Prima Secundae
Lecture 145: The Subject of Virtue: Powers, Understanding, and Will

Transcript
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But after that I said, I'm a philosopher, what do I care about? That disturbed your tranquility. Yeah, yeah. By the time I was going into Assumption, you know, and the guy had stopped at the stop thing there and I had come up behind him, right? And I could see this car coming down to you as a lady driver. I just braced myself. Everyone was going to hit, you know? Wham! And wham! He hit my car so hard it went into the car in front of me, you know? And neither one of their cars could move afterwards, right? My car was still about to move, you know, so I had to go down to where they could call, you know? And I go, I might proceed to school, you know, and give my lectures, you know, without any problem. I don't care about this dumb, dumb car. You went and saw in your rearview mirror what she was doing then. You know, I go some route to church, you know, in the morning, wasn't I? I go to the A3 Mass. And these women, they come down the middle of the road, they seem like they own the road, you know? And so I always stay well to the right, you know, because I know there's going to be a woman. And it's not a man. It's always a woman. That's only inductive reasoning, Dr. Williams. It's inductive and you haven't proven anything. It just happens that way in your neighborhood. So virtue is not able to be in the irrational part of the soul, except insofar as it partakes of what? Reason. Reason, right? Is the proper subject of human virtue, right? When he gets to temperance and fortitude, he'll argue that the virtue, the habit, is in, like if you give us the habit. Yeah, yeah, yeah. I mean, insofar as it's reason, but that's where it is, right? Yeah, yeah, yeah. It's not in the mind. Well, he could, I used a quote the other day, the brothers were talking about chastity, he quotes from Augustine on St. Thomas, he says, chastity is not the virtue of the body, but the soul. It would be in the habit. Yeah. Perfectly. But I think men's there means, I don't think it's limited to reason meaning reason, the intellectual purpose, and it just really means the soul in general. It partakes of reason, right? It partakes of reason. It's included in there. Yeah. But, you know, I always say, if you listen to the music of Mozart, right, which is the representation of the emotions, right, that's the best example of how the emotions can partake of reason, right? But like in that thing, you didn't ask this article, did you know that one? Yeah. In a sense, the thing that's good about Mozart's music, and the music of the Baroque too, right, is that it represents the emotions in harmony with what? Reason. Reason, right, huh? And you get to romantic period, you get a little bit of revolt there, right, you know? And as Arceline says, the one thing romantic will not admit is that the reason, the emotion should be subject to the reason it seems to them. Kind of indulge the emotions and so on. And you get the later people that are really crazy, right? I remember driving the car the other day, my wife and I, and I heard Prokofiev's classical symphony came on, you know? Of course, the story I had heard was that they were saying to him, why don't you write more like these other guys? So, you wrote the classical symphony, which is a little bit hysterical, you know, but it's got a nice little piece in it, nevertheless, you know? So, you know, an immensely talented man Prokofiev was, you know, but he's born the wrong century, you know? I told you the story, you know, where I was kind of interested in the music of Prokofiev, and I was going to listen to one of his quartets, you know, the music room at the St. Paul Public Library. And, you know, you write, you know, if you open, you just sign your name, and then you go in there, right, you can do whatever you want, it's in the collection of the library. So, I was in there, and the girl's at the desk, and so, I mean, it's a sound foo-foom, but you can hear the kind of thing. I hadn't been there very long listening to Prokofiev, and the girl comes in, and she thought I had it on the wrong speed. I just laughed, I said, yeah, I said, yeah, this is a coffee up here. It didn't sound right to her, you know? That's common sense, right, you know? I first heard that room, though, you know, the Mozart's 36th Symphony, right? It was one of these beautiful days with the blue sky, these puffy, powerful clouds, you know, and so. And someone said, you know, if all that survived Mozart was the introduction there to the 36th Symphony, you know, it would be enough to establish his greatness, you know? It's such an impressive thing, you know, when you realize it's representing, you know, magnanimity, you know, like it does later on in the Jupiter, which is also in C major, right? It uses that key for representing magnanimity. Then you realize that the emotions can protect your reason, right? Like, if it isn't this crazy, you know, rock and roll stuff, you might wonder, you know? Yeah. It's something to do without reason, you know? Mozart, you know? Now, he says, it's proper, justice is proper, the rectitude, right? Which is constituted about exterior things which come into the use of man, right? Which are the proper matter of what? Yes. Justice, right, huh? But the rectitude, which implies an order to a suitable end and to the divine law, which is the rule of the human will, is common to every virtue, right? So the idea of rectus is broader than just justice, right? Right and wrong, right? Even speaking of right lines, right? I think it's, well, we call it a straight line, we call rectus linearity. Now, to the fifth it should be said that someone can use virtue badly as a what? Object, right, huh? As when he senses badly about virtue, as when he what? Hates it. Hates it? That's one way, right? Okay. Or when he is what? Proud about it. Proud about it, right, huh? Okay. Not, however, in the beginning of its use, that what? The act of virtue itself. The act of virtue is bad. Yeah, yeah. To give alms is good. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But for the wrong reason. Yeah, yeah, yeah. But you could say it's accidental in a sense, right? Okay. A woman's beauty, huh? A woman's modesty can be an object of what? Lust, right, huh? That's prejudice, right? The beauty itself as such is not bad, right? God made it beautiful to catch a man anyway, right? And still, last night, you know, he's going to get married on New Year's Eve, right, huh? And so, that's a proper quote from Shakespeare, you know. Oaken my sides whole to think that man that knows by history report his own proof of who it is. Name which he cannot choose but must be, right? Will is three hours of language for a shared bondage. That's what Yakima says in Sumbiline, right? And later on in Sumbiline, of course, Sumbiline realizes how evil is his wife, right? He says, and he's surprised to him, and he says, Who is can read a woman, right? Yeah, yeah. A magnificent great point. You know, when they explain interligere in Latin about to read within, right? Interligere, right? So, I mean, Shakespeare has that kind of connection with it. Where you speak in Latin, right? Who is can read a woman? Yeah. Well, we see that sometimes, you know. You can read somebody, you know. Don't we see that sometimes? Yeah, you can read somebody's character. Or even one of those, like Padre Pio, he could read hearts. He could read. Oh, yeah, yeah. I read stories about some guy in confession, you know. He's not telling the thing, you know, that he did. He could be very severe with the man, you know. Yeah. He's just read a book about how many guys he kicked out of the confession. Yeah, yeah, yeah. One after the other. Get out of here! When I first heard, you know, that in after the war, there's some of the American soldiers trying to read a confession to him, you know. Because, you know. I suppose I could like what the career of ours, right? You know you're getting cleansed. Yeah. Must we stop there rather than begin the question 15? We did the 6.6 objection. Oh, oh, excuse me. You're not used to doing that. Oh, yeah, I'm entirely weak about it. To the sixth, it should be said that infused virtue is caused in us by God without us doing something right, but not however without us, what? Consent. Consent. It's interesting he says that, right? Where Aristotle talks, you know, about virtues that are gotten by repeated, what, acts, right? And thus is to be understood that it is said that God in us without us works right. Because those things which are, what? Done by us, huh? God caused in us, not without us acting right, huh? For he operates in every will and every what nature. I'm getting closer to the virtues, I want to get to the subject of virtues. Look at the premium, just look at the premium here. Then we'll have to consider about the subject of virtue, and about this six things are asked, huh? First, where the virtue is in the power of the soul as in a, what, subject, right? So where's that geometry? Is this floating around in my head or somewhere? Where is it? Now, my geometry is in the power of my soul, right? My reason, huh? Second, where the one virtue can be in many powers. I wouldn't think it could be, would you? But there might be a connection, right, between, like, foresight and temperance, right? Memory. What they call the foolhardy man, you know? Shows there's some connection there between the vice and the reason, right? The particular reason, but you probably see you make distinctions down this. Third, whether the understanding is able to be the subject of virtue, right? Well, I've got logic up there, and I've got geometry up there. I've got with Medicae up there. I've got some natural philosophy, or the wisdom of nature, as Shakespeare calls it. Even some wisdom up there, right? Some theology, right? There are all kinds of virtues up in my reason, right? Even a little bit of foresight and knowledge, too, which I got. It was really about MacArthur there, you know. He really had foresight there when he was headed to Japan there after the war. He kept the Russians out, you know, trying to get in all the time. It would have made a mess. Like Germany, you know, they would have divided it up like that, you know. And they would have, like Korea, you know, they would have made a mess of the whole thing. Of course, you know, sometimes they were even threatening to invade, you know. And MacArthur says, I'll take the Russian embassy here and lock them all up. The guy says, I believe you would. He said, you won't, you won't. That's the way they had the Russians, you know. It's like, you know, it was Patton in Europe there, you know, the Russians were complaining about something about the use of the boats or something like that, you know. And he just got, you know, into a fit. I could see if he got fit, and the Russians, you know, run out, you know. And he turned to his thing and said, how was that performance, he said. He scared the wits of the guy, you know, huh. You know, he gets his gun out, you know, like, you know, like, you know. So the guy turned to MacArthur and said, I believe you would. He didn't pursue the matter anymore. Whether the, what, irascible and concupiscible can be the subject of virtue, right? Third, whether the sense-acquehending powers, the I here, the maybe. And then, last of all, the will, right? Interesting, he puts the will last, right? Because when Plato talked about these, what did he talk about? You had reason up here, and you had, what, irascible here, and then you had temperance down here, right? And then he had no place left for justice, right, huh? So justice was kind of the order of all of this, right? But actually, justice belongs in the, what, the will, right, huh? So in a sense, he didn't see the will as a distinct subject there, a distinct virtue, right? But he did see the irascible as being the subject of, what, courage, right, huh? And temperance of the concupiscible, right, huh? Of course, when Aristotle begins, he