Prima Secundae
Lecture 146: Prudence, Moral Virtue, and the Irascible and Concupiscible Powers

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But the practical intellect is the subject of what? Foresight. Since foresight is right reason about things to be done, it is required for foresight that man has himself well towards the beginnings of the reason of what? Things to be done. And these are the ends. To which a man has himself well through the rectitude of his will, well, just as to the beginnings of speculative things, the natural light of the agent, what? Intellect, huh? The things that are naturally understood, like the whole is more than a part, right? Okay, that's underlying geometry and so on, right? But underlying foresight is the rectitude of the will, right? To the guard to the end. So I don't want to be just to other men. I'm not going to reason, I'm not going to figure out what to do, right? Unless I want to eat and drink moderately. I'm not going to know when I've had enough. If I have the excessive desire to drink, right, I'm going to easily go beyond and say I'm not, you know, might even argue the policeman about it, right? Now that's what he says, a beautiful, beautiful proportionate comparison here, right? And therefore, just as a subject of reasoned-out knowledge, right? Which is right reason about things to be looked at. You know how Shakespeare defines it by looking, right? Is the, what? Spectative, the looking understanding, in order to the agent, what? Intellect, right? Which lumens the, you can see, we naturally understand. So the subject of prudence is the practical understanding, but in order to what? Right will, right? You can see why he had the article two before this, right? Because that was kind of laying the foundation, right? But a virtue can be, to some extent, in some way, in what? Yeah. But not in the same way, right, huh? And in some order between them, right, huh? It's an order here of what? The beginning of foresight is the end, right? So if your will is not, you know, you've got to be, you've got to know the end not just in a speculative way, so to speak, right? But you have to be inclined to the end in a concrete way with the will. That's interesting, huh? It's a beautiful text, huh? So, in your final exam, you're going to have a question of what does foresight and faith have in common, right? Or why are these, although in reason, right, why are they virtues sempliciter, loquendo, right? Why art and sciencia and so on are not sempliciter, right? Virtues, huh? It's a beautiful text, huh? Interesting. And Aristotle saw that, you know. Aristotle insists upon that, right? If you don't have the moral virtues, you can't really have foresight, huh? You can have worldly wisdom, we'd say, you know, but you can't have really the virtue of foresight, huh? Isn't that in, it's either in Aristotle and or in the commentary, where the word for moderation of temperance refers to saving your reason or anything? Yeah, so for sune, yeah. But you can't have the virtues without foresight in some measure. Yeah, yeah. They're concerns of the means, right? But it's kind of interesting. I used to talk to students a bit and I'd say, it's kind of subtle, you know, because, you know, as Dionysius says, the good of man is to be in accordance with reason, right? I'd say to them sometimes, which is better, knowledge or love, right? And in the premium to the three books on the soul, right, Aristotle wants to talk about how this is a very good knowledge. And he begins by saying, holding as we do that all knowledge is good, but that one knowledge is better than another because it's about a better thing, right? Or because it's more certain, right? In both ways, we could say the knowledge of the soul is very good knowledge, right? Okay. But notice Aristotle is pointing out that all knowledge is what? Good. Good. All knowledge is such as good, right? There was one time there in that question period afterwards that father was asking about, you know, sex education, right? But is to know some of these details about this, is that as such bad? No, it's because of the, you know, the sakes or the passions and so on, right? That it's not suitable, right? Okay. So it's because it's something other than the knowledge itself that it's not suitable to give this, right? I told you how when you're doing the commandments, the commandments are little. Well, it came to the sixth commandment, right? They're just little kids, you know. So what's adultery, daddy, right? So I said, it's stealing somebody's mother or father. Oh, yeah, that sounds pretty bad, right? And it's not really a false thing I said, right? But I thought it was appropriate, you know, for a little one, right? And so there's some things that's not appropriate for them to know, right, huh? But it's because there's something else in them, right, huh? It's not the knowledge itself that is bad, right? But it's all love as such good. And so, you know, we're talking about, you know, the famous text in the Trinitati of Augustine there, right, huh? He speaks of a perverse and immature love of reason, right, huh? That gets people in this, you know, if you've ever been to the academic world, you know what I'm talking about. Or you pick up Reason magazines like that, right? You know, these kind of atheistic things, you know. But they have