Prima Secundae
Lecture 148: Art and Prudence as Intellectual Virtues

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No, I said, you know, my mother didn't, I always tell the story, my mother didn't like when I called man an animal, and I'd say, well, mother, he's not just an animal, he's an animal that has reason, and my mother would say, well, that's better than I. So animal is only a part of what man is, so they all agreed to that, right? But animal includes besides man, dog, cat, horse, elephant, and so on, so somebody's a part includes more than the whole. Oh, yeah, yeah, they're all convinced, right? But in a sense, I have to defend now that axiom, right? And I do so by going to the fifth book of wisdom, right, where Stalin distinguishes between the composed whole that's put together from its parts and the universal whole which is set of its parts, right? I've mixed up two kinds of whole here, right? So when I say animal includes more than man, I'm talking about animal's universal whole, right? Not as a what? Yeah. But I'm talking about animal as a composing part of the definition of man, it's only one of the parts, and there's other parts, like my mother wanted me to say. Maybe that he has reason, right, huh? Or two-footed, right? Two-footed animal that has reason. But I'll cut it. Yeah. Yeah. So, and therefore it has the notion of a more perfect virtue than science, right? Okay. But another way of saying that would be the reason I gave that deals with the very first clause, right, huh? Okay. There's some particular excellence there, right? That you just pull upon it in your name, right? So even in English, if we use the word knowledge, say, wisdom, right? We could say wisdom is what? It's a form of knowledge, right? But you might divide what? Wisdom against knowledge and say that people have a lot of knowledge these days, but they don't have much wisdom, right? And so I'm not providing wisdom against knowledge. Well, you said the wisdom was, you know? Well, the word is equivocal, right? But what kind of equivocal? It's a kind of equivocal where one that has something in common, something else, has also, in addition, something that makes it stand out, right? And you get to say, what? A new name, right? Don't so careful what Thomas is here, huh? Because you've got to know these words and understand these words that are equivocal by reason. Otherwise, you're going to be deceived and you get all mixed up and you don't know what to say. We always say that, you know, the priest is always saying that you've got to treat the girl like a person and not like a thing. Well, she's not a person, she's not a thing, she's nothing. You know, I mean, they're all confused at all, you know? Because there's a tendency, you know, as Monsignor Dion said, there's a tendency to want to make things you're difficult, right? Simplify things, right? And you can't get anywhere in the life of the mind, huh? De Connick used to say, you know, Charles De Connick, you know, that every respect of a word in philosophy is equivocal, you know? I like that. But only a mind that depends upon words in some way for its thinking, right? And upon the senses could be followed up all the time by this equivocation of words, right? To a second it should be said that when the, what, notion of the object under one act is referred to a, what, power or to a habit, right? Then the habits or the powers are not distinguished according to the, what, notion of the object, and of the material object, huh? Just as to the same power of seeing pertains to see, what? Color and light. Light being the ratio, right? Seeing the color, right? And it's seen together with that, right? So you don't know if we're, um, distinguish them, but one is like the reason which you see the other, right? Other things insofar as they partake of light, huh? And Thomas, you know, he talks about God there. When God, um, knows other things or wills other things, he does so under, what, knowing and loving himself. That's the formal object of his intellect and will, right? Okay. Can I explain the text very well there? I think he says, according to the notion of the object, I think he's talking about the formal object, okay? And the material object, you know, distinguish between the two. So, it's not like one thing is hearing the, what, seeing the color and the other thing is seeing the color, right? But the color is visible insofar as it partakes of light or something of that sort, right? Just as to the same power of sight pertains to see color and light, which is the reason of seeing color and seeing all together is seeing what? With it, huh? Okay? So, when I, when I see the shape of this table there, um, I, I see, what, the shape and the color at the same time, see more, right? But in the case of principles and conclusions, they're not, what, see more, right, huh? Okay? So, man who sees the principles doesn't always see right away. And so, you're not right away at the conclusions that follow from them, right? But the principles of demonstration are able to be considered, what, seoresim, by themselves, apart from that. Without this, that one considers the, what, conclusions. They are able to also to be considered, simul, together with the conclusions, right? In so far as the, what, beginnings are deduced into the, what, conclusions, huh? So, to consider them in the second way, the beginnings, pertains to science, right? To see the conclusion in the beginnings, right? Which considers all its conclusions. But to consider the beginnings by themselves without seeing the conclusions in them pertains to, what, understanding, right? So, this understanding is presupposed to science, right, huh? But it's one thing to see the beginnings by themselves, right? Another thing to see the conclusion in them, right? Now, if you go back to the likeness there to mathematics, right? Can't you see the length and width of the table without seeing the area? But have you multiplied them? Now, it's like, you know, when a woman goes into the supermarket there and she knows the price of everything she puts into her basket. Then she wonders if she's got enough money to cover it at the thing, right? Well, she could