begins in the third book. The first two virtues he talks about are fortitude and, what, temperance, right? And then justice doesn't come in until the fifth book, right? So Thomas is still following his master, Aristotle, here, huh? And interestingly, he takes it to the will last, don't you, huh? You might think he's made about that first, right? But I think he stopped there. Mm-hmm. father son holy spirit amen thank you god thank you guardian angels thank you thomas aquinas dio gracias god our enlightenment guardian angels strengthen the lights of our minds order and illumine our images and arouse us to consider more quickly saint thomas aquinas angelic doctor pray to us help us to understand all that you've written in the name of the father son holy spirit amen so look at the premium here again from the subject of virtue then we're not to consider about the subject of virtue and about this six things are asked first where the virtue is in the powers of the soul right as in a subject secondly whether one virtue is able to be in many powers and it gets down to individual powers huh and third with the understanding can be the subject of virtue now why should there be a question about that we'll see it's the most interesting article in some ways fourth whether the irascible and the concubisable right now thomas and epithumia in greek it's a sense desiring powers now fifth whether the sensitive grasping powers of the averages in them and fourth with i mean six rather with their the will itself right okay no so the first one proceeds thus it seems that virtue is not in the power of the soul as in a subject for augustine says in the second book on free judgment that virtue is that by which one lives rightly but to live is through a power of the what is not to a power of the soul but to its what essence there's an equivocation here in the word to live right and therefore virtue is not in the power of the soul but in its very essence more the philosopher says in the second book of the nicomachean ethics that virtue is what makes its however what good and his work or operation renders it good but just as the opus is what constituted through the power so the one having the virtue is constituted to the essence of the soul therefore virtue does not more pertain to the power of the soul then to its what essence then again those categories you know moreover potency is in the second species of quality virtue is a certain quality it's the first species in the first species of quality habit or disposition but of quality there is not a quality right therefore virtue is not in a power of the soul as in a subject right but against this he says is what aristotle says in the book on the universe that virtue is the ultimate of what the power but the ultimate of something is in that which it is the ultimate therefore virtues in the power of the soul you repeat that as the first argument in the body of the article right so thomas says i answer it should be said that virtue pertains to a power of the soul can be made manifest from three things he's got through reading a chapter in subakana gentiles there's 11 arguments right usually in the summa you know he cuts it off at three right so doesn't stretch your commemorative powers first from the very definition of virtue which implies a perfection of what power right but a perfection is in that of which it is the perfection that's going back to the ultimate potency right secondly from something else we showed before that it is a operative habit right huh but every operation is from the soul through some what power right so when we study the soul we point out that the power is not the same thing as the soul right they're like properties of it now and third from this that it disposes toward the what best but the best is the end which is either the operation of the thing or in the case of making something achieved through the operation proceeding from a what power so if it's the ultimate of it's going to have to be in the what power of the soul is in a what subject right now he applies the first objection by putting out the two senses in which to live is what used right now to live is said in two ways it's taken in two ways sometimes to live is taken to mean the existence the being the to be of the one living right okay that's a good sense of life and you say you died right now okay body is dead right and thus it pertains to the essence of the soul which is the beginning of being for the one what living another way to live is said to be the operation of the one living right and thus by virtue one is said to live rightly in so far as through the virtue someone operates right there i was reading thomas there in the summa kind of gentiles where he's talking about god being what life itself right now of course he uses both because god's being right is god i am who am right and god's operation of understanding and so on is what god is to right it's not something added unto the substance right so he argues in both senses of to live that he has here to god being what life itself right his substance is his being and his substance is his operation right so his substance is life itself those distinctions are made by aristotle too in the books on the soul that's the most common mistake right i was asking the students last night i said uh can you think without words well if you can in some way it's kind of imperfect you know you really know what you you think not only do other people not know what you think you can't say it in words but do you know yourself what you think you can't say what you think and uh but notice the most common kind of mistake is the mistake from equivocation right to the second it should be said that the good is either the end right that's the fundamental meaning that's why aristotle says if you do away with the cause called in you do away with the good no little thing he says or in secondary way and it is said in order to the end okay so in the our father the first two petitions ask for the what end and the second one it means children's order to the end right and then you have the ones that deal with the impediments to the end and therefore since the good of the one doing consists in his doing right the good of the one operating consists of operation this also is what what yeah it refers to the operation and consequent to the power from which the operation what proceeds so even though it goes back and you say the man is good it's because of his what virtue and his operating powers now the last one this is the question comes up a lot can one accident be the subject of another accident and the distinction thomas always makes is this one here to the third it should be said that one accident is said to be in another is in a subject not because an accident through itself or by itself can sustain another accident right but because one accident exists in substance by means of what another accident another accident as color belongs to the body and by the surface yeah whence the surface is said to be the subject of what color and in this way the power of the soul is said to be the subject of virtue the second article it gets more interesting to go along here you know this third article is really important but you've got to see the first and two to the second one goes forward thus it seems that one virtue is able to be in two powers you Of course, Thomas in the body of the article is going to say in some way this is possible, but not simply, right? For a habit is known, for habits are known through their what? Acts, right? But one acts goes forward in diverse ways from diverse powers. As walking proceeds from reason as what directs us, right? From the will as what who says, and by the motive power as what carries out the thing. Therefore, one habit of virtue is able to be in many powers, that seems to be so, but in distinction you're not seeing that. Moreover, the philosopher says in the second book of the Ethics, it's Nicomachean Ethics. There's actually three books come down in Ethics from Aristotle, but Thomas commented on the Nicomachean Ethics. Edimian Ethics, and then they call it the Magna Moralia. And there, you know, Nicomachean Ethics is probably the most basic, but there are some things and other ones too. Especially about the influence of God upon your will. Michael Aristotle saw that. What book is that in? Edimian Ethics. Thomas would refer to that too. Moreover, the philosopher says in the second book of the Ethics, but they're referring to Nicomachean Ethics in all these cases right now, that for virtue, three things are required, to know, to will, and to act immobily, right? But to know pertains to the understanding, to will, to the will. Therefore, a virtue can be in many, what? Powers. There's some element of truth in these things, right? But there's a distinction that should be seen. Moreover, prudence. And what's the English word for prudence? Foresight. Yeah. Winston Churchill uses, and Berquist uses, right? Foresight. But, you know, Thomas, you know, says that prudencia comes from providencia in Latin, right? So providencia is given as, what, an integral part of prudence, right? Because the principal part, it gives a stain to the whole thing. But you can see there with providencia that foresight is the English word for it. Moreover, prudence or foresight is in reason, since it is right reason about things to be done. As is said in the sixth book of the Ethics, why art is right reason about things to be made. But it is also in the will, because it is not able to be with a, what, perverse will, right? As is said in the same book. Therefore, one virtue is able to be in two, what, powers. But against this, virtue is in the, what, powers of the soul, is in a subject. But the same accident is not able to be in many, what, subjects. Therefore, one virtue is not able to be in many powers of the soul, right? Well, Thomas has to see a distinction here, right? That's the first thing the mind has to see is a distinction, right? So Thomas quotes Anaxagoras, right, huh? The first guy, like the sober man, as Aristotle said, talked about the mind, right? The mind to, what, distinguish things, right? So that's characteristic of the mind, right? We've spoken about how distinction is presupposed to, what, order, right? So something can be in two things in two ways. In one way, thus, that ex equo, equally, you might say, right? It is in both, huh? And in this way, it is impossible for one virtue to be in two powers. Notice the reason he gives now, right? Because the diversity of powers is to be, what, noted according to general or more universal conditions of the objects, right? But the diversity of habits according to, what, special or less universal, right? So you might say, you know, that the object of reason maybe is truth, let's say, in general, right? But of geometry, it's the truth about lines and angles and figures, right? Rhythmatic, it's the truth about numbers, right? Natural philosophy is the truth, right? So the object of the different habits come under the more general object of the whole, what, power, right? Whence, wherever there is a diversity of powers, there is a diversity of habits, right? But not reverse, right? It's a little bit like the genus and species, therefore, right, huh? You don't have dog in, what, two different genera, unless one genera is above the other one, right, huh? Okay? But that's why, you know, the word predicamenta there that they use in Latin, huh? He raised his word predicament, huh? He kind of used to be fond of that English thing, right? It wasn't meant to be in a predicament. It's a situation you can't really get out of, right? What you do, there's no way to get out of this damn situation. And this is the way, if you're in the genus of substance, like a man or a dog or a tree, you can't get out and go into the genus of quality, let's say, right, huh? And if you're, you know, the number seven, you're in the genus of quantity, you're stuck. You just can't get out and wander around and be a quality or be a relation, right, you know? If you're double, you're stuck in the relation, right, towards another, right? In another way, and this is the way in which there's an element of truth, right? Of course, as Aristotle says, and Thomas says, you know, in probable opinions, you know, in probable arguments, there's always some element of the truth, right? And this is the element of truth now. In another way is able for something to be in two or even more, none ex equal, right, not as we're equally, but in a certain order, right? And thus one virtue pertains, or is able to pertain, to many powers, thus that it be in one chiefly, right? This is the English word principally, huh? And it extends itself to others, either through the, what? The way of diffusion, right? Or by way of, what? Disposition, huh? According as one power is moved by another, and that's the idea of diffusion, right? And according to, what? Disposition according as one power takes from another, right? Okay? So my memory takes from my senses, right? Okay? And we'll see as we go on, huh? It's very interesting how one takes from another, right? But also how one diffuses or pours itself over the others, right? And so he applies then to the first objection that it should be said that the same act cannot, what? Equally and in the same order pertain to diverse powers, right? But according to, what? Yeah. And in a diverse, what? Order, right, huh? You've got to look before and after, right? Not looking before and after, you're not using your reason, right? To the second it should be said that to know is presupposed to, what? Moral virtue, right? Insofar as moral virtue operates according to right reason, huh? But essentially in desiring, moral virtue, what? Consists, right? Okay? So when you have a good desire, right? Or good love, right? It's got to be a reasonable, what? Love, right? But it's still essentially a love, right? A desire. Now to the third it should be said, and this will come out more in the next article. Foresight or prudence really is in reason as in a, what? Subject. But it presupposes the rectitude of the will as a, what? Beginning. And Aristotle's going to say this about, you know, the moral virtues are presupposed to prudence because they give them the, kind of, the foundation for it, right? Unless I want to eat mildly, the reason I can figure out how much is too much, right? And I see this with people who drink too much, right? right huh you know and the wife is trying to get the husband not to you know drink so much right huh oh i only had a couple of lousy beers right well he's not denying he's not denying the principle right that uh you shouldn't drink too much right but he just can't judge how much is too much right and uh because uh his desire to drink is what yeah yeah guy worked with in the package store there you know he was um saying you know trouble with drinking he says is that once you start to drink you lose your ability to judge how much is too much because he's a funny story about this guy you know he went to the um the uh banquet that they have for the package stores you know and love it knows old days you're a lot of drinking you know there's people you know giving free drinks and so on and he went to the bathroom i guess and he figured out how to unlock the bathroom thing right so his his fellow workers found that he's in there and so they pushed up over the top you don't down to lock the door because he was too drunk apparently then he wasn't was it noah you know got uh you know got uh you know yeah and uh you know i was quoting uh augustine there you know about the perverse and immature love of reason right well you could say that noah didn't have a perverse love of wine but he had immaterial although he wasn't experienced right he didn't realize you know the uh you know how it doesn't hit you all at once and maybe else he doesn't hit you too much you know and he was a little embarrassed there i mean his kids had to cover him up and so on and apparently he's a good man noah you know so we're not gonna see his perverse love of wine but now article three right now this is really a very important article to the third one goes forward thus it seems that the understanding is not the subject of virtue right let's be supposedly understanding now what he said in the second article right he's going to spell it out in terms of misa now for augustine says in the book on the morals of the church that every virtue is love what a narrow-minded mind but the subject of love is not the understanding right but only the desiring what power therefore no virtue is in the understanding right you're guessing saying that and her style says you know that human virtues divide into moral virtues and the virtues of reason right intellectual virtues well these great minds you know disagree what can you say right it's like my brother mark was maintaining you know that you know the war is the greatest great in the world and war and murray was maintaining carbonate sauvignon they say well these two experts are in disagreement was a poor man like me you know so he went back to my brother mark his early position you know the need for a perpetual seminar on this question i keep on testing both of them you know and say he goes in favor of provincial seminars never arrived to a final conclusion but he accepted this case exception that proves the rule there's some element of truth what augustine's saying right you know didn't he see these other things and gustin the guy really wants to understand what he believes even right so they're all in other things i guess one of the reasons why augustine began to be suspicious of the manichaeans was that they were what didn't know the liberal arts right so how could they know it these higher things in the lower things right moreover virtue is ordered to the good as is clear from the things that above but the good is not an object of the understanding but of the desiring power therefore the subject of virtue is not the understanding but the desiring what power right moreover virtue is what makes its however good that's part of the definition right as the philosophy says but the habit perfecting the understanding does not make the one what and doesn't make good the one having it for an account of science or art man is not said to be what good right therefore the understanding is not the what subject of what virtue so you're really confused now right you know a teacher could say it's a business of the teacher to confuse the issue but even that in a sense you know that you see there's some difficulty here right but against this is that men's the mind most of all is said to be the what understanding right but the subject of virtue is the mind is is clear for the definition of virtue induced above there's a definition of augustine i think right when a quality toss amenities right or the mind or anything else is reason right understanding therefore the end so augustine is in contradiction with himself right therefore and the understanding is the subject of what yeah i'm going to meet that formidable kind of distinction called the distinction of some pitch it here couldn't have quit in this article right you've already seen that kind of distinction many times i answer it should be said that it has been said above virtue is a habit by which someone operates well right but in two ways huh is some habit ordered to a what good act in one way insofar is through a habit of this sort a man acquires the ability of the faculty for a good act right just as through the habit of grammar a man has the faculty of what right thing but grammar does not however make that a man will always what speak rightly huh so i can say you you is my students and i are your teacher okay okay for a grammarian can what speak like a barbarian yeah or make a socialism which is a a grammatical mistake right and the same reason is in the other sciences and arts right so the cook knows when he can what ruin the steak by cooking it too much right and uh putting too much seasoning on something right you know you can you know you know they always talk about the time when daddy put too much pepper in the soup you know and okay i did so ignorantly right not through art right in another way a habit not only gives one the what faculty of acting but also makes that one uses that faculty rightly just as justness not only makes that a man be a prompt will to doing just things but also it makes that he in fact operates what justly right okay to notice the difference between justice then and what and the art of grammar right huh the art of grammar enables me to speak correctly but it doesn't necessarily incline me to speak correctly right but the virtue of justice not only incline makes me able to do what is just but it inclines me to actually do it right now and because good just as being is not said simply something according to that which is in potency or an ability but according to what act what does that mean right okay well if i you know say to you are there uh chairs and tables and doors and the trees out there in the campus would you say so without qualification simply no no no you'd say that they are what out there may be an ability right then there's something in the tree that is able to be a chair or a table or a door right then but you wouldn't say simply would you and in a sense you know the early greek philosophers couldn't quite explain this right because they said you know that everything that comes out of matter must already be in there right is that so and suck Socrates kind of makes this mistake in Amino there, right, when he says that the slave boy already knew how to square, how to double rather, meaning the size of a square. As a matter of fact, when he was first asked, he said you double the side, right? You get a square twice as big, sounds good, doesn't it? And Socrates has a conversation where he shows him that if you double the size, you actually get a square four times as big, right? And then he asks him, you know, questions and the slave boy gradually comes to understand. That the diagonal would be the size of a square twice as big, right? He puts together four squares, you know, and the diagonal is going to be half of each of those, right? So it's going to be twice as big, right, the square on top of the diagonal. And Socrates says, I didn't teach him, you know. But did the slave boy in the beginning know, actually? No, in fact, he was mistaken. He's so far from knowing, you know. He didn't say, I don't know. He says, he double the side. And so he's mistaken, right? So Socrates is making the mistake of simply and what? And that's a kundum quid, right? In Latin they say, simply and not simply, or simply and in some way, but a diminished way, right? That's a very common mistake, right? And of course, Meenu himself makes that mistake before, right? Because he says, how can you direct yourself to what you don't know? I told you the simple example I give in class sometimes is, I don't know how many students are in class today, right? But I'm awfully smart and I can direct myself with the greatest of ease to knowing that, right? And I count them and let's say I get 24, right? How did I direct myself with so much ease to 24 when I didn't know I was looking for 24? Well, I knew I was looking for the number of students in class, and 24 is the number of students in class, right? Though I didn't know that. But it is in fact the number of students in class. So in some way I knew, what? I knew what I was looking for, right? In some way. Is that to know simply? And I told you I used to always pick on a girl and I'd say, you know, and she's going to conduct herself, but I'll see. I said, do you know my brother Mark? And she'd always say, no. And they'd say, you know, you know what a brother is? You know what a man is? Yeah. Well, that's it. My brother Mark is. So you do know him, don't you? Well, in some sense, in knowing what a man is or what a brother is, you know every man and every, what? Brother in some way, right? Okay? And if you give me a wine to drink, you say, now what is this? You say, well, it's a wine. Do you know what I'm drinking? In general, in a certain way. Yeah, in some way, yeah. Yeah, but I don't know perfectly, right? And to know something in a generic way, in a sense, is to know it in potency, right? Okay? But if you know the difference between something and nothing, you say, in some way you know everything. One of my students would say, I'm going to go home and tell my dad that he'll like that. He's not the hell that professor. Pitchy. But if you know what something is, right? In some sense, you know everything, don't you? Because everything is something, right? Yeah. But that's not to know simply, but in some imperfect way, right? In some diminished way, right? I told you about how we tend to, you know, if you add, you know, onto a name, you know, you kind of baby-fy it a little bit, you know? So, you know, I know somebody's dad was called Annette, right? And she got older, she didn't like that, Annette, because it means little Ann, right? Well, now she's not little anymore, right? So she wanted to be called Ann, so we all started calling her Ann instead of Annette, right? But that's the way it is, right? See, it's like a child tends to say that, right? Not dad, but daddy or something, you know? So, just go for the paragraph again. And because good, just as a being, is not said something simply according to that which is in potency, right, or in ability, but according to that which is in act. Therefore, from habits of this sort, a man is simply said to operate good and to be good because he is, what, just or temperate, huh? And the same reason about similar things. And because virtue is what makes its have or good and what he does good, right? Habits of this sort, simplicitare, right? Simply are said to be, what, virtues, right? Because they render the good work in act, right? And then simply they make the haver, what, good, right, huh? The first habits, huh, like the grammar, do not, are not simply called virtues, right, huh? Because they do not render the work good except in a certain, what, ability, right? Nor do they simply make the one having it, what, good, right, huh? For one is not said simply to be good from this that he is knowing or an artist, right? But he said only good secundum quid, that he's a good grammarian or a good, what, carpenter or something, right? So from saying geometry, I'm now a good man because I know some geometry, see? No, I might be a good geometry though, right, huh, see? But I'm not said to be good simply, but you have to qualify, right? I'm a good geometry, right? In an account of this, he says, right, plurum quid, right, many times, right, science and art, huh? He doesn't say it's about foresight. He says science and art, right, are divided against virtue, right? But sometimes they are called virtues. This is clear again in the sixth book than the common ethics, right? Now let's go back to that, this kind of a general thing about how names become equivocal by reason, right? Sometimes you have a name that is said of, what, two things, right, huh? And then one of those two keeps that name that is said of both of them as its own name, right, huh? And the other maybe will be given a, what, a new name, right, huh? Okay. And there's two ways that takes place, right, huh? Sometimes one of them adds something very noteworthy that stands out in addition to, right, the common meaning of the name common to both. And then that gets a new name, right, huh? And the other one keeps the other name, right? But then said she had to reverse, right? Sometimes one of them has perfectly or completely what is in the common name and the meaning of the common name. And the other has, in some imperfect way, right, incompletely, in potency, somewhat, as he says, what's common, right? And then it kind of loses that name and it's called just a habit or something, right, huh? Okay? So sometimes he says it's, what, divided against and sometimes it's, what, not, you know? And there's all kinds of examples there. I mean, it runs through philosophy, right, huh? And he's always say, you know, priesthood always say, you know, now, the guy treats the lady like a, you know, person, not as a thing, right? So you're dividing person against thing, but yet is a person nothing, right? No, no, see? But the word thing is being kept by these things that don't have much to say beyond being a thing. And a person who has something very noteworthy, reason and will and so on, right, huh? They can't even name a person, right, huh? So this is, people are constantly getting confused about these things, right, huh? So you can divide person against thing if you want to, but you can also say a person is the thing, you know? So that's a very common kind of equivocation. First, I'll devise habit, a disposition against habit, right? But sometimes you'll say that habit is a disposition, right? But because the disposition is stable and not easily moved, right, it gets a new name, habit, right? And then your mood could change, you know, with a cup of coffee or a good meal or something, that just keeps the name disposition, right, huh? Okay? Does man have reason or understanding, right? That's a good example of it, right? And sometimes we say, well, reason is, man has the same thing as his understanding, right? And sometimes we say the angels have understanding and man has not understanding, but, yeah, which they call in Latin sometimes, intellectus abumbratus, right? Overshadow, you know, reason. So when Shakespeare defines reason, right, he defines it by looking rather than by what? Seeing, right? Because looking doesn't imply that you are understanding very much, right? And he says, first, you have to have a discourse, right? Because by a discourse that you come to understand, right? For the most part, we understand very little. It's very little, and very general, right? Without discourse. But most of it is, you know, I translate the Greek word episteme, right? Which means in Greek, you know, coming to a halt or a stop, right? But if you go back to the great Boethius there, where he says that understanding is to reasoning as rest is to emotion, right? So episteme, by its etymology, right? Names and understanding comes after emotion, right? So I translate episteme, which is usually translated in Latinx, right? I translate it into a reasoned-out understanding, right? So my good teacher there, Euclid of Athens and Alexandria, right? He has a reasoned-out understanding of lines and angles and figures, right? And a reasoned-out understanding of numbers, right? In 7, 8, and 9, right? That's a good way I think of translating it, episteme, right? You don't see it at all in Latinx, right? But I don't see the one word you can use to really get the sense of what both Plato and Aristotle point out, episteme, you know, comes from the word to come to a halt or a stop, right? So it signifies a rest or an understanding that comes after, right? But the English word understanding is really a marvelous word, right? And the word standing comes from the word standing, right? So it's like Boyica says, right? It's a kind of rest, right? But there could be an understanding that's kind of in the beginning, kind of a natural understanding, right? But simply, episteme is a reasoned-out understanding. It's an understanding that comes after what? Motion, right? So that's what he emphasizes there in the definition of reason is reason, right? It's the ability for a larger discourse looking before an actor, right? Trying to understand, right? We do understand a few things, right? So he says the first habits, though, right? Do not simply, are not called simplicitare virtues, right? Because they do not render the, what? Work good except in a certain, what? Ability, right? Nor do they make simply the man, what? Good, right? But he's a good geometer. Or he's a good cook. Right? For one is not said, for man is not said to be simply good, from this that he is knowing, or that he is an artist, right? But he's said to be good only secundum quid, as a good grammarian or a good artist. Okay, we read that out before. Okay. So he says the subject, therefore, of a habit, which is called a virtue secundum quid, right? Is able to be the understanding, right? Is able to be the understanding, not only the practical understanding, right? But also the speculative understanding, right? Without any order to the will, right? As the philosopher says in the sixth book of the ethics, that's the book that's about the virtues of reason, right? So science, wisdom, and natural understanding, right? And also art, right? Which isn't a practical reason. Are laid down to intellectual virtues, but in this, what? Secundum quid, right? He's going to say something different about prudence, and also about faith, right? Now the subject, however, of a habit, which simplicitair is said to be virtue, right? He's not able to be, except the will, or some power, according as it is moved by the, what? Will, right? And the reason for this is because the will moves all the other powers, which are in some way, what? Rational, right? It's going to involve even the emotions, right? He moves them to their acts, as has been had above them. And therefore, that a man in act, and not just in ability, right? Bene agad, acts well. Happens from this, that a man has a good, what? Will, right? So my knowledge of the art of deception, or the physical reputations, right, huh? I can come into class, and I can, what? Deceive the students, right, huh? And if I did that, you know, and left them in deceived, right, then I'd be making a bad use of my, what? Power? Yeah, my knowledge, right, huh? Okay? So I'd come in and show them, you know, that the whole is not always more than the part. Oh, yeah. But it's by the equivocation of the word whole and part, right? I told you how I do that, right? And thus, that man in act acts well, happens from this, that man has a good will. Whence the virtue that makes one act well, in act, right? Not only an ability, it's necessary that it either be in the will itself, right, or in some power according as it is moved by the will, right? Now, it happens that the understanding is moved by the will just as the other, what? Powers. For one considers something, an act, in that he wants to, right, huh? So I want to do some geometry now, right? I've been at it for a while, but... And therefore, the understanding, according as it has an order to the will, is able to be the subject of virtue, simpliciter dicte, right? It's simply. And in this way, huh, the speculative understanding, or reason, is the subject of what? Faith, huh? For the understanding is moved to assenting to those things which are of faith from the command of the, what? Will. And then he quotes the great Augustine, right? For no one believes unless he wills to do so, right? I suppose you have to do that to see the pulpit is somewhat off the cuff remarks, right, huh? Okay? It's just because, if you know, the idea of proselytizing or converting was kind of nonsense, right, huh? Yeah. Well, the way in which there's an element of truth in that is that no one believes unless he wills, right? And so you have to... I was listening to Junior Holm yesterday, right, and he was talking to a guy from Northern Ireland there, you know, and he had become a Catholic, right, huh, and so on, huh? But he was trying to use his reason all the time, right? Get this in. And God finally said to him, you know, can't you be a fool for me, you know? So this is what he's saying, right, huh? That's kind of a strong way of putting it, right? But he did, so... I think that's what the Pope does. Mm-hmm. I think that's what he's saying. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. Put it out your eye, but, I mean, it's kind of a, kind of a shocking way, you know, in a sense, kind of an abrupt way, you know? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Eyebrows, but... But notice, he says that the, the, what, faith is in the speculative, huh? Looking reason, right? Because primarily its object is, is God, right? And God is, you can't leave on him. Just ignore him, right? Right.