a perverse and immature love of what reason, right? But is it possible, you were saying before, that Noah had not a perverse love of wife, but an immature love of them. And I was saying to my students, and I said, can a man have a perverse love of a woman, right? Sure. And an immature, you know, love. And they're not exactly the same thing, right? But they're both not good, right, huh? And so, not all love is what? Good, huh? So, only a love that is ordered, right, as opposed to perverse, right, huh? A love that is mature in some way, right, huh? Now, I think there was an expression I used to use in the last day. I was telling him as a kid, puppy love, isn't that the word? Yeah. What is puppy love? Is that a good love? No. Immature. Yeah, but I think you'd call it immature rather than perverse, right? Yeah, yeah. You know? Or I left my neighbor's wife, then I got perverse love of a woman, right? So, there it seems, you know, that it's reason, right, or knowledge, right, that orders things, right? And therefore, it seems that the knowing powers, right? I mean, the love and so on, depends upon knowledge, right, to be good, right, huh? But here it seems to be reversed, you know, because you have to, yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. I mean, eventually this will come out, maybe later on, huh? But you can see a problem, which comes first, right? Chicken or the, you know, egg, right, huh? Which comes first, reason or the, what? The rectitude of reason or the rectitude of the will, because seeing the rectitude of the will depends upon being ordered, right? And it's reasonable, it looks before and after, and therefore knows order, right? And, you know, that's why Dianusius says, you know, for man to be good is to be, what? A reasonable? Yeah, to be informed of reason. That's what he says very clearly, Dianusius, right? And there was Tal would say something like that, right, and so on. Thomas himself would say something like that, huh? But then you have Augustine talking about virtue as love, right, huh? You know? And, but of course, he actually says the order of love, right? So, there's some knowledge that comes before the rectification of the will, right? But then there must be the rectification of the will before you can have foresight, right? So, that's a very subtle thing, right? And Aristotle saw that, right? Thomas says, this is a very interesting article, huh? So foresight depends a lot on experience. Yeah, but I mean, it depends upon the rectitude of the will and even of the, what, the rasible and cubital appetites, right? Shall we take a little break, or? Where the irascible and the concupiscible are the subject of virtue, right? To the fourth, one goes forward thus. It seems that the irascible and the concupiscible are not able to be the subject of virtue. First of all, because these powers are common to us and the beasts, right? The boots. But now we speak about virtue according as it is proper to man. For thus it is said to be human virtue. Therefore, the irascible and concupiscible are not able to be the subject of what? Human virtue. Human virtue. Which are parts of the sense-desiring power, huh? Greek, as I mentioned, they called them the thumas and epithymia in Plato and Aristotle, right? And Plato says in encourages and thumas and temperances and epithymia, yeah. Moreover, the sense desiring power is a power using a bodily organ, right? But the good of virtue cannot be in the body of man. But the apostle says in Romans 7, I know that it does not dwell in my flesh, good. Therefore, the sense desiring power cannot be the, what, subject of virtue, huh? These are all probable arguments, aren't they? Moreover, Augustine proves in the book on the morals of the church that virtue is not in the body but in the soul, in that through the soul the body is, what, ruled, huh? Socrates is that to argue that the soul is, what, immortal, right, huh? Even the body survives death, at least the bones, right? So he fortsiori, huh? The soul that rules the body. Because it's more like God was definitely immortal, right? Because it ruled the whole universe. But if the soul rules the body, it's more divine-like than the body. Therefore, if the body survives, right, at least the bones, and they say down in Egypt, you know, even the mummies there, they preserve the flesh. But then therefore it's the ori, the soul is preserved, right? Pretty interesting, Socrates' argument, so. Okay. Whence that someone uses the body well, the whole should be referred to the, what? Soul. Yeah. What's the word, origa, they mean in Latin now? Chariot, I think. Okay. Just as, what? That if one makes temperate the chariot for oneself, he, what? He governs the horses. Yeah. Right that he rules. Oh, by which he governs the horses, yeah. Yeah. This whole is, what? Ode to me. Ode to me, yeah. Yeah. Now, Plato is that example of the horse being ruled by the man, right? The chariot, too. Yeah, so it's easier to see that the, than that the reason rules the emotions, right? But something like ruling the horse, no? But just as the soul rules the body, so also reason rules the sense appetite. Therefore, the whole ought to be attributed to the rational part, that the irascible and the conquistable are rightly ruled, right? But virtue is that for which one lives rightly. Therefore, virtue is not in the irascible and conquistable, but only in the rational part, right? You can see how the article, too, is kind of, well, ordered it before, right? Can a virtue be in more than one power, right? Well, there's a certain order among those powers, right? By the way, the auriga also can mean the charioteer, the one that drives the chariot. Oh, okay, okay. I know, there's always been reminded in Shakespeare, the word battle means, you know, the army itself, right? It's a true battle and order, you know? It means army and battle before the battle begins. Moreover, the chief act of moral virtue is what? Choice, huh? So in Aristotle, to find moral virtue, it's a habit with choice, right? Existing in the middle towards us, right? Determine the right reason. But choice is not an act of the irascible or the conquistable, but of what? Reason, huh? The cat doesn't choose to eat the mouse, right? Therefore, moral virtue is not in the irascible and conquistable, but in what? Reason, huh? But against all this is that fortitude, or courage, I guess in the Latin, the English word, are laid down to be in the irascible, right? Temperance, moderation, and the conquistable. When the philosopher says in the third book of the Ethics, as we accept those two virtues, courage and temperance, that these virtues are of the irrational part, right? But they can partake of reason in some way. The answer, Thomas says, that the irascible and the conquistable are able to be considered in two ways. In one way, by themselves, right? Insofar as they are parts of the sense-desiring power. And in this way, it does not belong to them that they be the subject of, what? Virtue. In another way, they are able to be considered insofar as they partake of reason, right? Through this, that they are apt to, what? Obey reason. And in that way, the irascible or the conquistable is able to be the subject of human virtue. For thus, it is a beginning of human action insofar as it partakes of, what? Reason, right? So, in the music of Mozart and the Baroque, right, you have the movement of the emotions, right? In harmony with reason, right? Right? Even Harry Truman, you know, complained about the music of his time, right? Rock and roll, you know, there's no reason. And in these powers, it's necessary to lay down that there are, what, virtues, huh? Now, that in the irascible and the conquistable there are some virtues is clear, huh? For the acts which go forth from one power according as it is moved by another, right? Is not able to be perfect unless both powers is well disposed for the, what, act. For just as the act of the artist is not able to be, what, suitable unless the artist is well disposed for acting and also his, what, his instrument, yeah. In these, therefore, in those, therefore, which are the irascible and the conquistable do, right, huh? According as they are moved by reason, right? It is necessary that there be some habit perfecting one to act well not only in reason but also in the, what, irascible and the conquistable that they are, what, habituated to listen to reason or to follow reason, right? And because the good disposition of the moving power, excuse me, the power, it's a move mover, right? Should be noted according to its conformity to the moving power. Therefore, the virtue which is in the irascible and the conquistable is nothing other than a certain habitual conformity of these powers to reason, right? So, play a comparison to the man taming the horse, right, huh? If you go to Washington Irving's Tour of the West there, you know, where he goes out west, he described really, through the, you know, the disciplining of these horses, right, you know, they get these wild horses and how they tame them, you know, and then the horse, you know, is obedient now, right? And, uh, uh, but notice, uh, first time you get on such a horse, he's going to try to throw you off, right? You've got to keep on coming back upon him, right? And that's what your emotions say to be, they kind of throw reason off, you know, you know? But it's more clear, right, huh? You know? I don't know if you've ever read The Republic of Plato, you know? But in the first book, Socrates kind of overpowers him with his reasoning and so on. And then at the beginning of the second book, you know, someone says to Socrates, do you want to just seem to have convinced us or do you want to really have convinced us? And that's when Socrates blows up the soul big, right, huh? And he compares it to the parts of the city, right? And you can see more the order of the parts to each other than the order of the parts of the city, right? Than you put in, what? In the man himself, right, huh? So, Aristotle, when he talks about the reason ruling the emotions, you know, he raises the question, should reason rule the emotions like a master rule? rules the slave, right? Or like the father rules the son, right? Of course, the father and the son are two different people, right? And the master and the slave are two different people, right? So you can see, you know, better the relation of the two, right? And you can see the relation of reason and emotions, right? Aristotle, you know, eventually concludes they should rule the emotions like the father rules the, what, son, right? And it's because the emotions have something to say about what they do, right? And they, it's not kind of a tyrannical rule, right? But you'll speak for the reason it's ruling the hand, right? Actually, or for this, there's no resistance up out of my hand, right? My emotions is sometimes resistance to go one way or another, right? You know? So, we'll mention that later on here, and they apply to the objections. So what is moral virtue, right? It's a habitual decision to listen to, right? And to follow the reason, huh? But in that horse, there's a kind of something like a habit there, you know? And in the same way with the child, right? Thomas is, I think he's talking about temperance there, you know, intemperance. Because of the childish vice, right, huh? And he's comparing it, you know, to the rule of the father or the child. If the father doesn't discipline the child, well, that goes his own way. Eventually you get to a point where the father can't control the, what, child, right? Okay? The mother used to say to me, you know, it's time when the, please have to stand in. You know? Parents can't need moral control than the kid, right, huh? What's like with the emotions, right, huh? You give in to them all the time, and eventually they become too powerful for you, right? And you can't really, you know? So he applies to the first objection, huh? Distinguishing the element of truth in it from the element of truth not in it. The irascible and incubusable considered secundum se, huh, by themselves, right, huh? Insofar as they are parts of these sense-desiring powers, huh, are common to us and to the, what, beast, right? But according as they are rational by participation, as obeying reason, in that way they are, what, property of man, right, huh? And in this way they're able to be the subject of human virtue, right? Remember when I was in high school there, you know, one of these dance things, you know, where they're talking, the guy's, actually, the words in the song, you know, you don't think I can make a monkey out of you? I will, you know. And without taking a reason, right, huh? You know, therefore it's like a beast, right? There's no human virtue there, right? Not properly human, right? So Gus, I mean, what is it? I guess, you know, talks about how different vices are compared to some animals, right, huh? And so if I'm irascible, I'm, you know, like a dog or something, you know, huh? As Heraclitus says, you know, dogs bark everyone, they don't know. Other vices are like pigs and so on, you know, it could be compared to some irrational animal. Now what about the body there, right, huh? To the second it should be said that the flesh of man from itself does not have the good of virtue, right, huh? But it comes to be, nevertheless, a tool, right, of virtuous act, insofar as reason moving, right, our members, which is speaking to our body members, right, we, what, go to serving justice, right? Ibn Mus, what is that? Ibn Mus, you could say we show them, or maybe you could, I'm not sure. So also, he says, the irascible and incubusable from themselves do not have the good of virtue, but more the infection of the foams, right, huh, from which people's sin. But insofar as, what, they conform to reason, thus in them is, what, generated the good of, what, moral virtue, right? Now in the third one you get this famous distinction of Aristotle. To the third it should be said, in another way, right, is the body ruled by the soul and the emotions, or the irascible and incubusable, by what? Reason, right, huh? For the body, immediately you might say, obeys the soul without, what, contradiction, in those things in which it is apt to be moved by the soul, right? Whence the philosopher says in the first book of the politics that the soul rules the body by a, what, despotic, huh, like a slave, right, huh? That is, as a lord rules his, what, servant, huh? And therefore the whole motion of the body is referred to the, what? Soul. Soul, right? An account of this in the body there is not any virtue but only in the, what, soul, right? But the irascible and incubusable, and how do they translate Newton there anyway? Not at once? Yeah. There's a sense of all at once, right, but kind of like, but how do they translate there in your English text? I'm missing it. It's the middle of the third reply, but the irascible do not obey reason. Do not obey reason blindly. 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Their act, huh? Now, what about the fourth objection, from choice? To the fourth, it should be said that in choice, there are two things. To wit, the intention of the end, which pertains to the moral virtue, right? And the foretaking of what is for the end, which pertains to what? Prudence, huh? This is said in the sixth book of the ethics, huh? Now, that one have a right intention of the end, regarding the passions of the soul, this takes place from the good disposition of the irascible and the, what? Conchipisable. And therefore, the moral virtues are about, about the passions, are in the irascible and the conchipisable, right? I'm disposed to drink or eat modally, right? But then reason says how much I should have, right? Okay. So if I'm going to operate in somebody today, maybe I shouldn't have any cocktail if I go in there, right? But maybe after I operate, I should maybe relax the cocktail or something, right? But reason, only consider those circumstances, right? And say what is appropriate this time, right? Half a man's going to be going to bed shortly afterwards, right? He's got to go out and drive or something, you know? You have to consider these things, right? Usually the doctor has coffee, I think, before he operates. Unless it makes me nervous, man. He's got a shaky hand. Yeah, I say, you know, you would eat more on Thanksgiving, you know, especially if Grandma's gone to a lot of work to make some special pie or something, you know? Have a little bit of water. Yeah, you've got to, you know, but to me, you want to eat that much every day, right? Well, it's called a feast for a reason. Yeah. I was reading it in Mass today, you know, it's from Jeremiah, I think it was, huh? He's talking about it. He's talking about it. You know, they read the whole book, kind of, you know, and they were weeping and so on, and they said, no, no, I'll go home and drink sweet wines and eat this and rejoice, you know, in the Lord, right? Today is a day for rejoicing, not for... Tomorrow we have St. Francis, which he's one of our patrons, so we go on a hike tomorrow, but we won't bring any wine. It's hard to look good. It's hard to look good. Okay. Well, actually, when you have hot dogs, it's better with beer than with wine, you know? Especially if you have mustard, I mean, isn't it? Yeah, yeah. Or hot pastrami sandwich, something like that, you know? Yeah, yeah. Mustard, you know, you want a beer, you don't like... Pizza, you want a beer. Yeah, yeah. That's the only thing I feel like, eating, drinking beer, you know, I don't know, with a meal, it's just... To the fifth, one goes forward this. It seems that in the interior sensitive powers, right, there can be some virtue, right? For, and this is going to be a very interesting distinction that Thomas will make, the sense desiring power can be the subject of virtue, insofar as it obeys reason. We just said that, right? But the sensitive powers, apprehensive powers, the interior ones, they obey, what, reason, right? For, to the command of reason, the imaginative power and the cogitative power and the memory power, right, operate, right? Therefore, in these powers, there can be some virtue, right? I'm trying to remember the arguments that Thomas has, now there's 11 arguments today, you know, I can remember them. Let alone in order, right? I suppose the Middle Ages there, where you didn't have access to books too much, you know, you had to really memorize what you, you know? Here's a chance to read this book, you know, I better try to remember what I read. Take notes. Apparently, that's what St. Thomas was especially famous for, his memorization skill. That's why some of them are wrong, too. Some of his quotes are not exactly correct. It's a memory. It's shocking. Well, Brother Bernard could produce the new and improved version. We're working on it. Well, I'm going to see Dikai one time, you know, and I had my B&I edition of this, but some other book, you know, and I was asking about some, you know, he's going to look at my text so much, and then, by the way, what that, and he's just, Leonine out, you know, and stuff. He's so used to, you know, remembering the page was on, and the thing there, you know. I do that all the time. I remember the position on the page, but then I have to look through the book to find which page that one. Yeah, yeah. Because that's often occurred to me. It was on this page, down here, here. Yeah, see, you have none of that with those computer things, you know. They just, you know, it's gone, you know. But then you could do a word search real fast. So, that's a nice, interesting argument, right? And it's based upon, what, seeing a likeness of ratios, right, huh? Moreover, just as the rational desiring power, which is the will, is impeded in its act, right, huh? Or is also aided through the sense appetite, right? So, also, the understanding, or the reason, is able to be impeded or to be aided through the foresaid, what, powers, right? So, when you're doing geometry, you've got to be able to picture these things, right? The time I was doing the thing with the solid figures, I had a little, you know, cardboard thing, you know. Yeah. Or the dining table, or the kitchen table, or something, you know, help you to picture these things. That's therefore, in the, what, just therefore, as in the sensitive, desiring powers, there can be virtues, so also in the apprehensive ones, right? Yeah, I just obtained, the other day, the first six books of Euclid that somebody had done, somewhere in the 19th century, that instead of referring to lines or angles or whatever by, you know, A, B, or A, B, C, or something, it does them with a little colored diagram. So, in the course of the proposition, instead of saying angle A, B, C, it shows you a little picture from the, it's curious, isn't it, but it helps your visual memory. Yeah. Moreover, prudence is a certain virtue, a part of which, as Tullius lays down, is memory, right, in his book on the rhetoric. Therefore, also in the memoritative part, there can be some, what, virtue, right? For the same reason, in the other interior apprehensive powers, right? So, I find myself, you know, if I memorize a sign of, let's say, a Shakespeare or a poem, I come to know that poem much better, right? Think about it, right? Or I memorize a psalm, you know. You start to notice things, you know, after a while, you know. So, there's your imagination, remember, you start to decline, right, huh? Albert the Great there, he said, a real filial memory towards the end of his life, you know. So, he had a tremendous, you know, scholar and so on. But against this is that all virtues are either intellectual or moral, as is said in the second book of the Ethics, right? But the moral virtues are in the appetitive part, right? The intellectual virtues in the understanding of reason. Therefore, there's no virtue in the, what? Yeah. So, Aristotle divides human virtue into the virtues of reason itself, and then the moral virtues, which are in the appetitive powers that we share in reason, right? So, he divides it into two, right? This guy wants to divide it into three, right? Yeah. Now, Thomas does admit that there are habits in the ones, right? I answer it should be said that in the sense powers, right? The apprehensive ones, right? So, I use that when grasping, right? The thing known as, yeah. He was giving one of the students last night there, you know. Something he said, I said, what is a square? He teaches geometry, right? So, square is an equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral. The equilateral and right-angled quadrilateral is a definition. Therefore, a square is a definition. What's wrong with that? Well, next time you tell me I said that. But in some sense, you know, in the definition you have contained what a square is, right? Without the mind becoming a square, huh? And that's really a beautiful thing, apprehensive, right? The grasp, huh? Of course, with this course, you borrow the name of the act of the legs, right? I don't think you use the hand so much or the feet to name the act of the will, do you? Obscure thing that will. Okay, so he says, In the grasping, the interior grasping powers, there are laid down some habits, right? Didn't say the exterior senses, right? But the interior ones, right? Which is clear from that expression that Aristotle says in the book on, what? Memory, right? And memory, right? That in memory, one thing after another, right? Custom, what? Works, right? Which is like, as it were, a sort of nature, right? We call it second nature, right? It has a similar effect. For it is nothing other, right? For nothing other is a habit that is, what? Constitudinalis. It's kind of hard to make an adjective that in English, huh? Custom and habit. Yeah. Then a certain, what? Habit acquired through custom, right? Which is in the mode of, what? Whence about virtue, Tully says, that's Cicero, in his rhetoric, it's a habit in modem naturae, right? In agreement with, what? Reason, right? In the mode of nature. In man, nevertheless, that which is acquired from custom and memory, and in the other sensitive grasping powers, is not a, what? Per se, but something annexed to the habits of the intellectual part, right? Not a complete habit in that part, right? Something annexed to it. But nevertheless, if there are these habits and these powers, they are not able to be called, what? Virtues. Because virtue is a perfect habit, by which it does not happen except to do the good, right? When is it necessary that the virtue be in that power which is consummating, right? The good work, right? But the knowledge of the true is not consummated or completed in the grasping sense powers, right? But these powers are, as it were, preparatory, right? To the knowledge of the, yeah. And therefore, in these powers, there are not, what, virtues by which the true is known. But that's more in the understanding or the reason, right? Okay, now, if you look at this first objection, by the first objection, you see, I'm kind of elaborating upon this, right? Because the first one is saying, well, don't the sense powers, interior, obey reason, like the emotions, right? Emotional powers, obey reason, you know? Well, let's make a distinction here, right? You're looking before and after, right, huh? To the first therefore it should be said that the sense desiring power has itself to the will, which is the desiring power of reason, as moved by it, right, huh? And therefore the work of the appetitive power is completed in the sense, what, appetite, right, huh? In account of this, the sense appetite is subject to virtue, right? So let's give you an example. There was a last time of driving up to Quebec on the route to President Kennedy, right, with a new car, right, huh? And this crazy Frenchman, you know, didn't like the fact that I was slowing down for all the potholes. So he roared by me, wham, picked up one of the loose stones that was on this terrible road, right? And I could hear a bang against the side of the car, and I knew it was going to leave a good mark, you know, but I said, I'm a philosopher, what do I care, you know? So I, you know, but you kind of talk to your emotions, right, huh? You know, it's like a child, right, huh? You say, no, no, take it easy, no, take it easy. In account of this, the sense appetite is a subject of virtue, right, huh? Because it's consummated, right, with this mildness, right, huh? But the sensitive grasping powers, right, huh? More have themselves, right, maji sehaban, right, don't be too precise here. But maji sehaban have themselves more as moving with respect to the understanding, right? So the images are, what, moving the reason, right? The images is enlightened by the acting upon understanding, right? They're really moving the understanding or undergoing understanding, right? So they're not completing the act, right? And therefore they don't have the enlisted character, yeah. In that the images is a famous proportion of Aristotle. The images have themselves to the understanding soul as colors to the, what, sight, huh? As is said in the third book about the soul. It's a beautiful proportion that Aristotle has. And therefore the work of knowing is ended or completed in the understanding, huh? And in account of this, the knowing virtues are in the understanding of reason itself, right? So Thomas is looking before an actor, and Aristotle did before him, right, huh? That, in a sense, the will comes before the emotions as far as what courage and temperance is concerned, right, huh? Okay. And so, you know, if I'm walking down the hall and you bump into me, right, I get angry. Or reason, you know, in these things, you can consider, right, huh? That, uh, with an intention on your part, right, huh? Like one of these high school kids goes down in the hall and knocks everybody. That's different, right, huh? It may call for a little bit of anger, right, huh? Yeah. But the, uh, you know, if you're using my kids' target practice or anything, you know, if it calls for a deal, it could be a good deal of anger, right, you know? Maybe not to kill you, but I don't know. Stop the damn practice of using my kids. Get the wounded. Yeah. So it's kind of completely right, you know, my anger is, what, obeying my reason, right, huh, according to the circumstances, right? These guys I work with there in the accounting house, as I call it, a place where you come to church's funds there or something, you know? A couple of them, they really always kidding each other, you know, huh? Kind of insulting each other, but it's kind of like, oh, it's all good nature, you know? You know, you have to get your stitches out sometimes, the way you learn, you know? Somebody does the thing to my head, you've come a long way. Yes, yes, yes. I tell you that, they asked me, the guy says, what have you learned since coming here? You know, the company else, and I said, the company, I said, what else is there? I mean, it's a question of before and after, right? That the images are before the reason more, right? The courage and emotions and so on, or the temperance of them is after the well, right? So it's more the completing of the act, right, is there, right, huh? Calm down, you know, calm down. So the completion of this act of calming down is in your irascible, right, Kim? You've had enough, you know, since you're a little kid, right? Had enough. Had enough ice cream. Kim, yeah. We're going to this friend's house, and it was in high school, first time, you know, and he said, take some ice cream, and I said, yeah. He picks out, like, a salad. Oh, I like that, you know. Well, he was underweight, and they're trying to fatten him up, you know. I never got it, just so I used to be that big enough. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Some sisters were telling me yesterday, Mr. Catherine, they get a lot of food donated to the school, and they went someplace, and the guy gave them a big, huge box of something that was frozen. They didn't know what it was. It was expired by, like, two years ago, and they didn't know what it was. Should we eat this, or what is it? They didn't know what it was. Well, it turned out that some big juice, like, ice cream treat, and they said, oh, we probably went chocolate all over our face. So they explained they didn't matter at that point. But anyway, yeah. It was frozen. A little temperance, yeah. A little temperance. So he said, this advice is for the second objection, too, right? One time, Father Boulay was making a point about this, you know, and the reason is kind of almost, you know, at the mercy of the interior of the senses, right? You can't imagine these things properly, right? You can't really do geometry and other things, right? You can't picture these things, right? I know that happened to me when I got to the higher algebra. I did fine algebra one, geometry. And then I got the algebra two, and it's like pre-calculated stuff, and I was just, there was a total disconnect. I couldn't understand it at all. I couldn't imagine, I couldn't imagine it at all. You know, somebody has something you're supposed to do in your computer there, you know, and the instructions are just not clear at all, you know? You can't figure out what you're asked to do, you know? Just tell me what to push, you know? That's all I know. It's translated for the Chinese. Yeah, especially when it's translated for the Chinese. Now, the memory that's in prudence, right? We'll come to that eventually. To the third, it should be said that the memory is not laid down to be a part of prudence in the sense of a, what, subject part, as a species, as a part of the genus, right? As if the memory be itself a virtue, what, per se, right? But because it's one of those things which are required for a foresight is the goodness of what? Memory, right? And thus, in some way, it has itself by way of what? Internal. Part, yeah. So you don't consider it being a virtue all by itself, maybe, you know? It gets more complicated. Remember the alibi. That's part of the military group. You get time is too late for the other week.