wife doesn't use a deal. You have a little dress, right? But he doesn't, out there trying to, you know, put a needle. Okay. So, this is what they call the, the, the, the, the cannon parts, right? The pool. Okay. Well, in the text I actually saw, which is in the very end of it, you have the natural and then the reference to metaphysics, right? Some people want to stick in mathematics there, right? Maybe it's not fair to that. But in the case of the rhetoric, where does you put rhetoric, right? Because rhetoric is the art of persuasion, right? And you persuade men to some extent by some argument, or current argument, as Aristotle says. And that seems to be, what? Like this, because you talk about arguments, you talk about logic, right? But then you also, what? Persuade men even more so by moving their emotions and their prejudices, right? And that's something, you know, that belongs to what? Calipatwasi, right? The customs of men, right? Or some guy who hated Nixon out there in California, right? And so you'd follow Nixon's tape recorder. So if Nixon's talking to businessmen, you know, you'd make it a different talk than to talk to the labor man, right? And so on and so. But you have to adapt yourself to these things, right? But the most persuasive things is the image you projected yourself, right? I'm a man who's not talking about, right? I'm a man that, uh, is your good and mine, you know? And I'm wondering if you're not. It's nonsense. I feel your pain. Yeah, yeah, yeah. And, uh, that's, that's the thing when, uh, the Japs striped, uh, the car says Ricky, you know, in the office there, you know, and the boats came through, you know. It's the guy in the other office there, the officer runs in to see if they're crap is okay, and the car says yes, well, what's the problem? You know? That'd he goes out, you know, you know, where the, the Japs, uh, you know, what do you call them? Snipers. Snipers, yeah. And, and, and, and, and, and, and we left the crap and wondering that we just killed a sniper over here. He says, that's, that's the thing to do, he said. That's the right thing to do. That's the thing you're supposed to do, you know? He's got to be getting, you know, he's not afraid at all, right, Dan? So, but you've got to understand what, courage, right, and, and, and these are the things, right, to, you know, to reject this. So it's an offshoot of what? Logic and the political philosophy, right? And, um, I used to take an example there, you know, of, uh, the Maasani's, right? I was looking at one of the Maasani's speeches, right? And he's making fun of the component there because he came up the hard way, right? He's just grabbing the plinches and so on and on. Well, in a, a slave-owning society, you know, you know, that's, you know, that's, you know, that's, it's going to be very bad rhetoric in a democracy, right? Because we'd admire a man who's self-made, a man who was born, right? And, uh, a man who'd work her way up and, you know, start off in a very, you know, that's political philosophy, right? It tells you what the customs are of the democratic man and what the customs are of the mystocratic man. So, um, I would try to put rhetoric and try to shove it into one of these four. I'd say, as my teacher of style says, it's a par-a-fu, as, you know, and, uh, it's kind of an off-shoot, the way he translates English, right? So, it's an off-shoot of these, right? Okay, well, then we're now studying experimental science, right? It's a philosophy, science course, and so on. Well, as my good friend Heisenberg points out, um, you know, modern science is a union of natural and technical science, right? So, experimental science, you know, based on the experiment, is the experiment something natural or artificial? Well, in a little bit of bulk, right? So, it's kind of an off-shoot of, what, these two, right? Just like we're going to be an off-shoot of these two, right? So, you couldn't simply, you know, Heisenberg and Sisyphe, you can't simply talk about the natural world as natural anymore, in experimental science, because there's no way to know these things without acting upon them, right? And acting upon them in a way that, that, that very much changes them, right? So, what do you have? It's kind of an off-shoot, right? So, I was turning to Barthes and Verstappen, and say, you know, okay. Well, then the question was, where do you put mathematics, right? Is mathematics, uh, purely one of these, right? Well, if, as Tommy said, mathematics has a foundation in things, in the natural order, right? But it's, what, abstracted, right? It's completed in reason, right? It's a little bit like the other example, because of universal, right? Universal, you know, has a foundation of things, right? If I get this universal, I get this universal in my mind, cat, dog, and she looked for us, you know? You know, I talk about these universal, man, woman, I got this universal. Where the heck did I get the universal, right? There's a foundation of things, but they weren't universal in things, were they? So, does this in some way explain, at least, I mean, this is kind of related, but it explains the difficulty of Anselm's argument? Because I think his argument has, I think it has a good foundation in his experience of reality, and he's trying to reason from that. That's my, that's my impression of it, but I mean, that's kind of off topic. So, yeah, okay, so, I think part of Fruits is, you know, it's a little complicated. So, this doesn't include everything, right, in the original thing, but it does help you understand rhetoric, right, and experimental science. That's what I've heard, I remember, when my mother used to work at the Art Institute and the Field Museum in Chicago, in both places. She said it was a big art argument among artists whether photography was an art or a technical science, which is, well, you're dealing with a contraption, a gadget, you know, a tool, but it's a question of seeing the light in things and the shapes of things and the composition of certain limits of things, so it's kind of a combination in some way. Yeah, you see these exhibitions they have signed at the Museum of photographs, right, but they're done in such a way that you... Well, you look at Anselm Adams, or whatever his name was, they're just black and whites, and they're just nature, but they're stunning. Well, I was standing in my backyard, and I took them, you know, over and towards the neighbors across, you know, thinking like this, give me a nice picture of them. Except for those damn wire reserves. That's what they do now on the computer, they can change all that. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah.