Prima Secundae
Lecture 151: Moral Virtue Distinguished from Intellectual Virtue

Transcript
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58, huh? Then we're not to consider about the moral virtues, huh? We talked before about the order here, right, huh? Seems to be, what, reverse of the order in the, what, the Comachian Ethics, right? Or in books 3 through, what, 5, we talked about the moral virtues, right? And then in book 6 about the virtues of reason, right? Well, here he has the reverse, right? Okay? And perhaps part of that reason is that the virtues of reason are more, what, shared by God, right? So God is understanding, he has knowledge of things by their causes, he has wisdom, right? He has foresighted over the whole universe, right? He has the spirit, right? He even has art, right, huh? He's making the universe, right? But most of the moral virtues, God doesn't, what, have, like temperance or mildness, because they have emotions, the ones that are concerned with emotions and so on, right? And doesn't mean he has courage, you know, in a strict sense, right? Matter of fact, he said to be, right? It's only justice, maybe, that he has, right, or something like that. Maybe it's the morality, too, of course, that's what that great, that the Senate said, right? But maybe that's part of the reason, right, huh? The ones that are more like God, right, huh? But we'll leave it at that. And first, about the distinction of them from the virtues of reason, right, huh? Secondly, about the distinction of them from each other, according to their what? Right. Yeah, it won't matter, yeah. And that's question 59, I guess, okay? Next question. Third, about the, what, distinction of the chief ones, or the cardinal ones, as we call them, from the others, right, huh? And, of course, that's presupposed to the order there of the, what, second, secundary, second, pardon, second. Because he does the three theological virtues and then the four cardinal virtues. And the other virtues are, you know, attached by some likeness to the, what? Yeah, yeah. So if temperature is a chief one, you get humility comes in there, right, and eutropoleia and so on, right? That are some similar, one mode of proceeding, right, huh? Wildness is put there, right? See? Okay. And that's going to be in the, what? Not to question 61, I guess. There must be two ones for the distinction among themselves. About the first five things you're asked, right? Now, the first thing you should ask is whether every virtue is a moral virtue, huh? And so I'll go back to that idea that moral virtue is, what, for the most part, or fully virtue, right? Because it inclines you to do well as well as giving the ability to do well, huh? Secondly, whether moral virtue is distinguished from intellectual virtue, right? Third, whether sufficiently virtue is divided to the intellectual and the moral, huh? Something in between. It's not until this point that he does that article, especially, huh? Four, whether moral virtue can be without the intellectual virtue. Five, whether a converso. Intellectual virtue can be without, what? Moral. Moral, right? What a thorough mind this guy had, huh? Should we envy him? Or should we thank God for him? Thank God for him? Read this, I use the modern philosophers, especially when you read, what's his name? Uh, English philosopher there. Russell? Well, those guys, yeah. But he's that kind of envy of Aristotle, you know, that he should have been so great. And had somebody, and they called me philosopher, you know, I mean, how dare he be called me? Yeah. We're all equal, you know? Yeah, we're all equal in stupidity. Yeah. He's fighting Hume, too, you know, Aristotle's fame is all gone now, he says, you know. He doesn't worry about him anymore. He's got to care of that, I guess. Yeah, yeah, yeah. Kind of like rejoicing the fact, you know, that he's declined in his, or in verse, saying to me, you know, and you could see after De Connick died, all these guys coming out of the woodwork, you know, and they envied the man. It's been great. I really admired the humility of De Connick. He would defer to Monsignor D'Anne, you know, and there was no envy, no false humility, you know. I mean, Warren came at De Connick later than me, you know, he was going to work at De Connick because he's in science and so on, and De Connick, you know, made perfectly clear to him that D'Anne is the greatest mind up here, you know. And I told you when I was writing my doctoral thesis, Monsignor is my director, you know, and I went to ask De Connick about the things, and he's thinking, what would you bother with me, you know? You got D'Anne, he said, well, I don't see what you think, too, you know, so I told him what he thought, but, you know. I mean, you know, just, just amazing. I'd see him on scene, you know, De Connick's house was not far from where I was, you know, and I'd come out and see him once you're walking back and forth there, you know, before he goes in to see De Connick, you know, he's probably thinking something else they're going to talk about, you know. And, oh, it says, hello, move on quick, I want to disturb you with this train of thought. But it's kind of remarkable, those two guys. Father Poulet was the third guy, you know, he was going to De Connick, Indiana. I was telling the students last night, they were doing the natural philosophy there, you know, but when De Connick was doing, I don't know, the course in Place or Tamron, you know. I remember him coming down the hall and I was kind of standing in the hall and he stood in front of me and he said, isn't this wonderful, you know. He just, more wonder than anybody in the whole class, I said, you know. Just, even teaching this thing, you know, since the 1930s, he said, I still see something new when I go through there, you know. Of course, in the end of Rome, Monsignor D'Anne pointed out something De Connick had not seen. And De Connick said, how is it possible that I had taught this all these years and not seen anything, you know. It's amazing, these guys, they're marvelous guys. Okay. To the first, then, one goes forward thus. It seems that every virtue is moral. For moral virtue is said from moris, that is from custom, right? So we call them customary virtues, that could be misunderstood today, of course. Why do they call it customary virtues? Because they're produced by custom, right, repeated acts. But of all virtues, we're able to be, what, accustomed to the acts of all, what, virtues, huh? I'm accustomed to doing geometry now, let's say, right? Whence every virtue is moral. What a wonderful judgment. I just, what a super guy this guy is. Teacher Kasurik said, you know, compared to Aristotle, he says, I got the brain of an angkor. Well, he meant it, too. He was always the best philosopher in the graduate school, by far. There's nobody else compared to him. None of those guys would ever say that, you know. Compared to Thomas, I got the brain of an angkor. However, the philosopher says in the second book of the Epics, that moral virtue is a habit with choice and, electivus, existing in the middle of reason towards us. Actually, he said it's a habit with choice, existing in the middle towards us as determined by the right reason, right? Get the whole thing. But every virtue seems to be a habitus selectivus, with choice. Because the act of any virtue, we're able to, what, do from what? Choice, right? So I choose to pick up that booklet from time to time, right? Do a couple marvelous theorems, right? My master there. And every virtue, in some way, consists in the middle of, what, reason, as will be clear below. So, what does Shakespeare say? All my reports go with the modest truth, nor more, nor clipped, but so. Or as Faustus says, they say more or less than the truth. They are, what? Villains in the suns of darkness. Something like that. So, you know, the truth about the Trinity, right? You know, you have, or the Incarnation. In the Trinity, you have those who say there are three persons and three, what, natures. And then there are those who say there's one person. And then there are those who say there are three persons and three, what, natures, and three, what, natures, and three, what, natures, and three, what, natures, and three, what, natures, and three, what, natures, and three, what, natures, and three, what, natures, and three, what, natures, and three, what, natures, and three, what, natures, and three, what, natures, and three, what, natures, and three, what, natures, and three, what, natures, and three, what, natures, and three, what, natures, and three, what, natures, and three, what, natures, and three, what, natures, and three, what, natures, and three, what, natures, and three, what, natures, and three, what, natures, and three, what, natures, and three, what, natures, and three Really, in one nature. And the truth is in between those two, right? Then with Christ, you know, you have the reverse, right? And some say because you have one person, you have one nature there. Some say because you've got two natures, you've got two persons there. And the truth is you have one person with two natures. So the truth is in between, you know? Thomas will explain that, right? Go to the meat. And you can see that about art, too, right? You know, if you cook the meat too much, you're going to get criticized. Cook it not enough. It is raw. Still quivering. Yeah, cook it. Or you cook the meat too long, you know. So I get these criticisms from time to time. Better to undercook it. You guys put it on again for a little more. But, you know. Let's say you put salt or seasoning on, and you can put too much or too little, right? I put too much pepper in the soup one time, and I was criticized for that. And everybody remembers the time that Daddy put too much pepper in the soup. Everybody remembers, yeah. Maybe because it was a memorable occasion, it never happened again. And now his beautiful statement of Thule, of Cicero. For Thule says, more of what Thule says in his rhetoric, right? That virtue is a habit, right? In the manner of nature, right? It's like a second nature, we say. Okay. In what? Agreement with what? Reason. That's beautiful. But since every human virtue is or to the good of man, it's necessary that it be, what? An agreement, right? Reason. Consent to reason, right? Since the good of man is to be according to reason, as Dionysius says. And therefore, every virtue is moral, right? Wasn't it Gregory the Great that brought Dionysius back to the Western world? Well, I think it was Gregory the Great, I think. Yeah, I don't know. He'd been out, you know, or something out there, you know. And he got to know Dionysius, so he did a lot to get to. But against this is what the philosopher says in the first book of the Ethics, huh? That speaking about, what? Moribus, right, huh? We do not say, when he sapiens, or intelligens, right? He's wise or understands, but that he is, what? What? Mild or what? Sober, right, huh? Thus, therefore, wisdom and understanding are not, what? Moral. Moral. I don't understand that, obviously. Today you would. Which, nevertheless, are virtues, as has been said above, right, huh? Therefore, not every virtue is, what? Moral, right, huh? When somebody, a fellow who was in a seminary and told his grandmother, he was studying moral theology, and she said, Is it immoral theology? Actually, moral would mean originate without custom, right? I answer. It should be said, for the evidence of this, to consider, is necessary to consider, quid sit mos, huh? What is mos? For thus we will be able to know what is moral virtue. It sounds like a reasonable proposal, wouldn't you say? But mos signifies two things. I didn't know that. Sometimes it signifies constitutinem, huh? Which means, I guess, custom, right? Just as is said in the Acts of Apostles, I guess, chapter 15, verse 1, Unless you'll be, what? Circumcised. Circumcised, according to the custom of Moses, you are not able to be saved, huh? Well, that's, that was rejected, wasn't it? Thank God. But he's just, uh, quoting it to what he was saying, right? To indicate an example of that one meaning of the word morris, osmos. Sometimes it signifies an inclination, right? A certain naturalism or inclination, right? Or a quasi-naturalism, right? Like a second nature, right? To doing something, right? Whence also, of brute animals, there are said to be some, what? Custom. Yeah. You see this in, you know, I see this in natural scientists sometimes, huh? Okay. Whence it is said in the second book of Maccabees, in the 11th chapter, that the, what? The lions? Roaring in the way of the lions, I guess. Yeah. The enemies, roaring at their enemies in the custom moment, they prostrated and killed them quite as well. So they warred like the lions are accustomed to war, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. And this is taken, mos, in Psalm 67, where he said, who makes them to dwell in the, what? House in one, what? In one way. Yeah. They have a common inclination, you might say, right? Mm-hmm. Okay. And these two meanings, in nullo distinguunter, nowhere distinguished, among the Latins, as regards, what? Word. Yeah. The vocal sound, right? Mm-hmm. But in Greek, they are, what? Distinguished. Distinguished, huh? Mm-hmm. For ethos, which with us signifies, what? Morum, sometimes has the first e long, and it's written there, eta. Okay. Alpha, beta, gamma, delta, epsilon. Eta. Eta. Eta, eta. Sometimes it has the first, what? Short, and it's written there, epsilon, right? Mm-hmm. Yeah. See? You're fighting out every day. This is Thomas, right? And I forget these things. It's interesting. Now, moral virtue is said for mori, according as mos signifies a certain, what? Natural inclination. Or equated inclination, right? Not that it's said, according to custom, because it's acquired by custom, right? And here he says it's more inclination, right? A natural inclination, or quasi-natural, right? Like second nature, I guess. Mm-hmm. To what? Doing something, right? And he says, to this meaning of moris, propinqua, near, is the other signification, by which it signifies, what? Custom. For custom, in a certain way, is turned into, what? Nature. So we call it a second nature. He's second nature to me now, like breathing out and breathing in, like in the musical, right? So he's got a custom to this woman, right? But breathing on and breathing in is custom and nature in the first sense, right? See? It's a second nature to me now. Now it's manifest that the inclination to an act properly belongs to the, what? Desiring power, of whom it is to move all the powers to what? Yeah. And therefore, not every virtue is said to be moral, but only that which is in the, what? Desiring power, huh? So he answers the first objection then by saying to the first therefore it should be said that that objection proceeds from the word moris, according as it signifies what? Custom. Custom, right? It's kind of funny he says that because you might say, you know, that in order to acquire a moral virtue, you have to repeat these acts, right? And then you get this kind of second nature, right? So you just don't think, you know, let's get drunk this weekend, huh? And you don't think, like high school kids. I remember the kids in high school, you know, talking, you know, let's get drunk this weekend. And he's on thing of that, you know? A children in school there, Mr. Schmidt there, you know, talking about this growing up, you know, and you're brought up, right, you know, and so on. You get exposed to these bad things and say, well, Schmidt just doesn't do that, you know? You don't get drunk the weekend. Or