know what it's going to cost her by adding up the price of everything she put in there, which price she, what, knew, right? But she can't maybe do this in her head and so on. And so she knows the, what, prices these things, or assume, as she says, apart from, right, or by itself, apart from the total one, right? And sometimes she's, what, surprised to what it comes to, right? So it's a different, right? It's a really different habit, right? To know them by themselves and to know the conclusions by them, right? But they're connected to the habits, right? And since you get to know them in themselves before you can, you know, reason out from them, right? This is an example, I think, like a comparison or analogy. St. Thomas uses when he speaks about the angels who see God still being purified in some way. And he gives us this example of the difference between the angels all see God, but they don't see all the same things. He compared it, I think, to, like, seeing a view in the distance and then somebody pointing out some detail to you. He said, oh, you know, did he not see it before? Well, yeah, it's the whole thing, but I didn't see it in particular. Yes, he used that, and maybe there's something like that here. Well, I don't know if that's exactly the same thing, but there's something like it in the sense that some people would see more in God than others would, you know? But it's not like there's two sights there, you know? Maybe it's like, yeah, okay, never mind. I mean, there might be a private revelation of something that God sees in himself that we don't see in him, right? And that would be another manifestation, right? But then you're not seeing it through seeing him, right? I mean, there might be a private revelation of something that's going to be a private revelation of something that's going to be a private revelation of something that's going to be a private revelation of something that's going to be a private revelation of something that's going to be a private revelation of something that's going to be a private revelation of something that's going to be a private revelation of something that's going to be a private revelation of something that's going to be a private revelation of something that's going to be a private revelation of something that's going to be a private revelation of something that's going to be a private revelation of something that's going to be a private revelation of something that's going to be a private revelation of something that's going to be a private revelation of something that's going to be a private revelation of something that's going to be a private revelation of something that's going to be a private revelation of something that's going to be a private revelation of something that's going to be a private revelation of something that's going to be a private revelation of something something outside of you're seeing. But here it's through seeing the beginnings in themselves and then they'd find you to do something from them, right? You reason out the conclusion, right? The conclusion is in what power of the premise is, but you have to reason it out and see that, what follows from it. Just like you say the area of the table here is in the knowledge of the length and the width, right? In the power of that, right? So if I know the length and the width, I'm able to know the, what, area, but not until I multiply to actually know it. So I can know the length and the width by themselves without knowing the area. It's a kind of unlikely to say, you know, because you know the length and the width, you know the area. But, you know, there's no soap necessarily, right? So it's amazing, you know, the beginnings of Euclidus and then he starts to draw conclusions out. Oh, goodness. It's really beautiful what he does. But notice he goes on out at the end to point out, though, this connection here. Whence the one rightly considers these three virtues are not ex equo, equally, right? Distinguished from each other, right? But in a certain, what? Order, right? Just as happens in potential, what? Powers, right? This is something we'll meet more later on, right? Of which one part is more perfect than another, right? Just as the reasonable soul is more perfect than the sensible and the sensible than the, what? Living soul, right, huh? Okay? It's a little bit like, you know, three, two, and one, right, huh? Two includes one, but something more. And three includes two, but something more, right, huh? Okay? And in this way, he says, scientia depends upon understanding as from something more, what? Yeah, more principle. And both depend upon wisdom as from, what? Principle, right? Which contains under itself both understanding and science. And Aristotle says this, right? I was giving you an example of that when I was doing the whole and part, right? The students there couldn't, in a sense, what? Defend their acceptance of the whole being more than the part, right? In fact, they're denying it, right? The words, right? Because of this, what? Yeah, yeah. By the wise man who distinguishes the senses of the whole, right? He can, what? Defend and judge better, right? The truth of the axioms and everybody can, you know, could be misled, right? So, holes, I mean, you use this notion of potential holes and aversions, right? Potential, you speak of potential parts of aversion, right? Yeah, and this will come up a lot in the secunde, right? He'll distinguish the subjective parts, which are the species, right? But then he's doing with the potential parts, right? Which are? Well, you have to wait until you get there, you know? I have a hard time. I've been through this, like, a number of times, but I just can't seem to get it in my mind. But, like, in Foresight, we were talking about it a little earlier. Okay. Consul and then judgment, right? But then command, which is kind of the principal thing, right? Has the full power of it. Are those potential parts? Well, the consul of the judgment would be, yeah. Would be potential parts. Yeah, yeah. Part of the power, right? When I talk about the four tools of dialectic, you know, I think that they are, what, four abilities or four powers, right? In a sense. But they