Prima Secundae
Lecture 152: The Division of Human Virtue: Intellectual and Moral

Transcript
================================================================================

Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit, amen. Thank you, God. Thank you, guardian angels. Thank you, Thomas Aquinas. Deo grazius. God, our enlightenment, guardian angels, strengthen the lights of our minds, order and illumine our images, and arouse us to consider more correctly. St. Thomas Aquinas, angelic doctor. Great grace. And help us to understand all that you have written. In the name of the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit, amen. To the third, then, one goes forward thus. It seems that human virtue, right? I notice he says humana virtus, right? Is not sufficiently, huh? Completely divided by moral virtue and intellectual virtue. And the first objection is that prudence, or foresight, seems to be something in the middle. Between moral virtue and intellectual virtue. For it is numbered with the intellectual virtues in the sixth book of ethics. That's the sixth book of the Nicomaginetics, which is devoted to the virtues of reason, right? And also, by everybody, now, is commonly numbered among the four, what? Cardinal virtues. Cardinal virtues. Which are moral, as will be cleared with all, right? It seems to be something in between these two, right? The Nicomaginetics divided into three instead of two, right? Therefore, not sufficiently is virtue divided by intellectual and moral as through, what, the immediate ones in which you divided them. Moreover, continence and persevering, right? And also patience, are not numbered among, what? Intellectual virtues. Nor also are they moral virtues because they do not hold the middle in, what? Passions, right? So the common man is a man who's got this urge to pursue the woman or go to some excess in the sensual pleasures. And he's struggling, you know, and he has to jump into the bush or something, you know? You know? But he doesn't have the mean that is virtue, right? Okay? What is the rich in Venice there, huh? It's no mean happiness to be constituted in the mean. You know, it's a beautiful, you know, pun on the word mean there, you know, which shows how well Shakespeare understands these things, huh? Well, this person is not in the mean, right? He's got this great struggle. And perseverance or patience, you've got this sadness, you know, you're really struggling, right, huh? Okay? Therefore, one does not sufficiently divide virtue through intellectual and moral, right? There's no place for these things, right? Now the third objection, right? The reason why I emphasize it, he's saying virtus humana, right? Moreover, faith, hope, and charity are certain virtues, huh? But they are not, what, intellectual virtues, for these only are the five, right? The impossible fives. Science, sapiens, intellectus, those are the theoretical virtues, right? And prudence and art, right? Those are the five that are style of distinguishes. Nor are they also moral virtues, because they're not about, what, the passions or the emotions, about which most of all is moral virtue, right? The first two virtues you take up among moral virtues are courage, which is about, you know, fear and so on. And then you have, what, temperance, right? These are about passions, emotions. And therefore, virtue is not sufficiently divided by intellectual and, what, moral. I think when Thomas takes up the question, are faith, hope, and charity virtues, he'll say, well, virtue is either moral or intellectual, but this is neither. Therefore, they're not virtues, right? Here he hears things, he's arguing the other way around, right? But against all this is what somebody called the philosopher, right, says in the second book of the ethics. Two-fold is virtue, this intellectual, that moral, right? My brother Richard and his cousin Donald, they're both philosophy majors, right? Same age, same year. And they give my Uncle Jim, you know, the Dickabockian ethics degree, right? Never got to college, right? But it made sense to him, right? Of course, Uncle Jim had joined, you know, the U.S. Army in the First World War. He falsified his age. He was like 17 or something, you know? And then he never got married, so in the Second World War, he said, well, I should volunteer. He said, why should a married man go, you know, with children? So he volunteered again, right? So he had some virtues, you know? So, so you can understand this, so he's trying to make a mock in ethics, right? And we're kind of reading that, you know, when I was in high school, you know, the rest of it. You know, what does the master say? I am sure it should be said that human virtue is a habit, right? Perfecting man to doing what? Well. Well, for doing well. But the beginning of human acts in man is only two-fold. To it, the understanding, or the reason, as you can call it, right? And the repetitive power, huh? Someone translated appetite there. But the repetitive power, right? For these are the two things that are movers in man, as is said in the Third Book on the Soul, right? Aristotle takes up the, what, living powers, the vegetative powers first, right? And then he takes up the, what, sense powers. Then he takes up the intellectual powers. And last of all, the moving powers, right? Because they presuppose either sense or understanding and the desiring powers, right? These are desiring powers with the moving powers, right? Whence every human virtue necessarily is perfective of one of these two beginnings, right? If, therefore, if it is perfective of either the speculative intellect or the practical, which differ, what? Not as two different powers, but they differ by their, what? End, right? To the good act of man, it will be an intellectual virtue, right? It's perfecting either looking reason or doing reason, as I call them, right? To the great scandal. I think I want to use the word theoretical or speculative. I've got to use the Greek word or the Latin word, huh? Or even practically, it's really kind of a Greek word or Latin word. If, however, it is perfective of the repetitive part, and that means both the, what, the will and the irascible and gives emotional appetites, sense appetites, it will be, what, a moral virtue, right? Whence it remains that every human virtue is either intellectual or what? Moral. Moral. So let's see, as I would tell my students, that's known as a universal affirmative statement. Every human virtue, every human virtue without exception, right, is either one of those two, right? That's a division in two, two. Now what about the ejection here from foresight, right? Or prudence, which is sometimes put with the moral virtues, as when we talk about the cardinal virtues. And in the Prudence there, where Socrates talks about the virtues, he has the four cardinal virtues plus piety. It's kind of interesting, huh? He's more pious than we are, the cardinal virtues. And he asks Prudence, you know, are these five names of the same thing, or are they names of different things, like the nose and the ear, you know? And Prudence says, well, they're names of different parts, you know, different things. And Socrates starts to reason of all things that they're really the same thing, right? And it's kind of beautiful the way he reasons, huh? He takes the idea, you know, that he's showing that foresight and temperance are the same thing, right? He says, he induces, you know, that the thing is only one opposite, right? And then the opposite of wisdom and the temperance is the same. But you can see it in Shakespeare, right, huh? When you call somebody fond, right, huh? That means foolish, right? So if you're fond of a girl, you're making a fool of yourself. It's a girl. That's what it means, right? And so he'll say somewhere else, he'll say he's being stupid. You're being fond. I mean, it doesn't do with a girl. You know, does it mean foolish? Well, foolish is the opposite of wisdom. And it's the opposite of temperance, right? You know, I mean, a person gets drunk, he acts like a fool, right? And so the intemperance is a kind of foolishness. So if that's the opposite of temperance, it's also the opposite, obviously, of wisdom. They must be the same thing, right? But that's the shock that he's mistaken there, of course. Interestingly, he argues, right? But Tommy sees here what? The fundamental thing for the mind, which is to see what? Distinction, right? Distinction is more basic than division. And division than what? Definition, right? The definition, in a way, is what? Involves a division, right? The species into its genus and differences, right? And a division is what? A distinction of the parts of some whole, right? So distinction is kind of the fundamental thing for the mind, right? And that's why we... When Shakespeare defines reason as looking before and after, before and after presupposes distinction, right? You don't say division or definition, but it does presuppose distinction, huh? So Thomas sees a great distinction here. Prudence, secundum essentium sum, according to its very nature or essence, right? Is a virtue of what? A reason. A intellectual virtue. But according to the matter, right? It comes together with the moral virtues. Okay? For it is right reason about things to be done, right? Okay? Right reason about how much I should drink or eat, right? How angry I should be, or not... Maybe I shouldn't be angry at all. Maybe I should be a little bit angry. Maybe I should be very angry, you know? So, okay. And according to this, it is numbered with the moral virtues, right? So that distinction is not too hard to see, but... Put it clear. Clear-minded, yes, huh? If you gave the average guy that objection, I mean, it would be all over the place, right? You wouldn't see that distinction that illuminates the thing, huh? Now, the second objection, huh? To the second, it should be said that continence and perseverance are not perfections, right? Of the sense-desiring power, huh? They're not perfections of the irascible appetite, or the conchusable appetite, as we say. Which is clear from this fact that in the one who's continent, the one who perseveres, their excelled, disordered, what? Passions. Which would not be the case if the sense-desiring power had been perfected by some habit conforming it to what? Reason, huh? But continence, or perseverance, is a perfection of the rational part, right? Which holds itself, right? Contains itself, you might say. Contain, as the word continence there, contain yourself, right? Control yourself, right, huh? Get hold of yourself. Get hold of yourself, we say, right? But you need to get hold of yourself because, you know, you have this excessive passion, right, huh? Like to murder you, right? Well, get to control yourself, right? Lest it be, what? Deduced, right? If I didn't do it, right? Yeah. But nevertheless, it falls short of the definition of virtue, right? The notion of virtue. Because the intellectual virtue, which makes reason have itself well about moral matters, presupposes the right desire of the, what? End. Yeah. So that it might rightly have itself about the beginnings, which are the ends, right? From which it, what? Reasons, right? And this is lacking in the content of man, the persevering man. The one is too aroused, essentially, you might say, right? The other is too depressed, or too sad, or too, you know, miserable, right? Too much to do about nothing, you know, where the accused falsely, the daughter, the only daughter, you know, of being, you know, involved some other man, you know, the man she's about to marry, you know? And the father, you know, is telling him to calm down. He says, What? Someone else having exactly the same thing's happening to me? It's my only child. And he goes on. He says, Well, you know, no, you're different from a beast. And then he complains about the philosopher, you know? Never could have flossed or, you know, put up with a toothache, you know? Isn't there a passage where Augustine complains about a tooth? It must be in confessions, I guess. I think so, yeah. Yeah, okay. It gives him a lot of discomfort, you know? It's kind of a beautiful thing where people, you know, a person who's not feeling these things, right, not in the situation, he can say, Calm down. Get in control of yourself. It just makes you more angry, right? I'm not yelling. Tell me the story, you know, of a clerk there, I don't know, in the bank or, I mean, in the post office, something like that. There are always people coming with complaints, you know, and he's standing very calm, you know, and so on. And this guy, he finally got there, and he saw how patient the guy was, you know, with all these complaints, and so he said to compliment the guy on his patience and the guy's book. He had a quarter. He had a quarter. So you can't really have a virtue in the, what, intellectual part with respect to human action if your appetite is not, what, well disposed, because then you don't have, what, the starting point, right, which is the end, right, for your deliberation, right? So my experience of drunks is, you know, they don't really deny the principle, the abstract principle that one should drink moderately, right? What they deny is that they've had too much. Everybody else can say they've had too much, right? But they can't judge, you know? Charlie used to work with the Packer story. He'd say, you know, tell us when you start to drink, he says, you lose your ability to judge how much is too much, right? Okay. Norrie says, is that able to be a perfect doing or operation which goes forward from two powers, right, unless both powers are perfected by a, what, suitable habit. Just as there does not follow a perfect action of some agent through a tool if the tool is not, well, what, disposed, right? No matter how, the principle agent is, what, perfect, right? But this person who is confident or persevering despite this, what, excess of this emotion, right? He's not perfect in both, what, powers, right? Whence is the sense-desiring power which the rational part moves is not perfect, right? No matter how perfect the rational part is, the action following will not be, what, perfect, huh? Don't they say about St. Jerome he had kind of a temper, right? Okay. Whence neither will the beginning of action be a virtue, right? So Thomas is solving this by saying, what, continence and perseverance don't belong to a third category of, what, virtue because they don't belong to either the moral virtue or the virtues of reason. But they're not virtues, period, huh? See? An account of this, huh? Continence from pleasures, right? And perseverance from, what? Sadness, right? Are not virtues but something less than a virtue. As the philosopher says in the seventh book of the Ethics, right? In the seventh book of the Ethics he's already talked about, what, the moral virtues in books two through five and then the five virtues of reason in book six, right? What does he do in book seven, right? He talks about those things that, what, are either above or below human virtues. right and these things are below right they don't quite measure up he talks about heroic virtue you know and uh which is kind of quasi semi-divine thing right and thomas refers to that text when he talks about the gifts of the holy spirit right kind of heroic virtue right where a hero in greek fiction would be what a man who had a human mother or father and then the other part was it was divine right so achilles was an arrow right because his mother was a goddess right his father was a human mortal some are the reverse right some have a you know god for a father and so so they have something on so aristotle is talking about something that falls out right you know he talks about bestiality this is a vice that is below human vice right it's not even a vice it's something even worse than that right and uh then he also talks about how some of them might be above right human for assurance so that's what's in the seventh book afterwards then the eighth and ninth books he talks about friendship right and now he can come back in the tenth book and complete the consideration of happiness and what he is fully now now the last objection huh that's why i was emphasizing the word human virtue right thomas is asking whether intellectual and world sufficiently divide human virtue right to the third should be said that faith hope and charity are supra above human virtues right but they are virtues of man insofar as he is made a partaker of divine grace and therefore the divine nature in the sense right okay so as i mentioned you'll argue the other way around with these questions with the faith hope and charity are virtues to say well virtually they're moral or intellectuals so he's neither one so he still doesn't talk about those so they can't be bridges right you Now, four and five, notice that, four is saying what a moral virtue can be without intellectual virtue, and then five would be the reverse. Can intellectual virtue be without what? Moral virtue, right? To the fourth, then, one goes forward thus. It seems that moral virtue is able to be without intellectual virtue. For moral virtue, as Tully says, right, is a virtue in the mode of nature, right? In agreement with what? Reason. But nature, although it consents to some superior reason moving, right, it, however, is not necessary that that, what, reason be joined to nature in the same thing, right? So Aristotle, in the biological works, he admires the mind, right, that designed these, structured these animals, right? But that mind is not possessed by those animals, right? I'm always amazed when I read about, you know, these migrations of the birds, you know, and so on. They seem to be able to go great distances and find their way, you know? We don't have a map to get lost or something, you know? Well, and I guess through the years when they study these things, some birds, depends on the birds and on many things, I guess, but I don't know, but some kinds of birds, when they migrate, they make the same, they stop in the same places every year, they stop in the same tree, even on the same branch. Some particular bird will always go to that particular branch in that tree, every time they migrate. We'll figure it out. Therefore, it's able to be, therefore, in man, a moral virtue in modem naturae, right? That's what he's emphasizing there, huh? Inclining one to agreeing with reason, although the reason of that man is not itself perfect through what? Intellectualism. Yeah, okay. Moreover, through intellectual virtue, man, what? Achieves? Perfect use of reason. Perfect use of reason, yeah. But sometimes it happens that some, in some things, right, the use of reason is not very vigorous, right? But they are nevertheless, what? Virtuous. Virtuous and acceptable to God, right? Therefore, it seems that moral virtue can be without intellectual virtue, right? I was reading Thomas' commentary there on the eighth psalm, you know? And he says, you know, how God is the end there, the reason, and so on. And he says, some men, of course, depart from this, right? But the only ones that adhere to it are, he says, are two, the wise and the simple, right? Well, of course, what does he mean by simple? He doesn't mean the simpletons, right? But he means those who are, what? Pure of art, in a sense. Like hope. Simple in the good sense, right? Shakespeare and the science, they're complaining about simple truth and this call of simplicity. And, yeah, it's simple. They seem to not have the vigorous use of reason, right? But they still, they, what? They have sin. Yeah, yeah. That's what Chesney says. You don't have to be intelligent to be an intellectual. For me, intellectual is a pejorative word, you know? I mean, I never call myself an intellectual. I agree. I would never say that. No. I might say I tried using my reason, but I wouldn't say that. But it's curious, I mean, how the intellectuals in the academy, they've got crazier opinions than the man in the street does, you know? They can't, the man in the street can hardly believe that they think they do. Moreover, a moral virtue makes a, what, inclination to do well. But some have a natural inclination to doing well, right? Even without the judgment of reason. Some people are mild, right? By nature, right, huh? Or temperate, right, huh? It's kind of interesting to see that, you know, people, you know, who don't eat or drink too much, right? You know? It's kind of natural temperance, right, huh? Well, then can't you have moral virtue without, huh? Therefore, moral virtues are able to be without inflection. There seems to be some truth to these objections, right? But against this is what Gregory says, huh? Now, he's stopped quoting the philosopher, and he's quoting Gregory in the 22nd book of the Morality, right? Thomas makes a lot of use of Gregory there in the Amalo, huh? Talk about the seven capital races, huh? That the other virtues, unless those things that they desire, they do, what? In a prudent way, right? Are in no way able to be, what? Virtues. Virtues, huh? But prudence is a intellectual virtue, as has been said above. Therefore, moral virtues are not able to be without, what? Intellectual. Well, I assume that Thomas is going to say, you know, that you can't have moral virtue perfectly without the virtue of reason, right? But there is some truth in the objections, right? I am sure it should be said that moral virtue is able to be without some virtues of reason, right? Just as without wisdom, science, and what? Art. Art, you know? It doesn't say intellectives, because it's that you naturally have, right? But it is not able to be without, what? Intellectual. I suppose that's... Understanding. Yeah? That's the natural. Fundamental things, yeah. And prudence, he says, right? Now, without prudence, there cannot be moral virtue, because moral virtue is a habit with, what? Choice. That is one making for a good choice, huh? But in order that a choice be good, two things are required. One is that there be a suitable intention of the end. And this comes about through moral virtue, right? Which inclines the desiring power to a good that is in agreement with reason, huh? Which is a suitable what? End, huh? But secondly, that man rightly takes those things which are towards the, what? End. And this cannot be except by reason, taking counsel rightly, right? And judging, right? Rightly. And what? Command. Commanding, yeah. Three acts there, right? Which belongs to prudence, especially the third one, right? And to the virtues annexed to it, attached to it. And we're talking about ubuya, gnome, and cynicism. You can stand those words, huh? We have a, the words to finish. Whence moral virtue without prudence is not able to be, right? And consequently, not without, what? Understanding. Yeah. For through understanding are known, I call it natural understanding, huh? Are known to principles or beginnings, naturally known, right? Both in speculative matters and in, what? Doing. Doing, huh? Whence just as right reason in speculative matters, insofar as it proceeds from principles, naturally known, presupposes the understanding of beginnings. So also prudence presupposes that, right? And I understand the natural law, which is right reason about things to be, what? Done. Done, huh? Okay. How does he answer these objections? Because they all seem to have a little bit of truth in them, right? To the first, therefore, it should be said that the inclination of nature in things lacking reason, right, is without, what? Choice. Yeah. In the sense that they do choice there, right? And therefore, such an inclination does not require of necessity, what? Reason. Reason, right? But the inclination of moral virtue is with choice, huh? That's a key thing for him, right? Mm-hmm. So Aristotelian talks about choice where, in the third book, huh? But in the second book, he defines moral virtue as a habit with choice, right? Mm-hmm. Sometimes I translate that like that, or sometimes it's a habit of choosing. right? Choosing what is in the middle towards us has determined the right reason. And that's in the definition of it, right? So that's the key thing here, choice. People are talking about choice now. That's sick. They're masters of deceit, that's all I have. Masters of deceit, word crafters. Who is it? Masters, all the political mumbo-jumbo, all the word crafters out there. You can ask them, are you in favor of chopping up babies in the mother's womb? Well, that's a choice. That's what you're choosing, yeah. But no, in surprise they don't inform women about what the thing is, they make a reasonable choice, you know, kind of difficult for them to make. Just a bunch of, you know, something they tell them. Now, the second should be said that in the virtuous person it is not necessary that the use of reason, be vigorous, huh? What's the word for bichyat there? Be strong, vigorous, thrive, flourish, bloom, blossom, be active, be effective. Vigorous, huh? Flourishing as regards all things, right? But only as regards those things which should be done by virtue, right? Right, huh? And thus the use of reason is vigorous in all that are, what? Virtuous. Virtuous, huh? Whence also those who seem to be simplicians, right? The word simplicians, right? In that they lack, what? Worldly astuteness, huh? Slyness, yeah, or something like that. Are able to be, what? Prudent, right, huh? According to that of Matthew 10, 16, be prudent as serpents. And simple as what? Doves. Doves, huh? Yeah, I don't know if it's not the word simple that St. Paul used to wanting children in sin, but not in sense. Yeah. In knowledge, meaning, I think sense there being a basic kind of knowledge is required just to be virtuous. That's what I understand. Even we use the word, he's got sense. We say that. Good sense. Yeah, my mother was talking about that good sense. Now, what about this natural inclination? To the third, then, it ought to be said that the natural inclination to the good or virtue is a certain, what? Beginning of virtue, huh? But is not, however, a, what? Perfect. Perfect virtue. For this inclination, the stronger it is, the more, what? Dangerous, in a way, it is, right? Unless right reason be joined, through which there comes about a right choice of those things, which, what? Yeah. Just as the, what? Running horse. If it be blind, the more strongly it impinges itself, right? The more strongly it runs, right? And therefore, although moral virtue is not rat's erecta, as Socrates said, right, that was a mistake too, not only, however, is it according to right reason, right, insofar as it inclines to that which is according to right reason, as the Plato is laid down, but also necessarily it be with right reason, as Aristotle says in the Sixth Book of the Ethics, right? So he refers to Aristotle to both Socrates and Plato, right? You know, you've heard the story that Aristotle's supposed to set up a monument, you say, to Plato, you know, the first man to show both by word, by his example, right, that the virtuous life is a happy life. What a praise of Plato, you know? He showed his, well, he acted, right, what was a good life, you know? And he also showed by argument and by word, right, that this was a good life, you know? Some may have done one, but not the other, right? And vice versa, right? Some of it was a good life that couldn't be defended, right? He gave a good example, but he also, you know, showed by reason that this was the way they lived. That's what, um, Father Benegar, who's a Franciscan theologian back early in the 20th century, wrote a book on spiritual theology, he's talking about humility, and he says, well, if it's true that the author of The Imitation of Christ says, it's better to be able to practice humility than define it, he says, well, if that's considered one extreme, and the other is to be able to define it but not practice it, we can virtualize it, be able to practice it and define it. It's the same idea. You know, you see this sometimes in the soldier, you know, who, it's a very young soldier, you know, they're kind of foolhardy in a sense, right? And then as they get older, they, you know, they're really courageous in the full sense, right? Because they don't, you know. Take others, you know. Yeah, you know, the famous thing, I guess, Washington is supposed to, he's in those first battles during the French Indian wars, you know. And he's talking about the brawl, swizzing by him, you know, and how exciting it was, you know, how good. Because they asked him in real life, you know, did he actually say that? Well, maybe I did, he said, but I was a young man, he said. Who, who was the one who said, I heard this not too long, but I don't know who said it. It's a simple, simple expression. When I was young and foolish, I was young and foolish. But didn't, was it, was it, was it, was it Benedict or some of these people, you know, did they get into the British life, right, and they would go to a certain excess, right, in penance. To care of ours, didn't they? Yeah, and then hurt their, their physical health, right? And that's not prudent, you'd say, right? You know, so, but you have a certain, you know, pretty strong inclination to discipline yourself, right? But, but you know. The care of ours admitted that later, and his legacy did hinder yourself. Some of us still have that problem. Yeah. Yeah, we don't, we don't have excess of inclination dependence. Well, of course, the better example, there's a woman too, you know, who, you know, lose weight or, you know, really, really, you know, going to excess, you know, and some of them realized that they went to excess, you know. I was talking to one of my girl students one time, you know, and very good, very good. Very good student. But no, she didn't eat lunch, you know. So I said to her, say, don't eat lunch. Oh, she's definitely unusual for a girl not to eat lunch. That's not good? Unusual for girls not, you know, a lot of girls to eat lunch. Better to find the mean, better to find the mean in between the extremes. It's not all or nothing. Yeah. But it started off. So, so moral virtue cannot be without, what, intellectual virtue, without foresight and what, actual understanding. It can be without wisdom and art, Shinzi and art, right? So it can be without three of the five, but not without the other two. Now he's asking the reverse question, right?