it might be, you know? What stupid thing? But, you know, I don't think of, you know, you see what demonstrations say in Euclid, you know, it's one act that you kind of, what, perform there, you know, already, you know? It doesn't be repeated like... You know, you know, it doesn't be repeated like... You know, you know, it doesn't be repeated like... You know, it doesn't be repeated like... You know, it doesn't be repeated like... Like this other thing has to do, you know. But Hamlet's telling his mother there, you know, about that second husband, right? You know, don't go to bed with him tonight, you know, it's time to be easier. But you have to repeat the acts, right? In the intellectual virtues, it seems like you, kind of one act, you can see something, you know. But anyway, kind of sage, chiefly for the other meaning of mass, right? The inclination, right, that he argues from, right? Okay? Here he says these, both of them come by custom, right? So that's not the way he distinguished them, right? To the second should be said that every act of virtue can be done from what? Choice, huh? But right choice, only that virtue which is in the desiring part of the soul, makes for a what? Right choice, huh? The phrase has been said above, that to choose is an act of the, what? Desiring part, huh? Okay? Notice that word, too, that Thomas uses, he talks about love, you know, delixio, right? You know, words that kind of like, I translate that, chosen love, right, huh? But obviously love is in the appetite, huh? Whence the habit of choice, which is a, what, beginning of choice, is only that which perfects the desiring power, although also the acts of other habits are able to come under, what? Choice, huh? So I can choose to think about the triangle, right? Choose to think about motion, think about God and so on. Now, to the third, it should be said, huh, that nature is a beginning of, what, motion, huh? There's a full definition of nature there in the second book of natural hearing, physics, is nature is a beginning and cause of motion and of rest, huh? In that which it is, first. As such, and not by happening. But he's emphasizing that it's a source of motion, right, huh? But to move things, huh, to doing, seems to be proper to the desiring power, right? And therefore, to be assimilated in nature in agreement with reason is proper to, what, the virtues which are in the desiring power, right, huh? Article 2. Article 2. Article 2. To the second one goes forward thus, it seems that moral virtue is not distinguished from what? Intellectual. I think he'd already saw this thing, but he's been very, what? Precise, right? Very penetrating, very thoughtful about these basic things. For Augustine says in the book on the city of God that virtue is the art of living well. I know he got in trouble for saying it's an art. But art is a intellectual virtue. There you go. And Augustine, I don't know about that. Therefore, moral virtue does not differ from intellectual virtue. He's like Pope Francis. He says things that people can twist all over. I don't know how to get him out of this. Get him out of this. Moreover, many times the definition of moral virtues is laid down what? Scientia, knowledge or science, huh? As some define that perseverance, which is a moral virtue, right? Is the science or the what? Habit of those things in which one ought to what? Remain or what should not remain, right? Stubborn, be a vice, right? Virtue is persevering those things you should persevering, right? And holiness, I guess, huh? Samtitas is a science making us, what? Faithful and observing things that are just according to God, right? But science is an intellectual virtue. Therefore, moral virtue ought not to be distinguished from intellectual. Moreover, Augustine says in the first book of the soliloquies that virtue is recta et perfecta ratio, right? Right in perfect reason. He is in trouble, as I guess. But this pertains to intellectual virtue as is clear in the sixth book of the ethics. Therefore, moral virtue is not distinguished from intellectual, right? Moreover, in the fourth objection, nothing is distinguished from that which is placed in its what? Definition. But intellectual virtue is placed in the definition of moral virtue. For the philosopher, he says, in the second book of ethics, that moral virtue is a habit with choice, existing in the middle towards us. He left it out. Determined by reason, right, huh? And insofar as the, what? Prudent man, huh? Sapiens would determine, right, huh? Okay? What would Christ have done? I didn't say, right? I didn't say, right? Okay. This right reason of this sort determines the middle of moral virtue, huh? Or, excuse me, this right reason determining the middle of moral virtue pertains to an intellectual virtue, as is said in the sixth book, right? So I used to say to students, does anger know how much anger you should get, right? My standard argument is, yes. I bump you coming down the hall. You bump me down the hall. Should I get angry? Well, it was a pure accident. Not at all, right, huh? If you're one of these kids in high school goes down knocking, everybody goes down, they should get a little bit of anger, right? Or if you're being careless, you know, huh? You know? But only reason can consider what circumstances are, right, huh? Using my kids' photography practice, right, to call for it. What a firm anger, right? You know? Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. Firm upon, that's fine. Yeah. If your congressman is supporting abortion, you know, maybe she can tell. That would be the most effective thing to get angry at them, but... But, again, this is what is said... Okay. Therefore, more virtue does not distinguish intellectual. But, again, this is what is said in the first book of the Ethics, huh? That, uh, virtue is determined according to this difference, right? For we say, of these, some are intellectual and some are, what, moral. So, Aristotle gives, at the end of the first book, it's the division of the two, right? And then in books two through, what, five, he takes up the moral virtues, and in book six, the intellectual virtues, huh? So, in, uh, Tame with a Shoe, right, you have a good description of the Ethics, right? He's going to apply that part of philosophy that treats of happiness by virtue especially to be achieved. So, Shakespeare knew exactly what the Ethics was doing, right? Mm-hmm. He says it better than most humans say it. Even philosophy would say what it's about. What's that book about? Happiness by virtue to be achieved, especially to be achieved by mind. Mm-hmm. Nobody knows why Shakespeare is so wise. Let's turn back a little bit. Mm-hmm. Now, he says, the first beginning of all human, what? Works. Works. He's reason, right, huh? And whatever other beginnings of human works are found, in some way, what? Obey reason. Obey reason. But in diverse ways, however, huh? For some obey reason, altogether, automatically, you might say, right? Mm-hmm. Without any contradiction. Just as the members of the body, right, huh? If they are in their natural state, consistent, right? Mm-hmm. For immediately, for the Ethic Commander reason, the hand reaches out, right, huh? Wow. Especially if there's popcorn at the end. It's different. Or the foot, right? Mm-hmm. Whence the philosopher says in the first book of the politics that the soul rules the body by despotic principality. That is, as a lord or master rules his, what? Servant, right, huh? Who has no right of, what? Contradicting him, right, huh? Now, some lay down that all active principles which are in man have themselves in this way to reason, huh? Which, if it were true, it would suffice that reason was perfect for acting well, right? Whence, since virtue is a habit by which we are perfected in acting well, it would follow that it was in reason alone, right? Unless there would be no virtue except the intellectual one. And this was the opinion of Socrates of all people, right? Who said that all virtues are, what? Prudences, right? As is said in the sixth book of the ethics, right? Like, you know, the reason why you ever do anything bad is because you don't know what's going on. I read an article the other day about, somebody talking about vocations, religious life, and I think he's a young Dominican who was writing this. It was really good. Was it all the same thing? Yeah. Well, very good, except that he says that everybody has a call, God wants what's best for you, and religious life's best, therefore everybody's called to religious life. And I said, I thought that was very mature. Okay. I did an article. Yeah, yeah. I thought that was a little mature. And he says, so everybody's called, but then not everybody can really live it. So you have to go and try it to see if you really can live it. If you can't, then you can go get married. And I just thought, oh my God, that doesn't work. I didn't mean both things. Yeah. Well, what he's lamenting is that there's indecision. They want to discern forever and never get to do anything. So he's trying to get people to do something, but I think you're going about it the wrong way. It sounds like this is what he's saying. But if you can just see this, then do it. It seems to be a very modern problem, right? I mean, in the modern world, the problem is some ignorance, right? It just teaches people the right thing. Oh, yeah. Yeah. When Socrates laid down that man, right, knowledge existing in him was not able to, what, sin, right? But to every sin, sin's an account of ignorance, right? I see there's some truth to this, right? And Thomas says, quote, even Aristotle, saying, you know, every man whose sin is mistaken. In some way, he thinks that what is bad is what? Good, right? And Scripture says the same thing, right? And Scripture says the same thing, right? But this proceeds from the supposition of something false. For the desiring part, right, obeys reason not on nino ad nutum, not automatically. I don't know how they translate it ad nutum there, too. Because it depends on the fact that it relates to the reason not in mind. Yeah, nutum is more the idea, but just, you know. If a gesture is not out or something. Buddy. Cum adicua contradiccione, right? In resistance. Whence the philosopher says in the first book of the politics that reason commands the appetitive, right, by a political rule by which one rules the what? Free. Free, right? We have some work or some right