all make up the power of the... The real potential parts. Yeah. I don't know if that's... That's why I'm spitting it, but I think that's one way... They're part of the power of the dialectic. So is... Are your example of a number is two a potential part of three? Well, no. You more say that... Yeah, yeah. Three contains two in a sense, right? But more, right? The kind of example there is that the soul, right? That the rational soul contains what the sense soul does but something more, right? And the sense soul contains what the living soul has but something more, right? But... But... Because you're just to compare blood with sap, right? And blood would be a more marvelous thing than sap, right? But something like sap in the tree, right? That's a hard thing to get a hold of instead of a potential hole, you know? Yeah. But... Aristotle, in the chapter on a hole in the park doesn't really talk about potential hole but he seems to know what it means, you know? I mean, he talks about when he talks about the soul and so on, right? Mm-hmm. Because he speaks of the powers of the soul as being the parts of the soul, right? Oh. See? Those would be like... Potential parts. Yeah. He doesn't mean... Power of the soul. Yeah, he doesn't mean quantitative parts, obviously, right? Yeah, yeah. Or... Or species, right? Or even integral parts of an integral hole wouldn't be like that either, right? Yeah, yeah. Yeah. Interesting. So interesting, yeah. That's a little bit. Yeah. Which I've been to have. Yeah, but it's very difficult to get a hold of at first, you know? It's funny how you go through these things and they don't stick. But Thomas, when he explains the whole doctrine of the hole in part, he speaks of the potential hole in his parts as in between the other two kinds of hole, right? Mm-hmm. It's a little bit like, what? Both of them, right? But it's not quite like the genus and the species because you can't say the hole of one part, right? Mm-hmm. But it's not exactly like the composed hole either, right? It's something hard to understand, right? And it's interesting that Aristotle doesn't speak of the explicitly in the fifth book of wisdom, as high as it may be, right? But he obviously talks about this and he talks about the parts of the soul. That's a very interesting thing he says there, right? He puts natural understanding ahead of science, which always struck me as kind of funny, you know? Mm-hmm. To the theory, now what about this idea? Why isn't there one for opinion, right? In dialectic, right? To the third, it should be said that as has been said above, the habit of virtue is determinedly has itself to the good in no way to the, what? Bad. Bad, huh? That's why Thomas would argue, you know, when God has virtue, that the virtue, because God's all together simple, is God, right? Therefore, he can't do anything bad. He necessarily works according to his what? His virtue, right? But even if I have virtue, you know, some virtues, I'm not the same as my virtue, and some might not use it. Now, the good of the understanding is the true, and the evil of it is the, what? False. Whence only those virtues, those habits, are called intellectual virtues, which semper, always, the true is said, right? And never the false. And therefore, opinion, which is the result of dialectical reasoning, right? And suspicion, which is the kind of reasoning you have in rhetoric, is an argumentative part of rhetoric, uses the enthymeme in the, what, example, right? They can be of both the true and the, what? False. And therefore, they might, what? Not produce something good, right? And therefore, they are not intellectual virtues, as is said in the Sixth Book and the Ethics, right? Now, stop and think a bit about that, huh? As Aristotle shows and he takes up the natural road, what is more known to us is less known by nature, right? So he's talking about how we know things, what, imperfectly, right? The imperfectly known, in a sense, even the defectively known, you might say, is before the perfectly known for us, right? So there's two interesting befores and afters in our thinking. And one is that we guess before we know. The simplest example of this is when a murder has been committed, right? They don't know who done it. They don't know who done it. But, you know, who's the, who's the suspect, right? And the wife has been murdered. It's a husband. I was talking about that last night with my students. And I said, you know, it's like having to Rosie and I hate to have the police, you know, their first. What were you doing? Suspect, number one. You know, they suspect you for some reason. Prime suspect. Yeah, either the husband is himself or he hired somebody to do it, you know. So they don't go to everybody in the town when somebody's been murdered, right? But they try to guess who might have done it. I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. I don't know. right? And sometimes, you know, they go to that man, they question him, and he didn't know what he was doing at that time, and da-da-da-da. And eventually, they get closer to knowing that he did it, right? But you obviously guess before you what? Know, right? And in logic, right, we have the dialectic and rhetoric, both of which are arts of what? Guessing, right? But as I used to point out to students, you know, the weatherman has got a what? Art of guessing, right? There's a 60% chance of rain tomorrow. But he doesn't know. Or the economist says, you know, barring unforeseen circumstances, the economy should, you know, do this. He doesn't know, right? Even the doctor, you know, he thinks, he guesses that you might have this, and he'll run a couple tests on you, you know. I know people who always, you know, it's all these old folks who are in the daily mass that hear about these tests and so on. People I know, you know, friends, you know. The doctor's going to know. So he's guessing, right? He doesn't know what's wrong with you. And, you know, I hate to, you know, have a jury there to decide my fate, you know. I hate to be on a jury myself, you know, a life and death, you know. I guess that he did it. But I mean, a lot of times it's guessing that people have been wrongly, you know, put in jail and, you know, DNA and this guy is terrible. But anyway, but we guess before we what? Know. And that's why Aristotle proceeds dialectically before he tries to determine the what? Truth, eh? We guess before we know. Now, the other thing is that we think about something before we what? Understand it, right? And, um, what comes after thinking about something but before understanding it? No, thinking out. Thinking out. Yeah. And you can distinguish a number of senses of thinking out by the eight senses of in, in the fourth book of the physics, right? So to think out the parts of some, what, whole, right? That's one sense of thinking out, right? To think out the definition of something, right? What's the Shakespearean sonnet? Well, I thought out that it's a likeness of thought and feeling in 14 lines of iambic pentameter divided into three quatrains of alternate rhyming and completed by rhyming coupling. That's my definition that I thought out of. And I thought out a definition of what? Comedy, right? Now, article comedy. Okay. Um, the seventh sense of in, or something is in the efficient cause, right? In the power of the efficient cause. That's the sense of thinking out if you think out a conclusion, right? Which also can be called reasoning out, right? So by the syllogism, you think out a conclusion, right? Uh, in a sense if you think out the, the, the cost of what you've got in your grocery basket, right? Okay. So, um, these are two ways in which imperfect knowledge, or not knowledge in the strict sense at all, right? Comes before knowledge or perfect knowledge, right? Okay. We guess before we know, right? And many times you don't get beyond the guess, right? And we think about something before we understand it. And many times, you know, we think about something without understanding it. Do you think about what I told you? Yeah. But I still don't understand it. We say that a lot. Okay. So, Thomas, you know, when he's talking about opinion and suspicion there in the sixth book of the ethics, he calls them a, what? A guess, right? And, uh, I guess a good word to use, guess, right? But we do guess before we know, right? Many times, you know? Uh, Einstein says, you know, a scientific hypothesis is, what, free to imagine. Well, what is free to imagine? Is that known? No. It's a guess, right? And even maybe after they confirm it, it's, you know, confirmed guess, but still guess. You know? Einstein actually says scientific theory is a system of guesses, right? You know? Maybe it's not knowledge in a strict sense, right? You know? But, uh, you know, the Pythagorean theorem, you know, I think has been shown that it must be so, right? Or that the interior angles of a triangle could have two right angles, right? Those things have really been shown, huh? So we don't have too much knowledge. We have a lot of guesses, huh? A lot of wild guesses, right? It's funny, on TV, you know, they have something. They're always having a, you know, asking people to write in and say yes or no, you know, if they think this is true or not. They get a sized idea, people, you know? Just a wild guess, you know? I told you, they're interviewing people, you know, about the health bill, and they say, yeah, what do you think is better, on the Affordable Care Act or the Obamacare? And they say, well, what is, you know, saying, the Affordable Care Act is obviously better, you know, and the name tells you it's better. That's the name of the act, right? The Affordable Care Act. It's just nicknamed Obama. They only have to say, you know, what's going on, the average citizens, right? I told you, I talked to a guy who was, you know, helping a guy who was waiting for a governor to stay here, you know? And he's trapping over the stage, you know, meeting people all the time, you know? And he says, people don't know what the candidates stand for, right? And sometimes the candidate they're supporting is supporting the thing that they're opposed to, right? They don't even know this, right? We just saw the ignorance, you know, of the people, you know? I mean, the under-informed, as they call them. Not even the subtle things, you know, it's just a man stands for. So, should we take a little break here? Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Mm-hmm. Let's look at the third article here now. He's going towards the practical virtues, right? Now, why does he take up art before prudence? Maybe because it's more like the first ones, right? It just doesn't have that rectification of the appetite, right? I can be a good cook, you know, and be a glutton, you know, or something, right? Okay, to the third one goes forward thus. It seems that art is not an intellectual virtue. For Augustine says in the book on free judgment, right, that no one badly uses a, what, virtue, right? But someone uses an art, what, badly, right, huh? For a man, or some artist, according to the knowledge of his art, can do bad things, right? So, see, the doctors these days, abortion, so on, right? Therefore, art is not a, what, virtue, right, huh? As I always say, no, no, so I'd kill you better than a doctor, huh? Make it look accidental, too. Okay, but this may go back again to the distinction of the, what, two senses of virtue, right, huh? Moreover, of virtue there is not a virtue, right? But of art there is some, what, virtue. What the hell is that? As it's said in the sixth book of the Ethics. Therefore, art is not a virtue. That's an unusual objection, right, huh? Moreover, the liberal arts are more excellent than the mechanical arts, right? Thomas talks about that in his commentary on Boetes, right? The distinction between the liberal arts and the mechanical arts, right? But just as the mechanical arts are practical, so the liberal arts are speculative. So the liberal arts are, what, grammar, rhetoric, logic, and then you've got the, what, geometry, arithmetic, and, yeah. There's a kind of making in all the liberal arts, right? But it's kind of a liberal making, right? Not a none. Therefore, if art were intellectual virtue, it ought to be, what, numbered with the speculative virtues, right, huh? But again, this is what the philosopher in the sixth book of the Ethics, as he lays down art to be a virtue, right, huh? But nevertheless, he does not number it with the speculative virtues whose subject he makes to be the necessary part, the scientific part of the soul, right? Okay, so, so, usually they say art is, what, right reason about making, right? Prudence is right reason about doing, right? So in Aristotle, you know, they define, usually the way they state the definition of moral virtue. It's a habit with choice, right? Existing in the middle, towards us, as, what, determined by right reason, and right reason about doing, right? That's foresight, right? Thus, therefore, huh? Okay. Answer should be said that art is nothing other than right reason about some things to be made, right, huh? The good of which does not consist in this, that the human, what, desiring power has itself in some way, right? But in that which, what, makes the work that is made, right, be in itself, what, good, huh? Going to make a good wine, right, or a good dinner, or a good book, or whatever it is. It does not pertain to the praise of the artist, insofar as he's an artist, by what will he makes the work, right? But how is the work that he's made, okay? It's a way that he gets, I hate making dinner for you, right? Because he made a dinner that tastes good, right? He's reading about, what's his name, the German, I mean, the English painter there. He seems like music better than painting, you know, but he did this very nice paints job. Thus, therefore, art, properly speaking, is a, what, habit of doing. But nevertheless, in some way, it comes together with the speculative habits. There's an unlikeness there, right? That's why he takes it up before. Prudence, foresight is much more different, you know? So he passed from the less unlike to the more unlike, huh? Okay? It's the principle of Thomas Kidd's there in ordering the books on life. Right after the Dianima, he puts the books on, what? Sense and sensible and memory and imagination because in the Dianima, you're considering the soul and a kind of separation from the body, and these things are closer to the mental and so on. Then you go to the books like the parts of animals and all that sort of stuff, you know, we're getting very down into matter, right? So we go from things that are less unlike to things that are more unlike. Because also in regards to those speculative habits, it pertains in what way the things which they consider are, right? Quality, you see, habion, right? What way they have themselves, right? Somebody used that phrase, how they have themselves, you know, he's in the Latin text, right? That's the way they say it. But not in what way has itself human, what? Desire towards them, right? For so long as a geometer demonstrates the true, right? Triangle has interior angles, it's varied angles. It makes no difference how it has itself according to the repetitive part, right? Whether he rejoices in the fact that it has three angles, or iratis. He's angry about it. Darn it, it's silly. It's all right. And, you know, in the type of the development of modern physics there, you know, the physics of the 20th century, and they were trying to carry out the program in the 20th physics, and it just didn't work, you know, and they got kind of irritated, you know. But they're kind of forced by the truth itself, you know, to go the way they did, right? So it makes no difference whether they rejoiced or hated it. I agree about it. Yeah. I guess Plankton liked the idea at all, what he had discovered, right? But he was forced to go, right? By the truth itself, huh? And thus, neither does it differ in the artist, right? It has been said, right? So he makes the soup so it tastes good, right? That's all. I don't care whether you hate soup or not, right? Get somebody out the house there, you know, and try and order them a drink, you know. And they want some kind of vodka, you know, vodka bottle, you know. Funny, I love a bottle of vodka, you know, and make them a drink, you know, but, you know, just as long as I make it for the right proportions, you know, I'm a sufficient... Mixologist. Mixologist. Mixologist. Yeah, that's what they call him, you know. So you don't have to like the drink to make it properly, right? Mm-hmm. You know? Yes. A friend of mine, a woodworker, makes a beautiful walnut table and walnut chair. I hate walnut. And therefore, in that way, art has the notion of virtue just as the speculative habits, right? Insofar to wit as neither art nor the speculative habit make a good work as regards its, what? Use, huh? Which is, what? Proper to a virtue that perfects the appetite, huh? But only as far as the ability to act, what? Well, huh? Okay? So you can see why he takes up art before we say, you know. See, he proceeds in an orly way, this Thomas Aquinas, I think he is. He doesn't just wander like a modern guy would wander, huh? Okay? The Emory Deconic say in class, you know, when Thomas gives, or Aristotle, gives examples, you know, he always asks, why does he use this example, right? So I wouldn't bother with a modern philosopher, he says, why does he use this example, you know? Just the person who thought that had. Yeah. My old teacher, Kassarik, said, you can tell the guy is, you know, mined by the examples he chooses, right? He knows what he's doing. Okay. To the first, therefore, huh? It should be said that when someone having the art does a, what? It should be said that when someone having the art does a, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what, what Okay, now we get prudence, which is going to be distinguished from art. Why does he distinguish it from art and not from the speculative virtues? Well, what does the dialectician say? Yeah, yeah, that's where the difficulty is, right? Things are farther apart, well, that was not the same thing, right? So is the politician and the carpenter closer, you know? The politician and the philosopher. To the fourth, one proceeds thus. It seems that foresight is not a different virtue from art. For art is right reason of what? Some works. But diverse general works do not make that something lose the notion of what? Art. Since there are diverse arts about works that are valde diversa, right? Since, therefore, also prudence is a certain right reason of works, it seems that also it ought to be called what? Art, huh? Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. Art. However, foresight, more comes together with art than speculative habits, for both of them are about what can happen otherwise, right? As is said in the Sixth Book of the Ethics. But some speculative habits are called arts, therefore much more prudence ought to be called an art. Moreover, to prudence pertains to take counsel well. This is said in the Sixth Book of the Ethics. But also, in certain arts, it happens that one takes, what, counsel, as is said in the Third Book of the Ethics, as in the military art, right, huh? So, MacArthur would call together a staff there, you know, and discuss what should we do now, right? Even what, Washington used to do that, too, right? So, MacArthur got to the American Embassy there in Japan, and he said, We're here, General. The picture, they had Washington in there, you know, and we're here, General. He made it. I think MacArthur kind of thought of Washington as the greatest American, you know. Not Lincoln, but Washington. That's like when my dad, when we first moved to South Carolina, we moved down in January, it was back in the 70s, and in February, it's Washington's birthday and Lincoln's birthday, and they were both holidays, so we got down to South Carolina. My dad just started his job, and he asked one of his co-workers, he said, We get Lincoln's birthday out, and they said, Lincoln who? That's interesting you speak of the military art, because Thomas and he devised later on the species of foresight, I guess, in the second day, have military foresight, right, huh? And distinguishes that from political foresight. MacArthur had something of both, right? Because he was really in Japan after the war there, he showed a lot of political foresight. And the gubernativa, right? The government takes counsel, right? In medicine. Therefore, prudence is not distinguished from art. But against all this is that the philosopher distinguished prudence from art, right? That's awesome, right? I answer it should be said that where there is found a diverse notion of virtue, there is necessary for virtues to be, what? Distinguished, right? Now, instead above, that some habit has the notion of virtue, from this only, that it makes the ability of a good work, right? Another, from this, that it makes not only the ability of a good work, but also that one actually uses it for a good thing. Art, however, makes only, huh, solum, the facultatum, right? The ability for a, what? Good work. Good art. How do we get the word facultatum to our word faculty, huh? Because it does not regard, what? Appetite. Appetite. Art does not, right? But foresight not only makes for the ability of a good work, but also for, what? The use of this. For it regards the appetite, not because it's in the appetitive power, right? But as presupposing the rectitude of the, what? Appetite. Now, this is something that Aristotle saw, and Thomas follows his master Aristotle here. Now, the reason of this difference is because art is right reason about things to be made, right? Right? Foresight is right reason about things to be done, right? Now, to make and to do differ because, as is said in the ninth book of the metaphysics, right? That's the book on act and ability, right? And in the second part there, Aristotle will go on to different senses of act, right? And there he distinguishes between making and doing. That faccio, or making, is an act passing over, right? Into exterior matter, right? Just as to build and to, what? Cut. And other things of this sort, huh? Why to act is an act remaining in the one acting, as to see or to will and so on, right? Thus, therefore, in this way, foresight has itself to these human acts, which are the use of, what? Powers and habits. Just as art has itself to the outside makings, right? Because both is a perfect reason with respect to those things to which it is compared, right? Now, the perfection and the rectitude of reason in speculative matters depends upon the beginnings. Which reason, what? Syllogizes, right? Just as has been said. Notice, Thomas, a lot of times he'll say, instead of reasoning from premises, he'll say reasoning from kajikis, right? Yeah. From which reason syllogizes, right? Just as has been said that science depends upon the, what? Understanding, right? This natural understanding of the beginnings. Which is the habit of, what? Beginnings. And it presupposes it, right? So, in human acts, the ends have themselves like the beginnings in, what? Yeah. This is the famous proportion of Aristotle in the seventh book of the Ethics, right? In times, which is a lot in theology, right? And therefore, for foresight, which is right reason about things to be done, it's required that man be well disposed about the ends, which happens through right desire, the rectified appetite. And therefore, for prudence is required, what? Moral virtue, through which the appetite becomes, what? Rectified, huh? So, when Thomas is talking in the Ethics there, why does Aristotle take up the moral virtues, he says? For the virtues of reason, right? And he's taking the foresight, especially there. He says, well, for two reasons. One, because by the moral virtues we are disposed for the virtues of reason. And also because they are, what? More known. More known, right? But you can see how they're disposed in a sense. You need to rectify it towards the end, right? If I don't want to eat moderately, I'm not going to find what's a moderate amount to eat. If I don't want to be just in my dealings with you, you know, I'm not going to find what is the right price to charge or the right, you know? So you've got to have the rectitude of the will, because that's a starting point, right? And if I want to treat my wife right, I'm not going to find the right way to treat her right. Okay. Um, incidentally, because you're making an exterior matter, right? This is why the arts are distinguished by what? Basically by the matter in which they make something, right? Because. I bear a bad work of art, this is not a work of art, nay rather it is against art, right? Just as when someone who knows the truth lies, right, huh? This is not said according to science, but against science, right? Whence just as science has itself always to the good, right, so also what? Art. So if I change the proportion of the cocktail there, right, so it's too sweet or something, right? Okay, Manhattan should be two to one, right, huh? That would be too sweet, right? Only one part of sweet vermouth, right, huh? So, okay. What's that one you made with two parts brandy and one part cream to mint? If you did the reverse, it would be just too sick and too sweet, right? Otherwise it helps your digestion after that, right? Okay. So it's not according to art, right? Whence, just as science always has itself to the good, so in a sense art always does, right? In fact, according to art, right? You give the right proportion. And according to this, it is said to be a, what? Virtue, right? But in this, nevertheless, it falls short from the perfect or complete notion of virtue, right? Because it does not make the use, what? Good. Good, right, huh? But for this, something else is what's required, right, huh? Although the good use of, what? Without the art is not possible, right? You don't know how to make the food, right, huh? Okay. Is that clear enough there? You get that same distinction, right? Between the, but the art itself doesn't make you use it, right, huh? Lays come in a little arsenic there to give it to her husband gradually, right, or something like that, you know? Arsenic's an old lace, or the story, yes. It's not according to art, it's not the way you're supposed to make the drink. Now, to the second, huh? It should be said, because for this, that a man use well the art which he has, there is required a, what? Good will. Good will, right, huh? Which is perfected by immoral virtue. And therefore the philosophy says that there is a virtue of art, right? To it, a moral one, insofar as the good use of it requires some, what? Moral virtue, right, huh? For it's manifested, the artist, through justice, which makes his will right, huh? Inclines that he do a, what? Faithful work, right, huh? Doesn't put in some cheap stuff, whichever, right? Okay. There's, again, the mechanical arts, we got a desk, this was a while back, got a desk for $99, big desk, like the one that I think he bought, he said, $99, a friend of mine is a carpenter. He looked at the desk, he looked at the desk, and I said, how much is he going to pay for it? It's obviously, it's made in China. And he said, well, I said, $99, and he looked at it and he said, you know, you couldn't even get the material in this country, $99. They can get the material, make it, and ship it, and sell it for a profit at $99. So that's what Aristotle means, right, that there's some virtue of art, right? Now, to the third it should be said, this is talking about the liberal arts, right? To the third it should be said that also in those, what? Speculative matters, right? There is something by way of being a certain, what? Work, huh? For example, the construction of a, what? Syllogism, right? Or of a suitable, what? Speech, huh? Or the work of numbering and, what? Measuring, right, huh? And therefore, whatever, what? Of reason, habits, speculative habits or order, right? Are said, to a certain similitude or likeness, to be arts, but what? Liberal, to the difference of those arts which are ordered to works they're done through the body. Yeah. Which are in some way servile, because you're a slave, your body, right? Right. Insofar as a slave, the body is in a slave-like way unto the soul, right? And man, according to his soul, is free, right? And those sciences which are ordered to no work of this sort are called simpliciter sciencia, right? In no way arts, right? Nor is it necessary, if liberal arts are more noble, that there belongs to them more the notion of what? Art, huh? Once Indianists do it a lot on what liberal arts are. But you've got to be clear that they're not arts in the same sense exactly, right? But there's a certain likeness of them to the arts, right? When the arts are strict sense, it's just a kind of matter exterior to you that you're acting on in a manual way, right? I can add up numbers in my head a little bit. I worked at the package store, you know. A guy would come over with three or four balls, you know, and sometimes I just kind of add them up in my head. You know, I get kind of clever at how to do it in your head. He said, how'd you do that? They trusted me after a while. But in the making of the syllogism, right? Making the definition. The logic is sometimes called an art, right? The art of making definitions, syllogisms, statements, and so on. It's not a making in the full sense of the word. You can see how there's an ambiguity there with the word art, right? There's geometry to be put under scientia here, in the Latin word, episteme, right? Of course, you can put under r's, right? Simply put it under scientia, right? But there's something like this there, right? Of course, Euclid is making things as it goes along, right? Making an equilateral triangle in the first theorem. It's kind of a mental making, right? Mm-mm-mm. And especially when the difference in matter requires different tools and a different way of being worked, right? So my wife there sometimes makes a dress or something, right? And my brother-in-law makes houses and tables and chairs sometimes. And he uses a hammer and saw. My wife doesn't use that when she makes a dress. He uses scissors and a needle and so on, right? And she does not work at all with my brother-in-law's matter, which is wood. Sewing together the table, sewing together the house. And she does it with my mother, not my mother, but my wife, you know, hammering ones on it. I take the piece of the dress, the cloth, and, you know, join them by nails, right? Ditting things. So different matters require different, what, tools and a different way of working, right? You know, usually the glass floor, you know, doesn't use the hammer and so on to do what he wants to do, right? Because you've got to work at the man in a different way, right? And you notice this in Aristotle in the book on the poetic