in what? In it of contradicting, right? We call that dialogue today. Whence Augustine says upon the psalm that sometimes the understanding precedes and there follows a slow or no affection at all, right? Okay. Insofar as it's sometimes, by the passions or habits of the appetitive part, this is done so that the use of reason in the particular is what? Impeded, right? And according to this, to some extent it is true what Socrates says, right? That science being present, one does not, what, sin, huh? If, however, this is extended, usque, all down to the use of reason, any particular, what? Tutable thing. Yeah, yeah. So one shouldn't commit adultery, but with this woman here now, this is the thing to do, right? You know, it applies to that thing, right, huh? You know? It's like saying, you know, this is a dog, if I shouldn't do it, this is pleasant, I will do it, you know? The mind is going back and forth like that. It could stop under either one, right? Thus, therefore, for this, that man act well, there is required not only that reason be well disposed through the habit of a, what, intellectual virtue, right? But also that the desiring power should be well disposed through the habit of, what? Moral virtue, right? So therefore, just as the desiring power is distinguished from reason, so moral virtue is distinguished from the intellectual. Whence, just as the appetite is a beginning of human action according as it partakes in some way of reason, so also moral habit has the notion of a human virtue, insofar as it's conformed to what? Reason, huh? So you have reasonable habits, right? Now, to the first, therefore, it should be said, and we're going to do the poor Augustan here, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that Augustan communitaire, right? General. Takes art, right? For any right, what? Reason, right? And thus, under art, it includes all superdents. What a sloppy right, huh? Which is also right reason of things to be done, right, huh? Just as art is right reason of things to be done. That's what you're doing there, right? That's one of the forms of what? Ways that a word becomes equivocal by what? Reason, right? By dropping out part of its what? Meaning, right? So, you know, when Aristotle takes the word suffering or undergoing, you know, and says that sensing is an undergoing, right, huh? You keep the idea of receiving something, right? But you drop out the idea that it is, like, that it is painful or destructive of you, right? And then when you go and apply it to understanding is an undergoing too, right? You even drop out the idea of a body, right, huh? You're still kind of receiving there. And so, that's one way that a word becomes, what? Equivocal by reasoning. So it becomes generalized, you might say, right, huh? Okay? So that's the way it's gusting off the hook here, right? Okay? But if someone didn't realize and thought that art was being used, and so it's a little bit, you know, a little bit, not the best choice of words, right? We can put them out this way, huh? And according to this, when it is said that virtue is the art of right living, essentially it belongs to foresight, right? But nevertheless, participative, right, huh? So you've got to make these distinctions, Augustine, right? To the other virtues, according as they are, what? Directed according to prudence. I don't know if Shakespeare, if Shakespeare, I don't know if Augustine knew much of Aristotle. He speaks about the categories, you know, a little bit, but it doesn't seem to just talk about the Nicomachean Ethics, do you? I don't know. I don't think he's here, you know, and even in doing physics, I will, you know. So it's kind of remarkable how far you got without having, at times, at the advantage of both Augustine, Ham and Aristotle, you know, and had that great help with the great too, and so on. Sometimes it's a little, a little, you know, Augustine can be more misleading, times he's no more careful there, you know? The way you speak about those things, right? Okay, now, those things in the second one, he says, such definitions, by whomever they are found given, proceed from the Socratic, what, opinion, right? And they should be expounded in the same way as we have said about art, right? So, he's not exactly saying you should continue that way of speaking, right? Because it might be misleading, right? And the same thing should be said towards the, what, the third one where he said virtue is the right and recta perfecta ratio, right? Okay? It's essentially that, but participatively that, right? You know? That's kind of funny because, you know, he quoted the definition of virtue before of Augustine, you know? You know? Which no one uses badly which seems to fit just more virtue, right? And now he's saying virtue is recta perfecta ratio, right? You know? So, there's no freedom there in Augustine, Okay. Now, to the fourth reason it should be said that right reason, which is according to foresight, is placed in the definition of moral virtue, not as a part of its essence, but as something partaken of in all the moral virtues, insofar as foresight directs all the moral virtues, right? We all partake of these, right? Now, should we stop or what is it? No. Good.