art, when he distinguishes the imitative arts, right? He distinguishes them first by that in which they, what, make, right? So the painter and the poet don't make them the same matter, right? And so even though later on when he defines, you know, tragedy and things of the sort, he puts down first of all what it's an imitation of, right? Before he puts down that in which they imitate, right? When he distinguishes the arts, he does first of all by that in which they imitate. Because you have a different matter that requires a different, what? Yeah, yeah. I was reading in Shakespeare today there, it was in the Tame of the Shoe, you know, where he says, is a Vulcan a good carpenter? A Vulcan works with, you know, fire and so on, right? That's what he worked with wood, you know? My father's factory there, you know, says I work in the wagon place there where they're making, not wagon, but these drums, you know. And you heat the metal and you bend the metal, right, eh? So that's the way you work with wood, you know? You heat it and then you bend it, eh? That would wreck it, right? You see? So the wood and the metal have to be worked with differently, right? They're really different arts, right? So it's very important that he says that it's faccio as actus transians, it's an act going out to exterior matter, right, eh? But the good of artificial things is not the good of the, what? Human desire, right? But the good of the, what? Artificial things themselves, right, eh? And therefore art does not presuppose, what? Right appetite, right, eh? And then it is, this goes back to Plato, that more is praised the artist who willingly sins, right, than the one who unwillingly sins, right, eh? Because it's not ignorance, right, in his part, right? If he knowingly sins, right, eh? So Montserrat of work, you know, it's called The Musical Joke, right? Where he's showing you the mistakes that musicians make. Well, he's knowingly, right, making mistakes, right? Okay? And when I, you know, use these fallacies, I'm knowingly making mistakes. But in the moral matters, right, if I knowingly, you know, kill you, right? That's worse than if I, you know, unknowingly, you know, happen to kill you, right? But the artist used to be very, right? Yeah. If I ruin the meat on the grill, right, that's annoyingly. It develops that, right? Because the rectitude of the will is of the notion of foresight, right? But not of the notion of what? Art, right? Thus, therefore, it is clear that foresight is a virtue distinct from art, eh? It's a marvelous distinction of the two. To the first, therefore, it should be said that the diverse genera of artificial things all are, what? Outside of man. And therefore, they're not, what? The common notion of virtue here, right? Of art, right? But foresight is the right reason about, what? Human acts themselves, right? Whence the virtue, the ratio or notion of virtue is diversified, right? So doing is an act that remains within the doer, right? Making is one that passes out into exterior matter, no? To the second, it should be said that foresight more comes together with art than the speculative habits as regards its subject and matter, right, eh? For both are in the, what? Opinionative part of man, of the soul, right? And about the contingent that can have itself otherwise, right? But art more belongs with the speculative habits in the notion of, what? Virtue, because it doesn't have the rectitude of the appetite, eh? Then prudence, which is closer to the moral virtues, right? So it's interesting how in the so-called cardinal virtues, what are they? There are three moral virtues, justice, fortitude, and temperance, and what's put with them? Foresight, eh? See, it's kind of strange, right? Somebody said, well, it's the foresight of virtue of reason and the other virtues of the appetites, right? The will and the wrath of the will and the gifts of the will, right? Why are they put together, right? Well, because foresight presupposes the, what? Rectitude of the appetite, right? So it makes sense to put it with them, you know, among the cardinal virtues. You don't have art in there, or geometry and justice and so on. It's an interesting enumeration, though, the cardinal virtues, right? But you can't understand that unless you understand how foresight differs from both the speculative virtues and from art, right? And why it's put there with those moral virtues, not them. Plato and the protagoras there, he has the four cardinal virtues plus piety. He has five virtues. Interesting. He has piety raised more pious than we are, huh? Yeah, people grow our house in a balloon, you know. I hear the sound blowing again. We hear it sometimes in the morning, you know, you know, and then, and actually when they were out there, it was that last Saturday, you know, coming over and, hi, hi, they were sitting down to us down on the ground there, you know. They were coming down so low, I think they were hitting the neighbor's trees, almost, they were almost touching the neighbor's trees, I don't know. Wow. They came down into a tree, she was stuck on a branch. Swap, swap, swap. We saw, that's a secundum, right, huh? Mm-hmm. Okay, the third one. The third should be said that foresight is bene conciliativa, right, taking counsel well about those things which pertain to the whole life of man, right? And therefore to the last end of human life, huh? But in some arts there is counsel about those things which pertain to the, what? Private ends of those arts, right? When some, insofar as they take counsel well in warlike things, right, or in sailing, right, are said to be prudent, what? Leaders. Or governors. Mm-hmm. Not however prudent, what? Some peachy tear, right? But only those who take counsel well about those things which confer to the whole of, what? Life, huh? Mm-hmm. Leaders or sailors? Captions. Governatore. Governatore is, well, gubernatore is, that's the Greek for a helmsman. That's what I'm saying. Gubernatore is, you know, gubernatore is, that's what the Phi Beta Kappa, that's what it means, Theosophia, Viu, Gubernatore. Philosophy is the helmsman of life. That's what the fraternity found me to get. The helmsman of life. The helmsman of life.